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Using a positivist empirical approach, this thesis extends the existing literature by 
examining the Vietnamese accounting and financial reporting environment using 
contemporary data. 
Regression analysis reveals some interesting characteristics of Vietnamese listed 
firms. Vietnamese listed firms have a moderately average proportion of 
independent directors on their corporate boards (53.89 per cent), a high level of 
state ownership (26.63 per cent), a moderate level of managerial ownership (12.77 
per cent) and a relatively low level of foreign ownership (9.80 per cent). 
Regression analysis results provide support for the juxtaposition of agency theory in 
explaining the variations of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure practices. In particular, 
the evidence reveals that a firm’s voluntary disclosure practice is positively 
influenced by the strength of their corporate governance (the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards). High state ownership, which is a 
unique feature of Vietnamese listed firms, has a significant and negative association 
with the extent of voluntary disclosure. Whilst a higher proportion of managerial 
ownership reduces the extent of voluntary disclosure, foreign ownership has no 
impact on such practice. Firm size, profitability, type of industry, auditing firms, 
listing duration and stock exchange location are important attributes associated 
with voluntary disclosure in Vietnamese annual reports. 
Evidence from this thesis suggests that corporate governance can serve as an 
effective monitoring mechanism to enhance the level of information disclosure in 
Vietnam. Such findings encourage Vietnamese policy makers to adopt stronger 
corporate governance mechanisms to improve the level of information 
transparency. The negative influence of state ownership on the extent of 
Vietnamese voluntary disclosure offers valuable insights into Vietnam’s future 
privatization plans. Moreover, the negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and voluntary disclosure practices enhances the understanding of the 
entrenchment problem of managerial ownership, particularly in an emerging 
market.   
Overall, the empirical results of this thesis not only contribute to the extant 
literature, but also provide helpful insights for policy makers in Vietnam as they 
strive to improve corporate information transparency. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates the issue of corporate transparency in the fast-growing 
economy of Vietnam, specifically in relation to voluntary disclosure practices. 
Vietnam’s transformation from a centrally planned economy towards a market 
oriented economy is regarded as one of the most successful transitions in the 
world, with an average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of seven per cent 
per year for the past two decades (World Bank 2012). It is estimated that by 2025, 
Vietnam will become the world’s 17th largest economy with a GDP of $436 billion US 
dollars (USD) and per capita GDP of $4,357 USD (Wilson and Stupnytska 2007). 
Despite its success, the Vietnamese economy is still relatively under-researched, 
particularly in regard to its accounting field. 
Using a positivist empirical approach, this thesis seeks to better understand the 
extent and determinants of key contemporary corporate disclosure practices 
pertinent to Vietnamese listed firms. Precisely and through the juxtaposition of 
agency theory, this thesis investigates the influence of corporate governance (the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards1), three common 
ownership identities of Vietnamese listed firms (state, managerial and foreign 
ownership) and firm-characteristics variables (firm size, profitability, leverage, 
industry, auditing firm, listing duration and stock exchange location) on the extent 
of voluntary disclosure made by 252 Vietnamese non-financial listed firms across 
the annual reporting year 2009. Regression analysis results reveal that the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards is an important aspect 
associated positively with voluntary disclosure while the proportion of state 
ownership and managerial ownership are the ownership identities that influence 
the extent of voluntary disclosure negatively. Firms-characteristics statistically 
                                                          
1  In Vietnam, the Board of Directors is called Board of Management. For the purpose of 
consistency with the existing accounting literature, the term ‘Board of Management’ will be 
hereafter referred as ‘Board of Directors’. A discussion of a typical Vietnamese corporate 
governance structure is presented in Appendix A. 
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related to the extent of voluntary disclosure are firm size, profitability, industry, 
auditing firm, listing duration and stock exchange location. The results of this thesis 
offer valuable perspectives from both a theoretical and practical sense. 
This chapter is structured as follows: the background and motivation for the 
research are advanced in Sections 1.2 and 1.3 respectively, followed by a discussion 
of the research questions in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5, the significance and 
contributions of this thesis are presented. Key assumptions and limitations are 
provided in Section 1.6 and finally, the outline of the thesis structure is presented in 
Section 1.7.  
1.2 Background 
From 1975 to the present day, Vietnam has undergone transformational changes 
reflecting its growing importance in the world economy. Prior to its reunification in 
1975, Vietnam was a French colony for more than 90 years (1858–1954). The 
French brought to Vietnam its French accounting model. However, as the 
bookkeeping and accounting records were mainly handled by the French officers, 
they made little effort to train the Vietnamese employees. As such, the French 
influence on accounting in Vietnam was very minimal during this period (Bui, Yapa, 
and Cooper 2011). From 1954 to 1975, Vietnam was divided into two regions: each 
with its own government. Whilst the South operated under the capitalist free 
market economy (supported by the United States (US)), the centralized state-
planned economy dominated in the North (ruled by Ho Chi Minh’s communist 
government). These significantly different political and economic systems resulted 
in two official accounting systems (Nguyen and Pham 1997). In the North the 
Chinese and Soviet cost accounting models were adopted, while in the South the 
French accounting remained in practices (Bui, Yapa, and Cooper 2011; Chu 2004). 
After reunification in 1975, there was a fundamental change in corporate ownership 
structures amongst Southern Vietnamese businesses as they were forced to 
become State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The cost accounting system of Northern 
Vietnam subsequently dominated all businesses in the new unified economy of 
3 
Vietnam. However, constraints endemic to the centrally planned economy led to a 
dwindling of key resources that nearly culminated in the collapse of the Vietnamese 
economy by the early 1980s. In 1986, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) 
launched an economic reform program aimed at changing the state controlled 
economy to a market oriented economy referred to as ‘Doi Moi2’. Following the 
implementation of economic reform in 1986, Vietnam is now remarkably successful 
in achieving economic growth. The key events that led to this success subsequent to 
‘Doi Moi’ are noted below and discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
One of the highlights of ‘Doi Moi’ is to reduce government intervention in the 
economy by reorganizing the management and ownership structure of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). In Vietnam, the progress of transferring state ownership to 
private ownership (privatization) was carried out under the name of ‘equitization’. 
Although it involved the process of transferring state ownership to private 
ownership, Vietnamese ‘equitization’ is unique in the sense that unlike most other 
Asian developing countries, the Vietnamese government still retains a substantial 
amount of ownership in many of the listed firms, especially those deemed to be 
large and strategically important to the nation. For the purposes of consistency with 
the existing privatisation literature, the unique Vietnamese term of ‘equitization’ 
will be referred to hereinafter as privatization. 
The year 2000 marked a significant event for the Vietnamese privatization process 
with the creation of its first stock exchange, Ho Chi Minh City Securities Trading 
Center (HoSTC) located in Ho Chi Minh City, which is later renamed Ho Chi Minh 
Stock Exchange (HOSE) in August 2007. As of June 2012, this is the largest stock 
exchange in Vietnam. The second stock exchange, Hanoi Securities Trading Center 
(Hanoi STC) located in Hanoi, was subsequently established in 2005 with lower 
capital requirements in order to facilitate greater privatization of SOEs. Hanoi 
Securities Trading Center (Hanoi STC) was renamed the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) 
in January 2009. 
                                                          
2
 ‘Doi Moi’ means new and renovation in Vietnamese. 
4 
Since its establishment in the year 2000, the Vietnamese capital market has not 
only been the main vehicle for ownership restructuring of SOEs but also played an 
important role in its growing economy, facilitating the flows of capital into the 
nation. With 30 listed firms and a total market capitalization of less than six trillion 
Vietnam Dong (VND) (approximately $0.5 billion USD), the stock market only 
contributed 6.1 per cent of Vietnam’s  GPD in 2005 (State Securities Commission of 
Vietnam 2010a). The market started to grow dramatically from 2006 with 130 newly 
listed firms and by the end of 2006, market capitalization increased to 
approximately $219 billion VND (equivalent to $14 billion USD), representing 
approximately 22.7 per cent of GDP3. Since then, the number of listed firms and 
total market capitalization has continued to increase and by the end of 2009 (this 
thesis study period), there were over 400 listed firms with total market 
capitalization accumulated up to $620 trillion VND ($30.6 billion USD), equating to 
nearly 38 per cent of total GDP (State Securities Commission of Vietnam 2010a). 
The rapid development of Vietnam’s capital market not only created changes in its 
business structures but also generated important new issues for Vietnamese 
accounting and reporting practices. In fact, this development represents a 
fundamental conceptual shift in accounting practices from a cost-based accounting 
system towards a more external financial accounting focus. First, since listed firms 
were no longer able to obtain finance injections from the Vietnamese government, 
these firms needed to seek financial resources from external sources including 
financial institutions and outside investors. As a result of this new way of obtaining 
capital, corporate information previously used for the purpose of budgeting and the 
planning process shifted to providing information for external stakeholders in their 
economic decision making process. The new primary stakeholders for corporate 
information expanded to include amongst others: financial analysts, creditors, local 
                                                          
3
 The significant increment in the number of listed firms at the end of 2006 was a result of the 
abandonment of tax incentives for listed firms after 1
st
 January 2007. According to Document 
11924 TC/CST dated 20
th
 October 2004 and Document 5248/TC/CST dated 29
th
 April 2005 by the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF), listed firms are entitled to a reduction of tax by half within the first 
two years of listing. However, in September 2006, the MOF issued Document 10997/BTC- CST 
abolishing this tax incentive after 1
st
 January 2007. Thus as a result of this tax incentive program, 
many firms rushed into listing at the end of 2006, causing a huge increase in the number of listed 
firms. 
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and foreign investors and environmentalists. A more diversified group of users in a 
new ‘capital’ economy with increased stakeholder expectation creates more 
incentives for managers of listed firms to improve their financial reporting. This 
represents a significant movement from Vietnam’s cost accounting practices during 
their earlier non-capital market period. 
The rapid development of its capital market requires Vietnamese regulators to 
implement substantial reform of its financial regulatory framework to cater the 
needs of a new accounting, reporting and corporate information disclosure. As a 
result, the period from 2001–2012 witnessed substantial reforms in Vietnamese 
accounting systems, accounting practices and accounting information disclosure. 
For instance, in 2003, Vietnam promulgated a new Vietnamese Law on Accounting 
and subsequently Vietnamese Accounting Standards 2003 (VAS 2003), which were 
based mainly on the extant International Accounting Standards (IAS) and 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) with some modifications to 
accommodate the Vietnamese culture and environment. Chapter 2 discusses this 
convergence process in more detail. The Securities Law 2006 was established in 
2006 to improve the standards of corporate governance and reporting practices of 
all listed firms. A Circular 38/2007/TT–BTC Guidance for Information Disclosure on 
Stock Exchange4 was issued in April 2007 with the aim of providing guidance to 
enhance the information disclosure of Vietnamese listed firms. The mixed progress 
and development of the current Vietnamese accounting reporting infrastructure 
framework are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 2. 
With the continuous strong growth of its capital market, it is important to 
understand the Vietnamese capital market by examining the nature of its corporate 
information disclosure practices. Thus, the next section highlights the key 
motivations for this thesis. 
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  As of 20
th
 June, 2012, this Circular has been revised and updated two times: Circular 09/2010/TT–
BTC in 2010 and Circular 52/2012/TT–BTC in 2012. However, for the 2009 annual reports, which 
is the sample for this thesis, Circular 38/2007/TT–BTC is the main regulation guiding the 
disclosure practices of listed firms. As such, this thesis focuses mainly on the regulation of this 
Circular 38/2007/TT–BTC. 
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1.3 Motivations for the Thesis 
Despite numerous efforts to create a strong financial regulatory environment to 
improve the level of information transparency within the stock market, there are 
still concerns with regard to the level of information transparency among 
Vietnamese listed firms. For instance, in July 2008, a corporate scandal involving the 
Bach Tuyet Cotton company (BBT) raised major concerns about the need for 
improvements in the corporate transparency of Vietnamese listed firms. In 
particular, BBT had been making losses steadily in 2006 and 2007 whilst declaring to 
shareholders in its annual reports that it was making profits (Bach 2008). As BBT 
was one of the biggest former SOEs and the biggest medical cotton provider in 
Vietnam, BBT’s erroneous financial reports raised major concerns not only for 
Vietnamese authorities but also for both local and foreign investors. In fact, from 
this viewpoint, market participants became more aware of problems with corporate 
disclosure issues by listed firms. In reaction, Vietnamese authorities started to 
improve their regulations concerning the level of information disclosure amongst 
listed firms. 
Moreover, on 8th April 2009, at the Vietnamese Listed Companies Conference in 
Hanoi, the State Securities Commission of Vietnam (SSC) restated the view that 
Vietnamese financial reporting lacked transparency, by identifying major issues 
regarding the weakness of information disclosure among listed firms: 
● the low level of quantity and quality of information disclosure among listed 
firms, and 
● the high discrepancy between annual reports before and after being audited. 
The low level of information disclosure of Vietnamese listed firms is not surprising; 
given that most of the Vietnamese listed firms originated from SOEs who in the past 
only provided information to the state and not to other stakeholders (Chapter 2 
provides more detail of these traditions of Vietnam corporate information reporting 
under the centrally-planned economy). 
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The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and subsequent Enron collapse in 2000 renewed 
regional and global concerns that low levels of information transparency (weak 
corporate disclosure) can cause enormous damage not only to firms but can also 
negatively affect a nation’s economy as a whole. Information disclosure is even 
more important to the development of an emerging market like Vietnam where the 
sustainability of its new market relies heavily on reducing the information gap 
between internal and external investors (Barako 2004; Healy and Palepu 2001; 
Armitage and Marston 2008). Bushman and Smith (2001) state that a high level of 
information transparency creates confidence in a market, which subsequently 
encourages better flow of foreign investment. The importance of effective 
corporate governance systems and corporate disclosure is encapsulated by the 
famous quote of Arthur Levitt (the former chairman of the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission): 
“If a country does not have a reputation for strong corporate 
governance practices, capital will flow elsewhere. If investors are not 
confident with the level of disclosure, capital will flow elsewhere. If a 
country opts for lax accounting and reporting standards, capital will 
flow elsewhere. All enterprises in that country—regardless of how 
steadfast a particular company’s practices may be, suffer the 
consequences” (cited by Demaki 2011, 1). 
Accordingly, corporate communication, especially voluntary disclosure reporting is 
an important practice for all listed firms in a young Vietnamese stock market. 
Previous literature provides evidence demonstrating that voluntary disclosure 
practices convey enormous benefits by reducing a firm’s cost of capital and cost of 
debts, improving liquidity of the market and facilitating a firm’s growth (Healy and 
Palepu 2001). Thus, in order to increase investor confidence and maintain 
continuous economic growth, Vietnamese regulators need to build a good 
corporate information disclosure system and listed firms should focus on enhancing 
the level of information disclosure, specifically voluntary disclosure practices. 
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In recent years, given that investor confidence around the globe has been severely 
shaken by the great 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC)5, the need to enhance 
disclosure transparency has become even more imperative, to underpin both local 
and foreign investors' participation in capital markets, especially in an emerging 
country such as Vietnam. 
Given the importance of the stock market in supporting and accelerating economic 
growth, an understanding of disclosure practices among listed firms in Vietnam is 
necessary. This thesis provides an in-depth look at Vietnamese listed firms’ 
communication practices, assisting various interested stakeholders in their decision 
making (Barako 2004; Healy and Palepu 2001). More specifically, the findings of this 
thesis will support Vietnamese policy makers by providing empirical evidence to 
underpin financial reporting regulation development. 
To support a better understanding of variations in voluntary disclosure practices 
amongst Vietnamese listed firms, this thesis employs agency theory. Agency theory 
provides reasons as to “why accounting reports would be provided voluntarily to 
creditors and stockholders” (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 306). Agency theory has 
been used extensively in both mature capital markets (Cooke 1989, 1992; Bradbury 
1992; Frost and Pownall 1994; Meek, Roberts, and Gray 1995; Camfferman and 
Cooke 2002) and emerging capital markets (Ho and Wong 2001; Xiao and Yuan 
2007; Barako 2004; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Hossain, Tan, and Adams 1994; Ho 
2009) to provide explanations for information disclosure behaviours.  
Many studies report that the disclosure choices of a firm are significantly influenced 
by the strength of its corporate governance system (Ho and Wong 2001; Barako 
2004; Ho 2009). According to Ho and Wong (2001), in an intensive monitoring 
environment, it is difficult for managers to withhold any information or disclose any 
false information. Therefore, effective corporate governance mechanisms promote 
transparency and accountability regarding a firm’s information, which subsequently 
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  The Global Financial Crisis was triggered in the United States (US) in mid-2007 and started 
spreading around the world between mid-2007 and 2009. This time span of 2007–2009 for the 
Global Financial Crisis is the time period generally agreed upon by most economists (Kenc and 
Dibooglu 2010; Mishkin 2011). 
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has a positive impact on the level of voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, the 
disclosure choice of what and how much to disclose is a function of different types 
or identities of ownership structures. Prowse (1995) suggests that different types or 
identities of ownership structure may have different monitoring skills, varying 
corporate objectives and thus diverse incentives towards corporate disclosure. 
In the next section, the two research questions addressed in this thesis are 
presented. 
1.4 Research Questions 
Using a sample of 252 non-financial Vietnamese listed firms (a representative 
amount of 56.30 percent of the total listed firms’ population in Vietnam) for the 
2009 financial year ending 31st December, this thesis empirically investigates the 
information transparency issue, specifically the voluntary disclosure practices in 
Vietnam. More precisely, this thesis has two main aims: (1) to analyze ‘what 
information’ is voluntarily disclosed by Vietnamese listed firms, and (2) to 
understand ‘what factors’ drive the disclosure of certain information. 
Accordingly, the main research questions of voluntary disclosure practices 
addressed in this thesis are as follows: 
1 What is the extent of voluntary disclosure made by Vietnamese listed firms 
in their 2009 comprehensive annual reports? 
2 What are the significant predictors influencing the extent of voluntary 
disclosure made by Vietnamese listed firms in their 2009 comprehensive 
annual reports? 
The extent of a firm’s voluntary disclosure is measured using an index from a 
composite measure of items that are carefully selected and screened tailoring the 
unique environment of Vietnam’s corporate reporting practices (the composition of 
this Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI) is specified in Section 4.4.1).  
Using the unweighted measurement approach, this thesis finds that on average, the 
10 
level of voluntary disclosure in Vietnam is relatively low at 20.31 per cent. More 
detailed findings about the Research Question 1 are provided in Chapter 5.  
To answer the Research Question 2, this thesis employs agency theory. Based on 
agency theory, the previous literature and the unique environment of Vietnam, this 
thesis proposes that corporate governance (H1) and foreign ownership (H4) have 
positive influence on the extent of voluntary disclosure while state ownership (H2) 
and managerial ownership (H3) are negatively associated. Regression analysis 
results show support for H1, H2 and H3 but not for H4. The hypotheses are advanced 
in Chapter 3 while testing for these four hypotheses (Research Question 2) are 
outlined in more detailed in Chapter 6.  
1.5 Significance of the Thesis 
The dramatic occurrence of the 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis and its effects on 
capital markets place a spotlight on the importance of corporate disclosure in 
facilitating investment decision making. Accordingly, this study of Vietnamese 
voluntary disclosure is necessary and timely. There are five major contributions of 
this thesis. 
First, despite becoming an important fast-growing economy, the Vietnamese 
economy is still relatively under-researched, particularly with regard to its 
accounting and finance aspects. Sarikas, Vu and Djatej (2009) call for more studies 
of present-day Vietnamese accounting, particularly reporting practices and 
corporate governance of listed firms in the newly-established stock market. This 
thesis reflects an attempt to fill the gap in the literature by extending the 
understanding of corporate voluntary disclosure in the Vietnamese context. 
Second, although voluntary disclosure is a topic that has received significant 
attention in accounting literature since the 1970s, many of the earlier studies 
focused on developed or Western countries (Cooke 1989, 1992; Malone, Fries, and 
Jones 1993; Meek, Roberts, and Gray 1995; Raffournier 1995; Patton and Zelenka 
1997; Hossain, Perera, and Rahman 1995; Frost and Pownall 1994). In recent years, 
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there have been more studies conducted in emerging or Asian markets (Ferguson, 
Lam, and Lee 2002; Chau and Gray 2002; Xiao, Yang, and Chow 2004; Barako 2004; 
Ghazali and Weetman 2006; Krishnamurti, Sevic, and Sevic 2005; Ho 2009; Chau 
and Gray 2010). However, there is no known study investigating this issue in 
Vietnam. With the unique transition from a tradition of 'secrecy' regarding 
disclosure in a centrally planned economy, towards more ‘transparent’ disclosure in 
a market oriented economy, a Vietnamese study provides a unique extension to the 
extant literature of voluntary disclosure. 
Third, García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) recommend further examination 
into the area of ownership identity to provide greater insight into the relationship 
between ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure. A study of voluntary 
disclosure and its association with different ownership identities in Vietnam is of 
value, given its unique characteristic of high level of state ownership. Within studies 
of voluntary disclosure, very few of these investigate the issue of state ownership. 
Some examples are Chinese listed firms (Xiao and Yuan 2007; Yuen et al. 2009; 
Wang, Sewon, and Claiborne 2008), Singaporean listed firms (Eng and Mak 2003), 
Malaysian listed firms (Ghazali and Weetman 2006), Romanian listed firms (Bogdan, 
Popa, Pop and Farcane 2009), New Zealand listed firms (Jiang and Habib 2009) and 
Egyptian listed firms (Samaha and Dahawy 2011). Nevertheless, the past limited 
research does not provide a consensus view and accordingly, the empirical results 
of Vietnam’s state ownership aspects and its association with voluntary disclosure 
supplement the literature by adding another perspective to the existing debate of 
the relationship between state ownership and corporate communication. 
Fourth, within the Vietnamese context, this study will assist policy makers by 
helping them to better understand corporate disclosure behaviour and strategies 
supporting the development of a coherent set of mandatory disclosure 
requirements that are suitable for their corporate environment (Hossain, Perera, 
and Rahman 1995). Understanding the factors influencing the level of information 
disclosure in Vietnam, particularly voluntary disclosure can facilitate Vietnamese 
regulators to determine the effectiveness of the corporate governance regime, 
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evaluate the success of ownership reforms (privatization process) and possibly 
provide suggestions for the process of harmonising Vietnamese Accounting 
Standards with globally-based standards (such as International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)). 
Finally, this research is a major contribution to all stakeholders of Vietnamese listed 
firms. Specifically, as this is one of the first known empirical studies of information 
disclosure practices in Vietnam, the results of this thesis will be of interest to both 
local and foreign investors who are considering investing in Vietnam. Furthermore, 
various broader stakeholders such as creditors, suppliers, unions, environmentalists 
and media groups will also be able to gain a better understanding of the overall 
comprehensive information disclosure levels among Vietnamese listed firms. 
This thesis is incorporated based on several assumptions, which are outlined in the 
next section. The limitations in this thesis are also discussed. 
1.6 Assumptions and Limitations 
As with any research project, this thesis has a number of assumptions and 
limitations. Specifically, this thesis is underpinned by two major assumptions. First, 
based on agency problems, it primarily focuses on the sole economic perspective 
that assumes all individuals are driven by desires to maximize their own wealth. In 
particular, it assumes that managers have incentives to deviate from shareholders’ 
best interests and make decisions that maximize their own wealth as opposed to 
shareholder wealth. Under such circumstances, managers have incentives to reduce 
agency costs by engaging in increased information disclosure. Second, in regard to 
the method of scoring the extent of voluntary disclosure, this thesis assumes each 
item in the disclosure index is of equal importance in the corporate information 
users’ decision making process. Therefore, this thesis utilizes the unweighted 
approach. This approach is discussed and supported in more detailed in Chapter 4. 
There are also several limitations inherent in this study. First, the focus of this thesis 
is only on voluntary disclosure of Vietnamese listed firms and thus restricts 
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generalization of this research because it only uses one country as a reference 
point. However, the findings of this thesis can be useful to the process of reforming 
disclosure and governance regulations in other emerging or Asian countries where 
environments are more prone to secrecy (like Vietnam) rather than transparency.  
Second, in 2009, among the population of 448 Vietnamese listed firms, more than 
one third (or 170 firms) did not provide comprehensive annual reports. The 
unavailability of these annual reports (non-response bias issue) may impact on the 
generalization of the results. Nevertheless, David, Stirling and Weldon (1998) argue 
that such an issue does not always lead to bias or measurement errors. Past studies 
indicate that the extent of the non-response problem can vary according to 
different types of research. For instance, Smith (2003) observes and concludes that 
a response rate of less than 25 per cent is common within accounting research 
(such as this thesis approach). Furthermore, this thesis undertakes extra analysis of 
these 170 non-reporters' data to minimize the potential bias in interpretation 
within the results of this thesis. Appendix E presents the analysis of this 
phenomenon.  
Third, as this is a cross-sectional study that focuses solely on 2009 annual reports, 
the results generated from this study may be biased, as disclosure practices can 
change over time. However, in prior years, the Vietnamese stock market was not 
fully developed and thus, the sample size of earlier years is not sufficient for a 
longitudinal study. 
Fourth, the findings of this thesis may be limited as it only focuses on voluntary 
disclosure provided in the firms’ annual reports. There are various ways that firms 
can release information, such as press releases, conference meetings, letters to 
shareholders, through the two stock exchange websites in Ho Chi Minh City and 
Hanoi, the firms’ websites or quarterly and semi-annual reports. Arguably, 
increasing the usage of the Internet in recent years provides another interesting 
avenue to examine the level of voluntary disclosure. In recent years, the extent of 
Internet disclosure has been a topic of interest to accounting scholars (Kelton and 
Yang 2008; Xiao, Yang, and Chow 2004; Hanifa, Rashid, and Hafiz-Majdi 2006; Khan 
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2006; Oyelere, Laswad, and Fisher 2003; Trabelsi, Labelle, and Dumontier 2008). 
Within the context of Vietnam, not all firms have a website or update the 
information on their website regularly6 (Ministry of Finance 2009). Thus, the 
comprehensive annual report is still the primary vehicle in Vietnam to share 
information between firms and their stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, these assumptions and limitations are normal and consistent with 
many other financial accounting studies. Furthermore, despite these above 
mentioned limitations, the results of this thesis provide a major contribution to the 
growing literature on financial reporting in emerging countries by generating 
important insights into a rapidly growing and important nation such as Vietnam. 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
The structure of this thesis is consistent with a positivist empirical approach. It 
contains seven chapters. Figure 1.1 illustrates the structure of this thesis. 
The central emphasis of Chapter 1 is to provide an overview of this thesis, including 
background, the motivation for the research, research questions and the important 
contributions of this thesis. Assumptions and limitations of this research are also 
outlined. 
Chapter 2 summarizes the evolution of Vietnamese accounting reporting practices 
since reunification in 1975 to 2012. In particular, the development of Vietnamese 
accounting is divided into five distinct phases: Phase I (1975–1985): A socialist 
transformation period after reunification; Phase II (1986–1990): A period of 
economic renovation ‘Doi Moi’; Phase III (1991–2000): An acceleration of 
privatization of SOEs; Phase IV (2001–2005): An introduction of domestic stock 
exchange; and finally Phase V (2006–2012): The continuous expansion of the 
economy and its capital market. This chapter is crucial in explaining the financial 
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 This is despite the fact that Section I, sub-section 4.1 (a) of Circular 38/2007/TT–BTC issued by the 
Ministry of Finance states that all listed firms are required to have a website as a means to 
communicate the firm’s information to investors. 
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regulatory framework that affects the changing status of Vietnamese listed firms’ 
disclosure practices. 
Chapter 3 provides a critical review of voluntary disclosure studies and hypothesis 
development. Specifically, this chapter employs agency theory framework to 
explain the variations of corporate disclosure practices by considering prior 
empirical studies examining the relationship between corporate governance, 
ownership identities and the level of voluntary disclosure. The discussion of agency 
theory and the relevant literature focuses mainly on Asian or emerging markets 
which have in common highly concentrated ownership. Based on previous 
literature, this chapter develops the conceptual schema and four hypotheses using 
agency theory tenets. 
Chapter 4 discusses the methodology utilized in the research. In particular, a 
positivist research paradigm is presented to justify the research position 
undertaken in this thesis. This chapter further describes the sample selection 
process, as well as the development and construction of a Vietnamese Voluntary 
Disclosure Index (VnDI). Then detailed definitions, measurement and 
operationalization of independent variables (corporate governance and state, 
managerial and foreign ownership) and control variables (size, profitability, 
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Chapter 5 reports the descriptive results to address Research Question 1 regarding 
the extent of voluntary disclosure. Using descriptive and independent t-tests, this 
chapter presents the mean, median and standard deviation results of the voluntary 
disclosure levels, as well as the characteristics of its four independent variables: 
corporate governance, state ownership, managerial ownership and foreign 
ownership. This is followed by control variable data of firm size, leverage, 
profitability, industry, auditing firm, listing duration and stock exchange location. 
Finally, correlation analyses of all variables are presented. 
Chapter 6 reveals the results of the multiple regression analysis relating to Research 
Question 2. It reports on the predictive association between the independent 
predictors of corporate governance and ownership identities, other firm 
characteristic variables and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Analysis on certain 
individual disclosure items is also carried out to add depth to the thesis. Finally, 
sensitivity analyses for four independent variables are provided. 
Chapter 7 provides the findings of this research aligned with the research questions. 
The significance of this thesis is once again emphasized with suggestions for future 
research directions. The chapter ends with concluding remarks. 
1.8 Summary 
This chapter offers an introductory overview of this thesis. The background of this 
doctoral research and the motivation for this research topic, which is voluntary 
disclosure in Vietnam, are described to provide insights into the two main research 
questions in this thesis. The significance of the thesis is also outlined, followed by 
the discussion of assumptions and limitations. The next chapter discusses a 
historical review of Vietnamese accounting reporting infrastructure in order to 




CHAPTER 2. A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF VIETNAMESE 
ACCOUNTING REPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a historical review of the evolution of 
accounting reporting practices in Vietnam. Such a review provides important 
insights, enabling a better understanding and evaluation of the Vietnamese 
contemporary accounting environment. Extant accounting literature suggests that 
accounting is a function that operates within a socio-economic environment and 
that 'as business environment changes, the demand and use of financial 
information changes leading to the establishment and development of accounting' 
(HassabElnaby, Epps, and Said 2003,  273). 
With its transition from a centrally planned economy to a more market oriented 
economy, Vietnam has implemented significant changes in its accounting system to 
adapt to the demands that have arisen as a result of dynamic socio-economic 
factors. HassabElnaby, Epps, and Said (2003) identify four major factors that explain 
the changes in a nation’s accounting: the political environment, the economic 
environment, privatization of SOEs and the development of the stock market. This 
chapter provides an overview of the Vietnamese accounting environment over the 
last 37 years (1975–2012), categorized by the significant environmental factors 
mentioned by HassabElnaby, Epps, and Said (2003). Specifically, in the context of 
Vietnam, five distinctive phases of development are identified in this thesis. 
● Phase I (1975–1985) is characterized as a socialist transformation (political 
environment); 
● Phase II (1986–1990) is a period of economic renovation ‘Doi Moi’ (economic 
environment); 
● Phase III (1991–2000) is the era of rapid business reform by privatization of 
SOEs; 
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● Phase IV (2001–2005) begins with the introduction of their first domestic stock 
exchange7; and finally, 
● Phase V (2006–2012) is a period with continuing expansion of the economy and 
its stock exchanges. 
For the purpose of examining the accounting information infrastructure in Vietnam in 
each of these phases, Lee’s (1987) structural schema is used throughout this chapter 
to provide further insights. According to Lee (1987, 79), there are “four basic 
elements that make up the accounting information infrastructure: 1) the information 
producer and final user; 2) the information intermediaries; 3) the laws and 
regulations that govern the production, transmission, and usage of information; and 
4) the legal entity that monitors and implements the laws and regulations”. Overall, 
the Vietnamese reporting infrastructure changes rapidly in response to Vietnam’s 
changing socio-economic conditions. Yet, these changes have been sporadic in 
nature. These inconsistent changes in accounting regulations arguably provide 
motivation for the examination of contemporary disclosure in the Vietnamese 
accounting environment. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews Vietnams’ socio-economic 
development from 1975 to 2012, through the country’s series of Five-Year 
Economic Plans. The remaining sections, Section 2.3 to Section 2.7 then focus on 
reporting infrastructure changes as they align with the specific five phases of 
Vietnamese economic development: Section 2.3 (Phase I) describes the 
implementation of a uniform cost accounting system under a socialist 
transformation period (1975–1985). Section 2.4 (Phase II) reviews the development 
of a uniform cost accounting system during the period of economic renovation ‘Doi 
Moi’ (1986–1990). In Section 2.5 (Phase III), the acceleration of SOEs privatization 
and the associated transformation of the uniform cost accounting system towards a 
more market oriented accounting system (1991–2000) are analyzed. Section 2.6 
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  Although the first stock market was established in Ho Chi Minh City in 2000, the market had only 
two listed firms and thus, it is felt that the period of 2001–2005 is a more ‘established’ and 
appropriate period of the capital market.  
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(Phase IV) provides a discussion of the establishment of the Vietnamese stock 
exchange and the rapid movement of its accounting towards IAS/IFRS (2001–2005), 
whilst Section 2.7 (Phase V) reviews other regulatory reforms and discusses the 
uncertain future of IAS/IFRS adoption in Vietnam in the expanding economy and its 
capital market (2006–2012). Finally, Section 2.8 provides a summary of the chapter.  
2.2 Economic Development (1975–2012) 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) suggest that corporate disclosure does not develop in a 
vacuum; rather, the environment shapes the way firms practise their accounting 
methods. Previous literature indicates that accounting practices are affected by and 
may be explained by a number of environmental factors, including a country’s stage 
of economic development, politics, legal system, corporate governance and the 
establishment of a capital market (Belkaoui 1983; Riahi-Belkaoui and Alnajjar 2006; 
Radebaugh and Grey 2002; Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan 2004; Salter 1998; 
Wallace and Naser 1995; HassabElnaby, Epps, and Said 2003). This section, which 
considers Vietnam’s social and economic development from 1975 to 2012, is 
important as prior research concludes that understanding such developments is 
fundamental to enriching the understanding of Vietnam’s contemporary accounting 
environment, specifically its external accounting reporting behaviours and voluntary 
disclosure practices. Since its reunification in 1975, Vietnam’s economy has 
developed via a series of the Five-Year Economic Plan. Highlights of Vietnam’s Five-
Year Economic Plan (from 1975 to 2012), how they link with the five phases noted 
above, the key events and accounting reforms are outlined in Table 2.1. 
Historically, Vietnam was under French colonial rule for more than 90 years (from 
1858 to 1954). In 1954, at the Geneva Conference8, it was decided to divide 
Vietnam into two regions: North and South Vietnam, a division that existed from 
1954 to 1975. The economy of the South took the path of capitalism with well-
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 July, 1954) was a conference held by the US, the United 
Kingdom (UK), the Soviet Union and China in Geneva, Switzerland. One of the main purposes of 
this conference was to end the First Indochina War and restore peace in Vietnam by dividing the 
country into two separate regions. 
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developed infrastructure aided by the United States (US) army. On the other hand, 
under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), the Northern 
economy had characteristics of a command/war economic system supported by the 
Soviet Union (Chu 2004). In April 1975, the North conquered the South and formally 
reunited the country. 
As shown in Table 2.1, the immediate post-reunification period was supported by 
the Second Five-Year Plan (1975–1980)9, which was based on a Soviet central 
planning model used in the North since 1954 (Pham and Carlin 2008; Harvie and 
Tran 1997; Fforde and Vylder 1996; Phan, Harvie, and Tran 2006). Under this 
regime, private ownership was not recognized or was discriminated against vis-à-vis 
state or collective ownerships. Most businesses were owned and therefore 
controlled and managed by the state (government); they are known as State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). South Vietnamese businesses that had been operating under the 
capitalist models prior to reunification in 1975 were forced to transform into 
SOEs10. 
The distinctive features of SOEs led to a number of corporate governance issues for 
Vietnamese firms. First, there were weak or non-existent controls over the 
managers of these firms. According to Djankov and Murrell (2002), the owners of 
SOEs (the state) often were unable to discipline their managers adequately since 
most decisions made in SOEs were based on consensus and the appointment of 
managers was often decided upon by political status. In particular, managers of 
SOEs had to at least be members of the Communist Party of Vietnam and there was 
no explicit contract covering managers’ actions or performance, but rather the 
positions were granted based on negotiations with the state (Sjoholm 2006). 
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 The First Five-Year Plan was only implemented in North Vietnam, which is before the country’s 
reunification (1961–1965) and by the Communist Party of Vietnam and as such, this First Five-
Year Plan is not discussed in this thesis.  
10
 According to Phan (2008), almost all households in the North and about 36 per cent of those in 
the South were forced to join agricultural collectives by the 1980s, while in non-agricultural 
sectors, SOEs accounted for approximately 88 per cent of the nation’s assets. 
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6.72 per cent 
● State ownership of 
production means. 
● Lack of business autonomy. 
● Absence of market 
mechanisms. 





primarily serves the 




Information producers: The state, chief 
accountant 
Information user: The state 
Main regulators: Ministry of Finance, 
Department of Accounting Practices 
Implementation bodies: Department of 
Accounting Practices 
*Note: no influential non-governmental 









4.38 per cent ● Economic renovation ‘Doi 
Moi’. 
● Reduction of state 
intervention in the 
economy. 
● Greater autonomy given to 
managers of SOEs. 
1988: Promulgation 
of Ordinance on 
Accounting and 
Statistics 1988. 






Statistics 1988 is 
designed to assist 
state planning and 
tax purposes. 
 
Information producers: SOEs (managers and 
chief accountant). 
Information users: SOEs’ managers and the 
state. 
Main regulators: Ministry of Finance, 
Department of Accounting Practices 
Implementation bodies: Department of 
Accounting Practices. 
*Note: no influential non-governmental 
implementation bodies during this period. 
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 The First Five-Year Plan was only implemented in North Vietnam, before the country’s reunification (1961–1965) by the CPV. Although the reunification was in 1975, it 

































8.20 per cent 
 
● Greater encouragement for 
direct foreign investment. 
● Promotion of external 
financial inflows to the 
economy. 
● Accelerating privatization of 
SOEs. 
● Economic growth. 




1996: Formation of 
State Securities 
Commission. 
1998: Participation in 




of National Council 
for Accountancy. 
2000: Establishment 
of first stock 






1995 is designed to 
assist users with 
decision making 
process. 
Information producers: Firms (managers’ 
discretion) 
Information users: Owners of firms (domestic 
and foreign), managers, investors and potential 
investors, creditors (domestic and foreign) and 
the state. 
Main regulators: Ministry of Finance, National 
Council for Accountancy. 
Implementation bodies: Vietnamese Accounting 
Association. Sixth FYP 
(1996–2000) 
6.98 per cent ● Promotion of foreign 
investment. 
● Acceleration of privatization 
of SOEs (12,000 reduced to 
6,000). 
● Minimal effects of Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997. 
● Establishment of first stock 
exchange in Ho Chi Minh 


































7.42 per cent ● Promotion of foreign 
investment. 
● Expansion of Ho Chi Minh 
Stock Exchange. 
● Establishment of Hanoi 
Stock Exchange. 
2003: Vietnamese 









objectives were to 
provide users with 
useful information 
for decision making 
process. 
Information producers: Firms (managers’ 
discretion) 
Information users: shareholders (foreign and 
domestic), investors, potential investors, 
financial analysts, creditors, the state and the 
public in general. 
Main regulators: Ministry of Finance, State 
Securities Commission 
Implementation bodies: Vietnam Association of 
Certified Public Accountants, which is the first 
















● Improving economic 
growth, speeding up 
industrialisation. 
● Promotion of foreign and 
private sector investment 
● Rapid expansion of stock 
market. 
● Negative impact of 2007–
2009 Global Financial Crisis.  
2006: Securities Law  
Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC Guidance for 
Information 






objectives were to 
provide users with 
useful information 
for decision making 
process. 
Information producers: Firms (managers’ 
discretion) 
Information users: shareholders (foreign and 
domestic), investors, potential investors, 
financial analysts, creditors, the state and the 
public in general. 
Main regulators: Ministry of Finance, State 
Securities Commission 
Implementation bodies: Vietnam Association of 
Certified Public Accountants, which is the first 
private or non-government professional body.  
Various sources: (Vo 1990; Harvie and Tran 1997; Martin, Rajapatirana, and Athokorala 1997; Nguyen and Pham 1997; Tran et al. 2000; Xuan 2000; Yang and Nguyen 2003; 
New Agriculturist 2008; World Bank 2008; Asian Development Bank 2010; State Securities Commission of Vietnam 2010a; World Bank 2012).
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 The average growth rate of Vietnam GDP during the Eighth FYP does not include the GDP growth for year 2011. As of 20
th
 June 2012, the GDP growth rate for year 
 2011 was not yet available.  
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Second, within SOEs themselves, the firms’ objectives were not always clear. For 
instance, the state’s main goal was to maintain employment and to enhance social 
welfare, rather than maximize profits (Sjoholm 2006). Thus, without a clear purpose 
of profit making, SOEs often incurred significant losses. Instead of disciplining the 
managers for losses, the state usually subsidized these firms, which perpetuated the 
problems, increased inefficiencies and eventually drained the national budget 
(Harvie and Tran 1997). Third, managers of SOEs typically had weaker incentives to 
increase a firm's performance than non-SOEs managers. Since most of these 
managers were appointed for their political status, rather than professional 
competence, they often focused on social objectives and their own reputations, 
rather than the firm’s actual performance. Fourth, being owned by the state, SOEs 
generally faced virtually no competition in the market, with little threat of hostile 
takeover (Djankov and Murrell 2002). Taken together, unclear objectives, weak 
incentives for enhancing performance, disregard for profit maximization and limited 
competition meant that SOEs were inefficient. 
Exacerbating the inefficiencies of the SOEs was the weak infrastructure inherited 
after the war, due to a lack of human resources, insufficient professional expertise, 
low foreign investment, high foreign debt and weak economic management (Harvie 
and Tran 1997; Pham, Trinh, and Nguyen 2007). As a result, there was a shortage of 
food and other necessities, large budget deficits and extremely high inflation (Pham 
and Carlin 2008; Harvie and Tran 1997; Fforde and Vylder 1996; Phan, Harvie, and 
Tran 2006). By the early 1980s, lacklustre production led Vietnam to the edge of 
economic collapse. 
The Third Five-Year Plan (1981–1985) was regarded as the pre-renovation period 
where many reforms were carried out to prepare for an economic transition from a 
centrally planned towards a more market oriented system (Vo 1990; Phan, Harvie, 
and Tran 2006; Bui, Yapa, and Cooper 2011). For instance, two key market reforms 
were implemented for the two main sectors: agricultural reform was undertaken via 
an ‘end-product contract’ system in which households were given a set of 
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production targets; any excess could be consumed or sold on the free market (Phan 
2003; Fforde and Vylder 1996); and the industrial sector was reformed via a ‘three 
plan system’ (Fforde and Vylder 1996)13. These reforms allowed managers of SOEs 
more autonomy in their decision making process, enhancing greatly the market 
oriented behaviours within SOEs. Thus, these are considered important SOEs 
reforms (Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003). As a result of these reforms, the 
Vietnamese economy started to experience growth with a much improved rate of 
GDP at 6.72 per cent (Harvie and Tran 1997; Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003). 
In 1986, Vietnam committed itself to an economic renovation by embracing a major 
change from the state-controlled centrally planned economy, called ‘Doi Moi’. The 
process of ‘Doi Moi’ involved partially abandoning the existing centrally planned 
economy and a movement towards a more market oriented economy. It included 
the process of reducing the size of the state sector in the economy by diversifying 
the ownership of state owned assets and increasing the private sector. It also 
incorporated trade liberalisation for direct foreign investment and provided 
incentives to attract more foreign investment (Griffin 1998; Harvie and Tran 1997; 
Vo 1990; Morley and Nishihara 1997). In summary, during this period the state 
reduced its intervention in the affairs of SOEs significantly and the economic role of 
the Vietnamese government changed from planner and manager of the economy at 
the micro and macro levels to the macro level only. As a result of major SOEs 
restructuring and promotion of foreign investment, the Fourth Five-Year Plan 
period (1986–1990) witnessed increased foreign investment (Tran et al. 2000) and 
economic growth, as well as a rapid increase in exports (Pham, Trinh, and Nguyen 
2007; Pham and Vuong 2009; Phan 2003). 
                                                          
13
 Under the industrial ‘three-plan system’, an SOE was given three choices for its production plan: 
1) firms were obliged to comply with the state regulations, purchasing inputs at subsidized prices 
and in return, supplying the output to the state at low prices; any profit must be transferred to 
the state budget; 2) firms were not able to purchase inputs at subsidised prices, but were 
allowed to produce beyond the budget requirements: the excess outputs could be traded and 
revenue acquired could be used to purchase additional inputs. However, these additional inputs 
had to be within the authorized product lines; and 3) no restriction on inputs and outputs for 
certain ‘minor’ products and firms were given the freedom to diversify their production lines. 
These firms’ new products could be sold without having any state intervention (Fforde and Vylder 
1996; Griffin 1998; Truong 2006). 
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The 1990s (including the Fifth and Sixth Five-Year Plan) were characterized by 
declining state intervention, encouraging involvement of the private sector and 
strengthening international competitiveness. As mentioned in Section 2.1, the key 
milestone of this period (1991–2000) was an accelerated privatization process. 
Specifically, the rapid privatization reform was implemented in mid-1992 and by 
1997, the number of SOEs reduced significantly from around 12,000 firms to some 
6,000 firms in 1997 (Phan 2003). As a result of significant economic reforms, 
Vietnam started to experience improved economic growth with remarkably high 
GDP growth rates above eight per cent during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1991–1995) 
(Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003) as shown in Table 2.1. With its significant economic 
reforms, Vietnam’s economy continued to grow until it was partially impacted by 
the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) that started in 1997. During this period, it is argued 
that Vietnam was protected from the full effect of the crisis by its lack of an 
established capital market. Since most of the private financial flows were foreign 
direct investment, there was little investment flow into the banking system. Hence, 
the effect of the Asian Financial Crisis on Vietnam's economy was not as great as 
with other Asian countries that had more developed capital markets (Van-Arkadie 
and Mallon 2003; Pham and Vuong 2009). Specifically, compared to other East 
Asian countries with established capital markets such as Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia and Thailand, Vietnam’s GDP growth rates were still relatively higher than 
these countries during, before and after the Asian Financial Crisis. Table 2.2 
illustrates the comparative growth rates in South-East Asian countries before and 
















1995 9.5 8.4 9.8 7.3 9.2 
1996 9.3 7.6 10.0 7.7 5.9 
1997 8.2 4.7 7.3 8.6 -1.4 
1998 5.8 -13.1 -7.4 -2.1 -10.5 
1999 4.8 0.8 6.1 6.2 4.4 
2000 6.8 4.9 8.9 9.1 4.8 
2001 6.9 3.6 0.5 -1.2 2.2 
2002 7.1 4.5 5.4 4.2 5.3 
Source: World Bank (2012). 
Legend: GDP growth rates above are expressed in percentages. 
Table 2.2 shows that prior to the Asian Financial Crisis outburst (1995–1996), 
Vietnam’s economic growth rates were the second highest, compared to 
neighbouring countries. As the AFC started in Thailand, during the crisis year 1997, 
Thailand suffered the lowest economic growth rate among the listed countries in 
the region (-1.4 per cent), whilst Vietnam remained the second fastest growing 
economy (8.2 per cent), after Singapore‘s growth rate of 8.6 per cent. In 1998, 
Vietnam was the fastest growing South-East Asian economy with an average GDP of 
5.8 per cent. Although it was lower than earlier periods, the rate in 1998 was 
significantly higher than those of other countries within the region, as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand all suffered negative growth rates. 
In 2000, Vietnam established its first stock exchange, the Ho Chi Minh Securities 
Trading Center (HoSTC) (later renamed the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE)) in 
August 2007. During the Seventh Five-Year Plan (2001–2005), Vietnam continued to 
focus on the expansion of its capital market, maintaining economic growth, 
improving the standard of living, education, science and technology and 
encouraging foreign investment via the stock market (Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
2010). To assist more privatization of SOEs, the Hanoi Securities Trading Centre 
(Hanoi STC) was promulgated in 2005 and became the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) 
 
29 
in January 2009. At the commencement of trading, the Vietnamese stock market 
was regarded as one of the fastest-growing emerging capital markets in the world, 
with a growth rate of approximately 19 per cent (Chandler 2006). 
The Eighth Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) period experienced improving economic 
growth, a speeding up of industrialization and a promotion of greater foreign 
investment, through Vietnam becoming a member of the World Trade Organization 
in 2007; and through private sector investment (Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
2011). However, “being a small, open, foreign direct investment-reliant and export-
dependent economy”, Vietnam’s economic growth was not spared the heavily 
negative impact of the 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis (Nguyen, Nguyen, and 
Nguyen 2010, 769). This Global Financial Crisis hit Vietnam in two ways. First, 
exports were reduced significantly due to the decreased demand from trading 
partners. Second, foreign direct and indirect investment decreased as foreign 
investors were reluctant to make further investments. Production levels, trade, 
service, exports, and foreign investment flows all fell. From an average GDP growth 
rate of more than eight per cent during 2005–2008, the GDP growth rate during 
2009–2010 was less than seven per cent (World Bank 2012). 
The events described above helped to shape accounting development in Vietnam. 
Four significant events, which are the reunification in 1975 with an economy 
moving away from a centrally planned system; the economic renovation ‘Doi Moi’ in 
1986; privatization of SOEs; and the establishment of a stock exchange—
underpinned the development of Vietnam’s accounting reporting infrastructure 
within five distinct phases: Phase I (1975–1985); Phase II (1986–1990); Phase III 
(1991–2000); Phase IV (2001–2005) and finally Phase V (2006–2012). 
The next section discusses in more detail the five key accounting developments as 
outlined in Table 2.1. This enhances the understanding of the status of 
contemporary Vietnamese corporate reporting practices. 
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2.3 Reporting Infrastructure in Phase I (1975–1985) 
Before 195414, the accounting system in Vietnam was very simple, with the main 
objectives being to record the expenditures and revenue of state budgets (Chu 
2004). Earlier studies (Chu 2004; Bui, Yapa, and Cooper 2011) suggest that 
accounting practices during this period were influenced by both Chinese and French 
accounting. Chu (2004) states that the Chinese accounting system impacted on 
Vietnam accounting practices through the resources and economic aids that 
Vietnam received from China15. However, Chu (2004, 147) argues that “Vietnamese 
accounting in this period was a patched-up and fragmented system until the Soviet 
accounting experts came to help in 1970”. Bui, Yapa and Cooper (2011) note that 
the French influence on Vietnamese accounting was very minimal. With its main 
focus on exploitation of resources to provide materials for French industries, most 
of the bookkeeping and accounting records were mainly handled by the French 
officers and as such they made little effort to train the Vietnamese to work as 
accountants (Chu 2004; Bui, Yapa, and Cooper 2011). 
During the period of 1954–1975, Vietnam was divided into two regions: each with 
its own government. Whilst the South operated under a capitalist free market 
economy, a state centrally planned economy dominated in the North. These 
significantly different political and economic systems resulted in two official 
accounting systems (Nguyen and Pham 1997). In the North, a series of SOEs were 
set up in various aspects of the economy with the Soviet cost accounting models 
playing an influential role. According to Chu (2004), in the early 1970s, the Soviet 
accounting experts provided assistance and training to help Vietnam set up its 
Soviet cost accounting system, which was believed to be the most scientific and 
suitable accounting system for the socialist centrally planned economy of the North 
during this time (1970–1974). On the other hand, in the South, French accounting 
                                                          
14
 Vietnam was a colony of the French from 1858 to 1954. 
15
  In the war years of 1946–1954, Northern Vietnam was influenced by China’s ‘Mao’s theory’ and 
the Marxism–Leninism of the Soviet Union. The Chinese influenced North Vietnam through 
providing military, political and economic assistance (including an accounting system) and 




remained in the key role (Bui, Yapa, and Cooper 2011; Chu 2004). Chu (2004) states 
that in 1972, under the leadership of the United States (US) army, the US 
accounting experts tried to introduce their accounting system in Vietnam. However, 
because of the political reunification of the North and the South in 1975, this 
project did not take hold.  
After reunification in 1975, and since the Communist Party of Vietnam (the political 
leader of the North) was the main political power, Vietnam continued to apply a 
cost accounting system modelled after the Soviet cost control accounting system 
(Ministry of Finance 2003; Sarikas, Vu, and Djatej 2009). This paralleled its adoption 
of a Soviet Union communist economic structure that had been used in North 
Vietnam since 1970. As the two regions had totally different economic systems and 
accounting practices, the South ‘market economy’ was transformed to the centrally 
planned economy of the North and its cost accounting system. Bui (2003) notes that 
to achieve uniformity of accounting practices across two regions, accounting 
experts in the North were sent to provide training courses in the South. Figure 2.1 
highlights the key characteristics of the Vietnamese accounting system in Phase I 
(1975–1985). The accounting system under a centrally planned economy was very 
different from that of a market economy. In particular, as the budgeting system was 
the main focus of the state, the accounting system served the purpose of facilitating 
the centralisation of economic planning and the control of all SOEs operations 
(Nguyen and Pham 1997). Nhu (2012) notes that under this centrally planned 
accounting system, the most important information is the firm’s production costs, 
and profit is just a reference for comparative analysis. Whilst Figure 2.1 highlights 
the key economic and accounting events, Table 2.3 provides further detail of the 






Figure 2.1  Key Economic and Accounting Events in Phase I (1975–1985) 
Legend: Figure 2.1 illustrates the key milestone development of accounting in Phase I 
(1975–1985).  
During this period, the Soviet Union not only provided political guidance for 
Vietnam, but also appeared to be the key influencing factor in the development of 
accounting in Vietnam. The Soviet cost accounting system under this centrally 
planned economy was considered a more efficient system, where all inputs and 
outputs were centrally planned (Chu 2004). Between 1975 and 1986, as Vietnam 
focused mainly on the recovery of its infrastructure after the war, reform of the 
Vietnamese accounting system was not a priority. There was little regulation of 
accounting practices. In fact, the unified Vietnam continued to adopt the old 
accounting system, which is the Uniform Accounting System 1970 that had operated 
throughout the Northern regions prior to 1975 (see Table 2.3 for the main 
characteristics of Uniform Accounting System 1970). Since the state was the main 
decision making body in deciding what, how and for whom to produce, accounting 
reports were prepared exactly to its specific requirements. Firms were not required 
to disseminate accounting information to the public as the deemed user of such 
information was limited solely to the state (Bui, Yapa, and Cooper 2011). 
Since maintaining assets and meeting budget requirements were the key concerns 
of a centralized planning cost accounting system, internal auditing played an 
important role in ensuring the accuracy of physical assets. Furthermore, unlike in a 
market economy, the need for independent auditing services in the centrally 
planned economy was almost non-existent (Bui, Yapa, and Cooper 2011). 
KEY POINTS 
1. Centrally planned economy 
2. Soviet model of cost accounting  
3. Internal audit with no independent audit 
























Sarikas, Vu and Djatej (2009) state that the cost accounting system applied under 
the centrally planned economy in Vietnam post reunification resulted in an 
inefficient use of resources. Specifically, this system of cost accounting arguably 
brought many inconsistencies and complexities. For instance, it was very difficult for 
the government to provide accurate targets for firms, because accounting reports 
could be manipulated and thus might not have reflected the true state of the firm 
(Doan 1999). Specifically, in order to get grants or subsidies from the state, most 
SOEs often manipulated the results to the desired state’s budget requirements (Chu 
2004). As the people preparing budgets were not involved in the daily activities of 
the firms, they did not have proper knowledge of a firm’s real situation, and thus 
the planning process was flawed. Consequently, budgets that were prepared based 
on these inaccurate records could be biased towards the desired state outcomes 
(Doan 1999; Chu 2004). 
Whereas the market economy regulations of accounting are based on accounting 
standards issued by professional bodies of accountants, the cost accounting system 
under a centrally planned economy focuses mainly on defining the quality and 
accuracy of physical assets and strict compliance with the state centralized budgets. 
This left no room for professional accounting to regulate the accounting system in 
Vietnam during this post reunification period of 1975–1985 (Bui, Yapa, and Cooper 
2011). Table 2.3 lists the tasks and responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance and its 
Department of Accounting Practices in regulating Vietnamese accounting practices 





Table 2.3      Vietnamese Reporting Infrastructure (1975–1985) 
Information producer and final user Information 
intermediaries 
Laws and regulations Legal entities and 
implementation bodies 
The Vietnamese government served as both main information producer 
and sole final user of accounting reports during this period (1975–1985). 
In each reporting period, the central government (the state) 
prepared a planned budget of cost prices, production inputs, prices 
for outputs and output production at the beginning of a period. 
Firms were required to comply with the specific purposes 
prescribed in the budget (Harvie and Tran 1997). At the end of the 
period, the firms then prepared their accounting reports according 
to the state’s targets and format requirements and subsequently 
sent the reports to the state. The state utilized the firm’s reports to 
provide estimates and planning for the firm’s production activities 
in the next period. Even though this accounting information was 
used by firm managers, its use was almost non-existent as they 
were not allowed to make any decision for the firm, other than 
those pre-determined by the state. 
Other producers of information during this period were the chief 
accountants16 of the firms, who were trained and appointed by the 
Vietnamese state to protect the assets of SOEs. According to Nguyen 
and Pham (1997), there was no formal education or training 
requirement for eligibility to practice accounting or auditing (internal) 
during this period. Instead, positions were obtained through an 
arrangement of the Ministry of Finance. Within this Soviet-style cost 
accounting system, the chief accountant's role was to safeguard state 
assets, rather than preparing the firm's financial statements to assist a 
variety of users with their decision making (Campbell 1958).  
During the period of 1975–1985, when 
Vietnamese accounting practices were 
limited to cost accounting, the chief 
accountant and the internal auditor 
were arguably the most influential 
parties in facilitating the provision of a 
firm’s information to the government. 
According to Campbell (1958), a 
Soviet-style cost accounting system 
shares similar characteristics with 
‘internal auditing’ in Anglo-American 
economies. This was the auditing 
approach used by the Vietnamese 
SOEs during this period (1975–1985). 




Main characteristics: cost 
accounting system with emphasis 
on budgeting tasks. 
Main objectives: to 
systematically, comprehensively 
and continuously provide 
accounting information for the 
purpose of controlling and 
planning national economic 
plans. 
 
A typical accounting report 
includes: 
● Capital structure reports; 
● Production costs and 
production price reports; 
● Products consumption 
loss/profit reports; and 
● A statement presenting the 
operational status of the firm. 
Ministry of Finance 
Before and after the reunification (1975), the 
Ministry of Finance remained the dominant 
regulatory body responsible for the Vietnamese 
financial regulatory system, and specifically for 
accounting reporting practices. 
 
Department of Accounting Practices (DAP) 
The Ministry of Finance delegates to the 
Department of Accounting Practices all the 
administrative responsibilities such as providing 
training and assisting with the implementation of 
Uniform Accounting System 1970 to accountants 
across the country, with emphasis on the 
Southern region.  
                                                          
16
    According to Chu (2004), chief accountants play a dual role in a socialist economic system: accountant for the firm as well as government financial controller. The chief accountant is not 
responsible for the profitability of a firm but rather safeguarding the firm’s assets and ensuring the firm’s compliance with approved budgets and plans provided by the state.  
17
 Decision No. 425 TC/CDKT dated 14
th
 December 1970. 
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Furthermore, as the only overt use of accounting reports during this period (1975–
1985) was limited to state’s needs, for statistical and centralized budget planning 
purposes, there was thought to be little demand for additional information 
disclosure. Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that under the centrally planned 
economy, SOEs had little or no incentive to engage in voluntary disclosure practices.  
Overall, the cost accounting system during this period (1975–1985) was 
characterized by what is commonly known as ‘internal auditing’ in Western 
economies with its main focus on fraud, theft or inappropriate use of resources, 
rather than the accuracy of methods or formats of transactions. According to Doan 
(1999), such a system was considered unnecessarily complicated, as it was viewed 
as being lengthy, with excessive details that required significant time to monitor 
daily activities in order to protect the firms’ physical assets. In a struggling economy 
with limited resources after reunification, the internal auditing personnel in the 
nation were only able to carry out their auditing tasks for a small numbers of SOEs. 
As a result, many SOEs were not audited for years, and subsequently fraud often 
occurred (Doan 1999). Needless to say, the cost accounting system under the 
centrally planned economy revealed many weaknesses, resulting in an inefficient 
use of resources. In response, an economic renovation ‘Doi Moi’ was subsequently 
implemented, moving Vietnam towards a more market oriented economy. This 
created the impetus for changes in the old uniform accounting system to support 




2.4 Reporting Infrastructure in Phase II (1986–1990) 
The start of Phase II (1986–1990) relates directly to the economic renovation ‘Doi 
Moi’ during which the Vietnamese economy moved towards a more market 
oriented system. One of the key objectives of ‘Doi Moi’ was restructuring the 
corporate ownership from a state dominated structure towards increased private 
ownership (privatization). The key events and characteristics of Phase II (1986–
1990) are illustrated in Figure 2.2.  
Figure 2.2  Key Economic and Accounting Events in Phase II (1986–1990) 
Legend: Figure 2.2 illustrates the key milestone development of accounting in Phase II 
(1986–1990). IAS = International Accounting Standards. IFRS = International Financial 
Reporting Standards. 
There was still virtually no regulation of accounting reporting disclosure during this 
period, with the main regulation being the Ordinance on Accounting and Statistics 
1988. Although there were some improvements, accounting regulation (Ordinance 
on Accounting and Statistics 1988) during this period (1986–1990) still emphasized 
statistical reporting and budget planning information for the state. Thus, at the 
time, financial accounting remained virtually non-existent. Table 2.4 presents 
further detail of the accounting reporting infrastructure during this period (1986–
1990). 
KEY POINTS 
1. Transitioning economy from centrally planned towards market oriented economy. 
2. Cost accounting system with tax purposes. 
3. Accounting reports for bank loan purposes. 
4. No practice of independent auditing and external financial reporting. 
























Table 2.4      Vietnamese Reporting Infrastructure (1986–1990) 
Information producer and 
final user 
Information intermediaries Laws and regulations Legal entities and implementation 
bodies 
Information producers: Within the 
firm, the chief accountant had a 
significant role in producing 




Furthermore, since managers were 
given more autonomy in planning 
their business activities, managers of 
the firms were also important 
producers of information. 
Information users: Whilst the state 
still remains the main user, there exist 
two new users: the managers of SOEs 
and the banks (which are mainly state 
owned during this period). 
 
Information intermediaries remained 
largely the same, with non-public 
accountants and state auditors 
(internal auditors) still considered to be 
the main information intermediaries.  
The Ordinance on Accounting and Statistics 1988 
Main characteristics: cost accounting system assisting 
state statistical and planning activities as well as 
taxation purposes (Yang and Nguyen 2003; Aly and 
Nguyen 2010). 
Main objectives: this Ordinance on Accounting and 
Statistics 1988 differs from the earlier Uniform 
Accounting System 1970 as the accounting reports are 
also prepared to suit taxation requirements, instead of 
just meeting planning needs (Narayan and Godden 
2000) 
The system involves the following components: 
● A primary records system; 
● An accounts and book-keeping system; 
● A system of forms and reports; 
● A system and method of calculating economic and 
financial targets; 
● A classification of national economic sectors, 
economic forms and schedules of classifications, 
codifications and contents of the state budget; 
● Units of weights and measures; and 
● The accounting and statistics year (Narayan and 
Godden 2000). 
The Ministry of Finance and its Department of 
Accounting Practices remained as the main 
body overseeing accounting practices. Their 
key responsibilities were the management of 
training programs and ensuring that the 
Ordinance on Accounting and Statistics 1988 




 June 1989, the Department of 
Accounting Practices established the Chief 
Accounting Club of State Owned Enterprises 
(CAC)—which later became the Vietnamese 
Accounting Association VAA. CAC consists of 
senior accountants across the country. The 
main function of this association was to 
provide a forum where accountants and 
researchers could exchange views and 
information on the nation’s accounting 
practices through seminars and workshops 
(Narayan and Godden 2000).  
                                                          
18 Decree No.26/HDBT issued by the Ministry of Finance on 18
th
 March 1989 defines the role of chief accountant as the main person liable for safeguarding the firm’s assets and states that 
he/she is responsible for conformity with state budget requirements, rather than the profit of the firm. 
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The transitioning of the Vietnamese centrally planned economy towards a market 
oriented economy brought many changes to the structures and operations of SOEs. 
Instead of transferring all the profits to the state, SOEs were now allowed to retain 
their profits and were required to pay tax on those profits, similar to legal entities 
under a market economy system. The new era of a more market oriented economy 
led to the introduction of new types of accounting information producers and new 
users. For instance, the roles of chief accountant and manager changed to 
incorporate the preparation of accounting reports and thus, the role of the state in 
the context of accounting information producers reduced significantly during this 
time (1986–1990). 
Whilst Vietnamese information intermediaries (which were still the chief 
accountants and the internal auditor) remained largely the same, an important 
change during this period (1986–1990) was that the demand for information had 
expanded to more users and was no longer just for the state’s centralized planning 
activities. 
Given that firms were now able to obtain external finance from different sources 
other than the state, the old Uniform Accounting System 1970 was no longer 
appropriate. Accordingly, the Ordinance on Accounting and Statistics 1988 was 
promulgated to regulate accounting reporting practices in a transitioning economy 
(see Table 2.4 for the summary of reports needed under this Ordinance on 
Accounting and Statistics 1988). Being heavily influenced by state management of 
the centrally planned economy, this Ordinance on Accounting and Statistics 1988 
still placed strong emphasis on standard forms and disclosure requirements for 
state statistical and planning purposes (Yang and Nguyen 2003; Aly and Nguyen 
2010). Table 2.4 outlines further detail of the Ordinance on Accounting and 
Statistics 1988. Despite these changes in regulation, the Ordinance on Accounting 
and Statistics 1988 still suffered many shortcomings. For instance, it was designed 
with more focus on SOEs and completely ignored other sectors of the economy. 
Many private and foreign-invested firms did not even utilize this Ordinance, 
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resulting in inconsistent reporting practices across Vietnam (Chu 2004). Moreover, 
the rapidly transitioning economy created a demand for accounting reports to 
change continuously, making this Ordinance less relevant (Nguyen 2008). All these 
limitations highlighted the need to modify or promulgate a new accounting system, 
which is discussed later in Section 2.5. 
As the involvement of both foreign and private sectors in the economy was still 
relatively limited, compared to the Vietnamese state sector (Chu 2004), there was 
no incentive for the private sector to establish self-regulating accounting bodies. 
Similar to the earlier period, the main accounting regulators during this period 
(1986–1990) remained the Ministry of Finance, represented by the Department of 
Accounting Practices (see Table 2.4 for the tasks and responsibilities of the Ministry 
of Finance). Nevertheless, a beginning stepping-stone for the accounting profession 
in Vietnam during this period (1986–1990) was the formation of the SOEs Chief 
Accountant Club (by the Ministry of Finance) on 1st June 1989 which later became 
the Vietnamese Accounting Association – VAA (see Table 2.4 for the formation and 
functions of this Chief Accountant Club). Although this club did not have any overt 
influence over the accounting regulatory process, Te (2010) states that it was a 
major step in Vietnamese accounting practices, as the establishment of this club 
first signified the importance of accountants and accounting practices in the 
transitioning economy. 
Overall, this period (1986–1990) witnessed a major change in Vietnam’s economic 
structure. Since the economic renovation was still in its infancy, the accounting 
regulations still did not have the characteristics of a market oriented accounting 
system. There was only a slight change in accounting systems, so that accounting 
reports were no longer designed solely for statistical and central planning purposes. 
Instead, they were also designed for taxation and finance purposes. With the 
absence of a capital market, the need for externally disclosed information, 
specifically, voluntary disclosure practices and the adoption of IAS/IFRS were still 
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not considered to be relevant at this stage19. The following section reviews 
accounting development in the next period (1991–2000). 
2.5 Reporting Infrastructure in Phase III (1991–2000) 
A key development in the Vietnamese economy during the period of 1991–2000 was 
the accelerated privatization progress of Vietnamese SOEs. In particular, managers of 
privatized SOEs were now given greater autonomy in planning, controlling and 
directing the firm’s operational activities. Like firms operating in a market economy, 
the government was no longer obliged to subsidize the firms’ losses and if these 
privatized SOEs were unable to pay their debts, they would face the possibility of 
bankruptcy.  The new structures of privatized SOEs created the need for these firms 
to obtain external finance, which is similar to a typical firm in a market economy 
setting. In response to these changes, the Enterprise Accounting System 199520 was 
established to satisfy the demands of a transitioning economy moving towards a 
market oriented economy. Under the new system, there was now a real distinction 
between the historical national cost accounting and the developing but more 
externally focused financial accounting, which did not exist under the earlier fully 
centrally planned economy. Along with accounting reform and existence of two new 
state owned auditing firms, this period (1991–2000) also witnessed the emergence 
of foreign independent auditing firms in Vietnam. Figure 2.3 highlights the key 
milestones of accounting development in Vietnam during this period (1991–2000), 
whilst Table 2.5 provides an overview of the overall developments in Vietnam 




                                                          
19
 Hope, Jin and Kang (2006) state that a country’s commitment to opening up its capital market is 
one of the important reasons for explaining the later partial adoption of IAS/IFRS. 
20
 Decision 1141TC/QD/CDCT adopted on 1
st
 November 1995, effective 1
st
 January 1996. 
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Figure 2.3  Key Economic and Accounting Events in Phase III (1991–2000) 
Legend: Figure 2.3 illustrates the key milestone development of accounting in Phase III 
(1991–2000). The two original state owned auditing firms are the Vietnam Auditing 
Company (VACO) and Accounting and Auditing Services Company (VAAC). VAA=Vietnamese 
Accounting Association (a state regulated body). SSC = State Securities Commission of 
Vietnam. EUROTAP-VIET = European Union Technical Assistance Program – Vietnam. NCA = 
National Council for Accountancy (a state regulated body). HoSTC = Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Securities Trading Center. IAS = International Accounting Standards. IFRS = International 
Financial Reporting Standards. 
During this period (1991–2000), a reformed accounting system under the 
transitioning economy introduced various accounting information users and 
producers. In particular, as there were more diversified ownership structures, the 
role of the accountant and accounting reports in the transitioning Vietnamese 
economy extended beyond the scope of merely fulfilling the state’s budget 
requirements. Specifically, the new objectives set out in Enterprise Accounting 
System 1995 are to provide useful economic and financial information for evaluating 
and predicting the financial performance and position of the enterprise. Under this 
new system, the deemed users of accounting information were expanded to include 
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 1991                                   1994           1995        1996                        1998          1999        2000           
KEY POINTS 
1. Establishment of state owned auditing firms 
2. Received foreign accounting training assistance 
3. Some characteristics of external reporting 
4. Presence of foreign ‘Big Five’ auditing firms 
5.  Moving towards but not adopting IAS/IFRS 




Table 2.5      Vietnamese Reporting Infrastructure (1991–2000) 
Information producer and 
final user 
Information intermediaries Laws and regulations Legal entities and implementation bod-
ies 
Information producers: Accountants 
are now recognized as one of the 
main producers of information for 
accounting reports to assist the 
decision making process of various 
stakeholders. 
Information users: the users of 
financial reports are expanded to 
include the owners of business, 
managers, small number of investors 
(domestic and foreign), creditors 
(domestic and foreign) as well as the 
state.  
Establishment of external 
(independent) auditing firms by the 
Ministry of Finance: Vietnam Auditing 
Company (VACO) and Accounting and 
Auditing Services Company (AASC) in 
1991. 
Presence of international auditing 
firms in Vietnam: the ‘Big Five’ and an 




Enterprise Accounting System 1995 (EAS) 
EAS 1995 is primarily designed to support the 
introduction of taxation and is more 
applicable to the government sector. 
The accounting system includes: 
● A Balance Sheet; 
● An Income Statement; 
● Notes to Financial Statements; 
● A Table declaring “Obligations to the 
Government”; and 
● The Cash Flow Statement (optional). 
 
Unlike the IAS/IFRS, the Enterprise Accounting 
System 1995 resembles a bookkeeping manual 
more than a collection of concepts and 
principles (Yang and Nguyen 2003). The World 
Bank (2001) criticizes this system, arguing that 
it does not highlight the basic principles, such 
as going concern, but rather all the financial 
statements have to be presented in a specific 
format required by the MOF.  
Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
MOF is represented by DAP and is the regulatory body 
responsible for developing and issuing accounting 
standards. 
Vietnamese Accounting Association (VAA) 
VAA was established in April 1994, as a subsidiary unit 
of the MOF. Its main functions include administrative 
responsibility for the registration of practice 
accountants, monitoring and improving the standards 
of the accounting profession and overseeing the quality 
of independent auditing firms (Narayan and Godden 
2000). The VAA is government regulated, rather than a 
self-regulated independent professional body (World 
Bank 2001).The VAA became a member of the 
International Federation of Accounting Committee and 
Accounting Federation of ASEAN in 1998. 
National Council for Accountancy (NCA) 
On 16
th
 August 1999, the MOF established the NCA21 as 
the key regulatory body for accounting and auditing 
practice in Vietnam. According to Narayan and Godden 
(2000), its functions were similar to those of Accounting 
Regulatory Boards in other countries.  
                                                          
21
 Decision No.92/1999 QD–BTC. 
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In response to the rapidly transitioning economy and to create a more attractive 
business environment for foreign investors, Vietnam began to pay more attention 
to constructing and developing its accounting system. In 1995, Vietnam 
promulgated a new accounting system called the Enterprise Accounting System 
1995. Table 2.1 and Table 2.5 provide more detail of this system. Given the 
historical influence of the socialist cost accounting system, it was not surprising that 
aspects of state control were still present in the new Enterprise Accounting System 
1995. For example, firms still had to follow certain standards and complete forms 
for their accounting reports in a way that could enable the Vietnamese government 
to easily control and supervise the firms. The Ministry of Finance still issued specific 
instructions on methods of calculation for certain types of transactions within 
certain industries such as banking, insurance services, electricity and aviation. Yang 
and Nguyen (2003) point out that during this period, there were many instances 
where firms had to wait for decisions from the authorities to determine an 
accounting treatment. Chu (2004) states that although this new accounting system 
looks like those of a market accounting system with a Balance Sheet, an Income 
Statement, a Statement of Cash Flow (optional) and Notes to Financial Statement, 
in practice, this system is complicated and seems to have a biased focus towards 
the state sector. Thus, although it was improved, the accounting system during this 
period was still heavily influenced by the cost accounting tradition, where accounts 
and firm accounting reports were prepared to a very rigid format. 
Consequently, although its intention was to unify accounting practices among all 
firms across Vietnam, in practice, there remained many inconsistencies in methods 
both within and between various sectors, resulting in great variance between 
accounting reports across the country (Sarikas, Vu, and Djatej 2009). As observed by 
the World Bank (2001), there seemed to be inconsistent levels of disclosure, 
financial reporting regulatory discipline and independent auditing across the nation, 
as the SOEs were subjected to different treatments compared to private and foreign 
owned businesses. Given the discrepancies and complexities of these reports, their 
users needed to have significant knowledge or expertise in accounting to be able to 
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interpret the information disclosure by firms (unlike the more understandable 
financial reports in a market economy). Even the Ministry of Finance acknowledged 
that the accountants preparing these reports could not fully understand them 
(Department of Accountancy - Vietnam 1999) and so the information needed to 
facilitate decision making was not easily and readily extracted as was intended per 
the stated objectives of the financial reports. Micheline and Nguyen (2007) support 
this point of view and state that although the Enterprise Accounting System 1995 
generated an improvement in accommodating the needs of internal and external 
users, the accounting reports were still not very practical and thus the usefulness of 
financial statements within this system remained limited. 
With the accounting reports moving towards a more external focus disclosure, a 
need for external or independent auditing services to verify accounting reports 
arose. Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance established two state owned and 
controlled auditing firms in 1991: Vietnam Auditing Company (VACO) and 
Accounting and Auditing Services Company (AASC). However, in a developing 
market oriented economy with increasing foreign trade and a heavy legacy of cost 
accounting history, these two auditing firms were soon unable to meet the growing 
demand for a more diversified and expanding Vietnamese economy. As a result, in 
1992 Vietnam allowed foreign auditing firms to establish their practices to 
accommodate the demands of a new economy. It was important to note that not 
only did Vietnam now welcome more foreign auditing firms but the local auditing 
firms and accountants also received training by one of the ‘Big Five’22 auditing firms 
at that time. In Vietnam, the traditional view of auditing under the cost accounting 
system simply involved safeguarding and protecting the state's physical assets. Up 
until this point, independent auditing was a totally alien idea in Vietnam. With more 
externally focused accounting reports in this period, Price Waterhouse’s training 
courses concentrated on the concept of random and judgemental sampling to 
better ensure that the financial statements presented a ‘true and fair’ view (Murray 
1997). This was a major milestone for Vietnamese accountants in developing more 
                                                          
22
 The ‘Big Five’ accounting firms during this period were Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International 
(DTTI), Price Waterhouse (PWH), Arthur Anderson (AA), KPMG and Ernst and Young (EY).  
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globally accepted accounting practices to support the accounting and reporting 
needs of a market oriented economy. 
By early 1994, not only were all of the ‘Big Five’ accounting firms operating in 
Vietnam but the number of local auditing firms was also increasing. The presence of 
the ‘Big Five’ auditing firms as well as foreign-invested firms had a positive impact 
on the economy. For instance, foreign-invested firms played a passive but 
important role in the process of Vietnamese accounting development through their 
suggestions and demands for revision or changes in the accounting regulations, and 
through their interactions with the Vietnamese accounting system. According to 
Chu (2004, 233), foreign-invested firms “were often asked for the removal of this or 
that account or for different methods of accounting. By this means, policy makers 
gradually have gained comprehensive and thorough understanding of accounting in 
the market economy and have realized that many of their proposals were 
reasonable”. This subsequently created pressure for Vietnamese accounting 
regulations to change. Overall, the experiences brought by the ‘Big Five’ auditing 
firms were quite positive.  Not only have these ‘Big Five’ auditing firms helped to 
improve the transparency and quality of Vietnamese accounting reports by 
conducting training for the accounting profession (as mentioned above), but 
Narayan and Godden (2000) state that the presence of the ‘Big Five’ auditing firms 
arguably helped to increase the confidence of potential foreign investors in the 
Vietnam economy. 
During the period of 1991–2000, whilst there was some help from foreign auditing 
firms and foreign-invested firms, accounting practices in Vietnam remained mainly 
under state control with the Ministry of Finance continuing to issue all of the 
regulations. As shown in Table 2.5, the Vietnamese Accounting Association and 
National Council for Accountancy were the two government regulating bodies 




Overall, the promotion of foreign investment and the increasing openness of the 
Vietnamese economy had a positive impact on the reform of its accounting 
standards. In particular, this period witnessed an increasing number of players in 
the process of Vietnamese accounting reforms as a response to preparation for the 
introduction of a stock market. Unlike Phase I (1975–1985) and Phase II (1986–
1990), accounting practices in Phase III (1999–2000) received more foreign input to 
improve the Vietnamese accounting system. Besides receiving training from Price 
Waterhouse in 1992, the Department of Accounting Practices (DAP) also obtained 
assistance in improving the Vietnamese accounting system. For instance, after the 
promulgation of the Enterprise Accounting System 1995, the DAP participated in the 
European Union Technical Assistance Program–Vietnam (EUROTAP–VIET) training 
project (Sarikas, Vu, and Djatej 2009). The project focused on accounting and 
financial regulatory reform such as the legal system, banking system, small and 
medium enterprises development and accounting and auditing reform. Specifically, 
to improve the conformity of Vietnamese accounting practices and move towards a 
more market oriented system, EUROTAP-VIET programs conducted several training 
sessions for the Vietnamese accounting profession. For example, short master’s 
degree programs in accounting were offered to Ministry of Finance officials and 
local auditors working in SOEs (Sarikas, Vu, and Djatej 2009; Chu 2004). Special 
efforts made by the European Union clearly indicated an aggressive attempt to 
influence Vietnamese accounting towards the adoption of International Accounting 
Standards (IAS). Although the Ministry of Finance still remained the main authority 
issuing accounting standards, the involvement of foreign auditing firms in the 
economy and foreign assistance aimed at improving the Vietnamese accounting 
system marked a radical milestone in the development of the Vietnamese financial 
reporting framework. 
Despite the fact that accounting disclosure was now needed by an increasing group 
of users, such as owners of businesses, managers, banks, a small but growing 
number of investors (domestic and foreign), and creditors (domestic and foreign)—
the absence of a capital market meant that there was still no clear demand for 
voluntary disclosure of information. The next section extends the discussion of 
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Vietnam’s accounting journey towards a more externally focused financial reporting 
system. 
2.6 Reporting Infrastructure in Phase IV (2001–2005) 
Following the creation of the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange in 2000, a second stock 
market, which is the Hanoi stock exchange (HNX), was subsequently established in 
2005 to facilitate increased privatization of SOEs. Since 2000, the Vietnamese stock 
exchange was not only the main vehicle for ownership restructuring of SOEs but 
also played an important role in Vietnam economic growth by facilitating the flow 
of capital into its nation economy. With the fast changing environment and the 
recent establishment of an official capital market, the Vietnamese legal 
infrastructure was considered inadequate to sustain the needs of a complex market 
economy (World Bank 2006b). The rapid expansion of the stock exchange was a 
fundamental conceptual shift in Vietnamese accounting reporting practices since a 
capital market needs to rely on more understandable financial communication 
between firms and financial report users. Specifically, in this new capital market 
environment, accounting became more important as a tool for income distribution, 
resource allocation and property protection in Vietnam.  Accordingly, in response to 
these rapid changes, Vietnamese regulators began to reconstruct their accounting 
system in order to meet the demands of the new economy (see Table 2.6 for the 
changes in reporting infrastructure during this period of 2001–2005). Figure 2.4 
outlines the key events of Phase IV (2001–2005). 
The development of a Vietnamese capital market generated new accounting issues 
in regard to its reporting practices. Specifically, the existence of these two stock 
exchanges created an increased and more explicit focus on external financial 
statements. Accounting information was increasingly used to assist external users in 
economic decision making, rather than merely assisting the state with budget and 
planning processes. Overall, the demand by various stakeholders in the Vietnamese 
economy for a firm’s information increased. Table 2.6 presents more detail of 
accounting information producers and users for the period of 2001–2005. 
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Figure 2.4  Key Economic and Accounting Events in Phase IV (2001–2005) 
Legend: Figure 2.4 illustrates the key milestone development of accounting in Phase IV 
(2001–2005). HaSTC = Hanoi Securities Trading Center. 
During the 2001–2005 period, the accounting profession also expanded to include 
other international and local auditing firms, besides the two state owned and the 
(now) ‘Big Four’ auditing firms23. However one of the accounting practice problems 
still facing Vietnam was the lack of experts and experienced professionals amongst 
Vietnamese local auditing firms (Aly and Nguyen 2010; World Bank 2006b). Despite 
the obvious need at this stage, Vietnam still did not have a clear plan to issue 
independent auditing practice standards in the near future (World Bank 2006b). 
Being a socialist country with both market economy mechanisms and the legacy of 
a centrally planned economy, auditing practices during this Phase IV (2001–2005) 
continued to be controlled by the Ministry of Finance. For instance, the Ministry of 
Finance influenced the appointment of auditors for some SOEs, listed firms and 
financial institutions by providing them with a list of recommended auditing firms 
on an annual basis. Using the list provided, managers of firms then selected external 
independent auditors. The World Bank Report’s (2006a) criticism was that this 
process of appointing auditors during this period did not enhance the independence 
                                                          
23
 Because of the Enron scandal, Arthur Andersen ceased operation after 2002. Thus, the ‘now’ Big 
Four auditing firms are Ernst and Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
and Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG). 
Vietnamese Law on 
Accounting 2003 enacted 
Vietnamese Accounting Standards 
 2001                                                 2003                               2005                                                                                                                         
KEY POINTS 
1. Moving towards an external focus accounting system 
2. Adoption of IFRS with modifications 
3. Establishment of private professional body 
4. Two stock markets launched  
Adopted first four 
IAS/IFRS 
HaSTC launched 





of auditors and illustrated the weakness of Vietnam’s accounting regulatory 
framework. 
The changes in Vietnam’s economy created momentum for innovation in its 
infrastructure, especially the financial and legal framework surrounding its accounting 
reporting practices. The creation of Vietnamese Law on Accounting 2003 was a result of 
both local and international pressure for more conformity of accounting systems across 
the nation. The Vietnamese Law on Accounting 2003 was formulated through the 
involvement and participation of many accounting professionals from across the 
country. This promulgation of a new accounting law was considered one of the most 
important achievements in their accounting regulation reforms as it legalizes the work 
of the accounting profession across the country.  
While the Vietnamese Law on Accounting 2003 regulated the practices of the 
accounting profession, the Vietnamese Accounting Standards 2003 provided guidance 
regarding accounting principles, assisting accountants with the preparation of 
financial reports, auditors in giving their opinions and users to better understand the 
external financial information provided24. Refer to Table 2.1 and Table 2.6 for more 
detail. Under the Vietnamese Accounting Standards 2003, a completed financial 
statement consists of a Balance Sheet, an Income Statement, a Cash Flow Statement 
and Notes to its Financial Statements. This set of financial reports illustrates the 
commitment of Vietnamese accounting regulations towards a financial reporting 
system that better supports a transitioning economy (see Table 2.6 for a complete list 
of accounting reports required during this period of 2001–2005). The main difference 
between the Enterprise Accounting System 1995 and Vietnamese Accounting 
Standards 2003 was that the latter is a more comprehensive set of concepts and 
principles providing a regulatory framework for financial reporting, whereas the 
Enterprise Accounting System 1995 does not define any specific concepts or 
accounting principles. 
 
                                                          
24
 Decision No 165/2002/QD-BTC dated 31
st
 December 2002. 
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Table 2.6      Vietnamese Reporting Infrastructure (2001–2005) 




Laws and regulations Legal entities and 
implementation bodies 
Information producers: accounting 
profession working in local and 
international firms, in both local and 
international auditing firms as well as 
in public administration. 
Information users: These stakeholders 
are investors (domestic and foreign), 
potential investors, financial analysts, 
creditors, government agencies and 
the public in general (Micheline and 
Nguyen 2007). 
Auditing profession in both 
local and international 
auditing firms as well as 
public administration 
(Micheline and Nguyen 
2007). 
 
Vietnamese Law on Accounting 2003 
This law regulates accounting and reporting practices for all public and 
private sector firms in Vietnam. It also outlines the process for 
appointing accountants in a firm and provides disciplinary regulations 
should accountants breach their duties. 
 
Vietnamese Accounting Standards 2003 (VAS) 
Importantly, under the Enterprise Accounting System 1995, 
transactions are recorded on a cash basis while VAS 2003 adopts an 
accrual basis, in conformity with international standards. VAS 2003 is 
based mainly but not entirely on the IFRS issued up until 2003. There 
are no comparable Vietnamese standards for many IFRS, particularly 
those concerned with fair value of financial instruments (World Bank 
2006b; Aly and Nguyen 2010). 
In this new system, an accounting report has more characteristics of 
classic external financial reporting purposes as it includes: 
● A Balance Sheet; 
● An Income Statement; 
● A Cash Flow Statement; and 
● Notes to Financial Statements. 
 
*Note: In addition to typical financial statements, firms listed on the 
stock market are required to produce comprehensive annual reports. 
State Securities Commission (SSC) 
To regulate the activities of the Vietnamese 
stock exchange, the State Securities 
Commission was established in 1996. 
However, prior to 2000, the monitoring 
functions of SSC on securities trading were 
minimal—most of their tasks focused on 
drafting legal documents and preparation 
for the building and development of the 
stock market, rather than enforcement 
issues. 
 
The Vietnamese Association of Certified 
Public Accountants (VACPA) 
The main objectives of VACPA includes the 
development of the accountancy 
profession, improving the quality of 
accounting, auditing and financial advisory 
services in Vietnam through training, 
technical update courses, professional 
ethics and service, quality control and 




With the assistance of the European Union in the early period (see Section 2.5 for 
the discussion of EUROTAP-VIET project), the Vietnamese accounting system was 
finally moving towards international standards through promulgation of accounting 
standards based on IAS/IFRS. At the end of 2001, Vietnam adopted the first four 
Vietnamese Accounting Standards (VAS) based on the IAS/IFRS version. This was an 
important milestone in the development of Vietnamese accounting as it signified 
the first step regarding Vietnam’s intention of harmonizing its accounting with 
global convergence. In this period (2001–2005), Vietnam continued its adoption of 
IAS/IFRS. By 2005, VASs issued 25 standards that were based on IAS/IFRS issued up 
to March 2004 with some modifications made to reflect local accounting 
regulations and environment (International Accounting Standards Plus 2009). 
Nguyen and Richard (2011) argue that the adoption of IAS/IFRS in the early 2000s 
was due to international pressure imposed by trading partners upon Vietnam when 
it became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2007. Table 2.7 presents 
the adoption of Vietnamese Accounting Standards (VAS) to the equivalents of IASs 
during the internationally expansive period of 2001–2005. 











Inventory  Dec-01 Dec-00 12 
Property, Plant and Equipment  Dec-01 Apr-00 20 
Revenue  Dec-01 May-99 31 
Intangible Assets  Dec-01 Sep-98 39 
Statement of Cash Flows  Dec-02 Dec-92 120 
Construction Contract  Dec-02 Dec-93 108 
Leases  Dec-02 Jan-01 23 
The Effects of Changes in Foreign 
Exchange Rates  
Dec-02 Dec-93 108 
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 These time lag figures are correct as of 31
st
 December 2009 (which is the sample data period of 
this thesis). The actual time lags are now much greater as none of these standards have been 













Disclosures in the Financial Statements 
of Banks and Similar Financial 
Institutions 
Dec-02 Dec-93 108 
Presentation of Financial Statements  Dec-03 May-99 55 
Related Party Disclosure  Dec-03 Dec-94 108 
Consolidated and Separate Financial 
Statements  
Dec-03 Dec-98 60 
Investments in Associates  Dec-03 Oct-00 38 
Interests in Joint Ventures  Dec-03 Oct-00 38 
Investment Property  Dec-03 Jan-01 35 
Accounting Policies, Changes in 
Accounting Estimates and Errors  
Feb-05 Dec-03 14 
Events after the Reporting Period  Feb-05 Dec-03 14 
Income Tax  Feb-05 Oct-00 52 
Segment Reporting / Operating 
Segment  
Feb-05 Aug-97 90 
Interim Financial Reporting  Feb-05 Jun-98 80 
Disclosures in the Financial Statements 
of Banks and Similar Financial 
Institutions 
Feb-05 Dec-98 74 
Earnings per Share  Dec-05 Dec-03 24 
Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and 
Contingent Assets  
Dec-05 Sep-98 87 
Business Combinations  Dec-05 Mar-04 21 
Insurance Contract  Dec-05 Mar-04 21 
Sources: Adapted from Pham, Tower and Scully (2011) and International Accounting 
Standards Plus (2009). 
Legend: VAS is the acronym for Vietnamese Accounting Standards and IAS is the acronym 
for International Accounting Standards. 
It is important to note that although IAS/IFRS was updated regularly after 2005, VAS 
was not. In fact, as seen in Table 2.7, VAS was based on the IAS that were issued 
before April 2004. Pham, Tower and Scully (2011) report an average time lag of 55 
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months26 between the adoption of VAS and the issued or updated IAS. Pham, Tower 
and Scully (2011) also argue that despite the adoption or convergence to IAS/IFRS, 
VAS still place more emphasis on rigid rules and formats and are less flexible than 
IAS/IFRS. For instance, whilst IAS/IFRS allows four different measurement methods 
(historical costs, current costs, net realizable value and present value), VAS only 
permits historical costs27. 
Another significant development was the establishment of the Vietnamese 
accounting profession during this period of 2001–2005. The Vietnam Association of 
Certified Public Accountants (VACPA) was established in 2005. The accounting 
profession in Vietnam was now under the supervision of its own professional body. 
It is believed that the reason for the establishment of this non-state professional 
body was because of external pressure from foreign investors. Prior to the 
establishment of VACPA, the Ministry of Finance was the only authority issuing 
regulations and monitoring accounting practices. 
Overall, the accounting reporting infrastructure had undergone rapid development 
during this period of 2001–2005 by moving its accounting reporting towards more 
international financial standards. This was probably one of the busiest periods for 
Vietnamese accounting regulators with many accounting regulations being 
reviewed to better ensure they would meet the requirements of a more market 
oriented economy with external focus accounting reports. In regard to its 
accounting standards, although not adopted fully, the progress of Vietnamese 
accounting towards IFRSs marked a significant milestone in Vietnam’s accounting 
development. The next section continues the discussion of Vietnam's sporadic 
movement towards strengthening its financial reporting regulatory framework. 
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  These time lag figures are correct as of 31
st
 December 2009 (which is the sample data period for 
this thesis). 
27




2.7 Reporting Infrastructure in Phase V (2006–2012) 
Phase V (2006–2012) witnessed a rapid expansion of the Vietnamese stock market. 
With just over 40 listed firms and total market capitalization of less than ten trillion 
VND (approximately $0.5 billion USD), the stock market contributed only 1.21 per 
cent of Vietnam’s GDP in 2005 (Duc 2010). However, in 2006, there were 130 new 
listings and by the end of 2006, market capitalization increased to approximately 
$219 trillion VND (roughly $14 billion USD), representing approximately 22.7 per 
cent of GDP). Since then, the number of listed firms and total market capitalization 
increased significantly and by the end of 2009 (the sample data period for this 
thesis), there were over 400 listed firms with total market capitalization of $620 
trillion VND (equivalent to $30.6 billion USD), nearly 38 per cent of total GDP (State 
Securities Commission of Vietnam 2010b). Table 2.8 summarizes the Vietnamese 
reporting infrastructure during this period of 2006–2012. 
Like any other capital market with an external reporting focus, the users of financial 
statements during this period (2006–2012) were varied (Table 2.8). Accounting was 
no longer limited to providing the data for statistical and planning purposes, but 
rather for varying purposes and users. Accordingly, financial statements needed to 
be prepared in such a way that the demands for corporate information of different 
user groups were satisfied. Greater stakeholder expectation created more 
incentives for managers of listed firms to improve their external reporting. Given 
that most Vietnamese listed firms originated from SOEs, which under a centrally 
planned economy did not have an external reporting focus, the need to provide 




Table 2.8      Vietnamese Reporting Infrastructure (2006–2012) 




Laws and regulations Legal entities and 
implementation bodies 
Information producers: Accountants 
are now recognized as one of the 
main information producers of 
financial reports to assist the decision 
making processes of not only the 
owners but also other stakeholders. 
 
Information users: User groups range 
from shareholders/owners of the 
firms, potential investors, corporate 
boards and management, creditors, 
suppliers, financial analysts, 
researchers and regulatory bodies. 
The main information 
intermediaries are 
accountants and auditing 
firms that are members of 
VACPA—an accounting 
professional body established 
in 2005. 
 
Securities Law 2006 
The Securities Law issued in 2006 governs the activities of public 
offerings of securities, listings, dealing, trading and investment as well 
as the establishment and regulation of securities companies, public 
funds and member funds. It also sets out objectives to improve the 
standard of disclosure of all listed companies. 
In particular, Article 16 requires that a completed financial report of a 
listed firm consists of a Balance Sheet, an Income Statement, a Cash 
Flow Statement and Notes to Financial Reports. Annual financial 
reports have to be audited by a MOF-approved auditor
28.
 
The Securities Law 2006 also stipulates ongoing information disclosure 
in order to enhance information transparency in the market. For 
instance, all listed firms are obliged to submit quarterly, half yearly 
and annual reports to the security regulatory bodies and the stock 
exchange within prescribed times. The publication of these financial 
statements has to be arranged and signed off by the CEO or senior 
managers (Article 101). Furthermore, the law sets out various 
penalties for companies that fail to disclose, or that disclose false or 
misleading statements (Article 128).  
Circular 38/2007/TT-BTC Guidance for Information Disclosure on 
Stock Exchange. 
This Circular sets out the mandatory requirements for Vietnamese 
listed firms with specific formats and contents of information 
disclosure in the annual reports of listed firms.  
 
Vietnam Association of Certified Public 
Accountants (VACPA) 
VACPA 2005 continued as the 
professional body responsible for 
monitoring and regulating accounting 
practices. In May 2010, VACPA was 
admitted as a member of the 
Confederation of Asian and Pacific 
Accountants (CAPA)—an Asian 
professional body of accounting. The 
Vietnamese accounting profession now 
had international recognition.  
 
State Securities Comission of Vietnam 
(SSC) 
As the capital market is more developed, 
SSC is now responsible for monitoring, 
regulating and supervising the daily 
trading of the two Vietnamese stock 
exchange markets (HOSE and HNX) 
                                                          
28
 The list of approved auditors is sent annually to all firms, including listed and unlisted firms, by the MOF. 
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Compared to the accounting reforms of the earlier period (1991–2005), the 
accounting regulatory reform during this period (2006–2012) seemed to focus 
mainly on the reporting and disclosure of listed firms, rather than the development 
of the accounting system or issuing of new standards like those in previous years. 
Specifically, two disclosure related regulations were promulgated during this period. 
First, the Securities Law 2006 was issued with the aim to ensure the fair, efficient 
and transparent trading of shares in the market. Article 128 states that if a listed 
firm did not provide sufficient information or false information, it would be subject 
to monetary fines. This Securities Law 2006, however, did not specify or provide any 
guidelines for sufficient disclosure and hence this law was not considered a 
particularly strong means of enforcing compliance.  
The Ministry of Finance issued its first disclosure regulation Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC Guidance for Information Disclosure on Stock Exchange29 on 18th April 2007. 
This Circular specifically addresses the issue of externally based financial reporting 
of listed firms, which marks the beginning of specific disclosure rules and 
regulations by the Vietnamese authority to improve the level of information 
transparency of Vietnamese listed firms. Specifically, according to Circular 
38/2007/TT-BTC, all listed firms in Vietnam are required to provide a 
comprehensive annual report that includes a set of financial statements consisting 
of a Balance Sheet, an Income Statement, a Statement of Cash Flows and Notes to 
Financial Statements. Specifically, under Circular 38/2007/TT-BTC an annual report 
should include: background and strategic information of the firm; a chairman’s 
report; a management report; human resources and employee information; the 
ownership structure and corporate board of directors information; and a set of 
financial statements. Within the Vietnamese reporting environment, a 
comprehensive annual report can vary from 20 pages to more than 200 pages. A 
comprehensive annual report not only has fundamental financial data in the 
Balance Sheet, Income Statement and Cash Flow Statements, but also contains 
                                                          
29
 Although labelled as ‘Guidance’, disclosure requirements under this Circular are mandatory and 
listed firms are obliged to follow all these requirements in preparing of their annual reports. 
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additional analysis and discussion to support stakeholders' decisions. It is important 
to note that this Circular had been frequently revised and upgraded since its first 
promulgation in 2007 to further enhance the level of information disclosure of 
listed firms in the Vietnamese stock market.  
Despite the disclosure reforms implemented, it seemed that these reporting and 
disclosure regulation reforms in Vietnam during this Phase V (2006–2012) were 
mostly mere 'form over substance'. As a result, implementing and complying with 
current regulations remained a major challenge for Vietnamese listed firms (World 
Bank 2006b). In July 2008, the corporate scandal involving the Bach Tuyet Cotton 
firm (BBT) highlighted the need for improvement in corporate disclosure amongst 
Vietnamese listed firms. BBT incurred losses for the period of 2005–2006, during 
which time it announced profits. BBT perpetrated many frauds in its accounting 
records and supplied false reports to its shareholders. BBT was consequently 
sanctioned and prevented from being listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 
(HOSE). The auditing firm responsible for BBT’s audited financial reports was fined 
and the two auditors in charge were prohibited from practising for two years.  
Furthermore, despite the fact that Circular 38/2007/TT-BTC requires all listed firms 
in Vietnam to provide a comprehensive annual report that includes a set of financial 
statements (including a Balance Sheet, an Income Statement, a Statement of Cash 
Flows, and Notes to Financial Statements), in reality, most of the firms did not 
comply with the requirements of issuing comprehensive annual reports. For 
instance, in 2009, nearly 40 per cent of Vietnamese listed firms did not issue 
comprehensive annual reports (these firms only provided a basic set of financial 
statements consisting of a Balance Sheet, an Income Statement, a Statement of 
Cash Flows and Notes to Financial Statements).  Table 4.2 outlines the sample 
selection of this thesis while Appendix E discusses in greater detail the issue of firms 
not providing comprehensive annual reports in the year 2009. 
It is clear that Vietnam's emerging capital market is faced with several problems 
including low information transparency, inaccurate financial reports and weak 
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shareholder protection (World Bank 2006b). The World Bank’s Corporate 
Governance Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) reports that 
Vietnamese firms had relatively low levels of disclosure and transparency compared 
to other countries within the Asian region. Table 2.9 presents the extract of ROSC 
results in relation to disclosure and transparency of Vietnam (see shaded area). 
Table 2.9      Extract Summary of ROSC of Four Asian Countries 
Disclosure and transparency 
Principles Vietnam Malaysia Thailand Indonesia 
A Disclosure standards 25 75 75 50 
B Accounting standards 50 100 50 50 
C Independent audit  50 75 75 50 
D External auditors should be 
accountable to the shareholders 
25 75 75 n.a 
E Fair and timely dissemination 50 75 75 50 
F Research conflict of interests 25 75 75 n.a. 
Sources: various sources (World Bank 2005a, 2005b, 2004, 2006b). 
Legend: The extract showing summary of ROSC corporate governance principle of disclosure 
and transparency. The numerical ratings correspond to: 100 = Observed, 75 = Largely 
Observed, 50 = Partially Observed, 25 = Materially Not Observed, 0 = Not Observed, and n.a. 
= not available. 
As seen in Table 2.9 above, when compared to three other Asian countries 
(Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia), Vietnam was considered to have a relatively low 
level of disclosure. Additionally, in a study of social reporting in emerging Asian 
countries by Krechowicz and Fernando (2009), Vietnam is found to have the lowest 
corporate environmental and social reporting disclosure compared to Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Vu (2011) offers the criticism that despite a 
concentrated effort to improve information transparency through issuance of 
mandatory requirements, accounting reporting compliance in Vietnam was not very 
well monitored and disciplined. For instance, when firms did not provide annual 
reports and/or were late in providing such information, the State Securities 
Commission simply sent out memos reminding listed firms to provide more 
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information for investors (Ministry of Finance 2009). Furthermore, the penalties for 
violating information disclosure regulations are relatively weak. In Decree No. 
36/2007/ND–CP dated 8th March 2007, Section 9, Article 1 of Remedies for 
violations of stock market information disclosure, it states that a fine of five to ten 
million VND (equivalent of $250 to $500 USD) shall be issued should listed firms 
provide insufficient information. At this stage of its accounting infrastructure 
development, Vietnam still did not have any criminal law regarding the violation of 
accounting and auditing practices, so all penalties for the violation of accounting 
standards were either small monetary fines or weak sanctions. These minimal fines 
and sanctions were arguably not sufficient to act as an incentive to improve a firm’s 
level of information disclosure. 
Taken together, these problems clearly demonstrate that although there were 
aggressive reporting regulatory reforms aimed at improving the level of information 
disclosure, their enforcement was weak. The most recent assessment of corporate 
governance in Vietnam by the World Bank (2006b, 24) reports that “there is not 
enough assurance that information prepared and disclosed by enterprises adheres 
to VAS/IFRS because the lack of an effective mechanism to monitor the quality of 
information, or more fundamentally, to monitor that information is prepared and 
disclosed at all”. Arguably, all these concerns still remain in 2012. This might be due 
to the fact that the regulatory reforms were carried out too rapidly while the legal 
system was not developed quickly enough to accommodate the changes within the 
accounting financial regulatory framework. Extant literature suggests that a weak 
legal system and low transparency within a market can negatively impact liquidity 
of the market as investors are reluctant to invest in an environment with high 
uncertainty (Ho and Wong 2001). Thus, Vietnamese listed firms need to improve 
the quality of their information disclosure in order to develop a sustainable capital 
market.  
With the recent 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis and aftermath, economic 
uncertainty exists around the world and investors are more reluctant to invest; 
thus, the incentive to improve information transparency is paramount. It is well 
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documented in the extant literature that full adoption of IAS/IFRS is one of the 
solutions as IAS/IFRS has the ability to reduce information asymmetry, as well as 
increase transparency, comparability, credibility and the understandable nature of 
financial statements (Bushman and Smith 2001; Tarca 2004; Horton, Serafeim, and 
Serafeim 2010). Nevertheless, as mentioned above, there was complete silence by 
the Vietnamese government on the intention to fully adopt IAS/IFRS during this 
period (2006–2012). Aly and Nguyen (2010) argue that the discontinuance of IFRS 
adoption after 2003 may be due to resource constraints. Additionally, interviewees 
in Aly and Nguyen’s (2010) study also point out that reluctance to ‘further’ change 
could be the reason why Vietnam had not fully adopted IAS/IFRS. For instance, most 
of the managers of SOEs and Small–Medium Enterprises in Vietnam feel that 
IAS/IFRS is less relevant to them when compared to larger private or listed firms, so 
adopting IAS/IFRS is felt to be a major problem for these firms. However, the 
majority of the interviewees in Aly and Nguyen's (2010) study indicated (or at least 
expressed their hope) that by 2020 Vietnam will fully adopt IAS/IFRS, but did not 
provide a specific road map for such an  adoption plan. Figure 2.5 outlines the key 
events of accounting development while Table 2.9 provides a summary of 




Figure 2.5  Key Economic and Accounting Events in Phase V (2006–2012) 
 
Legend: Figure 2.5 outlines the significant events affecting accounting development in 
Phase V (2006–2010). HoSTC = Ho Chi Minh Stock Securities Trading Center. HOSE = Ho Chi 
Minh Stock Exchange. HaSTC = Hanoi Securities Trading Center. HNX = Hanoi Stock 
Exchange. IASs = International Accounting Standards. IFRSs = International Financial 
Reporting Standards. 
Overall, whilst the earlier periods (1991–2005) involved a rapid development of the 
Vietnamese accounting system, this period (2006–2012) witnessed complete silence 
on its accounting standards development, although efforts were made to improve 
the level of information disclosure amongst listed firms. There was no continuing 
effort to converge the Vietnamese Accounting System and IAS/IFRS during this 
period. Resistance to change from small or medium enterprises and a lack of 
financial resources supporting the changes may be the main reasons for not further 
adopting IAS/IFRS. Despite improved policies to strengthen the level of information 
transparency in its emerging market, the information disclosure practices still face 
many problems in this period (2006–2012) due to the relatively weak and 
ineffective mechanisms regulating information disclosure activities. The 2007–2009 
Global Financial Crisis has reduced investors’ confidence in capital markets, 
especially where they lack information transparency. If Vietnam wants to maintain 
the growth of its young capital market and attract more foreign capital investment, 
it is suggested that it should consider enhancing the level of information 
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transparency of listed firms through engaging in voluntary disclosure practices, or 
complete convergence with IAS/IFRS in the very near future, as these are important 
ways to help improve its information transparency. 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter provides a historical review of accounting reporting practices 
throughout the period of 1975–2012. It scrutinizes the overall economic 
development of Vietnam during this time, through a discussion of the country’s 
series of Five-Year Economic Plans. The understanding of the relationship between 
political change and economic development, including a move towards privatization 
and the establishment of a stock market is important, as it offers explanations for 
the current status of contemporary accounting practices, and provides historical 
and contemporary understanding of the level of voluntary disclosure practices 
among Vietnamese listed firms. Phase I (1975–1985) describes the implementation 
of Vietnam’s uniform cost accounting system under a centrally planned economy. 
Phase II (1986–1990) outlines the development of a uniform cost accounting system 
during the transition from a centrally planned economy towards a market oriented 
economy. Phase III (1991–2000) discusses the transformation of the uniform cost 
accounting system into a more market oriented accounting system. Phase IV (2001–
2005) witnessed a rapid reform of the accounting system and its international 
influence to a more externally focussed financial accounting system; and finally, 
Phase V (2006–2012) notes some changes in the financial regulatory framework 
towards enhancing information disclosure in the capital market, but a complete 
silence on accounting development.  
In particular, this chapter notes that under a centrally planned economy, accounting 
practices in Vietnam had the characteristics of cost accounting with accounting and 
financial reports merely being used by the state for centralized planning and 
budgeting tasks.  On the other hand, under the market oriented economy, financial 
information is no longer solely a tool assisting the state in centralized budget 
planning. Instead, accounting information and financial reports are increasingly 
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used as key components in the decision making of a broader group of stakeholders. 
It is argued that given the 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis and corporate scandals 
within the Vietnamese market, in order to maintain strong growth, regulators as 
well as managers of listed firms need to pay more attention to information 
disclosure. The transformation of its economy and accounting environment from a 
cost accounting system towards an externally focused financial accounting system is 
believed to have an impact on firms’ disclosure choices. In particular, firms now 
need to prepare financial reports to address the information needs of various 
stakeholders who have interests in the firm, instead of just solely being prepared 
for the state’s centralized planning and budgeting purposes.  
Overall, what emerges from the above historical review is that the phenomenon of 
one dominating state ownership is very common in Vietnam as most of Vietnamese 
listed firms originated from SOEs. With no history or tradition of voluntary 
disclosure under the centrally-planned economy and the ‘insider control’ mentality, 
firms with dominating state shareholder may have little incentive to engage in 
voluntary disclosure practices. Using the agency theory framework, Chapter 3 
discusses in more detail the existence of this ‘insider control’ system within the 
agency relationship and how it links to the firm’s information disclosure. From the 
review of the relevant literature on voluntary disclosure through an agency theory 
perspective, the next chapter also postulates the four hypotheses of this thesis.   
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of literature on agency theory and corporate 
disclosure practices, focusing on voluntary disclosure. Section 3.2 presents the 
discussion of the theoretical framework of agency theory and information 
asymmetry arising from the separation of ownership and control. In Section 3.3, the 
motivations for firms to voluntarily disclose information and the benefits associated 
with voluntary disclosure are highlighted. According to existing literature, corporate 
governance and ownership structure are seen as effective mechanisms to minimize 
the agency problem. In Section 3.4 the interaction between agency theory, 
corporate governance and voluntary disclosure is reviewed. Section 3.4 also 
provides a discussion of prior studies that support the relationship between 
corporate governance and the level of voluntary disclosure, which in turn supports 
the hypothesis development. This is followed by Section 3.5 which examines the 
impact of different ownership identities on the agency problem. Empirical evidence 
from prior studies on the relationship between the identity of ownership structures, 
such as state, managerial and foreign ownership and the level of voluntary 
disclosure are further discussed in this section in order to generate the hypotheses 
relating to these three variables. The conceptual schema underlying the hypotheses 
is presented in Section 3.6 and finally, Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.  
3.2 Agency Theory 
There are many reasons why firms voluntarily supply additional information beyond 
mandated requirements. However, “no single theory can explain the phenomena 
completely” (Leventis and Weetman 2004, 7). Previous literature employs various 
theories to explain the incentives for voluntary disclosure such as: agency theory, 
legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, political economy theory, signaling theory 
and information cost theory.  
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Agency theory concerns with the principals-agent(s) relationship existing in the 
separation of ownership and management or in separation of risk bearing, decision 
making and management functions (Jensen and Meckling 1976; An, Davey, and 
Eggleton 2011). Under agency theory tenets, the agents (managers) with superior 
access to information have incentives to provide voluntary disclosure in order to 
mitigate the information asymmetry exists between the principals (shareholders) 
and their agents (managers) (Hossain, Perera, and Rahman 1995). 
Legitimacy theory explains how firms may try to legitimize their activities by 
engaging in information reporting, specifically corporate social responsibility 
reporting in order to get approval from society (Deegan and Rankin 1996; Deegan 
and Gordon 1996; An, Davey, and Eggleton 2011).  
Stakeholder theory examines the relationships of a firm with variety of stakeholders 
in society. Under stakeholder theory tenets, firms disclose information to manage 
their relationship with influential stakeholder groups (An, Davey, and Eggleton 
2011).  
Political economy theory “emphasizes the fundamental interrelationship between 
political and economic forces in society” (Miller 1994, 16). Van der Lann (2009) 
notes that within the political theory framework, information disclosure serves as a 
tool for constructing sustaining and legitimizing economic and political 
arrangement. In other words, political economy theory explains how firms engage 
in voluntary disclosure practices from both legitimacy and stakeholder theory 
perpectives.  
Signaling theory (information problem theory) proposes a problem of information 
asymmetry or ‘lemon’ problem rising in the market in any social setting (Akerlof 
1970; Healy and Palepu 2001; An, Davey, and Eggleton 2011). Signaling theory 
suggests that the managers of firms (usually ‘good firms’) may voluntarily signal 
their information to the public (investors and other stakeholders) to avoid 




Information cost theory strictly views information disclosure as a result of cost and 
benefits assessments by the management. Under information cost theory, 
managers of firms have incentives to engage in voluntary disclosure practices if the 
benefits of such disclosure exceed its costs.  
Among these above theories, agency theory has been used extensively in voluntary 
disclosure research in both mature capital markets (Cooke 1989, 1992; Bradbury 
1992; Hossain, Perera, and Rahman 1995; Frost and Pownall 1994; Meek, Roberts, 
and Gray 1995; Camfferman and Cooke 2002) and developing or emerging capital 
markets (Ho and Wong 2001; Xiao and Yuan 2007; Barako 2004; Ho 2009; Hossain 
and Hammami 2009).  
Agency theory provides reasons as to “why accounting reports would be provided 
voluntarily to creditors and stockholders” (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 306). Agency 
theory proposes a problem of interests and goals conflicts due to the separation of 
ownership and control. In developed or Western economies, the information 
asymmetry issue often arises from agency problem existing between shareholders 
(principals) and the firm’s manager/s (agent/s), whilst in developing or emerging 
economies, including Asian economies, the information asymmetry problem more 
likely occurs between dominant majority shareholders and minority shareholders. 
Adopting agency theory tenets, Healy and Palepu (2001) and Botosan and Plumlee 
(2002) argue that increasing the extent of corporate disclosure beyond that 
mandated can mitigate the problems of information asymmetry. Incorporating 
monitoring tasks such as strengthening corporate governance mechanisms within 
the firm or enhancing the extent of corporate disclosure helps to alleviate the 
problems of information asymmetry. It helps to reduce agency costs by better 
aligning the interests between managers and shareholders in the Western 
economies context (Shleifer and Vishny 1986) or between dominant majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders in a developing or emerging economies 
setting. This is because additional information provides the principals with the 
necessary knowledge to better monitor and evaluate the managers’ actions, as well 
as the performance of the firms in which they are investing. Consequently, 
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information asymmetry, monitoring and bonding costs (agency costs) can be 
reduced. As such, voluntary disclosure represents a perfect opportunity to 
investigate the problem of information asymmetry arising from agency problems. 
Furthermore, the choice to disclose may well depend on different identities of 
ownership structures. In an Asian environment the ownership structure is 
significantly different from that of a Western context, given that Asian ownership 
structures tend to be more concentrated. Section 3.5 discusses in greater detail the 
concentrated ownership structures that exist in Asia.  
Empirically, some studies find that the disclosure choice of a firm is significantly 
influenced by the strength of its corporate governance systems and identity of its 
ownership (Eng and Mak 2003; Xiao and Yuan 2007; Ho, Tower, and Taylor 2008). 
Agency theory is therefore appropriate for providing a framework linking voluntary 
disclosure behaviours to corporate governance mechanisms and different 
ownership identities. A review of agency theory and its role in the voluntary 
disclosure debate is provided in the next section. 
3.2.1 Overview 
The problems arising from the separation of ownership and control are initially 
identified by Berle and Means (1967) who acknowledge that within a modern 
corporation, the separation of ownership from control may lead to a situation 
where the interests of the owners and of the ultimate manager may, and often do, 
diverge. This issue is developed further by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
subsequently became known as ‘agency theory’. Agency theory postulates a 
relationship between the principals and the firm’s agent/s. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, 308), an agency relationship is “a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal/s) engage another person (the agent/s) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent”. Executive managers and corporate boards of directors are 




The agency relationship identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976) may be more 
relevant to those of developed Western economies than in developing or emerging 
environments. According to López-de-Foronda, López-Iturriaga and Santamaría-
Mariscal (2007), the conflicts between managers and shareholders is common in 
Anglo-Saxon countries while in countries with civil law, such as Asian countries, 
conflicts of interests often occur between majority and minority shareholders. 
The Western setting of diversified ownership means that it is less likely for an 
individual principal to get involved in the daily operating activities of the firm and 
therefore, monitoring of the agent’s actions is difficult. According to Grossman and 
Hart (1980), the reason for the lack of monitoring incentives by the individual 
shareholder is because of the ‘free-rider’ problem. Under such conditions as 
uncertainty and lack of information, the principals cannot determine if the agent 
behaves appropriately (Eisenhardt 1989). One aspect of the relationship between 
managers (who serve as shareholders’ agents) and shareholders is explained by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989, 7) as: 
“Like the rest of us, corporate managers have many personal goals 
and ambitions, only one of which is to get rich. The way they try to 
run their companies reflect these personal goals. Shareholders, in 
contrast, deprived of the pleasures of running the company, only 
care about getting rich from the stock they own. Hence, when the 
managers ignore profits to keep up traditional lines of business, 
conflicts are bound to rise.” 
A central issue of a firm is therefore the information asymmetry30 between the 
shareholders and their managers. This is especially true in more developed Western 
economies for manager and shareholder relationships. Managers have information 
advantages over the shareholders as they are the main decision makers of the firm. 
The ‘free-rider’ problem makes it harder for shareholders to accurately verify and 
evaluate the manager’s decisions. This information asymmetry creates a possible 
                                                          
30
 Information asymmetry is explained in greater detail in Section 3.2.2.  
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avenue for the managers to act opportunistically, pursuing their own interests, and 
thus the wealth of the shareholders may not be maximized (Shleifer and Vishny 
1989). According to Watts and Zimmerman (1990), since managers have access to 
the firm's information, such as present and future performance, he or she may 
decide to disclose or not disclose important information. Wright, Mukherji and Kroll 
(2001) state that under the circumstances of information asymmetry, managers 
may opportunistically capitalize on this information gap to pursue selfish goals and 
risk reducing strategies that are advantageous for them, yet may be harmful to the 
interests of the principals and thus, the wealth of shareholders is not enhanced. 
Arnold and de Lange (2004) argue that the Enron corporation failure represents one 
of the most egregious examples of this information asymmetry problem arising 
from separation of ownership and control and the escalation of opportunism by 
managers from that information asymmetry. 
The problems of information asymmetry from agency relationships in Western 
countries can be somewhat different to the context of developing and emerging or 
Asian countries because of its high ownership concentration characteristics. 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang’s (2000) study of 2,980 firms in nine East Asian 
countries (namely Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand), finds that a single dominant  shareholder exists in 
two thirds of the sample firms and that separation of management from ownership 
control is not common amongst firms in these nine countries. Fan and Wong (2002) 
argue that at higher levels of ownership the agency problem, including information 
asymmetry, shifts from the agent/s (manager/s) – principals (shareholders) 
relationship to conflicts between dominant majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders. This is because when ownership is highly concentrated, majority 
ownership is vested in an individual or a group of dominant majority shareholders 
who have sufficient power to influence management decision making. These 
dominant majority shareholders’ interests may differ from those of minority 
shareholders, and they may have influence over the managers of the firm to pursue 
their interests. These actions may benefit themselves at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Thus, in Asian settings where highly 
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concentrated ownership is relatively common, the problem of information 
asymmetry likely exists between the dominant majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders. 
Within the agency relationship, ‘agency costs’ are incurred. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) classify agency costs into three categories: monitoring costs , bonding costs 
and residual losses. Agency theorists argue that as a result of information 
asymmetry arising from separation of ownership and control, shareholders and 
managers are motivated to enter into monitoring and bonding contracts to ensure 
their utilities are maximized (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Specifically, monitoring contracts are the expenses incurred by shareholders to 
ensure that managers’ action are more in accordance with the shareholders' 
objective of wealth maximization (Denis 2001). Monitoring is not just limited to 
measuring or observing managers’ actions. It includes other efforts by the 
shareholders including: questioning appropriate incentives, setting budget 
restrictions, compensation policies and establishing operating rules for managers 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) . 
On the other hand, Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that bonding contracts are 
entered into to ensure that managers do not take action that could go against the 
welfare of the shareholders. Actions taken by managers under bonding contracts 
can vary from the appointment of independent directors, organising the presence 
of an audit committee and evaluating the expertise of audit committee members 
and/or engaging in voluntary disclosure of information to assist shareholders with 
their monitoring activities (Healy and Palepu 2001). The costs of such actions taken 
by the manager are known as ‘bonding costs’. 
However, even after incurring ‘bonding costs’ and ‘monitoring costs’, the principals 
can still suffer losses as the managers’ optimal decisions may still be different from 
those decisions that would maximize the principals’ welfare. These are known as 
‘residual losses’ (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
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The above section provides an overview of agency theory. The next section 
discusses agency conflicts and information asymmetry problems arising from the 
agency relationship in greater detail. 
3.2.2 Agency Conflicts and Information Asymmetry 
As mentioned above, the asymmetric information problem is more likely to occur 
between dominant majority shareholders and minority shareholders in economies 
with highly concentrated ownership, than between managers and shareholders in 
more dispersed ownership economies. La Porta et al. (2000) argue that where 
ownership is vested in dominant majority shareholders, they may exercise their 
power to influence managers to benefit themselves at the expense of minority 
shareholders, including the firm's decision to disclose information. In a similar vein, 
Fan and Wong (2002) document that highly concentrated ownership firms in East 
Asia tend to produce accounting information supporting the dominant majority 
shareholders’ self-interests, thereby creating an information asymmetry problem 
between the informed shareholders (dominant majority shareholders) and the 
uninformed shareholders (minority shareholders). 
Since dominant majority shareholders are able to utilize their influence to obtain 
additional information, managers of firms with a highly concentrated ownership 
structure may be reluctant to provide additional information. The relationship 
between high ownership concentration and information transparency (including 
voluntary disclosure practices) is well documented in the extant literature. For 
instance, Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) and Rouf (2010) find that ownership 
concentration is negatively associated with voluntary disclosure practices in 
Malaysia and Bangladesh respectively.  
The above discussion suggests the link between agency theory and information 
asymmetry and their links with voluntary disclosure practices in a highly 
concentrated ownership structure environment. The next section outlines the net 
benefits associated with voluntary disclosure practices. 
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3.3 Net Benefits of Voluntary Disclosure 
It has been suggested in the extant literature that an improvement in information 
disclosure generates many economic benefits to a firm in particular and the capital 
market in general. Accordingly, this section explores the definition of voluntary 
disclosure and the net benefits associated with a firm’s decision to voluntarily 
disclose information beyond what is mandated. 
3.3.1 Definition of Voluntary Disclosure 
Within the accounting literature, disclosure of information is seen as a 
communication channel between the firm and the public (Agca and Onder 2007). 
The additional information provided beyond mandatory regulation required in 
financial reports is known as voluntary disclosure. Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995, 
555) define voluntary disclosure as “disclosure in excess of requirements presenting 
the free choices on the part of company management to provide accounting and 
other information deemed relevant to decision needs of users of their annual 
reports”. Wallace and Naser (1995) provide a definition for voluntary disclosure as 
any intentional release of financial and non-financial information to various 
stakeholders by the management. This thesis defines voluntary disclosure as any 
information disclosed in excess of the Vietnamese mandatory reporting and 
disclosure regulations. 
Voluntary disclosure is an issue that has captured significant attention in accounting 
literature for a long period of time. In recent years, given widespread financial crises 
such as the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis and 
various dramatic corporate collapses, the importance of voluntary disclosure has 
been emphasized even more in both developed and developing or emerging capital 
markets. For instance, Ho and Wong (2001) state that a lack of transparency and 
accountability in South-East Asian countries might have contributed to the depth of 
the financial crisis in 1997. Gul and Leung (2004) also note that insufficient 
accounting information disclosure could be one of the main causes of the Asian 
Financial Crisis. In developed countries, Arnold and de Lange (2004) assert that the 
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collapse of Enron is a clear example of insufficient financial disclosure and the 
opportunism of managers. In the next section, benefits of voluntary disclosure are 
discussed in greater detail. 
3.3.2 Net Benefits of Voluntary Disclosure 
Verrecchia (1983) argues that a manager’s decision to disclose or withhold 
information depends on the trade-off between the costs and benefits of providing 
such additional information. In particular, managers disclose information if the 
benefits of informing shareholders or potential shareholders are greater than the 
costs of making such communication. 
The extant literature identifies a number of costs associated with voluntary 
disclosure, including the cost of collecting, possessing, auditing and disseminating 
information costs and competitive disadvantage costs (Edwards and Smith 1996). 
Depoers (2000) notes that competitive disadvantages costs come from information 
such as strategies and technological or managerial innovation about a firm’s 
operations. For instance, disclosure of information with regard to a firm’s future 
product development plan represents a potential competitive risk to the firm, as its 
competitors may use the firm’s disclosed information to develop a similar product 
or counter-product, which results in competitive disadvantages to the firm. 
According to Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther (2010), disclosure costs can also include 
the consequential costs resulting from the disclosure of proprietary nature of 
information such as competitors in the market, labour unions or regulators. The 
disclosure of such information is costly because it is informative. However, Beyer et 
al. (2010) argue that non-disclosure is also informative. As such, the costs of 
disclosing and withholding information depend on the reactions of other 
stakeholders towards disclosure and non-disclosure.  
Nevertheless, there are a number of benefits, which may explain the incentives for 
firms to engage in voluntary disclosure practices. These benefits include a reduced 
cost of capital and cost of debt, improvement in market liquidity, enhancement of a 
firm’s value and overall assistance of economic growth. 
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Prior studies indicate that increasing voluntary disclosure can improve capital 
market liquidity by reducing transaction costs and thereby increasing demand for a 
firm’s shares. Higher demand for shares leads to higher share prices, which results 
in a lower cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). Zhang and Ding’s (2006) 
investigation of Chinese listed firms shows a consistent negative association 
between information disclosure and the cost of capital between 2001 and 2004. In a 
study of voluntary disclosure and market liquidity in Jordan's emerging market, 
Haddad, Alshattarat and Nobanee (2009) find that enhancing voluntary disclosure 
helps to reduce the spread between bids–ask of share trading activities, which 
lowers the cost of capital and thereby improves the market’s liquidity. 
The effect of voluntary disclosure on reducing the cost of debt is also examined in 
previous studies. Empirical evidence from Sengupta’s (1998) study suggests that 
lower interest rates are associated with higher levels of disclosure, as higher 
disclosure reduces the perceived default risk resulting in lower borrowing costs. 
This is because when problems of asymmetric information exist, debt holders may 
assume that firms are withholding information because they are not truthful. 
Consequently, this may lead to an increase in borrowing costs as debt holders have 
to protect themselves from insufficient information received from the firms. On the 
other hand, when a firm discloses additional information voluntarily, it helps to save 
debt holders from information search costs, which subsequently reduces borrowing 
costs (Mazumdar and Sengupta 2005). 
Moreover, high levels of voluntary disclosure can reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding a particular firm that allows investors or potential investors to obtain 
more accurate earnings forecasts and therefore, shares are subjected to less 
volatility as their values are measured more accurately (Healy and Palepu 2001). 
Schuster and O’Connell (2006, 7) state that “improved disclosure is likely to lead to 
improvements in shareholders’ capital allocation decisions as well as their 
assessment of risk-adjusted return. Hence, from a macroeconomics perspective, 




Voluntary disclosure is also found to have a positive impact on a firm's stock return. 
Barako (2004) notes that voluntary disclosure of non-financial information can 
enhance a firm’s share value as well as social reputation. Mitton‘s (2002) study of 
398 firms in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand in the post- 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis period, find that firms with a higher disclosure quality 
and a higher outside ownership concentration have a significantly better share 
performance during the crisis. 
Overall, enhanced voluntary disclosure allows firms to raise external capital through 
a reduced cost of capital and a reduced cost of debts, while also enhancing a firm’s 
value and improving market liquidity, which can contribute to the overall growth of 
a nation’s economy. Barako (2004) suggests that in an emerging economy like 
Kenya, enhancing information disclosure is necessary to assist with the country’s 
economic growth, since voluntary disclosure is positively related to market liquidity 
and market liquidity is associated with economic growth. This is important in a new 
and emerging capital market like Vietnam. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis clearly 
demonstrates that low levels of transparency lead to investors avoiding emerging 
capital markets. In addition, since the 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis, 
information transparency of listed firms has received even more attention by 
investors. In order to raise additional funds to facilitate the process of privatization, 
listed firms in Vietnam should be encouraged to engage in voluntary disclosure 
practices. 
Although a great deal of empirical research has been carried out to examine the 
managerial incentives to improve corporate information transparency (specifically 
voluntary disclosure), many of the studies have focused on the impact of firm-
specific characteristics in developed or Western countries (Cooke 1989, 1992; 
Malone, Fries, and Jones 1993; Meek, Roberts, and Gray 1995; Raffournier 1995; 
Patton and Zelenka 1997; Hossain, Perera, and Rahman 1995; Frost and Pownall 
1994). In recent years, there have been more studies investigating the association 
between the extent of voluntary disclosure and institutional mechanism (such as 
corporate governance and ownership structure) in emerging or Asian markets (Xiao, 
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Yang, and Chow 2004; Ghazali and Weetman 2006; Barako 2007; Xiao and Yuan 
2007; Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Chau and Gray 2010; Rouf 2011). However, there is 
little study investigating this issue in Vietnam. With a unique institutional 
environment of Vietnam where high state ownership and control are common 
among Vietnamese listed firms, investigating the relationship between institutional 
mechanism and voluntary disclosure practice adds a significant contribution to the 
existing research field.   
The following sections evolve specific hypotheses relating to corporate governance 
and ownership structure to voluntary disclosure practices in Vietnam. Particularly, 
section 3.4 discusses the possible interaction between corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosure practices leading to the evaluation of Hypothesis 1. Section 3.5 
then advances Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 on various aspects of ownership. 
3.4 Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure 
Agency theory predicts that good corporate governance mechanisms can 
strengthen the monitoring and control of managers and thereby reduce 
opportunistic behaviours, which may lower the problem of information asymmetry 
(Fama and Jensen 1983). The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the previous 
corporate collapses of Enron, Anderson, WorldCom (in the US), and Ansett and 
OneTel (in Australia), support the importance of effective corporate governance 
systems and the linkage to corporate transparency around the world. According to 
Ho and Wong (2001), in such an intensive monitoring environment, it is difficult for 
managers to withhold any information or disclose any false information. Therefore, 
having good corporate governance mechanisms promotes the transparency and 
accountability of a firm’s information, which subsequently impacts positively on the 
level of voluntary disclosure. The next section discusses the important role of 
corporate governance mechanisms in providing internal monitoring for 




3.4.1 Overview of Corporate Governance 
There is no one perfect definition of corporate governance. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) define corporate governance as an institutional arrangement by the finance 
providers of the firm (shareholders) in order to ensure the proper return of their 
investment. In simpler terms, corporate governance is employed to align, as closely 
as possible, the economic interests and goals between individuals so that resources 
can be used efficiently. Denis and McConnell (2003) summarize corporate 
governance as a set of mechanisms employed to reduce agency conflicts arising 
from agency relationships of managers and shareholders. Effective corporate 
governance not only reduces agency conflicts by monitoring managers’ actions and 
reducing agency costs, but also enables firms to uphold their image and reputations 
to the public (Akhtaruddin et al. 2009). In Vietnam, the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in the Stock Exchange and Securities Trading 
Centers31 defines the term 'corporate governance' as the systemic principles 
implemented to ensure a listed firm is managed in a way that shareholders and 
other stakeholders' rights are protected (diagram of a typical governance structure 
in a Vietnamese listed firm is illustrated via Appendix A). Appendix A notes that the 
corporate governance mechanisms in Vietnam are problematic (World Bank 2006a). 
For instance, unlike other developed countries, the role of the Control Board or the 
Supervisory Board is unclear and they have fewer responsibilities than those Audit 
Committees in developed countries.  
Previous literature suggests that agency theory provides a framework linking 
disclosure behaviour of a firm to its corporate governance mechanisms (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Ho and Wong 2001; Barako 2004; Ho 
2009). Mitton (2002) asserts that a corporate governance system is implemented by 
shareholders in order to safeguard their assets and protect them from 
expropriation by managers. Specifically, shareholders implement corporate 
governance as a method to monitor managers' opportunistic behaviours and in 
order to better protect themselves from managerial fraud or diversion of assets. 
                                                          
31
 This Code was issued by the Ministry of Finance in March 2007. 
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The more effective a corporate governance system is, the more intensive the 
monitoring system is. Under such intensive monitoring mechanisms, it is difficult for 
managers to withhold any information or to pursue opportunistic acts that could 
expropriate shareholders’ wealth. Qu (2011) states that corporate disclosure can be 
used as a powerful tool to monitor managers' behaviours as it provides 
shareholders with information regarding the managers’ activities and firms’ 
performance. Overall, strong and effective corporate governance mechanisms 
provide shareholders with better information about the firm, which can lower 
asymmetric information problem and subsequently result in a higher firm value. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that an internal corporate governance mechanism 
is the main vehicle in reducing agency costs. It not only mitigates the conflicts 
between managers and shareholders (in a Western country scenario) but also 
between dominant majority shareholders and minority shareholders (in an Asian 
country scenario).  
Healy and Palepu (2001) contend that the agency problem can be mitigated by 
having an effective corporate board of directors with a high number of independent 
directors. A higher number of independent directors on corporate boards assists 
the monitoring of activities and provides more discipline for management on behalf 
of external shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Kaplan and Reishus (1990) 
find corporate governance mechanisms, such as the high proportion of independent 
directors on corporate boards, to be an effective monitoring tool for managers’ 
actions. This is because independent directors are charged with the responsibility of 
supervising company operations. Due to the fear of loss of reputation and markets 
for their services, as well as lawsuits, these independent directors have incentives 
for motivating the corporate boards of directors to make decisions appropriately 
and more in accordance with shareholders’ wealth maximization goals. Karamazov 
and Vafeas (2005) find that firms with more effective corporate governance 
mechanism is associated with less information asymmetry and higher financial 
disclosure quality. Hsiang-Tsai and Li-Jen (2010) emphasize the importance of 
corporate governance mechanisms (proxied by the proportion of independent 
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directors on corporate boards) in improving a firm’s level of information 
transparency. In particular, they find that in Taiwan, greater board independence 
encourages corporate boards of directors to better act in the best interests of 
shareholders. 
The above discussion supports the viewpoint that there is growing importance of 
corporate governance as a mechanism (particularly the proportion of independent 
directors on corporate boards) that mitigates the problem of information 
asymmetry. The next section provides more specific empirical evidence on the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and the proportion of independent 
directors on corporate boards in other countries, in order to develop the first 
hypothesis for voluntary disclosures of Vietnamese listed firms. 
3.4.2 Empirical Evidence and Hypothesis Development 
Corporate governance is not only an important mechanism supporting improved 
information transparency in developed or Western capital markets, but also in the 
context of emerging, developing or Asian capital markets. La Porta et al. (1997) 
state that agency costs in emerging markets are high due to weak legal 
enforcement. In such conditions dominant majority shareholders are entrenched to 
expropriate the rights of minority shareholders. Implementing a strong system of 
corporate governance is extremely important in an emerging capital market like 
Vietnam. In particular, good corporate governance mechanisms help to protect the 
vulnerability of emerging capital markets, to better avoid financial crises, to 
reinforce property rights, to reduce the transaction costs and cost of capital. These 
factors overall lead to stronger capital market development (World Bank 2006b). 
Within the corporate governance literature, corporate boards of directors, 
especially with their composition of independent directors, are often regarded as 
one of the most important mechanisms to represent and protect shareholders’ 
interests. An effective corporate governance mechanism should comprise more 
independent than non-independent directors. According to Armstrong, Guay and 
Weber (2010), independent directors are typically experienced professionals that 
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can offer the firms their expertise in areas such as business strategy, finance, 
marketing, operations and organizational structure. Furthermore, it is documented 
that a higher number of independent directors on corporate boards helps to 
monitor the performance and behaviours of the firms’ managers, which serves to 
reduce the agency problem. Prior studies in both developed/Western and 
emerging/Asian capital markets find that an effective corporate governance 
mechanism (a higher proportion of independent directors on corporate boards) is 
associated with increased information disclosure, particularly voluntary disclosure. 
Table 3.1 provides a summary list of studies investigating the relationship between 
the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards and the extent of 
information disclosure. 
In developed capital market settings, Baek, Johnson and Kim (2009) report 
significant positive association between the proportion of independent directors on 
corporate boards and the extent of information disclosure among US listed firms. In 
a study of Australian voluntary disclosure practices, Lim, Matolcsy and Chow (2007) 
also find a significant positive relationship between higher proportions of 
independent directors on corporate boards and the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
regard to the overall, strategic and forward looking information. 
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Table 3.1        Past Studies on Disclosure and Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Year Study Sample 
descriptions 
Hypotheses Findings 
1993 Malone, Fries 
and Jones  
125 US listed oil and 
gas firms  
Negative association between the 
proportion of outside (independent) 
directors on boards and the extent of 
financial disclosure. 
No significant association between the proportion 
of outside directors on boards and the extent of 
financial disclosure. 
2000 Chen and Jaggi  174 Hong Kong listed 
firm-year 
Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of financial disclosure. 
Significant positive association between the 
proportion of independent directors on boards 
and the extent of financial disclosure. 
2001 Ho and Wong  98 Hong Kong listed 
firms 
Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
No significant association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
2002 Haniffa and 
Cooke  
167 Malaysian listed 
firms 
Positive association between the proportion 
of non-executive directors on boards and 
the extent of VD. 
No significant association between the proportion 
of non-executive directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
2003 Eng and Mak  158 Singaporean 
listed firms 
Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
Significant negative association between the 
proportion of independent directors on boards 
and the extent of VD. 
2004 Gul and Leung  385 Hong Kong listed 
firms 
Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
Significant negative association between 
proportion of independent directors on boards 
and the extent of VD. 
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Year Study Sample 
descriptions 
Hypotheses Findings 
2004 Leung and 
Horwitz  
376 Hong Kong listed 
firms 
Negative association between proportion of 
independent directors on boards and 
voluntary segment disclosure. 
High managerial ownership: no significant 
association between the proportion of outside 
directors on boards and the extent of voluntary 
segment disclosure. 
Low managerial ownership: significant positive 
association between the proportion of outside 
directors on boards and the extent of voluntary 
segment disclosure. 
2004 Xiao, Yang and 
Chow  
300 Chinese listed 
firms 
Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of Internet based disclosure. 
Significant positive association between the 
proportion of independent directors on boards 
and the extent of Internet based disclosure. 




Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
Significant positive association between the 
proportion of independent directors on boards 
and the level of VD. 
2006 Ghazali and 
Weetman  
87 Malaysian listed 
firms 
Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
 
No significant association between proportion of 




Year Study Sample 
descriptions 
Hypotheses Findings 
2007 Barako  86 Kenyan firm-year Positive association between the proportion 
of non-executive directors on boards and 
the extent of VD. 
 
Significant negative association between the 
proportion of non-executive directors on boards 
and the extent of VD (general and strategic and 
financial information). 





Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of information disclosure. 
 
Significant positive association between the 
proportion of independent directors on boards 
and the extent of information disclosure. 
 
2007 Lim, Matolcsy 
and Chow 
 
181 Australian listed 
firms 
Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
Significant positive relationship between the 
proportion of independent directors on boards 
and overall VD (overall, strategic and forward 
looking information).  
2007 Xiao and Yuan  559 Chinese listed 
firms 
Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
Significant positive association between the 
proportion of independent directors on boards 




105 Malaysian listed 
firms 
Positive association between higher 
independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
Significant positive association between higher 




Year Study Sample 
descriptions 
Hypotheses Findings 
2009 Baek, Johnson 
and Kim  
374 US listed firms Positive association between the proportion 
of outside directors on boards and the 
extent of disclosure. 
Significant positive association between the 
proportion of outside directors on boards and the 
extent of disclosure (overall and board, 
management structure and process). 
2009 Yuen, Liu, Zhang, 
and Lu  
200 Chinese listed 
firms 
Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
Significant positive association between the 
proportion of independent directors on boards 
and the extent of VD. 
2010 Al-Shammari and 
Al-Sultan  
 
170 Kuwait listed 
firms 
Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
No significant association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
2010 Chau and Gray  273 Hong Kong listed 
firms 
Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
 
Significant positive association between the 
proportion of independent directors on boards 
and the extent of VD (but is mitigated by the 
influence of the appointment of an independent 
chairman). 
2010 Samaha  30 Egyptian listed 
firms 
Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of corporate governance information 
disclosure. 
 
Significant positive association between the 
proportion of independent directors on boards 




Year Study Sample 
descriptions 
Hypotheses Findings 




300 Australian listed 
firms 
Positive association between corporate 
governance structure (measured by 13 
items) and the extent of financial ratio 
disclosure. 
No significant association between stronger 
corporate governance structure and the extent of 
financial ratio disclosure. 
2011 Rouf 120 Bangladesh 
listed firms 
Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
No significant association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
2011 Vu, Tower and 
Scully 
45 Vietnamese listed 
firms 
Positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 
No significant association between the proportion 
of independent directors on boards and the 
extent of VD. 




Within the Asian but more developed capital market context, Chen and Jaggi’s 
(2000) finding suggests that the proportion of independent non-executive directors 
on corporate boards is positively associated with the comprehensiveness of 
financial disclosure among Hong Kong listed firms. Chen and Jaggi (2000) provide 
two main reasons for this result. First, the existence of independent directors on 
corporate boards assists the firm with its economic and financial strategy decision 
making and thereby improves economic and financial performance. Second, 
inclusion of more independent directors on corporate boards allows for better 
monitoring of management actions. Within such a monitoring environment, 
managers are less likely to abuse their power. More recently, Chau and Gray (2010) 
examine the voluntary disclosure practices in Hong Kong listed firms. The results in 
Chau and Gray’s (2010) study indicate that the proportion of independent directors 
on corporate boards positively influences firms‘ voluntary disclosure of strategic 
and non-financial information. Using a sample of listed firms from the Stock 
Exchange of Singapore in 2000, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) empirically investigate 
the association between corporate board monitoring and the level of voluntary 
disclosure and find a significant positive association between the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards and the level of voluntary disclosure. 
In other emerging capital markets, Xiao and Yuan (2007) provide evidence 
suggesting that a better corporate governance system results in a lower level of 
information asymmetry among Chinese listed firms. Yuen et al. (2009) also find that 
having firms with a higher proportion of independent directors on corporate boards 
is related to increased voluntary disclosure. They argue that the high proportion of 
these independent directors reduces the possibility of withholding information. 
Xiao, Yang and Chow (2004) examine the extent of Internet voluntary disclosure in 
China and find that the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards 
positively influences the level of such disclosure. Akhtaruddin et al.’s (2009) study 
provides evidence supporting a significant positive relationship between an 
effective corporate governance mechanism (measured by corporate board size and 
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the proportion of independent directors) and voluntary disclosure practices of 
Malaysian listed firms in 2002. Guan, Sheu and Chu (2007) investigate the issue of 
information disclosure in Taiwanese firms and find that a higher proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards encourages firms to engage in more  
information disclosure. In Egypt, Samaha (2010) report a significant positive 
relationship between the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure. The above studies suggest that the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards plays a complementary 
monitoring role to disclosure. Nevertheless, there are a few studies that report a 
substitute monitoring role (negative associations) or no role (no significant 
association) of corporate governance mechanisms on the extent of information 
disclosure (Table 3.1). 
Despite the mixed findings, the majority of evidence in earlier studies concludes 
that having good corporate governance mechanisms (a high proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards) promotes transparency and 
accountability of a firm’s information. In the light of agency theory and the majority 
of evidence from earlier studies, this thesis develops the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive association between a higher proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards and the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Vietnamese listed firms. 
Previous studies also indicate that ownership structure can potentially be an 
important determinant of voluntary disclosure practices. Accordingly, the next 
section highlights the hypothesized links between ownership structure and 
voluntary disclosure. 
3.5 Ownership Identities and Voluntary Disclosure 
Agency theorists suggest that ownership structure plays an important role in 
shaping a firm’s agency problems because of the inevitable conflicts of interests 
between managers and shareholders, as well as between dominant majority 
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shareholders and minority shareholders. Consistent with themes already discussed 
in this chapter, López-de-Foronda, López-Iturriaga and Santamaría-Mariscal (2007) 
state that conflicts between managers and shareholders are common in Anglo-
Saxon countries while in countries with civil law, such as Asian countries, conflicts of 
interests relate to ownership concentration between the dominant majority and 
minority shareholders. This section discusses the general overview of ownership 
structures in both Western and Asian countries, with the latter conflict emphasized 
in this thesis.  
3.5.1 Overview of Ownership Structure 
Franks and Mayer (1997) identify two types of ownership and control structures: 
‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ systems. An ‘outsider’ system exists where the ownership is 
widely held (common with firms in the US and UK). Outside shareholders are the 
owners of the firms who delegate control to managers. Individual shareholders, due 
to the ‘free-rider’ problem, do not have enough incentive or power to monitor 
management actions. This creates an opportunity for managers to behave against 
shareholders’ wealth. In such situations, a conflict between managers and 
shareholders can arise. 
On the other hand, an ‘insider system’ exists when ownership is highly concentrated 
and the majority of ownership is vested in an individual or a group of dominant 
shareholders who play an important role in influencing management decision 
making. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that dominant majority shareholders may 
not always have the same interests as minority shareholders and thus, agency 
conflicts shift to dominant majority shareholders and minority shareholders. Fan 
and Wong (2002), in a study of ownership structure in seven East Asian economies 
(Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand), 
also conclude that ownership structure is highly concentrated in East Asian 
economies. Such high concentration of ownership gives rise to an ‘entrenchment 
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effect’, that is similar to the managerial entrenchment effect32 (Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny 1988; Leung and Horwitz 2004). Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 759) describe the 
relationship between minority shareholders and dominant majority shareholders: 
“As ownership gets beyond a certain point, the large owners gain 
nearly full control and are wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to 
generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority 
shareholders. Thus there are costs associated with high ownership 
and entrenchment, as well as with exceptionally dispersed 
ownership.” 
Concentrated ownership thus increases the problem of agency conflicts. Fan and 
Wong (2002) report that the presence of large, dominant majority shareholders 
weakens the informativeness of reported earnings in East Asian countries. In 
particular, “when an owner effectively controls a firm, he or she also controls the 
production of the firm’s accounting information and reporting policies” (Fan and 
Wong 2002, 408). Fan and Wong (2002) argue that minority shareholders often 
believe that the dominant majority shareholders report accounting information in 
such a way as to avoid detection of their expropriation activities. Dominant majority 
shareholders, on the other hand, have incentives to conceal information due to 
proprietary costs. Evidence from previous studies suggests that the impact of high 
ownership concentration on a firm’s agency conflicts can vary. A certain high level 
of ownership concentration leads to potential entrenchment problems that can 
intensify the conflicts between dominant majority and minority shareholders (Fan 
and Wong 2002). These shareholders can use their influence over corporate boards 
to pursue their own goals, possibly at the expense of minority shareholders, which 
increases agency conflicts (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
In contrast, when high ownership concentration exceeds a certain level, additional 
ownership can provide these dominant majority shareholders with incentives to 
behave like minority shareholders, to align as closely as possible the conflicts of 
                                                          
32
 See Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) for a more detailed discussion of the managerial 
entrenchment effect.  
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interests between these two shareholder groups. In such circumstances, the 
presence of dominant majority shareholders serves as a monitoring mechanism to 
mitigate agency problems between shareholders and managers. Although there are 
conflicting findings, the majority of studies reach similar conclusions that ownership 
structure is an important corporate governance aspect that can influence a firm’s 
decision relating to information transparency, including voluntary disclosure. 
Despite the mixed evidence reported, it is clear that a firm’s identities or types of 
ownership structure can have a major impact on agency problems of information 
asymmetry, which subsequently influence the firm’s disclosure practices. 
Accordingly, the next section discusses the importance of different identities or 
types of ownership structure on alleviating agency conflicts and then develops three 
hypotheses according to different identities of ownership, specifically state, 
managerial and foreign ownership. 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) note that the identities of ownership structure 
potentially determines the nature of agency problems. Agency theory suggests that 
potential conflicts are higher in firms that are widely held as it is harder for 
shareholders to monitor management behaviours (Fama and Jensen 1983). When 
firms are listed on the stock exchange, ownership becomes more numerous and 
dispersed; thus individual shareholders’ incentive and ability to access company 
financial information becomes weaker. The problems of information asymmetry can 
become greater. Accordingly, managers of these firms have greater motives to 
disclose more information in order to reduce information asymmetry (Chau and 
Gray 2002). In contrast, firms with highly concentrated shareholdings are more 
likely to disclose less information than firms with widely held shareholdings because 
the information asymmetry problem is reduced. 
Agency theorists argue that the provision of adequate information to shareholders 
through the annual report is one element of bonding activities (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). For instance, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) report that the extent of 
voluntary disclosure for Malaysian listed firms is higher for firms with lower 
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ownership concentration33 and foreign shareholders. Similarly, Chau and Gray 
(2002) find a positive association between outsiders' ownership and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure for firms listed in Hong Kong and Singapore. The evidence from 
the above studies demonstrates the significant role of a firm’s ownership structure 
in influencing the firm’s decision relating to voluntary disclosure practices. 
The different impacts of ownership structure on voluntary disclosure could be due 
to various identities or types of ownership structures. Eng and Mak (2003,  326) 
assert that the choice of disclosure depends on different identities or types of 
ownership structures, noting that “the structure of ownership determines the level 
of monitoring and thereby the level of disclosure”. Prowse (1995) suggests that 
different identities of ownership structure may have different monitoring skills, 
varying corporate objectives and thus diverse incentives towards corporate 
disclosure. As such, this thesis investigates the influence of different identities of 
ownership structure on voluntary disclosure practices among Vietnamese listed 
firms, specifically state, managerial and foreign ownership.  
3.5.2 Empirical Evidence and Hypotheses Development 
Given the limited number of studies on concentrated ownership, the uniquely high 
ownership concentration structure in an emerging capital market such as Vietnam 
provides a perfect opportunity to empirically examine the influence of different 
identities of ownership structure on voluntary disclosure practices. As explained in 
Chapter 2, one of the distinguishing features of the Vietnamese capital market is that 
most Vietnamese listed firms originated as SOEs. Privatization of these SOEs allows 
managers and employees of a firm to obtain a significant proportion of shares prior to 
listing. Thus, high concentrations of state and managerial ownership are relatively 
common in Vietnam. Truong’s (2006) study of Vietnamese privatized firms at the end 
of 2004 reports that on average, the state still retains 38.1 per cent of total 
shareholding, while insiders (employees and managers) hold 46.5 per cent and only 
15.4 per cent of total shares are held by outside investors. Vu, Tower and Scully 
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 Their proxy for ownership structure is ownership diffusion based on the proportion of shares 
held by the top 10 largest shareholders.  
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(2011) report an average of 30.58 per cent state ownership, 5.40 per cent managerial 
ownership and 14.36 per cent foreign ownership among 45 random Vietnamese 
listed firms in 2008.  
Besides state and managerial ownership, foreign ownership plays a crucial role in the 
development of many emerging capital markets. Previous studies indicate that 
foreign shareholders promote development of emerging capital markets by 
strengthening the supply of capital (Ramaswamy and Li 2001; Mangena and 
Tauringana 2007). Ho, Tower and Taylor (2008) state that the high proportion of 
foreign investors enhances corporate governance practices, which impacts 
significantly on the level of information transparency and in the long run, can 
stimulate the growth of a firm, capital markets and a country as a whole. Accordingly, 
this thesis examines the three important ownership identities of Vietnam’s emerging 
capital market, namely: state, managerial and foreign ownership. The following 
sections discuss the empirical evidence of these ownership identities and generate 
three ownership based hypotheses. 
3.5.2.1 State Ownership 
As part of the ‘Doi Moi’ economic renovation in 1986, the Vietnamese government 
attempted to reduce the level of state intervention in the economy by reducing 
state ownership in SOE firms (privatization). Following the 1986 reform, the 
Vietnamese stock market was established in 2000 to facilitate the privatization 
process of SOEs, reducing state ownership and raising additional capital for 
Vietnamese firms. Since state ownership remains an important and unique attribute 
of Vietnamese listed firms, an investigation of the association between the extent 
of Vietnamese state ownership among listed firms and the level of voluntary 
disclosure makes a significant contribution to the literature of voluntary disclosure. 
Table 3.2 provides a summary of findings on the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and state ownership in limited prior studies. Within studies of voluntary 
disclosure practices and state ownership, there are four reasons supporting the 
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argument that the extent of state ownership in a firm weakens incentives to 
disclose information. 
First, unlike other highly concentrated ownership environments, the agency 
problem under a highly concentrated state ownership scenario is somewhat 
different. In a practical sense, there is no ‘real owner’ of these state shares because 
in its communist tenets, the state is represented by the people of Vietnam and so 
the state shares belong to the Vietnamese people, who do not have direct control 
of or interests in these assets. Thus, there is no ‘real owner’ of these state shares. 
According to Qu (2011), the lack of real ownership among state owned firms often 
leads to corruption and poor corporate governance among listed firms. This is 
because where there is no ‘real owner’ there is lack of an effective mechanism to 
monitor managerial behaviours, leading to exploitation by managers for personal 
benefits instead of acting in the interests of the shareholders. Furthermore, being 
the dominant majority shareholder, the state can also control firms through their 
influential legal power. Thus, firms with higher state ownership face less 
information asymmetry problems. It is argued that the state generally has better 
access to a firm’s internal information (Naser, Al-Khatib, and Karbhari 2002; Xiao 
and Yuan 2007) thus, there might be less dependence on information disclosure for 
decision making for firms with a higher level of state ownership. Being the state, 
these shareholders are powerful enough to obtain information about the firm 
through different avenues. For example, the state can access a firm’s taxation 
details, which are not available to other shareholders. 
Second, significant  state ownership usually represents a lack of personal interest in 
company profits (Xiao, Yang, and Chow 2004). Xiao and Yuan (2007) contend that 
the state focuses mainly on wealth distribution and social order and thus, 
enhancing shareholders' wealth may not be the primary objective for these state 
owned firms. Jiang and Habib (2009) also contend that state owned firms have less 
incentive to maximize profits because of guaranteed returns by the state and since 
firms can easily obtain additional funds, regardless of information disclosure, firms 
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with higher state ownership will have fewer incentives to disclose more 
information. 
Third, Jiang and Habib (2009) argue that state owned firms have less need to raise 
funds since they readily have access to state funding. Even if the state does not 
provide direct funds, these firms are able to obtain funds easily from other sources 
by virtue of being state owned firms. For instance, it may be much easier for state 
owned firms to obtain bank loans than other non-state firms, due to the political 
influence of the state.  
Fourth, firms with high state ownership may disclose less because of political 
constraints. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) argue that in a country like Malaysia, 
where there is a strong political connection, firms with high state ownership are 
discouraged from providing more information in order to protect political linkages 
or interests of the owners.  
Empirically, Luo, Courtenay and Hossain (2006) provide evidence supporting this 
point of view by reporting that a high proportion of state shares in a firm 
consistently weakens voluntary disclosure of future performance information 
among Singaporean firms for the years from 1994 to 2000. Xiao, Yang and Chow 
(2004) find that a high state ownership concentration of Chinese firms is associated 
with low Internet voluntary disclosure. Xiao, Yang and Chow (2004) explain that 
privileged access to information may contribute to low voluntary disclosure 
practices. Nevertheless, there are numerous studies that generally find positive 
associations or no association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and the 
proportion of state ownership. These studies are summarized in Table 3.2. 
Within the Vietnamese context, under a centrally planned economy, financial reports 
of Vietnamese SOEs were prepared mainly for the purpose of state centralized 
resources planning and not for the purpose of obtaining external capital (Chapter 2). 
According to Nguyen’s (2002) study of 261 privatized firms in Southern Vietnam in 
2002, there was no change in management of corporate boards, during and after 
privatization of more than 80 per cent of the SOEs. Before being privatized, the 
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influence of a manager on the operations of the firm was limited and therefore, profit 
maximization and enhancing shareholders' value were not traditionally the primary 
objectives of these firms. Thus, after privatization and with the same management 
board, managers of firms with high state ownership may not have incentives to 
provide additional information beyond those mandated.  
Based on the distinctive environment of Vietnamese state ownership and in light of 
the above agency based arguments, this thesis argues that the extent of state 
ownership in a firm is likely to reduce the level of its voluntary disclosure. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is posited: 
H2: There is a negative association between the extent of state 
ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports 





Table 3.2      Past Studies on Disclosure and State Ownership 
Year Study Sample descriptions Hypotheses Findings 
2002 Naser, Al-Khatib 
and Karbhari  
84 Jordanian listed 
firms 
Positive association between high spread 
ownership and the extent of information 
disclosure. 
No significant association between the 
proportion of state ownership and the extent of 
information disclosure.  
2003 Eng and Mak  158 Singaporean listed 
firms 
Positive association between state 
ownership and the extent of VD. 
Significant positive association between state 
ownership and the extent of VD. 
2004 Xiao, Yang and 
Chow  
300 Chinese listed 
firms 
Negative association between the 
proportion of state shares held by 
government agencies and the extent of 
Internet based disclosure. 
Positive association between the proportion 
of state shares held by state owned 
corporations and the extent of Internet 
based disclosure. 
Significant negative association between the 
proportion of state shares held by government 
agencies and the extent of Internet based 
disclosure (overall, content and China Securities 
Regulatory Commission disclosure items). 
Significant negative association between the 
proportion of state shares held by state owned 
corporations and the extent of Internet based 
disclosure. 
2006 Ghazali and 
Weetman  
87 Malaysian listed 
firms 
Negative association between the 
proportion of state ownership firms and the 
extent of VD. 
No significant association between the 
proportion of state ownership firms and the 
extent of VD. 
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Year Study Sample descriptions Hypotheses Findings 
2007 Xiao and Yuan  559 Chinese listed 
firms 
Negative association between the 
proportion of state ownership firms and the 
extent of VD. 
No significant association between the 
proportion of state ownership firms and the 
extent of VD. 
2008 Wang, Sewon, 
and Claiborne  
109 Chinese listed 
firms 
Association between the proportion of state 
ownership and the extent of VD. 
Significant positive association between the 
proportion of state ownership firms and the 
extent of VD (overall and strategic information).  
2009 Bogdan, Popa, 
Pop, and Farcane 
15 Romanian listed 
firms 
Positive association between high 
proportion of state ownership and the 
extent of VD. 
No significant association between the 
proportion of state ownership firms and the 
extent of VD. 
2009 Jiang and Habib  467 New Zealand firm-
year 
Positive association between high 
proportion of state ownership and the 
extent of VD. 
Negative or insignificant association 
between low proportion of state ownership 
and the extent of VD. 
Significant positive association between high 
level of state ownership and the extent of VD. 
2009 Yuen, Liu, Zhang, 
and Lu 
200 Chinese listed firms Positive association between the proportion 
of state ownership and the extent of VD. 
No significant association between the 
proportion of state ownership and the extent of 
VD. 
2011 Samaha and 
Dahawy  
30 largest Egyptian 
listed firms 
Negative association between the 
proportion of state ownership firms and the 
extent of VD. 
No significant association between the 
proportion of state ownership firms and the 
extent of VD. 
Legend: VD is the acronym of voluntary disclosure. 
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3.5.2.2 Managerial Ownership 
According to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory tenets, managerial 
ownership alleviates agency costs by causing managers to bear more of the firm’s 
economic consequences, thereby reducing the need for information disclosure. Li 
and Qi (2008) note that stock options give management ownership status that can 
link the benefits of a firm and its managers. The participation of managers in the 
firm’s capital ownership may cause these managers to be more concerned about 
the economic consequences of their actions because their wealth is at least partially 
dependent on the firm value. Since higher levels of managerial ownership help to 
align the interests of managers and shareholders, there is a reduced need for 
monitoring and subsequently, disclosure practices. Luo, Courtenay and Hossain 
(2006) argue that when managers own a substantial amount of shares in a firm, the 
effective control and concentrated ownership will potentially lead to an 
‘entrenchment effect’. Fan and Wong (2002) note that in such situations, the 
relationship is no longer between managers and shareholders, but rather between 
dominant majority shareholders and minority shareholders. Like any dominant 
majority shareholders in a highly concentrated firm combined with a weak 
shareholder protection environment, managers with shares may have incentives to 
expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth, as well as to manipulate information to 
their own advantage. 
On the other hand, low managerial ownership increases agency problems because 
managers have greater incentives to consume benefits, which can work against 
wealth maximization of shareholders (Eng and Mak 2003). In response to increased 
agency problems, shareholders increase monitoring mechanisms (Ghazali and 
Weetman 2006). As monitoring is costly, managers of firms have incentives to 
disclose additional information in order to minimize monitoring costs. Eng and Mak 
(2003) assert that voluntary disclosure is a substitution for monitoring costs. The 
need for more monitoring and more transparent disclosure decreases with a higher 
proportion of managerial ownership and vice versa. Empirically, some prior studies 
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support this view. Leung and Horwitz (2004) observe the relationship of managerial 
ownership and voluntary disclosure of Hong Kong listed firms in 1996. Their results 
reveal that when there is a low level of managerial ownership, information 
disclosure appears to be high. However, high levels of managerial ownership are 
associated with lower information disclosure. Luo, Courtenay and Hossain (2006) 
also find a negative association between managerial ownership and earning 
informativeness. In Singapore, Eng and Mak (2003) report a negative association 
between managerial ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure, as do 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) and Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) in Malaysia. 
Samaha and Dahawy (2011) investigate the extent of voluntary disclosure among 
Egyptian listed firms and find that managerial ownership is associated with lower 
voluntary disclosure. Table 3.3 reviews the results of earlier studies on the 
relationship between information disclosure and managerial ownership. 
Table 3.3 reports mixed results of the relationship between managerial ownership 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Studies that report a negative association 
between managerial ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure argue that in 
the context of Asian or emerging economies, where high ownership concentration 
is common, concentrated managerial ownership structure may discourage 
managers from providing information (Eng and Mak 2003; Leung and Horwitz 2004; 
Akhtaruddin and Haron 2010). On the other hand, in firms with lower levels of 
managerial ownership, investors may feel a stronger need to increase the 
monitoring of managers and therefore may demand more information from firms. 
In such circumstances, managers have incentives to provide more extensive 
disclosure (Eng and Mak 2003). 
In view of agency theory and on the basis that Vietnam is a developing Asian 
country with a highly concentrated ownership structure and with weak minority 
shareholder protection (as mentioned in Chapter 2), high managerial ownership 
may lead to managerial entrenchment that may subsequently reduce information 
disclosure. In contrast, due to their political status appointments, low managerial 
ownership creates high incentives for these managers to consume bonuses to 
 
100 
protect their political positions and low incentives for job performance. 
Subsequently, agency costs arise and these managers are likely to engage in more 
voluntary disclosure to reduce agency costs. Based on the evidence of prior studies, 
this thesis proposes that: 
H3: There is a negative association between the extent of managerial 
ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports 





Table 3.3      Past Studies on Disclosure and Managerial Ownership  
Year  Study Sample firms Hypotheses Findings 
2000 Gelb  3,219 US firm-year Negative association between the 
proportion of managerial ownership and 
the extent of information disclosure 
(measured by analysts’ ratings). 
Significant negative association between the 
proportion of managerial ownership and the extent 
of information disclosure (measured by analysts’ 
ratings). 
2003 Eng and Mak 158 Singaporean listed 
firms 
Negative association between the 
proportion of managerial ownership and 
the extent of VD. 
Significant negative association between the 
proportion of managerial ownership and the extent 
of VD. 
2004 Gul and Leung  385 Hong Kong listed 
firms 
Negative association between the 
proportion of managerial ownership and 
the level of VD. 
No significant association between the proportion of 
managerial ownership and the level of VD. 
2004 Leung and 
Horwitz  
376 Hong Kong listed 
firms 
When managerial ownership is low (< 25 
per cent): positive association between 
managerial ownership and voluntary 
disclosure of segment information. 
When managerial ownership is high (> 25 
per cent): negative association between 
managerial ownership and voluntary 
disclosure of segment information. 
When managerial ownership is low (< 25 per cent): 
significant positive association between managerial 
ownership and voluntary disclosure of segment 
information. 
When managerial ownership is high (> 25 per cent): 
significant negative association between managerial 
ownership and voluntary disclosure of segment 
information. 
2006 Ghazali and 
Weetman  
87 Malaysian listed 
firms 
Negative association between the 
proportion of managerial ownership 
firms and the extent of VD. 
Significant negative association between the 
proportion of managerial ownership firms and the 
extent of VD (overall, financial, strategic and 
corporate social responsibility information VD). 
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Year  Study Sample firms Hypotheses Findings 





Negative association between managerial 
ownership and the extent of information 
disclosure. 
No significant association between managerial 
ownership and the extent of information disclosure. 
2007 Xiao and Yuan 559 Chinese listed 
firms 
Positive association between the 
proportion of managerial ownership 
firms and the extent of VD. 
No significant association between the proportion of 
managerial ownership firms and the extent of VD. 
2008 Li and Qi  300 Chinese listed 
firm year 
Positive association between board 
ownership and the level of VD. 
Significant positive association between board 
ownership and the level of VD. 
2009 Baek, Johnson 
and Kim  
374 US listed firms Non-negative association between the 
proportion of managerial ownership 
firms and the extent of disclosure. 
Negative association between the 
proportion of managerial ownership 
firms and the extent of disclosure. 
Significant negative association between the 
proportion of managerial ownership firms and the 
extent of board, management structure and process 
disclosure. 
Firms with 5 per cent or higher managerial 
ownership in the industries with frequent takeover 
activities: significant positive association between 
managerial ownership and the level of ownership 
structure and investors relation disclosure  
2009 Jiang and Habib  467 New Zealand firm-
year 
Positive association between high 
proportion of managerial ownership and 
the extent of VD. 
Negative or insignificant association 
between low proportion of managerial 
ownership and the extent of VD. 
Significant positive association between high level of 
managerial ownership and the extent of VD. 
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Year  Study Sample firms Hypotheses Findings 
2010 Akhtaruddin and 
Haron  
124 Malaysian listed 
firms 
Negative association between board 
ownership and the level of VD. 
Significant negative association between board 
ownership and the level of VD. 
2011 Samaha and 
Dahawy  
30 largest Egyptian 
listed firms 
Negative association between the 
proportion of managerial ownership and 
the level of VD. 
Significant negative association between the 
proportion of managerial ownership firms and the 
extent of VD. 




3.5.2.3 Foreign Ownership 
Previous research asserts that foreign shareholders face significantly higher risks 
than local shareholders. La Porta et al. (2000) identify the potential risks associated 
with foreign share trading as: political risk, information asymmetry and inadequate 
legal protection. 
Bradbury (1992) argues that there is a greater need for disclosure as a means of 
monitoring the actions of the management in foreign based firms. This is because, 
due to separation of ownership and control geographically, foreign shareholders 
face considerably higher information asymmetry than local shareholders. In foreign 
held firms it is more difficult for foreign shareholders to control managerial 
behaviour, not only because of the geographical differences, but also because of 
the barriers of language and culture (Bradbury 1992; Xiao and Yuan 2007; Craswell 
and Taylor 1992). Xiao and Yuan (2007) further state that in emerging capital 
markets such as China, the information asymmetry problem is even higher because 
of difficulties in accessing hard copy annual reports. 
If investors make investment decisions on the basis of expected gains and costs, 
then high information costs would potentially discourage foreign shareholdings 
(Mangena and Tauringana 2007). Shareholders and potential shareholders, due to 
information asymmetry problems, are likely to make greater misjudgements of 
share values that eventually will lead them to discount share prices. In such foreign 
ownership cases, firms have incentives to reduce asymmetric information problems 
by providing additional information in order to prevent firms from undervaluing 
shares. 
Ferguson, Lam and Lee (2002) report that firms listed on several stock exchanges 
disclose more information than firms listed solely on the local market only, as 
information asymmetry is higher in foreign markets. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find a 
significant positive association between foreign shareholders and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure, among non-financial firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
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Exchange in 1995. They suggest that higher information transparency in firms with 
foreign ownership is due to the high information asymmetry resulting from 
geographic differences (Haniffa and Cooke 2002). Wang, Sewon and Claiborne 
(2008) argue that Chinese listed firms have incentives to provide more information, 
and increase transparency when a proportion of their shares is owned by foreign 
investors. Consistent with the above studies, Barako (2004) provides evidence 
suggesting that foreign ownership is a key variable explaining the disclosure 
variance between listed firms in Kenya from 1992 to 2001. Barako’s (2004) study 
reports a consistent positive association between foreign ownership and levels of 
voluntary disclosure, particularly regarding general strategic information, financial 
information, forward looking information and social and board member 
information. Xiao, Yang and Chow (2004) examine the Internet voluntary disclosure 
of Chinese listed firms and find that higher foreign ownership does not only 
encourage greater information disclosure but also these firms are more motivated 
to create English version websites. According to Ho, Tower and Taylor (2008), the 
proportion of foreign ownership in a firm also influences the prospects of greater 
information disclosure. The results of Ho and Tower’s (2011) study note consistent 
positive associations between foreign ownership and voluntary disclosure practices 
made by Malaysian listed firms over the economically diverse years of 1996, 2000 
and 2006. This positive association supports the argument that in order to obtain 
foreign funds and to enhance the monitoring of managerial actions there is a 
greater need to disclose more information. Table 3.4 lists a summary of findings of 
the relationship between information disclosure and foreign ownership. 
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Table 3.4      Past Studies on Disclosure and Foreign Ownership  
Year Study Sample firms Hypotheses Findings 
2002 Haniffa and 
Cooke  
167 Malaysian listed 
firms 
Significant positive association between 
the proportion of foreign ownership and 
the extent of VD. 
Significant positive association between the 
proportion of foreign ownership and the extent of 
VD. 
2002 Naser, Al-Khatib 
and Karbhari  
84 Jordan listed firms Significant positive association between 
high spread ownership and the extent of 
information disclosure. 
No significant association between the proportion of 
foreign ownership and the extent of information 
disclosure.  
2004 Xiao, Yang and 
Chow  
300 Chinese listed 
firms 
Significant positive association between 
the proportion of foreign ownership and 
the extent of Internet based disclosure. 
Positive association between the proportion of 
foreign ownership and the non-required China 
Securities Regulatory Commission disclosure items in 
Internet based disclosure (and the disclosure of an 
English website). 
2007 Barako  86 Kenyan listed firm-
year 
Significant positive association between 
the proportion of foreign ownership and 
the extent of VD. 
Positive association between the proportion of 
foreign ownership firms and the extent of VD. 





Significant positive association between 
qualified foreign institutional investors 
and the extent of information disclosure. 
Significant positive association between qualified 
foreign institutional investors and the extent of 
information disclosure. 




Significant positive association between 
the proportion of foreign ownership and 
the extent of VD. 
Significant and consistent positive association 
between the proportion of foreign ownership and 
the extent of VD. 
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2007 Xiao and Yuan 559 Chinese listed 
firms 
Significant positive association between 
the proportion of foreign ownership and 
the extent of VD. 
Positive association between the proportion of 
foreign ownership firms and the extent of strategic 
information VD. 
2008 Wang, Sewon and 
Claiborne  
109 Chinese listed 
firms 
Significant positive association between 
the proportion of foreign ownership and 
the extent of VD. 
 
Significant positive association between the 
proportion of foreign ownership and the extent of 
VD. 
Positive association between the proportion of 
foreign ownership and the extent of strategic 
information VD. 
2009 Bogdan, Popa, 
Pop, and Farcane. 
15 Romanian listed 
firms 
Significant positive association between 
the proportion of foreign ownership and 
the extent of VD. 
No significant association between the proportion of 
foreign ownership firms and the extent of strategic 
information VD. 
2011 Ho and Tower  150 Malaysian listed 
firm-year 
Significant positive association between 
the proportion of foreign ownership and 
the extent of VD. 
Significant and consistent positive association 
between the proportion of foreign ownership and 
the extent of VD. 
Legend: VD is the acronym of voluntary disclosure. 
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Over the years, the Vietnamese government has taken various steps to increase 
foreign ownership by reducing restrictions on foreign investment. The foreign 
ownership maximum has increased from 20 per cent in 2000 to 30 per cent in 2003 
and finally to 49 per cent in 2005 for non-bank listed firms. Listed banks remain 
subject to a lower foreign ownership ceiling of 30 per cent (Thai and Biallas 2007). 
Within the Vietnamese context, the majority of foreign owners are from developed 
countries that have stronger financial regulatory systems. These foreign investors 
are most likely more aware of the importance of financial reporting in investment 
decision making than local investors. Therefore, they may pressure firms to increase 
the extent of information disclosure in order to raise and retain foreign investment. 
Based on the majority of previous studies and agency theory tenets, the hypothesis 
to be tested is: 
H4: There is a positive association between the extent of foreign 
ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports 
of Vietnamese listed firms. 
3.6 Conceptual Schema 
A summary conceptual schema for this thesis is shown in Figure 3.1 below. This 
figure highlights the main hypothesis of this research: the level of voluntary 
disclosure among listed firms in Vietnam and the association between the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards and the three ownership 












Figure 3.1  Conceptual Schema of This Thesis 
 
Legend: Figure 3.1 presents the conceptual schema of this thesis. The conceptual schema 
shows the four principal hypotheses designed to test the association between the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards (H1), the proportion of state 
ownership (H2), the proportion of managerial ownership (H3), the proportion of foreign 
ownership (H4) and the extent of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure (VnDI). The sign (+) 




























This chapter presents a review of the relevant literature on voluntary disclosure 
practices, which is the main theme of this thesis. In particular, it justifies the 
relevance of agency theory in providing the theoretical framework explaining 
corporate voluntary disclosure decisions. Agency theory is concerned with the 
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders arising due to separation 
of ownership and control. In a developing, emerging or Asian economies context 
where weak legal enforcement and high levels of concentrated ownership are 
relatively common, the agency conflict often exists between the dominant majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders (La Porta et al. 1997). The agency conflicts 
of goals and interests give rise to the problem of information asymmetry. 
The chapter then provides a discussion on the motivations and net benefits 
associated with increased voluntary disclosure, whilst more focus is placed on 
developing, emerging or Asian capital markets. It is argued that enhanced voluntary 
disclosure is extremely important in emerging markets, particularly Vietnam. In 
order to sustain the growth of its economy, Vietnam’s capital market needs to 
strengthen the level of information transparency. 
The chapter also focuses on the interaction between corporate governance 
mechanisms, information asymmetry and voluntary disclosure. Based on agency 
theory tenets and the majority of past evidence indicating that corporate 
governance (the proportion of independent directors) positively impacts on firms’ 
voluntary disclosure, a positive hypothesis between a higher proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards and the extent of voluntary disclosure 
among Vietnamese listed firms is postulated. 
This is followed by a multi-layered discussion on the issues concerning ownership 
structure and how different ownership identities might impact differently on a 
firm's level of voluntary disclosure. Three ownership identities that have been 
described as relevant in the Vietnamese context, namely state, managerial and 
foreign ownership are reviewed based on past empirical evidence. Then three 
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hypotheses are developed in regard to these three ownership identities. These are: 
a negative association between the extent of state ownership or managerial 
ownership and voluntary disclosure practices, and a positive association between 
foreign ownership and voluntary disclosure practices. 
Chapter 4 outlines the research approach taken to conduct this thesis research 
investigating the issue of voluntary disclosure practices in Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH APPROACH 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the research approach utilized in this thesis. It identifies the 
overarching paradigm, ontology and epistemology of the thesis and explains the 
choice of research methodology and more specific research methods. As outlined in 
this chapter, this thesis applies an objectivist–positivist empirical research approach 
to explain what the level of voluntary disclosure is among Vietnamese listed firms 
and what variables can be used to assist in predicting the level of Vietnamese 
voluntary disclosure (VnDI). 
Section 4.2 describes the key components of the research paradigm such as: the 
epistemology, ontology, research methodology and research methods and the 
research approach utilized in this thesis. Section 4.3 outlines the data sample and 
data collection for the empirical analysis in this thesis. Furthermore, a description of 
the sample data and a defence of the use of annual reports as the main data source 
are included. Section 4.4 details the measurement of the dependent variable, which 
is the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI). In particular, it explains the 
development of the index as an approximate proxy to measure the level of 
voluntary disclosure among Vietnamese listed firms. Consistent with previous 
studies, it includes the screening of disclosure items and specific measurement 
(weighting and scoring) to derive the final disclosure index for Vietnamese listed 
firms. Although the methods used to develop the index are consistent with those in 
the literature, the index is different in that an extra step is added. The index is 
screened and reviewed by Vietnamese accounting experts to specifically address 
the voluntary disclosure practices of Vietnamese listed firms. In order to explain the 
level of voluntary disclosure, four explanatory (independent) variables such as 
corporate governance and three different ownership identities, namely state, 
managerial and foreign ownership are included. The operationalization of these 
variables is provided in Section 4.5. This is followed in Section 4.6 with the 
measurement techniques used for the seven control variables namely: firm size, 
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profitability, leverage, industry, auditing firms, listing duration and stock exchange 
location. Sections 4.7 and 4.8 provide an overview of the referential statistical tests 
and sensitivity tests of the thesis respectively. Finally, Section 4.9 presents a 
summary of the chapter.  
4.2 Research Process 
4.2.1 Research Paradigm 
The research paradigm provides the overall framework for a research project, as it 
identifies the researcher’s role in determining the course of any research project 
and distinguishing other perspectives. According to Guba and Lincoln (1994, 106), a 
paradigm is defined as “the basic belief system on world view that guides the 
investigator, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and 
epistemologically fundamental ways”. Various research paradigms present different 
perspectives of the world, and the choice of paradigm represents the researcher’s 
worldview based on ontological and epistemological assumptions (Blaikie 2007; 
Babbie 2010). As such, understanding the different types of paradigms is essential, 
as they provide the guidance and clarity about the most appropriate approach for 
conducting research. 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) state that the choice of a paradigm for research depends 
on three fundamental questions: 
1. The ontological question: Ontology governs the choice of research 
methodology that the researcher employs as it represents the researcher’s 
perspective of the world. A research paradigm is “the philosophical stance 
informing the methodology and thus provides a context for the process and 
grounding its logic and criteria” (Crotty 1998, 3). Guba and Lincoln (1994) 
state that ontology concerns the nature and the form of reality. It asks what 
‘reality’ is and what can be known about ‘reality’. For instance, reality can 
be ‘real’ or it can be a form of imagination or interpretation based on 
observation and experience. 
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2. The epistemological question: Trochim (2006) defines epistemology as a 
philosophical grounding for knowledge, or how the knowledge can be 
known. It regards the relationship of the enquirer (researcher) to the 
knowledge. In particular, it is concerned about the nature of knowledge and 
how it is constructed. Specifically, it asks ‘how can the reality be known?’ 
(Blaikie 2007). The matter of how knowledge can be obtained depends on 
the behaviour of the researcher in acquiring it. For instance, Blaikie (2007) 
explains that knowledge can either have an independent existence or it can 
purely represent an idea that has to be observed and constructed by the 
researcher to form a meaning. 
3. The methodological question: Blaikie (2007) notes that answering the 
ontological and epistemological questions allows a researcher to adopt an 
appropriate research methodology in order to produce reliable knowledge. 
In particular, methodological questions are concerned with the appropriate 
techniques for determining what can be known about the knowledge (Guba 
and Lincoln 1994). For instance, Guba and Lincoln (1994) propose that if the 
ontological position is that the world is ‘real’, then the epistemological view 
is objective; knowledge is obtained through experimentation and 
observation as the researcher will take a quantitative approach using 
experimental or manipulative methods. 
Differences in assumptions regarding the ontology, epistemology and methods 
leads the researcher to adopt and conduct research shaped on different 
constructions of research paradigms. According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), there 
are four basic paradigms available in research: positivism, post-positivism, critical 
theory and constructivism; these paradigms are summarized in Table 4.1. The 





Table 4.1      Basic Beliefs (metaphysics) of Alternative Paradigms 
Paradigm 
            
        Features 
Positivism Post-positivism Critical theory Constructivism 
Goals of paradigm Discover the truth through quantitative 
evidence on relationships between variables. 
Findings are absolute and true. 
Uncover reality of an economic 
system in which members act 
independently. 
Findings are tentatively true. 
 
Discover reality through 
participating and encouraging a 
specific informed population in 
order to gain insights. 
Findings are mediated by values. 
Transform meaning and enhance 
understanding of particular events 
or situations. 
Findings are created through 
researcher’s interpretation. 
Ontology 
The concept of 
reality 
Naïve realism: there is only one reality and it 
is assumed to be deterministic and governed 
by natural laws. 
Critical realism: there is an 
independent external reality but 
it is imperfect and 
probabilistically apprehendable. 
 
Historical realism: virtual reality 
shaped by social, political, cultural, 
economic, ethnic and gender 
values. Over time this reality is 
taken to be ‘real’. 
Relativism: reality is intangible. It 
can be constructed by experiences 
of the world. Reality is dependent 
on individual and can be changed 
with new information. 
Epistemology 
The theory of 
reality (how may 
the reality be 
known) 
Dualist/Objectivist: Researcher and research 
object are independent. 
Knowledge is true only if it can be verified 




Independence of researcher and 
research object is not always 
possible. 
Knowledge is probably true and 
is subject to falsification of trial 
and error tests. 
 
Transactional/subjectivist: 
Researcher and research object are 
interactively linked. Researcher 
influences findings through 
enquiries. 
Knowledge arises through action 




Researcher and research object are 
interactively linked with narrow 
focus on individuals to enhance 
understanding of meaning. 
Knowledge is obtained from 
interpretative results.  
Methodology 
Strategy, plan of 
action to 
determine reality 
Controlled experiment to prevent bias. 





Falsification of hypotheses may 
include qualitative methods. 
 
Dialogic. 
Dialectical methodology to 
transform misconceptions into an 





Questions of meaning, 
interpretation and understanding 
between researcher and 
respondent to produce an informed 
consensual construct. 
Research methods Experiments, questionnaires. 
Quantitative methods: t-tests, regression, 
Likert scales. 
Case studies, interviews. Action research, focus groups, 
historical analysis. 
Participants' observations, in-depth 
interviews, case studies. 
Various sources:(Guba and Lincoln 1994; Guba 1990; Perry, Riege, and Brown 1999; Blaikie 2007). 
Legend: Shaded column represents positivism paradigm, which is the paradigm approach adopted in this thesis. 
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There are several key points about each paradigm. First, the positivist paradigm 
asserts a single external reality, and that reality is considered to be driven by natural 
laws and mechanisms (Blaikie 2007). According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), the 
positivist paradigm adopts a perspective of independence and objectivity between 
the researcher and the research objects. It views the world as an external entity in 
which things have intrinsic meanings inside them, and the role of the researcher is 
to observe and discover the meanings that already reside in these research objects 
(Blaikie 2007). The dualist/objectivist stance within positivism requires a 
manipulative methodology in which a hypothesis has to be put to the test and 
verified. 
The positivist paradigm assumes that the knowledge it produces is absolute, and 
anything that cannot be verified is considered as meaningless (Blaikie 2007). Guba 
and Lincoln (1994) state that data in the positivist paradigm is quantitative and is 
collected in a structured manner to better ensure that findings are value-free and 
that the researcher cannot manipulate the final results, as the researcher only 
observes through a ‘one way mirror’. The mode of research inquiry is theory-
testing, where questions and/or hypotheses are tested by empirical means. The 
analysis or observation of data occurs within a controlled experimental 
environment to prevent bias (Guba and Lincoln 1994). 
Second, the post-positivism paradigm assumes that there is “an independent 
external reality” (Blaikie 2007, 15), but it is imperfect because it is impossible for 
humans to perceive accurately, given unsatisfactory human intelligence and the 
fundamentally intractable nature of phenomena (Guba and Lincoln 1994). Blaikie 
(2007, 113) notes that the post-positivist paradigm “incorporates the cautious 
realist ontology and the epistemology of falsificationism”. According to Healy and 
Perry (2000), as opposed to the positivism belief that there is a single reality, post-
positivism recognizes that there may be multiple perceptions about that single but 
mind-dependent reality. Perry, Riege and Brown (1999) state that this type of 
research seeks an understanding of the common reality of a system in which 
members may act independently. Findings obtained through post-positivist 
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research are usually considered real but fallible. Within the post-positivist 
paradigm, emphasis is placed on several methodologies, such as interactive 
participatory, action research or other approaches determined by the subject of 
research in order to discover the observable or un-observable structures and 
mechanisms underlying a particular event or experience. For instance, in order to 
reveal knowledge, the researcher must go through a process of trial and error, 
incorporating their observations to reject false theories, rather than verifying 
hypotheses as in positivism (Blaikie 2007). Thus, knowledge obtained forming this 
view is known as ‘tentative’, where knowledge is discovered through a “mixture of 
theoretical reasoning and experimentation” (Outhwaite 1983, 332). Data collected 
can be both quantitative and qualitative, although qualitative frequently dominates 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994). 
Third, the critical theory paradigm assumes that reality is apprehendable. Critical 
theory takes the view of realist ontology and transactional/subjectivist 
epistemology. According to Perry, Riege and Brown (1999), in critical theory 
researchers aim at critiquing and transforming social, political, cultural, economic, 
gender and ethical values. Under this type of research, the relationship between the 
researcher and the researched object is assumed to be interactive, where the 
researcher can influence the researched subject through the mode of enquiry (Guba 
and Lincoln 1994). Research data often involves long-term ethnographic and 
historical studies of organisational processes and structures (Perry, Riege, and 
Brown 1999). Critical theory assumes that social and cultural values are pre-
determined by the participants that shape a symbolic meaning system within the 
society; and that the role of the researcher is to transform these values into 
knowledge. In order to obtain such knowledge, the researcher has to engage or 
interact with the participants through communication. The results are interpreted 
from clarification of the dialogue between the participants of the research object 
and the researcher (Guba and Lincoln 1994). However, Blaikie (2007) asserts that in 
this type of research, the researcher seeks to take conscious steps to minimize his 
or her influence on the research object. Thus, the findings are considered value 
mediated. Data under the critical theory paradigm is usually qualitative and is 
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obtained by observation of interaction and communication between participants 
and the researchers (Guba and Lincoln 1994). 
Last, the fourth paradigm is constructivism. According to Guba and Lincoln (1994, 
110), constructivism adopts a relativist ontology in which realities are assumed to 
be “apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible mental construction, social 
and experientially based, local and specific in nature (although elements are often 
shared among many individuals and even across cultures)”. In other words, it views 
the world as external and reality as a product of human minds. Reality is only 
regarded as ‘real’ if is it perceived as ‘real’ or it is an idea that is perceived from the 
impression of being real (Blaikie 2007). From the constructivist’s point of view, 
meaning has more value than measurement, and perception is the most important 
reality (Perry, Riege, and Brown 1999). Meaning is not inherent within a research 
object, rather it has to be constructed; and the role of the researcher is assumed to 
be interactively linked with the research object to create findings as the 
investigation proceeds (Guba and Lincoln 1994). Guba and Lincoln (1994) state that 
data collected under constructivism type of research is purely qualitative, and 
derived from participant observations, text analyses, and unstructured interviews. 
Given the above explanations of each paradigm (in Table 4.1), it is argued that the 
most appropriate paradigm for this thesis is the positivism paradigm. This thesis is a 
study that better enables the researcher to determine ‘how things really are’ and 
‘how things really work’, as it aims to explain the possible determinants of voluntary 
disclosure practices of Vietnamese listed firms. This thesis, therefore, best fits under 
the positivist research paradigm as it will explicate real-world phenomena. 
The following section explains how the positivist research process is applied in this 
thesis. 
4.2.2 Research Approach 
Belkaoui-Riahi (2001) views accounting as a social science, and notes that different 
research practices in accounting have been based on different perspectives. This 
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thesis adopts the positivist paradigm, and thus an objectivist-positivist research 
process is adopted in this thesis. This research approach is outlined in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1  Thesis’ Research Process 
Ontology 
The concept of reality 
Positivism. 
Epistemology 




Strategy, plan of action to determine 
reality 
Empirical quantitative large data set 
analysis of Vietnamese listed firms’ 
annual reports. 
Research Methods 
Techniques or procedures to be carried out 
in order to obtain the reality 
Descriptive and statistical analyses (t-
tests, correlations, multiple regression 
and binary logistic regression).  
Source: Adapted from Crotty (1998) and Tan (2005). 
Legend: Shaded areas represent the research process of this thesis. 
The positivist paradigm has a naive realist approach, in which relationships are 
determined, predictable and reductionist (Guba and Lincoln 1994). This thesis 
investigates the level of voluntary disclosure among Vietnamese listed firms and 
identifies possible key determinants to predict the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Epistemology is the study of knowledge and the origin of that knowledge (Dawson 
2002). This thesis adopts an objectivist epistemology that suggests that reality exists 
independent of human perception. Tan (2005) notes that a distinguishing feature of 
objectivism is that the main focus of the research is on the facts, and then the 
researcher looks for causality, formulates hypotheses and finally tests them to 
discover the knowledge. Since the extent of voluntary disclosure among Vietnamese 
listed firms is studied through the information disclosed in annual reports, the 
researcher is considered independent of the research object. In this thesis, the 
researcher first develops the hypotheses based on agency theory and evidence 
reported from prior studies. The researcher incorporates them in the unique 
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environment of Vietnam, then subsequently integrates the data found in annual 
reports and tests them using inferential statistical tools. 
According to Bryman (2004), the choice of a specific methodology in research 
depends on the research question and what the researcher aims to achieve. The 
research methodology involves particular research methods employed to attain the 
required knowledge. In order to answer the two research questions of this thesis 
(advanced in Section 1.4), the use of secondary data which is an analysis of 
Vietnamese listed firms’ annual reports, is utilized in a positivist empirical 
quantitative fashion to explain the phenomena. In particular, the information 
disclosed in annual reports such as voluntary disclosure information, corporate 
governance systems, ownership identities (state, managerial and foreign 
ownership) and a set of firm-characteristics are tested against the hypotheses to 
discover possible relationships. 
The research method describes the specific set of techniques employed to obtain 
the final results. Positivist research often relies on the use of quantitative, 
systematic and precise data such as: the use of secondary data, statistics and 
objective measures for testing hypotheses (Neuman 2000). This thesis analyzes the 
possible determinants of firms’ voluntary disclosure via inferential statistical tests 
using the descriptive statistics, t-tests, correlations (Chapter 5) and multiple 
regression (Ordinary Least Square OLS) and binary logistic regression techniques 
(Chapter 6). 
It is important to mention that although this thesis is primarily a positivist study, 
given the exploratory nature of this research (being one of the first studies of 
voluntary disclosure practices in Vietnam), it initially adopts a small qualitative 
approach to enhance the understanding of the issues surrounding the corporate 
reporting environment in Vietnam. 
The next section presents the detail of the sample and data collection, the 




4.3 Sample and Data 
4.3.1 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
This thesis research design is based on a sample of one year cross-sectional analysis 
that includes all possible listed firms in the stock exchange population of Vietnam 
(Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi stock exchange) in the financial year ending 31st December, 
2009.  
As the focus is on voluntary disclosure practices in annual reports, firms with no 
externally published annual reports are excluded from the sample. Details of the 
exclusion procedure of the data set are as follows: 
1. Banks, financial and insurance listed firms (as they are subjected to 
different reporting regimes). 
2. Firms for which annual reports were unavailable. 
3. Firms with missing independent variables (corporate governance 
and ownership identities information). 
4. Firms with anything other than a 12-month financial year period. 
The data needed for this thesis includes data from annual reports for the financial 
year ending 31st December 2009, especially their voluntarily disclosed information, 
corporate governance details, ownership structure such as state, managerial and 
foreign ownership details and firm-characteristics such as firm size, profitability, 
leverage, industry, auditing firm, listing duration and the stock exchange location. The 
financial statements and annual reports are obtained from various sources, including: 
the two stock exchange websites www.hsx.vn (HOSE) and www.hnx.vn (HNX); each 
firm’s website; and Vietstock (a leading financial analyst’s database in Vietnam). 
Table 4.2 presents the final sample selected for this thesis. 
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Table 4.2      Final Sample Set for this Thesis 
Description  Number of listed 
firms in 2009 
Total firms listed on Vietnamese stock exchange in 2009 
population 
 448 
     HOSE listed firms  199 
     HNX listed firms   249 
Excluded firms 21  
     HOSE financial listed firms  12  
     HNX financial listed firms  9  
Excluded firms: 17034  
     HOSE listed firms with no annual reports in 2009 4  
     HNX listed firms with no annual reports in 2009 166  
Total available firms with annual reports  257 
     HOSE listed firms   183 
     HNX listed firms   74 
Excluded firms:  5  
     HOSE listed firms missing ownership data 4  
     HNX listed firms missing ownership data 1  
Final sample firms available for voluntary disclosure analysis  252 
     HOSE listed firms in 2009   179 
     HNX listed firms in 2009  73 
Percentage of sample firms from population  56.30 
Legend: The table above presents the exclusion procedure for selecting the final sample of this 
thesis.
                                                          
34
 See discussion of non-response bias of these 170 firms in Appendix E. 
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The total population consists of 448 listed firms35 which includes 199 listed firms in 
Ho Chi Minh stock exchange (HOSE) and 249 listed firms in Hanoi stock exchange 
(HNX) in 2009. Among these 448 firms, there are 21 banks, financial firms and 
insurance firms, which are excluded in the sample. There are also 170 listed firms 
that did not issue comprehensive annual reports (see Section 7.3.1 and Appendix E 
for a discussion of this phenomenon). Thus, these firms are excluded from the 
sample. From the sample of 257 firms with comprehensive annual reports, five 
firms did not provide ownership structure data, and thus, these firms are also not 
included in the sample. The final sample for voluntary disclosure analysis consists of 
252 Vietnamese listed firms including 179 HOSE and 73 HNX listed firms, signifying a 
representative 56.30 per cent of the whole listed firms’ population in Vietnam 
(Table 4.2). 
The next section provides the justification for the use of annual reports as the 
primary source of data for investigating the level of voluntary disclosure amongst 
Vietnamese listed firms.  
4.3.2 Importance of Firms’ Annual Reports 
It has been well documented in previous studies that the corporate annual report is 
the most representative vehicle to analyze corporate disclosure, not only for 
investors and analysts but also for other stakeholders (Vergoossen 1993; Epstein 
and Freedman 1994). According to Stanton, Stanton and Pires (2004), the annual 
report of a firm acts as both a traditional and a statutory formal communication 
channel between a listed firm and its stakeholders. Botosan (1997) states that 
although the annual report is not the only means of corporate communication, it 
serves as a good proxy for the level of voluntary disclosure provided by a firm across 
all disclosure avenues. 
                                                          
35
 This thesis defines all firms listed in 2009 as firms that are listed on the stock exchange and have 
commenced their share trading in 2009. In total, there are 461 firms listed in the two stock 
exchanges. Among these, there are 13 firms that had just been approved for listing at the end of 
2009 but did not begin any trading activity until 2010. Thus, these 13 firms are not considered as 
firms listed in 2009.  
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The significance of the annual report has also been well argued in prior studies in 
emerging capital markets. Hassan and Christopher (1999) report that investment 
analysts in Malaysia regard the annual report as the most important source of 
information for investment decision making. Consistent with this finding, Ho and 
Wong (2004) find that investment analysts in Hong Kong consider annual reports as 
the most essential source of corporate information while it is considered a vital 
document as ranked by bank loan officers in emerging countries such as Kenya 
(Barako 2004). 
Consequently, the annual report is viewed as the main source for voluntary disclosure 
of information in both developed capital markets (Cooke 1989, 1992; McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe 1993; Frost and Pownall 1994; Meek, Roberts, and Gray 1995) and 
emerging capital markets (Ho 2009; Barako 2004; Xiao and Yuan 2007; Wang, Sewon, 
and Claiborne 2008; Ferguson, Lam, and Lee 2002; Samaha and Dahawy 2011). 
Accordingly, the focus on annual reports in this thesis is appropriate, as it is consistent 
with previous voluntary disclosure literature in both mature and emerging capital 
markets. 
Whilst the annual report is an important source of information for corporate 
disclosure, there are many other means by which a firm can disclose information, 
such as a press release, or through the Internet. Because of the growth of the 
Internet, recent studies have examined the disclosure level of a firm via the Internet 
(Oyelere, Laswad, and Fisher 2003; Matherly and Burton 2005; Khan 2006; Hanifa, 
Rashid, and Hafiz-Majdi 2006; Xiao, Yang, and Chow 2004). Yet, according to the 
Ministry of Finance on their investigation of listed firms’ website availability, not all 
listed firms in Vietnam have a website and even if they do, they do not update it 
regularly (Ministry of Finance 2009). Due to the limited usage of these websites by 
Vietnamese listed firms, this form of disclosure is not analyzed in this study. Thus, 
the annual report remains the primary vehicle for Vietnamese listed firms to 
disseminate information to its shareholders. 
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The following section details the development and measurement of the dependent 
variable in this thesis: the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI). 
4.4 Dependent Variable 
The extent of a firm’s voluntary disclosure in this thesis is measured using an index 
from a composite measure of items that are carefully selected and screened and 
are tailored to the unique environment of Vietnam’s corporate reporting practices. 
The construction process for this Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI) is 
described in the next sub-sections. 
4.4.1 Development of Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index 
A scientific approach to implementing a disclosure index is to gauge the level of 
disclosure. This approach was first introduced by Cerf (1961) in his study of 527 US 
listed firms during 1956 and 1957. Since then, many accounting studies have 
applied similar methods to measure both the quantity and quality of disclosure. 
Whilst many studies utilize disclosure indices, there has not been a uniform method 
of selecting and measuring the disclosure items for each index. Cooke and Wallace 
(1989, 51) state that “financial disclosure is an abstract concept that cannot be 
measured directly”. However, they argue that a disclosure index can be used to 
capture the intensiveness of corporate information communicated by the firms. 
According to Marston and Shrives (1991), there is no general rule to offer guidance on 
the selection of items to measure voluntary disclosure. As a result, researchers can 
adopt or adapt an existing index (with some modifications) or even create a new 
index tailored to the needs of their specific research environment. 
Some researchers adopt an externally developed index to measure the level of 
disclosure. For instance, Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Hope (2003) adapt the 
Centre for International Financial Analysis Research (CIFAR) index whilst Khanna, 
Palepu and Srinivasan (2004) use the Standard and Poor’s Transparency and 
Disclosure Index (S&P). Despite being objective and comprehensive, these indices 
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possess some disadvantages. In particular, they are constructed based on the 
financial analysts’ perception of useful information for both mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure and therefore, they are not direct measures of voluntary 
disclosure practices. Moreover, an externally developed index is often designed by 
and for the organisation that develops it, and therefore offers low construct 
validity36 because it is not designed to answer the specific research question of a 
researcher (Bushee 2004; Webb, Cahan, and Sun 2008). 
Alternatively, researchers can take a researcher-developed approach and create a 
new index to capture disclosure practices in a particular environment. For example, 
Cooke (1989) evolves a selection of voluntary disclosure items based on the 
disclosure recommendations of the Swedish Institute of Authorized Public 
Accountants and the International Standards Committee. In Cooke’s (1989) study, a 
list of 146 items is compiled to examine the level of voluntary disclosure of Swedish 
firms. Such self-developed disclosure indices allow researchers to focus solely on a 
particular theme, and offer more validity than an externally developed index. 
Another researcher-developed approach is one in which the researcher firstly 
adopts an existing index and then makes modifications to produce an index that is 
reliable and appropriate to gauge the disclosure level of their specific research 
environment. This approach has been employed extensively in the voluntary 
disclosure literature of both developed and emerging capital markets. Specifically, 
Hossain, Perera and Rahman (1995) develop a New Zealand disclosure index based 
on earlier studies in other countries such as the US and the UK (Gray, Meek, and 
Roberts 1992), Sweden (Cooke 1989) and Mexico (Chow and Wong-Boren 1987), as 
well as on prior studies of New Zealand (McNally, Eng, and Hassaeldine 1982). Their 
index firstly examines New Zealand’s mandatory regulations and is critically revised 
by three accountants with expertise in New Zealand’s reporting regulations. Their 
final result is a list of 95 items from an initial list of 110. Meek, Roberts and Gray 
(1995, 561) compile a disclosure index based on “an analysis of international trends 
                                                          
36
 The validity of a measuring instrument is the property of a measure that allows the researcher to 
measure the object that it is supposed to measure (Babbie 2010). 
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and observations of standard reporting practices”. Their checklist begins with 128 
items and after screening against various mandatory requirements in the US, the UK 
and Europe, a final index of 85 items is developed. Ferguson, Lam and Lee (2002) 
initially produce a list of 102 items with reference to earlier studies in the US and UK 
(Gray, Meek, and Roberts 1992) and New Zealand (Hossain, Perera, and Rahman 
1995). Their list is then compared with mandatory disclosure requirements in Hong 
Kong to eliminate mandated items, resulting in a final list containing 93 items. 
Wang, Sewon and Claiborne (2008) develop a Chinese voluntary disclosure index 
based on earlier studies in Sweden (Cooke 1989), Hong Kong (Ferguson, Lam, and 
Lee 2002), the US, UK and Europe (Meek, Roberts, and Gray 1995) and their final 
disclosure index consists of 79 items. Ho (2009) develops a unique voluntary 
disclosure index for Malaysian listed firms by adapting several prior studies of 
voluntary disclosure, including those of Hossain, Tan, and Adams (1994) Hossain, 
Perera, and Rahman (1995), Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995), Gray, Meek, and 
Roberts (1992), Botosan (1997), Gul and Leung (2004), Haniffa and Cooke (2002; 
2005), Barako, Hancock, and Izan (2006), Ghazali and Weetman (2006) and 
screening these lists using independent experts with specific knowledge of 
Malaysian accounting practices. Of their initial list consisting of 151 original items, 
85 are included in the final index to capture the level of voluntary disclosure in 
Malaysian listed firms for 1996, 2000 and 2006 (Ho 2009). 
The above review supports the use of a disclosure index as a proxy to examine the 
level of voluntary disclosure. Accordingly, this thesis utilizes an index of disclosure 
to measure the level of voluntary disclosure by Vietnamese listed firms. Since there 
has been no known prior research on voluntary disclosure indices undertaken in 
Vietnam, as a starting point, this thesis adapts several well-known studies that have 
been utilized widely in the literature of voluntary disclosure. These studies include 
Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995), Ferguson, Lam and Lee (2002), Xiao and Yuan 
(2007), Ho (2009), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) and Wang, Sewon and Claiborne 
(2008). Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) is chosen as the primary source for this 
thesis on the basis that their extensive checklist is not only a result of “an analysis of 
international trends and observations of standard reporting practice, taking into 
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account the relevant research studies as well as other comprehensive international 
surveys of accounting and reporting” (Meek, Roberts, and Gray 1995, 561), but also 
is referred to frequently in later literature of voluntary disclosure. The remaining 
studies above are taken into consideration because they are conducted in emerging 
countries, which are more likely to share similar characteristics to Vietnam’s 
emerging capital markets. 
Several steps are involved in the construction of the Vietnamese Voluntary 
Disclosure Index (VnDI) as explained in the following sub-sections. 
4.4.1.1 Selection of Items for Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index 
The composition of the initial VnDI consists of two steps. 
First, an extensive review of previous studies on voluntary disclosure is undertaken 
to identify commonalities and consistency between these disclosure indices. To be 
included in the disclosure index, an item needs to have been mentioned in more 
than one of the key prior studies of Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995), Ferguson, Lam 
and Lee (2002), Hannifa and Cooke (2002), Xiao and Yuan (2007), Ho (2009), 
Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain and Yao (2009) and Wang, Sewon and Claiborne 
(2008). This method of items selection is consistent with previous studies (e.g., 
Hossain, Tan, and Adams 1994; Hossain, Perera, and Rahman 1995; Barako 2004; 
Alsaeed 2005; Xiao and Yuan 2007; Wang, Sewon, and Claiborne 2008; Ho 2009). 
The initial disclosure index contains 119 individual items (Table B.1 in Appendix B). 
Second, the items selected in the index are then categorized into five key sub-
categories, according to the users’ need for information. These five sub-categories 
are identified as relevant to investigate the level of voluntary disclosure in emerging 
markets (Ho 2009; Barako 2004): 
1. Corporate and Strategic Information Disclosure: consists of general firm 
information and strategic activities such as acquisition and disposal, 
research and developments (Meek, Roberts, and Gray 1995). This 
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information has been documented in previous literature as important for 
both financial analysts and shareholders (Meek, Roberts, and Gray 1995; 
Barako 2004; Ho 2009). 
2. Financial and Capital Market Data Disclosure: is any monetary information 
disclosed by the firms. According to Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995), this 
information includes segment information, foreign currency transactions, 
financial review information and updates and news on the stock prices of 
the firms. This information has been reported as crucial for shareholders in 
their investment decision making (Meek, Roberts, and Gray 1995; Ferguson, 
Lam, and Lee 2002). 
3. Directors and Senior Management Information Disclosure: relates to any 
information about the management of the firms. For instance, directors’ 
remuneration, directors’ ages and their experience (Ho 2009; Ferguson, 
Lam, and Lee 2002; Meek, Roberts, and Gray 1995; Barako 2004). Such 
information is useful as shareholders or suppliers need to know the 
experience and potential of management in order to determine the 
sustainability of the firm. 
4. Forward Looking Information Disclosure: information that enables investors 
to make predictions about the future. It includes assessments of 
opportunities and risks, activities, plans, forecasted earnings, forecasted 
performance of firms (Clarkson, Kao, and Richardson 1994; Celik, Ecer, and 
Karabacak 2006). Disclosures such as these may provide useful information 
for investors in making their investment decisions.  
5. Corporate Social Reporting Information Disclosure: represents any 
information that concerns the moral obligations or ethical activities that 
firms have engaged in to minimize any harm towards the community, 
environment, employees, and consumers (Belal 2001; Cahaya, Porter, and 
Brown 2006; Dobers and Halme 2009; Said, Zainuddin, and Haron 2009). 
Given that increasing attention has been paid towards global warming and 
ethical issues in recent years, this information is valuable not only to 
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shareholders but also to other stakeholders such as environmentalists, 
policy makers and society as a whole. 
The final screening of these items and the compilation of the final unique 
Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI) are detailed in the next section. 
4.4.1.2 Screening of Items for VnDI 
As this is one of the first known voluntary disclosure studies of Vietnam, extra steps 
were carried out during the screening process. These steps were taken in order to 
better validate the index and to specifically capture the level of voluntary disclosure 
among listed firms in Vietnam. 
First, an interview was carried out with a senior staff member of the State Securities 
Commission of Vietnam (SSC). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the SSC is the body 
responsible for issuing regulations and monitoring the activities of all listed firms in 
the stock market. This particular senior staff member had been involved with the 
development of many of the Vietnamese regulations in the financial regulatory 
framework for listed firms and thus was very knowledgeable, with expertise in 
corporate reporting regulations. The questions during this interview37 focused on 
the regulatory framework surrounding mandatory disclosure among listed firms. 
Following on from the knowledge gained from this first interview, a series of 
document searches was carried out. As a result, several mandatory regulations for 
corporate disclosure of listed firms in Vietnam are identified. These are: 
● Vietnamese Accounting Standards 2003 (including Decision 15/2006/QD–BTC, 
which provides reporting guidelines for annual reports of all firms in Vietnam). 
● Vietnamese Law on Accounting 2003. 
● Securities Law 2006. 
                                                          
37 The interview was carried out in accordance with Curtin University of Technology’s Ethical Requirements for 
Research with Low Risk, and this study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Approval Number ACC-04-10). 
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● Circular 38/2007/TT-BTC Guidance for Information Disclosure on Stock Exchange 
(under Securities Law 2006). Although it is named as ‘Guidance’, this document 
acts as a mandatory regulation governing the level of corporate disclosure 
among all Vietnamese listed firms. In particular, section II, sub-section 1.1.4 
states that all listed firms are obliged to prepare their annual reports according 
to the Format 2–CBTT–02 provided in the Circular. 
Second, the original list of 119 items (Section B.1 of Appendix B) is critically 
reviewed by experts with specific knowledge and practical experience of 
Vietnamese corporate financial reporting38. The purpose of verification by these 
experts is to incorporate their opinions about the relevance of each disclosure item 
in the context of Vietnamese financial reporting environment. The experts include: 
● The managing partner of one of the 'Big Four' auditing firms (KPMG, EY, 
Deloitte, and PWC), with more than five years of Vietnamese auditing 
experience. 
● Several senior auditors in former state auditing firms and several local and non-
state auditing firms, in both Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. These individuals each 
have at least ten years of auditing experience in Vietnam. 
As the focus of this thesis is on voluntary disclosure practices of listed firms, the 
preliminary lists of 119 items are sent with the request that they are screened 
against the mandatory regulations. Previous studies in emerging capital markets 
(Ferguson, Lam, and Lee 2002; Barako 2004; Xiao and Yuan 2007; Ho 2009) also 
employ this approach to construct a disclosure index that uniquely captures the 
disclosure practice in their research environment. 
 
                                                          
38
 These surveys are conducted according to Curtin University of Technology’s Ethical Requirements 
for Research with Low Risk.  
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Of the 20 surveys sent to the experts39, 12 are returned (representing a 60 per cent 
response rate)40. However, only eight responded with thorough and comprehensive 
replies and thus, a final useable response rate 40 per cent is achieved. According to 
Smith (2003), a response rate of less than 25 per cent is common in accounting 
research. As a result of these responses, 25 items are removed as they are found to 
be mandatory under various regulations. Of these 25 items, 24 items are from the 
Circular 38/2007/TT-BTC requirement and one item (off balance sheet financing 
information) is mandated to be disclosed in the financial reports of all firms (listed 
and unlisted) under Decision 15/2006/QD-BTC of Vietnamese Accounting Standards 
2003 (Section B.2 of Appendix B). 
Third, to further strengthen the validity41 of the VnDI, follow-up interviews are held 
with three individual Vietnamese experts42 in order to more fully understand the 
concerns and reasons surrounding the items recommended for exclusion from the 
index. From these interviews, a further ten items are recommended for exclusion as 
they are deemed to have little or no relevance to the reporting environment of 
Vietnam. The reasons for excluding these 35 items are provided in greater detail in 
Section B.2 of Appendix B. 
Given the exploratory nature of this research in the Vietnamese context, the above 
steps are necessary to obtain a unique index specifically tailored to capture the 
level of corporate voluntary disclosure in Vietnam. Based on the response from the 
                                                          
39
 The surveys are delivered in person to the offices of these individuals.  
40
 Among 12 of the 20 surveys returned, nine are returned within the first three weeks of 
distributing the survey. The author then conducted follow-up phone calls and emails to request 
the return of the remaining surveys. As the result, three are collected by the author at the offices 
of the participants. The remaining eight surveys did not respond to the follow-ups.  
41
 Babbie (2010, 146) defines validity as “the extent to which an empirical measure adequately 
reflects the real meaning of the concept under consideration”. For instance, this study measures 
the level of voluntary disclosure of information and thus the index should only contain items that 
are voluntary disclosure. Steps have been taken to eliminate items mandated for disclosure by 
various regulations; including items not relevant to the precise measurement of the level of 
voluntary disclosure (see Appendix B).  
42
 Upon completing the survey, experts are asked whether or not they are interested in engaging in 
a follow-up interview to discuss their answers. Three participants agreed, and interviews are 




survey and its follow-up interviews, a final list of 84 items for the VnDI is compiled. 
This list is detailed in Section B.3 of Appendix B. 
4.4.2 Measuring Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index 
According to the extant literature, there are four distinct types of measurement for 
a disclosure index. Table 4.3 provides a summary of these approaches. 
Table 4.3      Classifications of Disclosure Measurement 
Types Scoring Measurement 
1 Dichotomous Equal weightings of all items (unweighted 
approach). 
2 Dichotomous Differential weightings of all items (weighted 
approach). 
3 Qualitative (Range of 
scores e.g. 0-3)  
Equal weightings of all items (unweighted 
approach). 
4 Qualitative (Range of 
scores e.g. 0-3) 
Differential weightings of all items (weighted 
approach). 
Sources: various (Coy, Tower, and Dixon 1993; Suhardjanto 2008).  
Legend: Shaded row represents the measurement for disclosure index utilized in this thesis. 
1. In the first type of disclosure index, each item is equally weighted and 
expressed in a dichotomous form, whereby a firm is given one (1) for a 
disclosed item and zero (0) otherwise. This approach assumes that all items 
are equally important, and thus reduces subjectivity in determining weights 
for each item (Ahmed and Curtis 1999). This is by far the most common 
approach used in the extant literature of voluntary disclosure (e.g., Meek, 
Roberts, and Gray 1995; Hossain, Perera, and Rahman 1995; Ho and Wong 
2001; Ferguson, Lam, and Lee 2002; Naser, Al-Khatib, and Karbhari 2002; 
Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Xiao and Yuan 2007; 
Ho 2009).  
2. An alternative form of the dichotomous system is when all items are 
measured according to the deemed importance of each item to the specific 
research environment. The weighting of each item may be determined by 
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the researcher or by specific groups of respondents. For instance, in 
Robbins and Austin (1986), 20 out of 27 items in their disclosure index are 
assigned a score of 100 for disclosure of an item and zero (0) otherwise. 
These items are then weighted by bond analysts, based on their 
perceptions of the importance of each item in evaluating the financial 
condition of a city issuing general obligation debt. Similarly, Barako (2004) 
measures the extent of voluntary disclosure in Kenya based on the opinions 
of bank loan officers on the importance of each term. 
3. The third type of disclosure is different from the above two indices in a way 
that all items are ranked individually, according to the quality of 
information each contains and all items are weighted equally. In particular, 
in Coy, Tower and Dixon (1993), a three-point quality scale of disclosure 
items is implemented with (1) one awarded for items with poor criteria; (2) 
two for items with satisfactory criteria and; (3) three for items with 
excellent criteria. 
4. Finally, the fourth type of disclosure index is a qualitative range of scores 
for each item, and all items are awarded with different weights according to 
the interested parties’ perceptions of relevance or importance. In Robbins 
and Austin (1986), four out of 27 items in the disclosure index are awarded 
a score using a four-point percentage scale (0 to 100 per cent)43. These 
items are then weighted by bond analysts according to their importance in 
evaluating the financial condition of a city issuing general obligation debt 
(Robbins and Austin 1986). 
The second, third and fourth disclosure index approach may be more discriminating 
in certain cases. However, the level of subjectivity in measurement is considered far 
higher and thus, these approaches are not adopted in this thesis. This thesis 
therefore adopts the first approach.  
                                                          
43
 In their study, an item is given (1) zero if there is no disclosure; (2) 25 per cent if disclosure ranges 
between 1–10 words; (3) 50 per cent if disclosure is 11–30 words; (4) 75 per cent if disclosure is 
31–60 words and (5) 100 per cent if disclosure exceeds 60 words (Robbins and Austin 1986). 
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4.4.2.1 Weighting the Items of Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index  
Previous studies that apply a weighted approach (Botosan 1997; Eng and Teo 1999) 
do so on the basis that not all items in annual reports are of equal importance. 
However, this approach has been criticized in the extant literature as being 
subjective (Cooke 1989). It is difficult to quantify a user’s preference for a particular 
disclosure item. For instance, an item ranked five for importance or relevance is not 
necessarily five times more important or more relevant than an item with a ranking 
of one. Furthermore, the weighting of items is generated by different user groups, 
and may reflect the bias of these specific groups of users (Marston and Shrives 
1991) and reflects their perception rather than the actual information needs (Chow 
and Wong-Boren 1987). 
On the other hand, an unweighted approach offers lower subjectivity as it assumes 
that each item of disclosure is equally important for all users in decision making 
processes (Cooke 1989; Meek, Roberts, and Gray 1995). Cooke (1989, 15) argues 
that “an approach which tried to encapsulate the subjective weights of a multitude 
of users groups would be unwieldy, and probable futile”. Thus, if the focus of a 
study is on all users and not a specific group, then an unweighted approach is most 
appropriate. Furthermore, many prior studies on voluntary disclosure in emerging 
capital markets that employ both weighted and unweighted approaches find no 
significant difference between the two approaches (Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; 
Barako 2004). Table 4.4 presents a summary of previous studies and their various 
weighting approaches of disclosure items. 
As the focus of this thesis is on general voluntary disclosure to all users, it is 
considered most appropriate to adopt an unweighted disclosure index because this 
has been documented as being less subjective and judgemental. Furthermore, it can 
be seen from Table 4.4 that the vast majority of studies on voluntary disclosure 
practices in both developed and emerging economies adopt the less subjective 
unweighted approach. Therefore, the decision of adopting the unweighted 
approach for Vietnamese voluntary disclosure scores is considered appropriate. 
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Unweighted scoring approach  
1993 New Zealand (Coy, Tower and 
Dixon) 
1989 Sweden (Cooke) 
2000 Hong Kong (Chen and Jaggi) 1992 Japan (Cooke) 
2001 Hong Kong (Ho and Wong) 1995 New Zealand (Hossain, Perera, and Rah-
man) 
2009 New Zealand (Jiang and 
Habib) 
1995 Switzerland (Raffournier) 
  1995 US, UK and European (Meek, Roberts, 
and Gray) 
  1997 Spain (Inchausti) 
  1998 New Zealand (Adams and Hossain) 
  1998 Zimbabwe (Owusu-Ansah) 
  2002 Hong Kong (Ferguson, Lam, and Lee) 
  2002 Jordan (Naser, Al-Khatib, and Karbhari) 
  2002 Malaysia (Haniffa and Cooke) 
  2003 Singapore (Eng and Mak) 
  2004 Greece (Leventis and Weetman) 
  2005 Australia (Collett and Hrashky) 
  2005 Australia (Lim, Matolcsy, and Chow) 
  2006 Malaysia (Ghazali and Weetman) 
  2006 Singapore (Luo, Courtenay, and Hossain) 
  2007 China (Xiao and Yuan) 
  2007 Ghana (Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu, and 
Onumah) 
  2007 Turkey (Agca and Onder) 
  2007 Zimbabwe (Mangena and Tauringana) 
  2008 China (Wang, Sewon, and Claiborne) 
  2008 Ireland (Donnelly and Mulcahy) 
  2009 Malaysia (Akhtaruddin et al.) 
  2009 Qatar (Hossain and Hammami) 
  2010 Malaysia (Akhtaruddin and Haron) 
  2011 Malaysia (Ho and Tower) 
1987 Mexico (Chow and Wong-Boren): utilize both weighted and unweighted approach 
2004 Kenya (Barako): utilizes both weighted and unweighted approach 
Legend: The table above highlights previous studies of voluntary disclosure and their 
disclosure item weighting approach. Studies that utilize both weighted and unweighted 
approaches usually find no significant difference between the two. 
 
The following section further explains the procedure of scoring each item to 
produce a final disclosure score. 
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4.4.2.2 Scoring the Items of the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index 
One problem with scoring a voluntary disclosure index is that it is difficult to justify 
whether or not an item is considered relevant to any specific criterion. For example, 
an inventory item is likely to be irrelevant to financial or service firms. To minimize 
the subjectivity surrounding this issue, the following procedures are taken. 
First, each annual report of the firms is read twice. The first reading allows the 
researcher to gain familiarity with the operating environment of the firm. This 
provides the researcher with the necessary knowledge of the scope and activities of 
the firm in order to justify whether or not certain items are applicable to that 
specific firm. The second reading is then taken to award the score for that firm. This 
multi-layered approach is commonly used in the study of voluntary disclosure of 
emerging markets, as in Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Barako (2004) and Ho (2009). 
Second, the scoring sheet is piloted in 45 firms to ensure the scoring method 
applied in this thesis is reliable (Vu, Tower, and Scully 2011). Furthermore, 
according to Marston and Shrives (1991), a disclosure score is considered reliable if 
the result obtained by an independent researcher is a close replication of the 
original result. Therefore, in order to better ensure the reliability44 of the disclosure 
scores for Vietnamese listed firms, another researcher (who is an accounting 
academic and is also doing a Ph.D in accounting) is involved in the scoring of the 84 
disclosure items. A sample of 20 annual reports in the year 2009 (representing 8.1 
per cent of total sample) is randomly selected for this reliability check. To ensure 
the scoring method is correctly applied, detailed, clear instructions for scoring each 
item within the voluntary disclosure index are discussed between the author and 
the independent researcher. This method is introduced by Buzby (1975) and then 
followed by many researchers in their studies of voluntary disclosure (Ho 2009). The 
results between the two researchers reveal no significant differences (the results of 
these scores are displayed in Appendix C). Based on the results, the potential 
subjectivity problem arising from the scoring procedure against the disclosure 
                                                          
44




instrument is not deemed an issue in this thesis. Therefore, the scores of the 
Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index in this thesis are considered reliable.  
Finally, the disclosure score from each firm is recorded in a scoring sheet and firms 
are scored against the voluntary disclosure index. The scoring procedures are: 
1. Each firm is given a point of one (1) for a disclosure item within the check 
list and zero (0) otherwise. 
2. The scoring of each item is added to compute the total disclosure score 
achieved by a particular firm. 
3. The total disclosure score is divided by the total maximum possible 
voluntary disclosure score. 







VnDIi = Voluntary disclosure index for i
th firm; 
ni = voluntary disclosure item applicable to i
th firm (n ≤ 84 items); 
Xi = Dummy variable to the value of one (1) for disclosed item and dummy 
variable to the value of zero (0) for otherwise; so that: 
0 = VnDIi ≤ 1 
The use of the above relative style index is employed in several studies such as 
Buzby (1975), Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995), Owusu-Ansah (1998), Wang, Sewon 
and Claiborne (2008) and Ho (2009). This technique of dividing the actual score by 
the maximum score possible for a firm is applied to prevent firms being penalized 
for non-disclosure of irrelevant items. For instance, for firms in the services 
industry, items such as: 'Picture of major products'; 'Discussion of Research and 
Development activities'; 'Breakdown and analysis of operating expenses'; 
'Breakdown and analysis of operating expenses into fixed/variables'; 'Discussion of 
raw materials'; and 'Index of selling prices/quantity sales/raw materials prices' are 
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deemed to be less relevant. And as such, instead of the maximum score of 84, these 
firms' scores are divided by 76.  
There is no unequal weighting attached to the scoring of the final VnDI (as discussed 
in Section 4.3.2.1). Marston and Shrives (1991) assert that an index is valid if it 
represents the intention of the researcher. Since the focus of this thesis is on 
voluntary disclosure to all groups of users (as mentioned earlier), an unweighted 
scoring approach is appropriate. 
In the next section, the operationalization of independent variables (the proportion 
of independent directors on corporate boards, the proportion of state ownership, 
managerial ownership and foreign ownership) are discussed. 
4.5 Independent Variables 
Previous studies indicate that corporate governance mechanisms, particularly the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards, are an important 
determinant of a firm’s information disclosure levels (Eng and Mak 2003; Xiao and 
Yuan 2007; Ho, Tower, and Taylor 2008). The selection of ownership structure 
variables is based on the assumption that depth of information disclosure varies 
between firms, as different firms have different types of agency relationships 
(Naser, Al-Khatib, and Karbhari 2002). Accordingly, the key independent variables 
examined in this research include: the proportion of independent directors on 
corporate boards and the three ownership identity variables of state, managerial 
and foreign ownership. Table 4.5 presents the measurement of these four 




Table 4.5      Measurements of Independent Variables 
Independent 
variables 





Number of independent directors stated in the 
2009 annual report of firm i, divided by the total 
number of all directors (both independent and 
non-independent) in the 2009 annual report of 




Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by 
the Vietnamese government in firm i at the cut-
off date specified in the 2009 annual report of 
firm i, divided by the total number of ordinary 
outstanding shares of firm i at the cut-off date 





Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by 
senior managers on corporate boards in firm i at 
the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual 
report of firm i, divided by the total number of 
ordinary outstanding shares of firm i at the cut-






Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by 
foreign owners in firm i at the cut-off date 
specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i, 
divided by the total number of ordinary 
outstanding shares of firm i at the cut-off date 
specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i. 
Continuous  
Legend: The above table describes the measurements for the independent variables of this 
thesis. 
The measurement technique used for each of the independent variables is 
described below.  
4.5.1 Corporate Governance Proxy 
Previous literature suggests that agency theory provides a framework linking the 
disclosure behaviour of a firm to its corporate governance (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Ho and Wong 2001; Eng and Mak 2003; Barako 
2004; Ho 2009). Corporate governance mechanisms are implemented to improve 
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the monitoring of managers’ behaviour so that shareholders can protect themselves 
from fraud or diversion of assets by managers. Past studies of voluntary disclosure 
examine corporate governance aspects in many ways, but the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards has been by far the most common 
measurement for corporate governance (Forker 1992; Eng and Mak 2003; Gul and 
Leung 2004; Barako, Hancock, and Izan 2006; Lim, Matolcsy, and Chow 2007; 
Malone, Fries, and Jones 1993; Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005; Lakhal 2005; 
Chen and Jaggi 2000; Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Akhtaruddin et al. 2009).  
Therefore, consistent with the majority of literature, the proportion of independent 
directors divided by the total number of directors on firm corporate boards is used 
as a proxy to measure corporate governance (Table 4.5). 
4.5.2 State Ownership 
As in previous studies (Naser, Al-Khatib, and Karbhari 2002; Eng and Mak 2003; Xiao 
and Yuan 2007; Xiao, Yang, and Chow 2004; Wang, Sewon, and Claiborne 2008), 
state ownership is determined in this thesis by the percentage of shareholding 
owned by the state over the total issued shares of the company (Table 4.5).  
4.5.3 Managerial Ownership 
Similar to state ownership, managerial ownership is measured using a ratio. It is 
calculated by the percentage of shares held by senior managers on corporate 
boards45 over the total issued shares of the company (Eng and Mak 2003; Leung and 
Horwitz 2004; Xiao and Yuan 2007) (Table 4.5). 
                                                          
45
  Circular 38/2007/TT-BTC Guidance for Information Disclosure on Stock Exchange (under Securities 
Law 2006) requires all Vietnamese listed firms to disclose the proportion of shares held by 
managers on the firm’s corporate board. And thus, with little else disclosed about managers, this 
thesis defines managerial ownership as the proportion of shares held by senior managers on 
corporate boards.  
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4.5.4 Foreign Ownership 
Over the years, the Vietnamese government has taken various steps to increase 
foreign ownership by reducing restrictions. As of 31st December 2009, the 
ownership ceiling for foreign investors in listed firms is 49 per cent. Consistent with 
the majority of previous studies in emerging capital markets (Haniffa and Cooke 
2002; Barako, Hancock, and Izan 2006; Wang, Sewon, and Claiborne 2008), in this 
thesis, foreign ownership is measured by the percentage of shareholding by foreign 
investors over the total issued shares of the company (Table 4.5). 
4.6 Control Variables 
To test the main hypotheses, this thesis includes a number of firm-characteristics 
control variables (firm size, profitability, leverage, industry, auditing firm, listing 
duration and stock exchange location in order to minimize cross-sectional 
variations. These control variables are included, as they are reported in the 
literature to be associated with voluntary disclosure. 
4.6.1 Firm Size 
Firm size has often been reported as a significant explanatory variable in previous 
studies of voluntary disclosure practices. Considerable research notes a significant 
and positive relationship between firm size and information disclosure (Chow and 
Wong-Boren 1987; Cooke 1989; Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Cooke 1992; 
Raffournier 1995; Leung and Horwitz 2004; Wang, Sewon, and Claiborne 2008; Xiao, 
Yang, and Chow 2004; Xiao and Yuan 2007; Jiang and Habib 2009; Ghazali and 
Weetman 2006). According to Hossain, Perera and Rahman (1995), agency costs 
increase with the firm size. Thus, it is expected that larger firms will have more 
incentives to provide information in order to reduce agency costs. On the other 
hand, in smaller firms, managers may have less incentive to provide information 
due to fear of disclosing information that may give their competitors valuable 
information (Raffournier 1995). Furthermore, Singhvi and Desai (1971) offer a 
number of reasons why a firm’s size may affect its level of corporate disclosure. 
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First, information costs in bigger firms are fewer than in smaller firms. Second, it has 
also been posited in the literature that larger firms are more sensitive to political 
costs, thus, these firms disclose more information in order to alleviate public 
criticism or government intervention in their affairs. Third, larger firms are likely to 
have a wider variety of investors and so, the demand for information disclosure in 
these firms is higher than in smaller firms. As such, bigger firms are more likely than 
smaller firms to disclose more information to satisfy such demands. 
4.6.2 Profitability 
Empirically, prior studies find a significant positive relationship between the extent 
of voluntary disclosure and firm profitability (Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Ghazali and 
Weetman 2006; Mangena and Tauringana 2007). Moreover, a commonly held view 
is that more profitable firms usually disclose more information than less profitable 
firms, as the former have incentives to distinguish themselves from the latter. 
Agency theory suggests that managers of more profitable firms use external 
financial reporting information as a tool to enhance their personal advantages, such 
as: remuneration, promotions or bonuses (Singhvi and Desai 1971; Wallace and 
Naser 1995; Inchausti 1997) and to improve shareholders' value as a way to attract 
additional capital (Grossman and Hart 1980). Moreover, Ng and Koh (1994) posit 
that there is more public scrutiny for more profitable firms and thus, these firms are 
likely to engage in self-regulation mechanisms, such as enhancing corporate 
disclosure to avoid future external regulation.  
4.6.3 Leverage 
Agency theory indicates that firms face higher agency costs with higher leverage 
because higher leverage may result in higher monitoring costs (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Consequently, in order to reduce agency costs and improve information 
asymmetry, managers of firms with higher leverage may disclose more information 
to provide creditors, suppliers and investors with more assurance that the firm can 
meet its financial obligations. Some past studies of corporate disclosure find a 
significant association between leverage and corporate disclosure (Xiao, Yang, and 
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Chow 2004; Hossain, Tan, and Adams 1994; Barako, Hancock, and Izan 2006). On 
the other hand, there are few studies reporting that leverage lacks significant 
influence on the level of corporate disclosure (Ho and Tower 2011; Alsaeed 2005). 
4.6.4 Industry 
Verrecchia (1983) argues that the sector of operations influences the disclosure 
policy of corporations and therefore an industry variable should be included. 
Previous studies find that the type of industry can be an explanatory key for some 
of the variations in firms’ disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Barako 2004; Ho 
2009). Wallace and Naser (1995) argue that firms from different industries may be 
subject to different mandatory disclosure practices and hence, they may implement 
different voluntary disclosure practices. Furthermore, Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Ng 
and Koh (1994) posit that highly regulated industries may be subject to more 
rigorous controls, which may affect the disclosure practices of the company in this 
industry. Cooke (1992) reports that Japanese manufacturing firms provide more 
information than Japanese non-manufacturing firms while Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
find that industry type is related to voluntary disclosure practices in Malaysia. 
Consistent with Hackston and Milne’s (1996) study, this thesis classifies industries 
categorically as high-profile and low-profile, with one (1) allocated for firms listed in 
high-profile industries and zero (0) for low-profile industries. High-profile industries 
are those in: agricultural and associated sectors, chemicals, energy and fuel, 
engineering, forestry, liquor and tobacco, media and communications, mining, 
transport and tourism. Low-profile industries are industries such as: building 
construction, electrical, finance and banks, food, investment, medical supplies, 
meat and by-products, miscellaneous services, property, retailers, and textiles and 
apparel. 
4.6.5 Auditing Firm 
Additionally, extant literature indicates that variations of corporate disclosure may 
be caused by differences in the types of auditing firms (Singhvi and Desai 1971). This 
is because it is assumed that big auditing firms are more concerned with their 
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reputations and thus, they are more likely to associate with firms that provide 
adequate information, or they encourage clients to disclose more. Agency theory 
suggests that firms exercise their choice of auditor as a mechanism to reduce 
conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers, as auditing facilitates 
shareholders in the monitoring process (Watts and Zimmerman 1990; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). In particular, Wallace and Naser (1995) note that quality auditing 
firms, such as the 'Big Four' auditing firms, try to improve their perceived audit 
quality by encouraging their clients to participate in disclosing more information.  
4.6.6 Listing Duration  
Previous research suggests that the extent of voluntary disclosure of a firm is 
positively associated with firm age. Owusu-Ansah (1998) argues that the extent of 
the information disclosure of a firm depends on its listing duration, as it is a proxy 
for the firm’s stage of development and growth. Owusu-Ansah (1998) further 
advances a few reasons why in general, older listed firms are expected to disclose 
more information than newly listed firms. First, younger firms may face competitive 
disadvantages of information if they disclose certain items. Second, the cost of 
gathering, processing and disseminating information is more costly in younger firms 
and also, younger firms may lack information history records, which may lead to 
lower information disclosure. Third, Alsaeed (2005) posits that older firms tend to 
engage in a higher level of disclosure because these firms may enhance their 
financial reporting practices over time. As the Vietnamese capital market is 
increasing more rapidly every year, the numbers of newly listed firms play a 
significant role in the capital market population. Thus, an age-based listing duration 
variable of older versus newly listed firms is included in this thesis. 
4.6.7 Stock Exchange Location 
Given that Ho Chi Minh City was controlled by its colonial ‘master’ the French 
(1858–1954) and later came under the management of the US (1954–1975), Ho Chi 
Minh City arguably displays more of a Western influence whereas Hanoi, the 
Northern capital, is more closed up in its historical ‘communist’ way (as discussed in 
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Chapter 2). Although the country reunited in 1975 and its economy has opened up 
for more than 20 years since ‘Doi Moi’, culturally Ho Chi Minh City still appears to be 
more ‘open’ than its capital Hanoi. In addition to this difference, there is a five-year 
gap between the opening of the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange (HOSE was opened in 
2000) and the newer Hanoi stock exchange (HNX was established in 2005). 
Therefore, there may be a difference between the information disclosure 
environments of firms listed on these two stock exchanges. Within Vietnam, it is 
often perceived that HOSE listed firms are a better investment than HNX listed 
firms. For instance, according to a report of credit ratings analysis from the Credit 
Ratings Information Centre of Vietnam (2010), in general, HOSE listed firms perform 
better than HNX listed firms. Thus, managers of HOSE listed firms may provide more 
information in order to enhance this perception and to further distinguish them 





Table 4.6      Measurements of Control Variables 
Control variables Measurements of independent variables Type of 
variable 
Firm size (SIZE) Natural logarithm total assets of firm i as 




Ratio of net profit to total assets of firm i as 
reported in the 2009 annual report. 
Continuous 
Leverage (LEV) Ratio of total liabilities to total assets of firm i 
as reported in the 2009 annual report. 
Continuous 
Industry (IND) The value of one (1) is given if the firm i is in 
the high-profile industries category and zero 




The value of one (1) is given if the audit firm i 
is audited by the 'Big Four' auditing firms and 




The value of one (1) is given if the firm i is 
newly listed in year 2009 and zero (0) for 




The value of one (1) is given if the firm i is 
listed on Ho Chi Minh stock exchange and 
zero (0) for firms listed on Hanoi stock 
exchange. 
Categorical 
Legend: The above table describes the measurements for control variables of this thesis. 
4.7 Statistical Analysis 
Descriptive figures and related statistics (descriptive and t-tests) are employed to 
determine the means, medians and standard deviation of each variable. The results 
of these tests are provided in Chapter 5. To minimize the problem of 
multicollinearity between variables, two correlation matrices are presented via 
statistical tools such as Pearson (parametric test) and Spearman (non-parametric 
test) variants (Chapter 5). The multiple regression model (Ordinary Least Squares—
OLS) is the primary method used to test the associations between the dependent 
variable of voluntary disclosure and the predictor variables (Chapter 6). To add 
depth to the thesis, binary logistic regression is also conducted to further 
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investigate the impact of predictor variables on certain key voluntary disclosure 
items. The next sub-sections overview each of these statistical tests.  
4.7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are used to provide descriptions or inferences about a data set 
(Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). According to Cooper and Schindler (2008), descriptive 
statistics help to explain the centre, spread and shape of data distributions. In this 
thesis, descriptive statistics are used to calculate the means, medians, range and 
variance of dependent variables of the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index 
(VnDI) and its five sub-categories, the four independent variables of independent 
directors on corporate boards, state ownership, managerial ownership, foreign 
ownership and the seven control variables of: firm size, leverage, profitability, 
industry, auditing firms, listing duration and stock exchange location (Chapter 5). 
For the continuous variables, histograms are also plotted (Appendix D). For 
categorical variables, percentages and number-per-case are presented.  
4.7.2 T-tests 
T-tests are used to detect any significant difference between the means of two 
independent groups (Field 2009). This thesis utilizes t-tests to examine the 
independent variables of state ownership, managerial ownership, foreign 
ownership and the categorical control variables of industry, auditing firms, listing 
duration and stock exchange location. For instance, a series of t-tests are conducted 
as a beginning investigation of the relationships between the continuous dependent 
variables (VnDI and its five sub-categories) and for the categorical control variables 
(Chapter 5). 
4.7.3 Correlations 
“Correlation coefficients measure the strength of associations or relationships 
between two variables” (Field 2009, 783). The strength of association ranges from 
minus one to plus one. This thesis utilizes Pearson and Spearman correlations to not 
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only detect the strength of the relationships between variables, but also to detect 
the issue of multicollinearity between variables. Multicollinearity exists when two 
or more independent variables can explain the dependent variable well, but they 
may be highly correlated. If multicollinearity exists in an equation, it could be 
difficult to distinguish the individual effects of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable (Cooper and Schindler 2008). Inclusion of such variables in the 
equation can weaken the analysis by inflating the size of error terms (Tabachnick 
and Fidell 2007). According to Cooper and Schindler (2008), the two variables are 
considered highly correlated at 0.8 or a greater level46. 
4.7.4 Multiple Regression 
Multiple regression analysis is a statistical tool that is often employed to linearly 
test the relationships between a single dependent variable and a set of predictor 
variables (Cooper and Schindler 2008). In this thesis, the main statistical method 
utilized to test the association between the dependent variable of Vietnamese 
Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI) and the independent variables of independent 
directors on corporate boards and three ownership identities (state, managerial and 
foreign ownership) is the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. These are 
Hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H4 (Chapter 3). A number of control variables are also 
included in the regression model in order to minimize cross sectional variations. The 
control variables (firm size, profitability, leverage, industry, auditing firms and listing 
duration) are commonly used in previous studies of voluntary disclosure practices in 
emerging countries, while the stock exchange location variable is added based on 
the distinctive economic and reporting behaviour of Vietnam.  
The regression model of this thesis is as follows: 
VnDIi = λi + β1CGi + β2STATE + β3MANi + β4FOREIGNi + γ1SIZEi + γ2PROFITi + γ3LEVi + ∑i 
=1δ jINDi + ∑k=1δkAUDITi +∑m=1δmLISTINGi + ∑n=1δnLOCi +	    [Model 1] 
                                                          
46
  To better test the multicollineariy issue, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) score is calculated. 
VIF is a widely used method for detecting and measuring the multicollinearity problem for 





VnDIi = Ratio of Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure items reported by firm i in the 
2009 annual report; 
CGi = Number of independent directors stated in the 2009 annual report of firm i, 
divided by the total number of all directors on corporate boards (both independent and non- 
independent) in the 2009 annual report of firm i; 
STATEi = Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by the government in firm i as 
at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i, divided by the total number 
of ordinary outstanding shares of firm i as at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual 
report of firm i; 
MANi = Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by senior managers on the 
corporate boards in firm i as at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i, 
divided by the total number of ordinary outstanding shares of firm i as at the cut-off date 
specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i; 
FOREIGNi = Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by foreign investors in firm i as 
at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i, divided by the total number 
of ordinary outstanding shares of firm i as at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual 
report of firm i; 
SIZEi = Natural logarithm total assets of firm i as reported in the 2009 annual 
report; 
PROFITi = Ratio of net earnings to total assets of firm i as reported in the 2009 annual 
report; 
LEVi = Ratio of total debt to total assets of firm i as reported in the 2009 annual 
report; 
INDi = Categorical variable to control for industry differences with industry firm i is 
given a dummy variable in the value of one (1) if the firm is in High-profile industries; 
otherwise zero (0); 
AUDITi = Categorical variable to control for auditor differences with the auditing firm 
of the 2009 annual report of firm i is given a dummy variable in the value of one (1) if the 
auditing firm is one of the 'Big Four', otherwise zero (0); 
LISTINGi = Categorical variable to control for listing duration differences with firm i is 
given a dummy variable in the value of one (1) if it is newly listed in the year 2009, 
otherwise zero (0); 
LOCi = Categorical variable to control for listing location differences with firm i 
listed on the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange in the year 2009 is given a dummy variable in the 
value of one (1), otherwise zero (0); 
λi = Regression constant. 
β1,2…n, γ1,2…n    = Coefficients to independent and control variables. 
I =  Firm specific. 
 = Error of prediction. 
 
The multiple regression model and statistical results are presented in Chapter 6. The 




4.8 Sensitivity Analysis 
A number of sensitivity tests are undertaken to further the analysis (see Section 6.3, 
Section 6.4 and Appendix H). Different proxies are used for the key variables to 
ensure that different methods of measuring the constructs do not completely drive 
the overall results and conclusions. Table 4.7 presents the alternate measurements 
of the dependent variable and independent variables for the sensitivity analysis. 
● Sub-analysis tests of the five major sub-categories of the VnDI are conducted. 
These sub-categories are: (i) Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and Strategic 
Information Index (VnCSI), (ii) Vietnamese Voluntary Financial Capital Market 
Data Index (VnFCMI), (iii) Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior 
Management Disclosure Index (VnDSMI), (iv) Vietnamese Voluntary Forward 
Looking Information Index (VnFLI), and (v) Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate 
Social Reporting Disclosure Index (VnCSRI) (Barako 2004; Ho 2009). The purpose 
of these tests is to enrich the understanding of voluntary disclosure of 
information. Particularly, these tests examine the impact of predictor variables 
on different types and sub-categories of information disclosure.  
● To generate further insights on individual disclosure items and related 
explanatory factors, 16 key items47 within the index of 84 voluntary disclosure 
items are specifically selected for unique regression analysis against the 
predictor variables. These tests are conducted via a logistic regression statistical 
tool. The main objective of conducting extra analyses on these individual items 
is to explore the potential predictors for disclosure of certain key individual 
voluntary disclosure items. 
● On the basis that Vietnamese regulation requires at least one third of 
independent directors on corporate boards, extra analysis is carried out 
between two groups of firms: those that comply with this requirement and 
those that do not. The purpose of this extra test is to investigate whether it 
                                                          
47
  The selection of these 16 items is based on the top three most disclosed items of each sub-
category. For the Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure sub-category, 
there are two items that have the same scores and thus, the sensitivity tests are carried out for 
the four items within this sub-category.   
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makes any difference about the voluntary disclosure practices between firms 
that comply with the corporate governance and firms that do not. Additionally, 
corporate governance mechanisms are measured by the dominant role of a 
chairperson who is also a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the firm. A dummy 
variable of one (1) is given if the firm has a chairperson who is also a CEO and 
zero (0) for otherwise (Al-shammari and Al-sultan 2010; Barako 2007; Chau and 
Gray 2010; Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Gul and Leung 2004). Furthermore, 
extra analysis is also carried out to test the impact of corporate board size (the 
number of members within corporate boards) on the extent of Vietnamese 
voluntary disclosure. The purpose of these tests is to provide support for a 
more comprehensive understanding of the role of corporate governance 
mechanisms within Vietnamese listed firms.  
● State, managerial and foreign ownership48 are alternatively measured using 
dummy variables, such as: one (1) for the presence of state, managerial, and 
foreign ownership respectively, and zero (0) otherwise (Ho and Wong 2001; Ho 
2009; Gelb 2000; Xiao and Yuan 2007). Additionally, state, managerial and 
foreign ownership are then re-examined in low and high ownership 
concentration categories (above and below the 20 per cent level). Many studies 
on the ownership concentration in Asian economies utilize this 20 per cent cut-
off level (La Porta et al. 2000; Fan and Wong 2002; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 
2000). The objectives of these tests are to provide further support for the main 
findings of this thesis and are conducted as ways to mitigate the problems of 
endogeneity that can bias the interpretation of the results of the main thesis. 
These additional results are presented in Appendix H, while a discussion of the 
endogeneity issue is provided in Appendix I. 
  
                                                          
48
 Prior empirical studies indicate that ownership structure and corporate disclosure can be 
simultaneously determined (Makhija and Patton 2004). Endogeneity is considered an important 
limitation in empirical studies (Healy and Palepu 2001). It has been argued that endogeneity 
caused by firms’ unobservable specific factors, and omitted variables such as operational 
characteristics between firms, may produce bias in the Ordinary Least Square regression 
(Nikolaev and Van Lent 2005). The endogeneity issue is discussed in greater detail in Appendix I. 
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Table 4.7      Measurements of Variables for Sensitivity Analyses 
Primary analysis Sensitivity analysis  Measurement 
Dependent variable   
VnDI (a total 
disclosure index that 
includes 5 major 
sub-categories) 
Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and Strategic Disclosure 
Index (VnCSI). 
Vietnamese Voluntary Financial and Capital Market Data 
Disclosure Index (VnFCMI). 
Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior Management 
Disclosure Index (VnDSMI). 
Vietnamese Voluntary Forward Looking Information 
Disclosure Index (VnFLI). 
Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting 







Dummy variable is given the value of one (1) if the firm 
meets the requirement of at least one third of 
independent directors on corporate boards and zero (0) 
for otherwise. 
Dummy variable is given the value of one (1) if the firm 
has a CEO who is also a chairperson and zero (0) for 
otherwise. 
Corporate board size is measured by the number of 








State ownership Dummy variable is given the value of one (1) if the firm 
has state ownership and zero (0) for otherwise. 
Dummy variable is given the value of one (1) if the firm 
has a proportion of state ownership greater than 20 per 




Dummy variable is given the value of one (1) if the firm 
has any managerial ownership and zero (0) for 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable is given the value of one (1) if the firm 
has a proportion of managerial ownership greater than 
20 per cent and zero (0) for otherwise. 
Categorical 
Foreign ownership Dummy variable is given the value of one (1) if the firm 
has any foreign ownership and zero (0) for otherwise. 
Dummy variable is given the value of one (1) if the firm 
has a proportion of foreign ownership greater than 20 
per cent and zero (0) for otherwise. 
Categorical 




This chapter provides a general description of the research approach applied to this 
thesis, and in particular the objectivist-positivist research process. To investigate 
the issue of voluntary disclosure practices, a one year cross-sectional sample that 
includes 252 listed firms (accounting for 56.30 per cent of the available population) 
in the Vietnamese stock exchange population for the financial year ending 31st 
December, 2009 is analyzed. The annual report is the focus of this thesis because of 
its primary role in communication between firms and stakeholders in Vietnam. 
In order to specifically capture the voluntary disclosure practices of Vietnamese 
listed firms, a unique Vietnamese voluntary disclosure index is constructed. From 
the original list of 119 items gathered from the existing literature, the final index for 
the VnDI is developed and reduced to 84 items. These items are selected with their 
relevance as verified by Vietnamese accounting experts. 
The measurements of the independent variables such as corporate governance, 
state ownership, managerial ownership and foreign ownership, as well as control 
variables including firm size, profitability, leverage, industry, auditing firm, listing 
duration and stock exchange location are provided. Statistical analyses employed in 
this thesis are outlined. A number of sensitivity tests undertaken to further the 
analysis of this thesis are also noted. Different proxies are used for the key variables 
to ensure that different ways of measuring the various constructs do not, in 
themselves, drive the overall results and conclusions. 
The next chapter provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, 
independent variables and control variables. 
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CHAPTER 5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapters 1 to 4 provide an overview of this thesis, the background of Vietnamese 
reporting infrastructure, the literature review and hypotheses development, and 
the research approach utilized in this thesis. This chapter presents the findings 
related to Research Question 1: 'What is the extent of voluntary disclosure made by 
Vietnamese listed firms in the 2009 comprehensive annual reports?’ To answer this 
question, details of the descriptive statistics information for the: dependent 
variable Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI); independent variables, 
namely the percentage of independent directors on corporate boards, the 
percentage of three ownership identities (state, managerial, and foreign 
ownership); and control variables of firm-characteristics, such as firm size, leverage, 
profitability, industry, auditing firm, listing duration and stock exchange location—
are presented by highlighting the mean, median and standard deviations. Univariate 
statistics are also presented to offer preliminary insights into the inter-relationships 
between variables. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides an overview of the overall 
VnDI, its five key sub-categories of disclosure and the descriptive statistics of certain 
key items within the disclosure index. The statistical results for the corporate 
governance variable (percentage of independent directors on corporate boards) 
and three ownership identity variables (state, managerial and foreign ownership) 
are presented in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, results of the descriptive statistics for 
the control variables are presented. Section 5.5 highlights the univariate analysis 
findings for the categorical control variables. Section 5.6 summarizes the results for 
Pearson/Spearman product-moment correlations of the research variables and 
considers the possible presence of multicollinearity. Finally, Section 5.7 provides a 




5.2 Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI) 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for the Vietnamese Voluntary 
Disclosure Index (VnDI), its key sub-categories and the 84 individual items within 
the index. The VnDI consists of 84 items that are then categorized into five sub-
categories of voluntary information disclosure, namely: (i) Corporate and Strategic 
Information; (ii) Financial and Capital Market Data; (iii) Directors and Senior 
Management Information; (iv) Forward Looking Information; and (v) Corporate 
Social Reporting Information. 
5.2.1 Overall VnDI and its Five Major Sub-Categories 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for VnDI and each of the five key sub-
categories of information. The data is derived from 252 annual reports for 
Vietnamese listed firms in the year 2009 (see discussion of the sample in Chapter 4). 
The shaded area represents the overall VnDI which is at 20.31 per cent49 (ranging 
from 3.75 per cent to 50.00 per cent). The median is lower at 19.05 per cent, and 
the standard deviation is 9.07 per cent. 
  
                                                          
49
  As mentioned in Section 1.6 and Section 4.3.1, one of the limitations of this study is that there 
are 170 listed firms (representing nearly 40 per cent of the Vietnamese listed firms’ population) 
that did not provide annual reports for the year 2009 (Table 4.2). The unavailability of these 
annual reports may impact on the generalization of the thesis results. Appendix E presents extra 
analyses on this non-response bias phenomenon. As seen in Appendix E, there are significant 
differences between firm-characteristics of firms in the respondent group (firms with 
comprehensive annual reports) and non-respondent groups (firms without comprehensive 
annual reports). In particular, firms providing annual reports are found to have the following 
characteristics: i) bigger firm size, ii) higher profitability, iii) lower leverage, iv) in high-profile 
industries, v) audited by the 'Big Four' auditing firms, vi) older listing firms and/or vii) firms listed 
on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE). As bigger firms, firms with higher profit, firms in high-
profile industries, firms audited by the non-'Big Four' auditing firms, older listing firms and firms 
listed on HOSE are found to be significantly associated with increased voluntary disclosure (Table 
6.1), this thesis argues that if these 170 non-respondent firms were to be included in the thesis 
analysis, the level of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure would likely be even lower than this 20.31 
per cent figure (Table 5.1). 
 
157 
Table 5.1      Descriptive Results of VnDI and Five Sub-Categories 
 VnDI VnDSMI VnCSI VnFLI VnFCMI VnCSRI 
Mean (%) 20.31 47.49 26.48 21.88 17.39 16.22 
Median (%) 19.05 33.33 25.00 21.43 16.00 12.50 
SD (%) 9.07 29.12 16.80 16.53 8.98 13.16 
Minimum (%) 3.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum (%) 50.00 100.00 81.82 78.57 48.15 62.50 
Legend: VnDI is the acronym for Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (shaded) with its 
five sub-categories are Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior Management Disclosure 
Index (VnDSMI), Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and Strategic Information Index (VnCSI), 
Vietnamese Voluntary Forward Looking Information Index (VnFLI), Vietnamese Voluntary 
Financial Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI) and Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate Social 
Reporting Disclosure Index (VnCSRI). SD = standard deviation and number of firms = 252. 
As shown in Table 5.1 above, the sub-category of Directors and Senior Management 
Information has by far the highest level of communication (a mean of 47.49 per 
cent) while Corporate Social Reporting Information has the lowest disclosure at 
16.22 per cent. Falling in the middle at 26.48 per cent is the disclosure of Corporate 
and Strategic Information. The final two sub-categories, Forward Looking 
Information and Financial Capital Market Data rates are somewhat lower at 21.88 
per cent and 17.39 per cent respectively. Figure 5.1 presents the mean of the 




Figure 5.1  VnDI  and Five Sub-Categories of Information 
 
Legend: Figure 5.1 presents graphically the mean of Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index 
score and its five sub-categories. VnDI is the acronym for Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure 
Index (shaded) with its five sub-categories are Vietnamese Directors and Senior 
Management Disclosure Index (VnDSMI), Vietnamese Corporate and Strategic Information 
Index (VnCSI), Vietnamese Forward looking Information Index (VnFLI), Vietnamese Financial 
Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI) and Vietnamese Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure 
Index (VnCSRI). Number of firms = 252. 
5.2.2 Individual 84 Items of VnDI 
This section details the mean disclosure score of each individual item within the 84-
item Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index. Table 5.2 below shows the levels of 
voluntary disclosure across the sample firms per category of specific individual 






















Table 5.2      Descriptive Results of Individual Items of VnDI (84 items) 
Items of Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (84 items) Mean (%) 
Directors and Senior Management Information (3 items) 47.49 
Identification of senior management and their functions 83.33 
Other directorships held by directors 37.30 
Picture of senior management team  21.83 
Corporate and Strategic Information (14 items) 26.48 
Statement of strategy and objectives – financial  53.57 
Statements of strategy, implementation measures improve 
business 
49.60 
General discussion of industry trends (past) 38.89 
Discussion of competitive environment  29.37 
Discussion of Research and Development activities  28.97 
Descriptive information of marketing network (foreign) 25.79 
Statement of strategy and objectives – social 25.00 
Physical output and capacity utilization  24.60 
Picture of major products 24.21 
Discussion of future products developments 22.62 
Descriptive information of marketing network (domestic) 19.05 
Rate of return on expected projects 3.57 
Discussion on the impact of strategy on future results 0.40 
Discussion on the impact of strategy on current results 0.00 
Forward Looking Information (14 items) 21.88 
Forecast of sales – quantitative 60.71 
Forecast of profits – quantitative 60.32 
Assumptions underlying forecast  40.87 
Discussion of external factors affecting the firm's future (econom-
ics, politics and technology) 
38.89 
General discussion of future industry trend 30.16 
Forecast of sales – qualitative 18.25 
Forecast of profits – qualitative 17.06 
Discussion on future expenditure 12.70 
Discussion on the effects of foreign currency on future operating 
activities 
8.33 
Discussion on the effects of inflation on future operating activities 7.14 
Discussion on the effects of interest rates on future operating 
activities 
5.95 
Index (selling prices/quantity sales/raw materials prices) 4.76 
Forecast of cash flows – quantitative 0.79 
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Items of Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (84 items) Mean (%) 
Forecast of cash flows – qualitative 0.40 
Financial and Capital Market Information (29 items) 17.39 
Name of stock exchange firm is listed on 89.68 
Profitability ratio  76.59 
Volume of shares traded (year end) 60.16 
Gearing ratios  56.35 
Breakdown and analysis of sales and revenues  38.89 
Discussion of raw material  25.40 
Discussion of advertising, marketing activities - qualitative 18.25 
Discussion on the effects of interest rates on current results 14.68 
Discussion on the effects of foreign currency on current results 13.49 
Share prices information (year end) 12.70 
Other ratios that are not mandatory 10.71 
Share price information (trend) 10.32 
Major exchange rates used in the accounts 7.94 
Discussion on the effects of inflation rates on current results 7.94 
Breakdown and analysis of operating expenses 7.57 
Discussion of foreign currency exposure to firms' activities by 
managers 
6.75 
Volume of shares traded (trend) 6.35 
Competitors analysis  5.16 
Market capitalization at year end 4.76 
Market share analysis 4.76 
Return on capital employed ratio  3.97 
Market capitalization trend 2.38 
Discussion of advertising, marketing activities - quantitative 1.59 
Breakdown and analysis of administrative expenses 1.59 
Cash flow ratio  1.19 
Aging of debtors 0.40 
Disclosure of intangible valuations (except goodwill and brands) 0.00 
Breakdown and analysis of operating expenses into fixed/variables 0.00 
Order book or backlog information 0.00 
Corporate Social Reporting Information (24 items) 16.21 
Employee appreciation 52.38 
Company awards 47.41 
Discussion on the safety of the products 27.78 
Community programs (health and education) implemented  27.78 
Discussion of workplace safety (costs and measurement) 26.59 
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Items of Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (84 items) Mean (%) 
Nature of training 25.00 
Statements concerned with wealth created (value added 
statement) 
23.02 
General philanthropy 22.22 
Breakdown of line-of-business distribution of employees 19.05 
Discussion on the effects of Employment Contract Act 18.65 
Participation in government social campaigns 15.08 
Charitable donations (specific names/amounts) 13.49 
Statement of firm's environmental policies 11.90 
Categories of employees by gender 11.51 
General retrenchment or redundancy information  9.13 
Environmental protection programs (qualitative) 7.54 
Number of employees trained 6.75 
Reasons for changes in employees numbers or categories 5.56 
Amount spent on training 4.37 
Geographical distribution of employees 3.97 
Equal opportunity policy statement 2.78 
Data on accidents 2.38 
Picture of employee's welfare 1.59 
Environmental protection programs (quantitative) 0.79 
Overall VnDI 20.31 
Legend: All 84 items are calculated as the average mean of 252 sample firms based on their 
2009 annual reports. The mean averages of the five key sub-categories are also measured. 
In the category Directors and Senior Management Information, communication of 
various items ranged from 21.83 to 83.33 per cent, with the highest disclosure 
being 'identification of senior management team and their functions' and the 
lowest being 'picture of senior management team'. 
In terms of Corporate and Strategic Information, whilst more than half (53.57 per 
cent) of the sample firms outline their 'strategy and financial objectives', only a 
quarter of them (25.00 per cent) disclose 'strategy and social objectives'. In 
addition, whilst many firms discuss their 'strategy, implementation measures to 
improve their business' (49.60 per cent), none of them (0 per cent) disclose 'its 
impact on current results' and only a small number of firms (0.40 per cent) provide 
'a statement discussing the impact of its strategy on future results'. Information 
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related to 'rate of return on expected projects' also has a very low disclosure level 
at 3.57 per cent. 
From an accountability and stewardship perspective, future prospect information is 
important to enable investors to make better economic decisions. For Forward 
Looking Information, more than half of the sample firms provide 'forecasted 
information for their sales and profit in quantitative terms' (60.71 and 60.32 per 
cent respectively). Yet, very few of them discuss their 'forecasted issues for their 
cash flow' (0.79 per cent for quantitative and 0.40 per cent for qualitative 
information). 'Discussion of external factors affecting the firm’s future' and 'general 
discussion of industry trend in the future' are disclosed at 38.89 and 30.16 per cent 
respectively. 
Within the category of Financial and Capital Market Data, there are four items that 
have greater than 50 per cent communication, namely: 'name of stock exchange 
firm is listed on' (89.68 per cent), 'profitability ratio' (76.59 per cent), 'information 
on the volume of shares traded by the end of year' (60.16 per cent) and 'gearing 
ratios' (56.35 per cent). However, there are 14 other items that have a below ten 
per cent level of disclosure: 'major exchange rates used in the firm’s accounts', 
'discussion on inflation rates on current results', 'breakdown and analysis of 
operating expenses', 'administrative expenses', 'discussion of foreign currency 
exposure by management', 'the trend of volume of share trades during the year', 
'analysis of the firm’s competitors', 'market capitalization information at year end as 
well as its trend', 'market share analysis', 'return on capital employed ratio', 
'discussion of advertising and marketing activities', 'cash flow ratio' and information 
regarding 'aging of the firm’s debtors'. Moreover, within these 14 items, there are 
three items that are not mentioned at all among the sample of Vietnamese listed 
firms; these are the disclosures of: 'intangible valuations', 'breakdown and analysis 
of operating expenses into fixed/variables' and 'order book or backlog information'. 
Corporate Social Reporting Information has the lowest rate of disclosure among the 
sample of Vietnamese listed firms (16.21 per cent). Among those, 'employee 
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appreciation' information is the most transparent, with more than half of the firms 
disclosing this information in their annual reports (52.38 per cent). Other than 
'employee appreciation' information, Vietnamese listed firms seem to focus very 
little on information regarding employee training. For instance, 'nature of training' 
is disclosed at 25 per cent, 'number of employees trained' is communicated at 6.75 
per cent, while information on 'amount on training' is disclosed at only 4.37 per 
cent. Interestingly, while some firms disclose their firm’s participation in 
'philanthropic activities' (22.22 per cent), the 'specific amounts or specific names' of 
their donations are disclosed at a low rate of 13.49 per cent. Overall, there are ten 
items that have a less than ten per cent rate of disclosure (Table 5.2). 
In conclusion, among the 84 voluntary disclosure items within the list of VnDI, 
disclosure levels vary widely. Vietnamese sample firms disclose most about the 
'location of the stock exchange they are listed on' (89.68 per cent). This is followed 
by 'profitability ratios' (76.59 per cent) and 'quantitative information regarding the 
forecast of sales and profits' (60.71 per cent and 60.32 per cent respectively). A 
major finding is that 76 of the 84 items in the entire index have a less than 50 per 
cent rate of disclosure, with 36 of these items having disclosure levels of under ten 
per cent. 
Further analyses of key individual items in the VnDI conducted via logistic regression 
are presented in Chapter 6. The objective of these tests is to explore the potential 
predictors for disclosure of certain noteworthy individual items. 
The section above provides descriptive results for the dependent variable and its 
five key sub-categories of information. The next section presents descriptive results 
for the four independent variables, namely: the proportion of independent 





5.3 Independent variables 
This section documents the descriptive statistics for the four independent variables. 
In particular, the following sub-sections provide the results for: the corporate 
governance proxy variable (Section 5.3.1), state ownership (Section 5.3.2), 
managerial ownership (Section 5.3.3) and foreign ownership (Section 5.3.4). These 
results reveal some very interesting facts regarding the characteristics of 
Vietnamese firms. 
5.3.1 Corporate Governance Proxy 
The descriptive results for the proportion of independent directors on corporate 
boards (CG) variable are presented in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3      Descriptive Results of Corporate Governance Proxy 
Panel A – Proportion of independent directors on corporate boards 
Number of 
firms 
Mean (%) Median 
(%) 




252 53.89 57.14 20.86 0.00 100.00 
Panel B – T-tests of two groups of independent directors on corporate boards 
 N Mean (%) MD (%) t-stats Sig. 






ID(>1/3) 222 20.80 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant difference. Sig. = significant level. 
*Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at 
the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). 
SD = standard deviation. MD = mean difference. The proportion of independent directors on 
corporate boards is measured by the total independent directors on corporate boards 
divided by the total members of corporate boards. ID (≤1/3) = firms that fail to meet the 
required 1/3 of independent directors on corporate boards and ID (>1/3) for otherwise. 
Number of firms = 252. 
Overall, across the 252 Vietnamese listed firms, the number of members on 
corporate boards of directors ranges from four to 11. The results in Table 5.3 
indicate that the percentage of independent directors on listed firms’ corporate 
boards is a moderate 53.89 per cent figure. This exceeds the minimum requirement 
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of corporate governance for Vietnamese listed firms of at least one third of 
independent directors on corporate boards. Yet, there are 30 firms that fail to meet 
this minimum requirement (with less than one third of independent directors on 
their corporate boards).  
Panel B of Table 5.3 reveals that the groups of firms that meet the required one 
third of independent directors on corporate boards disclose significantly more VnDI 
information (p-value = 0.021) than the group of firms that fails to have more than 
one third of independent directors on corporate boards (20.80 per cent versus 6.73 
per cent). Thus, it can be concluded that the proportion of independent directors on 
corporate boards has a positive impact on the voluntary disclosure practices of 
Vietnamese listed firms. This finding is consistent with H1.  
5.3.2 State Ownership 
Table 5.4 shows the descriptive statistics of state ownership for the sample of 252 
Vietnamese listed firms. Despite substantial efforts to privatize, the average 
proportion of state ownership in the Vietnamese sample is 26.93 per cent, with the 
highest proportion at a substantial 79.92 per cent (Panel A of Table 5.4).  
Panel B of Table 5.4 provides t-tests to examine the differences of disclosure levels 
between groups of firms with state ownership. Panel B reveals that among 252 
listed firms, there are 181 firms that are at least partially owned by the state, 
representing 71.83 per cent of the full data set. On the other hand, only 71 firms 
have no state ownership (28.17 per cent). Panel B also reports that firms with the 
presence of state ownership engage in voluntary disclosure at a level of 19.67 per 
cent, while firms without any presence of state ownership score a higher rate of 
voluntary disclosure at 21.94 per cent. The difference in voluntary disclosure scores 
for the two groups of firms is moderately significant (p-value = 0.083).  
Additionally, Panel C of Table 5.4 shows that there are 130 firms (51.20 per cent of 
the total sample firms) that have the state as an influencing shareholder (state 
ownership >20 per cent) and there are 123 firms (48.80 per cent of the total sample 
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firms) with equal to or less than 20 per cent state ownership. The results also report 
that the voluntary disclosure score for influencing state ownership firms (>20 per 
cent) is significantly lower (p-value = 0.013) than for the group of non-state 
influencing ownership (≤20 per cent). Overall, t-tests show that the proportion of 
state ownership in a firm is negatively and strongly associated with the extent of 
voluntary disclosure within Vietnamese listed firms. These findings provide initial 
support for H2. 
Table 5.4      Descriptive Statistics and T-tests Results of State Ownership 











252 26.93 20.62 24.14 0.00 79.92 
Panel B – T-tests VnDI and the presence of state ownership 
 N Mean (%) MD (%) t-stats Sig. 
State 181 19.67 
-2.27 -1.746 0.083*** 
No State 71 21.94 
Panel C – T-tests VnDI and the influencing state shareholders 
 N Mean (%) MD (%) t-stats Sig. 
State (>20%) 129 18.80 
-2.817 -2.506 0.013** 
State (≤20%) 123 21.61 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant difference. Sig. = significant level. 
*Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at 
the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). 
SD = standard deviation. MD = mean difference. State ownership (STATE) is measured by the 
number of ordinary outstanding shares held by the government divided by the total number 
of ordinary outstanding shares. Number of firms = 252. 
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5.3.3 Managerial Ownership 
As shown in Table 5.5, managerial ownership within the sample of 252 Vietnamese 
listed firms averages 12.77 per cent50. The highest managerial ownership in a firm is 
at 95.48 per cent.  
Table 5.5      Descriptive Statistics and T-tests Results of Managerial Ownership 











252 12.77 4.94 17.59 0.00 9.55 
Panel B – T-test VnDI and the presence of managerial ownership 
 N Mean (%) MD (%) t-stats Sig. 
Managerial 245 20.34 0.961 0.276 0.783 
No Managerial 7 19.38 
Panel C – T-test VnDI and the influencing managerial shareholders 
 N Mean (%) MD (%) t-stats Sig. 
Managerial 
(>20%) 




Legend: There is no statistically significant difference in Table 5.5. Sig. = significant level. 
*Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at 
the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). 
MD = mean difference. Managerial ownership (MAN) is defined by the number of ordinary 
outstanding shares held by senior managers on the board divided by the total number of 
ordinary outstanding shares. Number of firms = 252. 
Panel B of Table 5.5 reports that there are 245 firms (representing 97.22 per cent of 
total sample firms) that have at least some managerial ownership and only 7 firms 
(2.78 per cent of total sample firms) that do not have any managerial ownership. 
                                                          
50
 As mentioned in Section 4.4, this study measures managerial ownership as the proportion of 
shares disclosed by senior managers on the corporate boards. Therefore, the proportion of 
managerial ownership could be higher if the data for other senior managers who are not on the 




The difference between voluntary disclosure scores for the two groups of firms is 
not significant.  
Panel C of Table 5.5 also reveals that there are 60 firms that have an influencing 
level of managerial shareholders (managerial ownership >20 per cent), while there 
are 192 firms with managerial ownership of equal to or less than 20 per cent. Initial 
findings from the t-tests analyses indicate that managerial ownership is not a 
significant predictor in explaining the variations of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure 
and thus, H3 is not supported. 
5.3.4 Foreign Ownership 
Results reported in Table 5.6 indicate that the proportion of foreign ownership for 
Vietnamese listed firms has a mean of 9.80 per cent. The proportion of foreign 
ownership among the sample of Vietnamese listed firms ranges from zero to the 
legal ceiling of 49 per cent. There are no firms that breach the maximum ceiling of 
49.00 per cent foreign ownership. Across the sample of 252 listed firms, there is no 
foreign ownership in 19 firms. There are 46 firms with influential foreign 
shareholders (foreign ownership >20 per cent). The results of t-tests analyses in 
Panel B of Table 5.6 illustrate that affiliated foreign firms have higher means for the 
voluntary disclosure index (20.61 per cent) than is the case for non-foreign owned 
firms (16.68 per cent). The difference between the disclosure scores for these two 
groups is moderately significant (p-value = 0.069). 
Panel C of Table 5.6 further presents that where firms have influential foreign 
shareholders, these firms tend to engage in more voluntary disclosure practices 
(23.19 per cent) than other firms with no influential foreign ownership (19.67 per 
cent). The difference of disclosure scores for the two groups is significant (p-value = 
0.017). These initial results provide support for H4.  
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Table 5.6      Descriptive Statistics and T-tests Results of Foreign Ownership 











252 9.80 4.19 12.03 0.00 49.00 
Panel B – T-test VnDI and the presence of foreign ownership 
 N Mean (%) MD (%) t-stats Sig. 
Foreign 233 20.61 3.9310 1.826 0.069*** 
No Foreign 19 16.68 
Panel C – T-test VnDI and the influencing foreign shareholders 
 N Mean (%) MD (%) t-stats Sig. 
Foreign 
(>20%) 




Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant difference. Sig. = significant level. 
*Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at 
the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). 
SD = standard deviation. MD = mean difference. Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) is measured 
as ordinary outstanding shares held by foreign investors divided by the total number of 
ordinary outstanding shares of the firm. Number of firms= 252. 
Appendix D presents the histograms for the three independent variables (state, 
managerial and foreign ownership) as well the continuous control variables (firm 
size, leverage and profitability). The histograms of the three ownership identities 
variables in Appendix D (Figure D.2 to Figure D.4) reveal that these variables are not 
normally distributed. Specifically, the histograms for these three ownership 
identities show that there are many firms with zero state, managerial or foreign 
ownership (refer to Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6). Therefore, to minimize the bias of data, 
alternative measurements of these three ownership variables are considered in this 
thesis. Section 6.5 reveals the results of additional analyses carried out for 
alternative measurements of these three ownership identity variables. 
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5.3.5 Section Brief 
Overall, the descriptive statistics provide evidence indicating that 53.89 per cent of 
directors on corporate boards of 252 Vietnamese listed firms are independent 
directors. This average figure exceeds the minimum legal requirements for 
Vietnamese listed firms (at least 33 per cent of directors on corporate boards being 
independent). Yet, there are 30 firms that fail to meet this minimum. The average 
percentage of state ownership in this study is 26.93 per cent (with a range of zero 
to 79.92 per cent). Further, t-tests report that firms with state ownership engage in 
significantly less voluntary disclosure practices than firms without any involvement 
of state ownership. The proportion of managerial ownership is 12.77 per cent 
(ranging from a high figure of 95.48 per cent to 0.00 per cent). No significant 
difference is detected between voluntary disclosure scores for firms with and 
without managerial ownership. Additionally, the proportion of foreign ownership 
among the sample 252 Vietnamese listed firms is relatively low at an average 9.80 
per cent. The t-tests results show that firms with foreign ownership provide more 
voluntary disclosure of information than other firms. Furthermore, it is found that 
the three ownership identity variables each have a noticeable number of zero per 
cent of state or managerial or foreign ownership. Therefore, extra analysis is 
conducted in Section 6.5 to further explore this phenomenon. The next section 
presents descriptive results for the control variables. 
5.4 Control Variables 
This section presents descriptive statistics for the continuous control variables, 
namely: firm size – SIZE (measured by the natural log of total assets), leverage – LEV 
(calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets) and profitability of firms – 
PROFIT (calculated as the ratio of net profit to total assets). Then descriptive 
statistics and various t-tests for categorical control variables such as: industry type – 
IND (categorized as high-profile and low-profile industries), auditing firm – AUDIT 
(measured as a 'Big Four' auditing firm versus a non-'Big Four' auditing firm), listing 
duration – LISTING (classified as newly listed firms versus older listed firms) and 
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stock exchange location – LOC (as Ho Chi Minh stock exchange and Hanoi stock 
exchange) are presented.  
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
5.4.1.1 Continuous Variables 
As shown in Table 5.7, with regard to control variables, the total asset of sample 
firms has a mean of 1,310,501 million VND51 (with a standard deviation of 532,148 
million52 VND). The large difference between the mean and its median suggests the 
total assets variable is highly skewed (Figure D.5 in Appendix D). To minimize this 
problem, firm size is recomputed as the natural log of total assets (Hossain, Perera, 
and Rahman 1995), ranging between 9.97 and 17.12 with an average of 13.24 
(Figure D.5 in Appendix D). 
Table 5.7      Descriptive Results of Control Variables 
  TOTAL ASSETS 
(million VND) 
SIZE LEV (%) PROFIT (%) 
Mean 1,310,501 13.24 49.06 9.48 
Median 532,148 13.18 51.09 7.28 
SD 2,630,459 1.24 21.60 10.52 
Minimum 21,422 9.97 8.02 -32.92 
Maximum 27,238,665 17.12 98.23 87.84 
Legend: SD = standard deviation. Total assets are expressed in millions of Vietnam Dong 
(VND). Firm size (SIZE) is proxied by logarithm total assets of a firm to eliminate the 
skewness in the data. Leverage (LEV) is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets of a firm.  Profitability (PROFIT) is calculated as net profit divided by the total assets 
of a firm. Number of firms = 252. 
                                                          
51
 As of June 2012, this amount is approximately equal to 63 million USD. 
52
  As of June 2012, this amount is approximately equal to 25 million USD. 
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On average, the sample firms have a return on assets of 9.48 per cent, ranging 
between -32.92 per cent and 87.84 per cent53. The sample also has an average 
leverage ratio of 49.06 per cent, ranging from 8.02 per cent to 98.2 per cent. 
Appendix D illustrates the histograms of these continuous control variables. 
5.4.1.2 Categorical Variables 
As shown in Table 5.8, there are more firms within low-profile industries (61.10 per 
cent or 154 firms) than firms within high-profile industries (38.89 per cent or 98 
firms). Table 5.9 highlights that non-'Big Four' auditing firms provide auditing 
services for a majority of the Vietnamese listed firms (82.54 per cent or 208 firms). 
Also, as noted in Section 4.5, the Vietnamese capital market is increasing rapidly 
every year, with a considerable number of newly listed firms. Table 5.10 illustrates 
that among the 252 listed firms in the thesis sample, there are 69 newly listed firms 
in the year 2009 (representing 27.38 per cent of the sample). For the stock 
exchange location category, Table 5.11 reveals that there are more firms listed on 
the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (71.03 per cent or 179 firms) than on the Hanoi 
Stock Exchange (28.97 per cent or 73 firms).  
5.4.2 Univariate Statistics 
T-tests are carried out on the dependent variable VnDI, including its five key sub-
categories and the categorical predictor variables, namely industry (IND), auditing 
firm (AUDIT), listing duration (LISTING) and stock exchange location (LOC).  
5.4.2.1 Voluntary Disclosure and Industry 
Table 5.8 reports that on average, there is no significant difference between the 
overall level of voluntary disclosure, as well as the five sub-categories, made by 
firms within high-profile industries and firms within low-profile industries. Thus, 
                                                          
53
 Besides having all data entry cross-checked many times, an additional checking process has been 
competently carried out for the top 30 and lowest 30 sets of numbers for all continuous control 
variables to ensure the accuracy of the data. 
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initial results for the univariate statistics indicate that industry type does not have 
any impact on the level of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure.  
Table 5.8      Descriptive and T-tests Results of Industry Category 
Panel A – T-tests VnDI and industry category 
Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
High-profile 
industries 




Panel B – T-tests VnDI sub-categories and industry category 
Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and Strategic Information Index (VnCSI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
High-profile 
industries 




Vietnamese Voluntary Financial Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
High-profile 
industries 




Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior Management Disclosure Index (VnDSMI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
High-profile 
industries 




Vietnamese Voluntary Forward Looking Information Index (VnFLI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
High-profile 
industries 




Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure Index (VnCSI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
High-profile 
industries 




Legend: There is no statistically significant difference in Table 5.8. IND = industry categories of high 
and low-profile; VnDI is the acronym for Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (shaded), with its five 
sub-categories, namely: Vietnamese Directors and Senior Management Disclosure Index (VnDSMI), 
Vietnamese Corporate and Strategic Information Index (VnCSI), Vietnamese Forward Looking 
Information Index (VnFLI), Vietnamese Financial Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI) and Vietnamese 
Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure Index (VnCSRI). Number of firms= 252. 
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5.4.2.2 Voluntary Disclosure and a Firm’s Auditing Firm 
As shown in Table 5.9, the overall level of voluntary disclosure for firms audited by 
the 'Big Four' auditing firms is not significantly different from firms audited by non-
'Big Four' auditing firms.  
Table 5.9      Descriptive and T-tests Results of Auditing Firm Category 
Panel A – T-tests VnDI and firm’s auditing firm category 
Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
'Big Four' 44 22.13 0.024 1.468 0.143 
Non-'Big Four' 208 19.93 
Panel B – T-tests VnDI sub-categories and auditing firm category 
Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and Strategic Information Index (VnCSI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
'Big Four' 44 30.51 0.49 1.757 0.080
*** 
Non-'Big Four' 208 25.63 
Vietnamese Voluntary Financial Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
'Big Four' 44 18.92 0.02 1.249 0.213 
Non-'Big Four' 208 17.06 
Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior Management Disclosure Index (VnDSMI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
'Big Four' 44 50.76 0.04 0.820 0.413 
Non-'Big Four' 208 46.79 
Vietnamese Voluntary Forward Looking Information Index (VnFLI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
'Big Four' 44 22.56 0.01 0.301 0.764 
Non-'Big Four' 208 21.73 
Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure Index (VnCSI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
'Big Four' 44 17.63 0.02 0.782 0.435 
Non-'Big Four' 208 15.92 
Legend: Shaded area denotes statistically significant difference. Sig. = significant level. *Correlation is 
highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). AUDIT = auditing firm. 'Big Four' 
auditing firms are KPMG, Ernst and Young, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International and 
PriceWaterhouse Coopers. The non-'Big Four' auditing firms category includes all other auditing 
firms. VnDI is the acronym for Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (shaded) with its five sub-
categories, namely: Vietnamese Directors and Senior Management Disclosure Index (VnDSMI), 
Vietnamese Corporate and Strategic Information Index (VnCSI), Vietnamese Forward looking 
Information Index (VnFLI), Vietnamese Financial Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI) and Vietnamese 
Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure Index (VnCSRI).Number of firms= 252. 
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Within the five sub-categories of information, firms that are audited by the 'Big 
Four' auditing firms tend to provide moderately to significantly more information in 
regard to the firm’s general and strategic information (p-value = 0.080). The results 
for the other four sub-categories are consistent with the result of overall voluntary 
disclosure with no significant difference for the two groups of firms. There seems to 
be no add-on effect of 'Big Four' auditing firms for most of the Vietnamese 
reporting information. 
5.4.2.3 Voluntary Disclosure and Firms' Listing Duration Category 
Table 5.10 shows that there are 69 newly listed firms, which is nearly one third of 
the total sample. On average, newly listed firms (firms listed in 2009) at a highly sig-
nificant level (p-value = 0.001) provide less voluntary disclosure of information than 
firms that have been listed on the stock exchange for more than a year (17.39 per 
cent versus 21.41 per cent). Further univariate statistics on the five sub-categories 
confirm significant differences for the disclosure of these two groups of firms (p-
values < 0.100). Thus, it can be argued that listing duration is a predictor for explain-




Table 5.10      Descriptive and T-tests Results of Listing Duration Category 
Panel A – T-tests VnDI and firms' listing duration category 
Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
New 69 17.39 -4.02 -3.198 0.001
*
 
Not new 183 21.41 
Panel B – T-tests VnDI sub-categories and firm’s listing duration category 
Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and Strategic Information Index (VnCSI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
New 69 20.47 -8. 28 -3.571 0.000
*
 
Not new 183 28.75 
Vietnamese Voluntary Financial Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
New 69 16.03 -1.87 -1.473 0.071
***
 
Not new 183 17.90 
Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior Management Disclosure Index (VnDSMI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
New 69 43.00 -6.19 -1.507 0.067
***
 
Not new 183 49.18 
Vietnamese Voluntary Forward Looking Information Index (VnFLI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
New 69 19.46 -3.33 -1.430 0.077
***
 
Not new 183 22.79 
Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure Index (VnCSI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
New 69 12.94 -4.51 -2.452 0.008
*
 
Not new 183 17.45 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant difference. Sig. = significant level. *Correlation is 
highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). LISTING = listing duration of firm. 
Newly listed firms are firms that have been listed for less than a year while non-newly listed firms are 
firms that have been listed for one year or more. VnDI is the acronym for Vietnamese Voluntary 
Disclosure Index (shaded) with its five sub-categories, namely: Vietnamese Directors and Senior 
Management Disclosure Index (VnDSMI), Vietnamese Corporate and Strategic Information Index 
(VnCSI), Vietnamese Forward looking Information Index (VnFLI), Vietnamese Financial Capital Market 
Data Index (VnFCMI) and Vietnamese Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure Index (VnCSRI). Number 
of firms= 252. 
5.4.2.4 Voluntary Disclosure and Firms’ Stock Exchange Location Category 
Panel A of Table 5.11 provides t-tests results of firms’ voluntary disclosure (VnDI) 
classified by stock exchange (Ho Chi Minh versus Hanoi). As seen in Table 5.11, 
more than two thirds of the sample firms (71.03 per cent) are listed on the Ho Chi 
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Minh stock exchange (HOSE). Moreover, the level of voluntary disclosure made by 
HOSE listed firms are significantly (p-value = 0.000) higher than HNX listed firms 
(21.96 versus 15.79 per cent).  
Consistent with the t-tests results between VnDI and a firm’s stock exchange 
location (LOC), t-tests for the five sub-categories all show highly significant 
differences between the levels of voluntary disclosure made by firms listed on the 
two stock exchanges (p-values < 0.050).  The results indicate that stock exchange 
location positively impacts on the extent of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure.  
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Table 5.11      Descriptive and T-tests Results of Stock Exchange Location Category 
Panel A – T-test VnDI and firms' stock exchange location category 
Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
HOSE 179 21.96 6.17 5.181 0.000* 
HNX 73 15.79 
Panel B – T-test VnDI sub-categories and firms' stock exchange location category 
Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and Strategic Information Index (VnCSI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
HOSE 179 29.48 10.36 4.616 0.000* 
HNX 73 19.13 
Vietnamese Voluntary Financial Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
HOSE 179 18.81 4.90 4.507 0.000* 
HNX 73 13.90 
Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior Management Disclosure Index (VnDSMI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
HOSE 179 49.91 8.35 2.300 0.013** 
HNX 73 41.55 
Vietnamese Voluntary Forward Looking Information Index (VnFLI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
HOSE 179 23.34 5.05 2.215 0.014** 
HNX 73 18.30 
Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure Index (VnCSI) 
 N Mean (%) Mean Difference (%) t-stats Sig. 
HOSE 179 17.94 5.93 3.747 0.000* 
HNX 73 12.00 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant difference. Sig. = significant level. *Correlation is 
highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). LOC = stock exchange location. 
HOSE is the acronym for Ho Chi Minh stock exchange. HNX stands for Hanoi stock exchange. VnDI is 
the acronym for Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (shaded) with its five sub-categories, namely: 
Vietnamese Directors and Senior Management Disclosure Index (VnDSMI), Vietnamese Corporate and 
Strategic Information Index (VnCSI), Vietnamese Forward looking Information Index (VnFLI), 
Vietnamese Financial Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI) and Vietnamese Corporate Social 
Reporting Disclosure Index (VnCSRI). Number of firms = 252. 
5.4.3 Section Brief 
The above section presents the descriptive analyses for the continuous and 
categorical control variables. The evidence indicates that the total assets 
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measurement of 252 Vietnamese listed firms is highly skewed. Consequently, the 
natural log of total assets is employed to measure a firm’s size. On average, the 
sample firms have an average return on assets rate of 9.48 per cent and an average 
leverage ratio of 49.06 per cent. There are more firms within low-profile industries 
(154 firms) than within high-profile industries (98 firms). The majority of 
Vietnamese listed firms are audited by the non-'Big Four' auditing firms (85.32 per 
cent or 208 firms). Furthermore, the descriptive results indicate that there are 69 
firms that were newly listed in the year 2009, compared to 183 firms listed prior to 
2009. Within the sample, there are also more listed firms in Ho Chi Minh than in 
Hanoi (179 versus 73 firms) 
Moreover, univariate statistics results report that the voluntary disclosure scores 
between firms within different categories of industries are virtually the same. The 
results also indicate that there is no significant difference between the overall 
voluntary disclosure made by firms audited by 'Big Four' auditing firms and non-'Big 
Four' auditing firms. The analyses also show that newly listed firms are clearly 
associated with voluntary disclosure at lower levels than older firms (p-value = 
0.001). Additionally, firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange have higher 
voluntary disclosure levels than firms listed on the Hanoi stock exchange (p-value = 
0.000). 
5.5 Spearman and Pearson Correlation Matrices 
Appendix F presents the results for Spearman and Pearson correlation matrices for all 
research variables of this thesis. The purpose of analysing correlation matrices is to 
provide further insights into the relationships among these variables. Correlation 
matrices are presented for the dependent variable and its five sub-categories and 




Overall, among the independent variables, the proportion of independent directors 
on corporate boards, the proportion of foreign ownership, firm size and stock 
exchange location are positively and significantly correlated with the overall VnDI. 
The proportion of state ownership and listing duration are negatively correlated 
with VnDI (Table F.1). Within the overall index, the five sub-categories are positively 
and significantly correlated with the VnDI as well as each other. Within the five sub-
categories VnCSRI has the highest positive correlation with the overall voluntary 
disclosure at r = 0.779 (Table F.2).  
Evidence from Table F.3 and Table F.4 in Appendix F indicates that the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards is significantly and positively correlated 
with VnCSI and VnFCMI. On the other hand, the proportion of state ownership is 
negatively and significantly correlated with three other sub-categories of 
information, namely VnCSI, VnDSMI and VnCSRI (Table F.3, Table F.5 and Table F.7 
respectively). The proportion of managerial ownership is not found to be 
significantly correlated with any of the sub-categories, as well as the overall VnDI. 
Moreover, the proportion of foreign ownership is positively and significantly 
correlated with the four sub-categories: VnCSI, VnFCMI, VnDSMI and VnCSRI (Table 
F.3, Table F.4, Table F.5 and Table F.7 respectively). 
For the control variables, firm size and stock exchange location consistently show 
significant correlations with all five sub-categories in positive directions. Whereas, a 
firm’s listing duration is negatively and significantly correlated with the overall VnDI, 
as well as its five sub-categories. The results from the correlation matrices indicate 
that profitability and industry are not correlated with the overall VnDI and five sub-
categories. Additionally, Table F.4 reveals that leverage is moderately significant 
and negative in its correlation with VnFCMI. No strong correlation is detected 
between leverage and the other four sub-categories. As reported above, the 
auditing firm is significantly and positively correlated with VnCSI (Table F.3), while 
the industry is correlated significantly and positively with VnFLI (Table F.6). 
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Overall, the results presented in the above correlation matrices indicate that there 
are no excessively high correlation coefficients. Among VnDI and predictor 
variables, the highest correlation is between the proportion of state and managerial 
ownership at r = -0.687 (Table F.1), whilst between VnDI and its five sub-categories 
the highest correlation is between VnDI and VnCSRI at r = 0.779. Thus, 
multicollinearity problems between dependent variables and predictor variables 
within this thesis are unlikely to occur. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter presents both descriptive and univariate statistical results as well as 
the Pearson, Spearman correlation matrices relating to the dependent variable, 
independent variables and control variables. 
Research Question 1 in this thesis examines the extent of voluntary disclosure 
within Vietnamese listed firms in the 2009 comprehensive annual reports. The 
evidence from descriptive statistics reveals some interesting patterns in the 
voluntary disclosure practices of Vietnamese listed firms. Specifically, the level of 
voluntary disclosure in Vietnam has an overall mean of 20.31 per cent and a large 
variation in range from 3.57 per cent to 50.00 per cent (Table 5.1). Among the five 
sub-categories of information, Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior 
Management Information has the highest voluntary disclosure level (47.49 per 
cent), while the lowest level of voluntary disclosure is for Vietnamese Voluntary 
Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure Information (16.22 per cent). 
In regard to independent variables, the percentage of independent directors on 
corporate boards has an average level of 53.89 per cent (Table 5.3). This average is 
above the minimum Vietnamese requirements of at least one third of independent 
directors on corporate boards. Whilst the proportion of state ownership is relatively 
highly-concentrated at 26.93 per cent, the proportion of managerial ownership and 
foreign ownership are much lower at 12.77 per cent and 9.8 per cent respectively. 
Preliminary t-tests also reveal that firms that are largely state owned firms generally 
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provide significantly less voluntary disclosure than firms with no or low levels of 
state ownership (Table 5.4). While the involvement of managerial ownership makes 
no difference to voluntary disclosure practices (Table 5.5), firms with the presence 
of foreign ownership appear to engage in higher levels of voluntary disclosure 
(Table 5.6). 
Furthermore, the Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices reveal that the 
proportion of independent directors, foreign ownership, firm size and stock 
exchange location are significantly and positively correlated with the overall 
Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index, while state ownership and a firm’s listing 
duration are found to have significant and negative correlations. Findings from the 
correlation matrices also suggest little potential for multicollinearity problems 
between variables. 
The next chapter presents the multivariate results of this thesis, to test the 
relationship between predictor variables and the dependent variable in order to 
provide insights into what drives Vietnamese firms to voluntarily disclose 
information in their 2009 annual reports. 
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CHAPTER 6. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends the statistical analysis reported in Chapter 5 by presenting the 
findings related to Research Question 2: 'What are the significant predictors 
influencing the extent of voluntary disclosure made by Vietnamese listed firms in their 
comprehensive annual reports?’. 
Using an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model with the Vietnamese 
Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI) as the dependent variable, this chapter 
statistically tests the four hypotheses proposed in Chapter 4. The results of this 
multivariate analysis are discussed in this chapter. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized in the following way. Section 6.2 presents 
multiple regression models to test the four hypotheses outlined in Chapter 4. It also 
reports on the multiple regression results. To further an understanding of 
Vietnamese voluntary disclosure practices, extra analyses are performed for 
individual sub-categories of the comprehensive VnDI in Section 6.3. Analyses of 16 
key individual voluntary disclosure items are illustrated in Section 6.4. The summary 
for the results of the sensitivity analyses are reported in Section 6.5. Finally, Section 
6.6 contains a brief summary of the findings.  
6.2 Multiple Regression 
For the purpose of this thesis, a multiple regression model is developed in order to 
test the association between the dependent variable: the Vietnamese Voluntary 
Disclosure Index (VnDI) and a set of predictor variables. Multiple regression analysis 
is a commonly used statistical technique adopted to investigate the relationship 
between a single dependent variable and four independent and seven control 
variables. Specifically, the hypothesized variables are: the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards (CG), the proportion of state ownership 
(STATE), the proportion of managerial ownership (MAN) and the proportion of 
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foreign ownership (FOREIGN) while firm size (SIZE); profitability (PROFIT), leverage 
(LEV), industry (IND), auditing firms (AUDIT), listing duration (LISTING) and stock 
exchange location (LOC) are employed as control variables. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, OLS is employed as the main statistical method for multiple regression. 
OLS regression is a method used for estimating parameters in regression analysis by 
minimizing the difference between the observed response and the value predicted 
by the model (Everitt 2002). Using regression analysis, it is expected that the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards and the proportion of 
foreign ownership will both have positive impacts on VnDI, while the proportion of 
state and managerial ownership will negatively influence VnDI. Because of the 
directional nature of the overarching research proposition, one-tailed tests for 
significance of independent variables are used. A one-tailed test has more power 
than a two-tailed test, as it is considered to be less likely than a two-tailed test to 
miss any valid relationship. Previous accounting research also employs one-tailed 
tests to interpret the results for directional hypotheses (Setyadi 2009; Ho 2009; 
Taylor 2008). 
Moreover, additional regression analyses for the five key sub-categories of 
information with predictor variables are conducted to provide further 
understanding of the voluntary disclosure practices of Vietnamese listed firms. Each 
of the sub-categories such as VnCSI, VnFCMI, VnDSMI, VnFLI and VnCSRI are 
included in turn as a dependent variable in the regression equation. The 








The regression model of this thesis is as follows: 
VnDIi = λi + β1CGi + β2STATE + β3MANi + β4FOREIGNi + γ1SIZEi + γ2PROFITi + γ3LEVi + ∑i 
=1δ jINDi + ∑k=1δkAUDITi +∑m=1δmLISTINGi + ∑n=1δnLOCi +	    [Model 1] 
Where: 
VnDIi = Ratio of Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure items reported by firm i in the 
2009 annual report; 
CGi = Number of independent directors stated in the 2009 annual report of firm i, 
divided by the total number of all directors on corporate boards (both independent and non- 
independent) in the 2009 annual report of firm i; 
STATEi = Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by the government in firm i as 
at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i, divided by the total number 
of ordinary outstanding shares of firm i as at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual 
report of firm i; 
MANi = Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by senior managers on the 
corporate boards in firm i as at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i, 
divided by the total number of ordinary outstanding shares of firm i as at the cut-off date 
specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i; 
FOREIGNi = Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by foreign investors in firm i as 
at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i, divided by the total number 
of ordinary outstanding shares of firm i as at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual 
report of firm i; 
SIZEi = Natural logarithm total assets of firm i as reported in the 2009 annual 
report; 
PROFITi = Ratio of net earnings to total assets of firm i as reported in the 2009 annual 
report; 
LEVi = Ratio of total debt to total assets of firm i as reported in the 2009 annual 
report; 
INDi = Categorical variable to control for industry differences with industry firm i is 
given a dummy variable in the value of one (1) if the firm is in High-profile industries; 
otherwise zero (0); 
AUDITi = Categorical variable to control for auditor differences with the auditing firm 
of the 2009 annual report of firm i is given a dummy variable in the value of one (1) if the 
auditing firm is one of the 'Big Four', otherwise zero (0); 
LISTINGi = Categorical variable to control for listing duration differences with firm i is 
given a dummy variable in the value of one (1) if it is newly listed in the year 2009, 
otherwise zero (0); 
LOCi = Categorical variable to control for listing location differences with firm i 
listed on the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange in the year 2009 is given a dummy variable in the 
value of one (1), otherwise zero (0); 
λi = Regression constant. 
β1,2…n, γ1,2…n    = Coefficients to independent and control variables. 
I =  Firm specific. 
 = Error of prediction. 
 
There are several potential problems associated with the generalizability of the 
multiple regression analysis that must be considered before interpreting the results. 
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The assumptions and potential problems of the multiple regression model are 
discussed in Appendix G. In order to avoid a biased and inaccurate prediction of the 
dependent variable – the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI), four 
important assumptions of the linear Ordinary Least Square regression model are 
tested. These assumptions are: 1) Independence (multicollinearity issues), 2) Outlier 
issues, 3) Normality and linearity and 4) Homoscedasticity (Hair et al. 1995). 
Multicollinearity issues are tested using correlation matrices (presented in Appendix 
F) as well as Variable Inflation Factors (VIF) in Appendix G. The results of correlation 
matrices and VIF reveal that multicollinearity is not a concern in the regression 
analysis of this thesis (Table F.1 and Table G.1). To identify the possible outlier issue, 
Mahalanobis and Cook’s Distance are calculated. The results reported in Cook’s 
Distance detect no outlier problems (Table G.2) while Mahalanobis reveals four 
potential outlier cases (Table G.3). Extra analysis is subsequently carried out with 
the dataset removing the four possible outliers. The results between the two 
datasets show no major difference between data with and without four possible 
outliers (Table G.4). Additionally, normality and linearity issues have been met as 
evidenced from the graphs of residuals (presented in Figures G.1, G.2 and G.3). 
Lastly, Table G.5 in Appendix G reveals that only the variable firm size violates the 
assumption of homoscedasticity. The log transformation of this variable is used. 
Many prior studies of voluntary disclosure find that there is a significant association 
between firm size (measured by log of total assets) and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. Thus, the problem of homoscedasticity is not deemed a concern. Overall, 
tests conducted in Appendix F show that assumptions of multiple regression have 
been met and hence, the results of statistical analysis in this thesis are deemed to 
be appropriate. The next section provides the results of multiple regression testing.  
6.2.1 Multiple Regression Results 
Table 6.1 provides the results for the tests of the four hypotheses stated in Chapter 
3. The shaded areas represent the significant predictor for the VnDI. As presented, 
Table 6.1 shows that the adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted R-Squared) 
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of the model is 0.195, indicating that the predictor variables of the model explain 
19.5 per cent of the variation in the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI). 
As a point of reference, this explanatory power is higher than for prior studies of 
voluntary disclosure in developing counties, such as in China by Xiao and Yuan’s 
(2007) adjusted R-Squared of 7.9 per cent and Xiao, Yang and Chow’s (2004) 
adjusted R-Squared of 8.0 per cent. The overall model is highly significant (p-value = 
0.000 and F statistics = 6.510). 
Hypothesis H1 proposes a positive association between the firms' proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards and the extent of voluntary disclosure 
made by Vietnamese listed firms. 
Table 6.1 reports a highly significant positive association between the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards and VnDI (p-value = 0.010). Therefore, 
H1 is supported. This indicates that among Vietnamese listed firms, the higher the 
proportion of independent directors on their boards, the more likely a firm will be 
to engage in a higher level of voluntary disclosure in their annual reports. Overall, 
the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards is a potentially 
important determinant of a firm’s voluntary disclosure policy. 
Hypothesis H2 predicts a negative association between the proportion of state 
ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure made by Vietnamese listed firms. 
Table 6.1 reveals a highly significant negative association between the proportion of 
state ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure (p-value = 0.005). Thus, H2 is 
supported. It is therefore argued that within Vietnamese listed firms, higher state 
ownership discourages firms from providing extra information beyond mandatory 
disclosure requirements. This finding illustrates the distinctive reporting 
environment of Vietnamese listed firms and contributes significantly to the 




Table 6.1      Multiple Regression Results  
Model summary    
Adjusted R-Squared 0.195 
F-statistic 6.510 
Sig. 0.000* 
Sample size 252 
Variables Coefficients t-statistic Sig. 
Constant -0.097 -1.416 0.079 
Independent variables    
CG (H1) 0.060 2.334 0.010
** 
STATE (H2) -0.072 -2.605 0.005
* 
MAN (H3) -0.081 -2.195 0.015
** 
FOREIGN (H4) 0.011 0.204 0.419 
Control variables    
SIZE 0.021 3.682 0.000* 
PROFIT 0.088 1.548 0.061*** 
LEV -0.006 -0.216 0.415 
IND 0.014 1.320 0.094*** 
AUDIT -0.022 -1.341 0.091** 
LISTING -0.030 -2.465 0.007* 
LOC 0.031 2.322 0.011** 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. *Correlation is highly 
significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese 
Voluntary Disclosure Index. CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate 
boards. STATE = the proportion of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial 
ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = 
profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry type. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = 
auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
Additionally, H3 predicts a negative association between the proportion of 
managerial ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure. The results shown in 
Table 6.1 supports this prediction (p-value = 0.015). Thus, it can be concluded that 
among Vietnamese listed firms, high managerial ownership may lead to managerial 
entrenchment that can subsequently reduce the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Whilst H4 proposes a positive relationship between foreign ownership and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure, the results shown in Table 6.1 do not report a 
significant association, although the direction is as predicted. This indicates that the 
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proportion of foreign ownership does not have predictive properties in determining 
the extent of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure. Consequently, H4 is not supported. 
As listed in Chapter 4, the control variables included in this thesis are: firm size, 
profitability, leverage, industry, auditing firm, listing duration and stock exchange 
location. Multiple regression results in Table 6.1 indicate that firm size is highly 
significant and positive in influencing the voluntary disclosure practices of 
Vietnamese listed firms (p-value = 0.000). This means that within Vietnamese listed 
firms, bigger firms are associated with more voluntary disclosure of information. 
Profitability is also shown to have a moderately positive influence on VnDI (p-value 
= 0.061). Thus, more profitable Vietnamese listed firms tend to provide more 
voluntary disclosure of information than less profitable firms. In contrast, leverage 
does not have statistical significance on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Additionally, the results also reveal that firms belonging to high-profile industries 
engage in more voluntary disclosure practices at a moderately significant level than 
do firms in low-profile industries (p-value = 0.094). This thesis also finds that firms 
audited by the 'Big Four' auditing firms voluntarily disclose less information at a 
moderately significant level than do firms audited by non-'Big Four' auditing firms 
(p-value = 0.091). This reveals unique information about the auditing environment 
of Vietnamese listed firms. Furthermore, the negative impact of a firm’s listing 
duration on the extent of voluntary disclosure is also shown in Table 6.1 (p-value = 
0.007). Thus, it can be concluded that in Vietnam, newly listed firms tend to avoid 
providing voluntary disclosure of information compared to older firms. Another 
interesting finding on the reporting environment of Vietnam is that the stock 
exchange location of each firm is an explanatory factor for Vietnamese voluntary 
disclosure practices. In particular, firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange 
are reported to engage in significantly more voluntary disclosure practices than 
firms listed on the Hanoi stock exchange (p-value = 0.011). 
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6.2.2 Section Brief 
In summary, the results in this section provide evidence indicating that a number of 
predictor variables tested in this thesis explain significantly the variations in 
voluntary disclosure practices among Vietnamese listed firms. Specifically, among 
the 11 predictor variables, nine variables have significant impacts on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure made by Vietnamese listed firms in their 2009 annual reports.  
Within the independent variables, the proportion of independent directors on 
corporate boards positively influences the level of VnDI, while the proportion of 
state ownership and managerial ownership are significantly and negatively 
associated with the level of VnDI. Amongst the seven control variables, all variables 
are significant predictors for VnDI except for leverage. In particular, firm size, 
profitability, industry and stock exchange location are found to be positively linked 
to VnDI. Auditing firm and listing duration also appear to have some influence. The 
next section investigates further the potential determinants of each of these 
predictor variables and the five sub-categories of information within the VnDI. 
6.3 Multivariate Analysis of Five Major Sub-Categories of Disclosure 
The purpose of this section is to enhance the understanding of the different types 
of voluntary disclosure information made by Vietnamese listed firms. Using 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression, several tests are carried out to examine the 
potential factors that influence a firm’s disclosure within the five major sub-
categories that make up the overall VnDI. These five composite categories of 
Vietnamese voluntary disclosure are regressed against the hypothesized variables, 
which include: the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards, and 
the proportions of state, managerial and foreign ownership. The hypothesized 
effects are the same as for the main hypotheses detailed in Chapter 4. Specifically, 
this thesis proposes positive associations between the proportion of independent 
directors on corporate boards, foreign ownership and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure, while state ownership and managerial ownership are expected to 
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negatively influence the voluntary disclosure practices of Vietnamese listed firms. 
The dependent variables in these tests are the disclosure score of each five sub-
categories within the VnDI (as outlined in Chapter 4). The measurements of these 
scores are unweighted approach as per the VnDI. 
6.3.1 Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and Strategic Information Index (VnCSI) 
This Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and Strategic Information Disclosure (VnCSI) 
sub-category comprises 14 items providing general information about the firms as 
well as strategic information (see the list of these items in Table 5.2). Table 5.1 
reveals that the average voluntary disclosure level for this sub-category is 26.48 per 
cent. As shown in Table 6.2, the adjusted R-Squared implies that the model explains 
about 13.25 per cent of the variations in voluntary disclosure for this sub-category. 
The model is significant (p-value = 0.000 and F statistic = 4.488). Table 6.2 reports 
that the proportion of state ownership has a moderately negative amount of 
influence on the level of voluntary corporate and strategic information disclosure 
(p-value = 0.070). Interestingly, although foreign ownership has no association with 
the overall level of voluntary disclosure (Table 6.1), it is found to have a significantly 
positive relationship with the voluntary disclosure of corporate and strategic 
information (p-value = 0.032). Profitability is also found to moderately and 
positively impact on the level of such disclosure (p-value = 0.082). Moreover, in this 
category of information, newly listed firms disclose less than older firms at a highly 
significant level (p-value = 0.005). Firms listed on HOSE are also shown to disclose at 
a highly significant level, more corporate and strategic information than firms listed 
on HNX (p-value = 0.007). The proportion of independent directors on corporate 
boards, the proportion of managerial ownership, leverage, type of auditing firms 
and the type of industry appear to have no statistical association with voluntary 
disclosure of corporate and strategic information (Table 6.2). 
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Table 6.2      Multiple Regression Results – Five Sub-Categories 
  VnCSI VnFCMI  VnDSMI   VnFLI   VnCSRI  
Adjusted R2  0.133   0.083   0.078   0.019   0.097  
F-statistics  4.488   3.065   2.931   1.447   3.452  
Significant  0.000   0.001   0.001   0.153   0.000  
Sample size  252   252   252   252   252  
 Coeff t-stat Sig. Coeff t-stat Sig. Coeff t-stat Sig. Coeff t-stat Sig. Coeff t-stat Sig. 
(Constant) 0.074 0.562 0.287 -0.065 -0.908 0.182 -0.243 -1.036 0.151 -0.134 -0.977 0.165 -0.181 -1.722 0.043 
Independent variables 
CG (H1) 0.058 1.172 0.121 0.063 2.316 0.011
** 0.088 0.998 0.160 0.054 1.042 0.149 0.057 1.438 0.076*** 
STATE (H2) -0.078 -1.478 0.070
*** -0.012 -0.420 0.338 -0.308 -3.263 0.001* -0.060 -1.085 0.140 -0.113 -2.665 0.004* 
MAN (H3) -0.044 -0.621 0.268 -0.037 -0.940 0.174 -0.363 -2.851 0.002
* -0.077 -1.032 0.152 -0.123 -2.164 0.016** 
FOREIGN (H4) 0.185 1.857 0.032
** -0.017 -0.303 0.381 -0.105 -0.590 0.278 -0.088 -0.847 0.199 0.025 0.308 0.379 
Control variables 
SIZE 0.008 0.780 0.218 0.016 2.649 0.004* 0.066 3.431 0.000* 0.023 2.056 0.020** 0.026 2.973 0.002* 
PROFIT 0.153 1.395 0.082*** 0.043 0.711 0.239 0.016 0.083 0.467 0.190 1.654 0.050*** 0.062 0.710 0.239 
LEV 0.010 0.167 0.434 -0.031 -0.969 0.167 -0.115 -1.123 0.131 0.032 0.527 0.299 0.005 0.118 0.453 
IND 0.018 0.881 0.190 0.009 0.776 0.219 0.028 0.751 0.227 0.027 1.226 0.111 0.011 0.633 0.264 
AUDIT 0.007 0.239 0.406 -0.024 -1.425 0.078* -0.083 -1.494 0.068*** -0.031 -0.953 0.171 -0.022 -0.896 0.186 
LISTING -0.061 -2.573 0.005* -0.015 -1.185 0.119 -0.037 -0.873 0.192 -0.034 -1.352 0.089*** -0.030 -1.590 0.057*** 
LOC 0.065 2.486 0.007* 0.030 2.111 0.018** -0.004 -0.080 0.468 0.028 1.030 0.152 0.020 0.950 0.171 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation 
is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior Management Disclosure Index (VnDSMI), Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and Strategic 
Information Index (VnCSI), Vietnamese Voluntary Forward looking Information Index (VnFLI), Vietnamese Voluntary Financial Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI) and Vietnamese Voluntary 
Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure Index (VnCSRI). CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of 
managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. 
LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252.
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6.3.2 Vietnamese Voluntary Financial Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI) 
This Vietnamese Voluntary Financial Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI) sub-
category comprises 29 items providing financial information for a firm (see Table 
5.2 for the list of these items). The average for this type of information is voluntarily 
disclosed at 17.39 per cent (Table 5.1). The adjusted R-Squared implies that the 
model explains approximately 8.30 per cent of the variations in the voluntary 
disclosure of this sub-category of information. The model is significant (p-value = 
0.001 and F statistic = 3.065). Among the four independent variables, only the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards is significantly and 
positively related to the level of voluntary disclosure for financial and capital market 
information (p-value = 0.011). Table 6.2 also indicates that firm size is highly 
significant and positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure in regard to 
financial and capital market information (p-value = 0.004). This finding supports the 
view that bigger firms (with more financial resources) provide more financial and 
capital market information than smaller firms. Furthermore, the results presented 
in Table 6.2 imply that firms audited by the 'Big Four' auditing firms are less likely to 
report financial and capital market information than other firms (p-value = 0.078). 
Furthermore, firms listed on HOSE tend to disclose this type of information 
significantly more than firms listed on HNX (p-value = 0.018). 
6.3.3 Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior Management Disclosure Index 
(VnDSMI) 
The Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior Management Disclosure Index 
(VnDSMI) sub-category consists of only 3 items (Table 5.2). This sub-category of 
information is disclosed the most among the five sub-categories at 47.49 per cent 
(Table 5.1). The regression results show that the model is significant (p-value = 
0.001), with an adjusted R-Squared of 7.80 per cent. The adjusted R-Squared implies 
that the model explains approximately 7.80 per cent of the variations in the 
voluntary disclosure of this sub-category. The empirical evidence in Table 6.2 
reports that there is a highly significant and negative association between the 
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proportion of state ownership and the voluntary disclosure of Directors and Senior 
Management Information (p-value = 0.001). This suggests that the higher 
proportion of state ownership discourages firms from providing information about 
directors and senior management. It is also found that the proportion of managerial 
ownership is associated with lower voluntary disclosure about their own directors 
and senior management teams, which is the focus of this sub-category (p-value = 
0.002). Like the first two sub-categories, firm size is found to be highly significant 
and positively associated with the voluntary disclosure of Directors and Senior 
Management Information (p-value = 0.000). Additionally, firms audited by the 'Big 
Four' are found to disclose less of this type of information at a moderately 
significant level, than firms audited by any other auditing firms (p-value = 0.068). 
6.3.4 Vietnamese Voluntary Forward Looking Information Index (VnFLI) 
This Vietnamese Voluntary Forward Looking Information Index (VnFLI) sub-category 
consists of 14 items (Table 5.2) and has the voluntary disclosure level of 21.88 per 
cent among Vietnamese listed firms. The adjusted R-Squared of the Forward 
Looking Information Index is a very low 1.92 per cent and not significant. Table 6.2 
shows that none of the independent variables, namely: the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards, state ownership, managerial ownership 
and foreign ownership, are clear determinants of voluntary disclosure of forward 
looking information of Vietnamese listed firms. For the control variables, the results 
indicate that firm size is significantly positive in its association with this type of 
information (p-value = 0.020). Table 6.2 also reports that a firm’s profitability 
impacts significantly and positively on the level of voluntary forward looking 
information disclosure (p-value = 0.050). Moreover, newly listed firms are found to 




6.3.5 Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting Information Disclosure 
(VnCSRI) 
This Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Social Reporting Information (VnCSRI) type 
of information consists of 24 items (Table 5.2). This sub-category of information 
reports the lowest level of voluntary disclosure (at 16.22 per cent) among the five 
sub-categories of the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index. The adjusted R-
Squared of the Voluntary Social Information Disclosure Index is 9.70 per cent and 
highly significant (p-value = 0.000). The adjusted R-Squared implies that the model 
explains 9.70 per cent of the variations in the voluntary disclosure of this sub-
category. As depicted in Table 6.2, a higher proportion of independent directors on 
corporate boards has a moderately positive effect on the level of voluntary social 
information disclosure (p-value = 0.076). Table 6.2 also reveals that the proportion 
of state ownership is highly significant in its association with voluntary disclosure of 
social information in a negative direction at the 0.01 level (p-value = 0.004). This 
indicates that a higher proportion of state ownership reduces the voluntary 
disclosure of social reporting information. Moreover, the result also reveals that 
managerial ownership is negatively and significantly influence this type of 
information (p-value = 0.016). Furthermore, firm size is found to have a significant 
positive association with this type of disclosure (p-value = 0.002). Also, newly listed 
firms seem to engage in moderately significantly less disclosure of social 
information than older firms (p-value = 0.057). 
6.3.6 Section Brief 
Overall, Section 6.3 adds depth to the understanding of the voluntary disclosure 
practices of Vietnamese listed firms by examining the potential determinants on the 
five sub-categories of information within the VnDI. The results shown in Table 6.2 
indicate that a firm‘s corporate governance mechanism (the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards) positively and significantly influences 
voluntary disclosure of Financial Capital Market Data and Corporate Social 
Reporting Information. This is consistent with the main regression result, which 
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reports that a higher proportion of independent directors on corporate boards 
increases the extent of overall Vietnamese voluntary disclosure (Table 6.1). 
On the other hand, the results reveal that the proportion of state ownership is a 
determinant of voluntary disclosure for Corporate and Strategic Information, 
Directors and Senior Management Information and Corporate Social Reporting 
Information. Consistent with the main regression results in Table 6.1, these 
associations are all in negative directions. 
The proportion of managerial ownership significantly and negatively influences the 
level of Directors and Senior Management Information disclosure and Corporate 
Social Reporting Information disclosure. In the main regression, it is also found that 
the proportion of managerial ownership is associated with lower overall voluntary 
disclosure of information. 
Among the five sub-categories of the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index, 
foreign ownership is the only variable significantly and positively associated with 
Corporate and Strategic Information. This is different to the main regression result, 
which reports no significant association between foreign ownership and the overall 
level of Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index.  
In summary, except for the proportion of foreign ownership, the analyses of five 
sub-categories of information are consistent overall with the statistical results of 
the main analysis as reported in the preceding sections. 
6.4 Analysis of Individual Voluntary Disclosure Items 
Using Binary Logistic regression analysis54, this section aims to enhance the 
understanding of the voluntary disclosure practices of Vietnamese listed firms. 
These extra analyses investigate the potential determinants of specific key 
individual voluntary disclosure items within the list of all 84 items (refer to Table B.3 
                                                          
54 Binary logistic regression is used when the dependent variable is a categorical variable and 
predictor variables that are continuous or categorical variables (Field 2009). 
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in Appendix B for list of 84 items). The dependent variable is the specific individual 
disclosure item and the predictor variables are the same as in the main regression 
model (Model 1). The logistic regression model is as follows: 
Itemi = λi + β1CGi + β2STATE + β3MANi + β4FOREIGNi + γ1SIZEi + γ2PROFITi + γ3LEVi + ∑i 
=1δ jINDi + ∑k=1δkAUDITi +∑m=1δmLISTINGi + ∑n=1δnLOCi +     [Model 2] 
Where: 
Itemi = Categorical variable given for disclosure of an item in the 2009 annual 
report of firm i a dummy variable in the value of one (1) if the firm disclosed this item, 
otherwise zero (0); 
CGi = Number of independent directors stated in the 2009 annual report of firm i, 
divided by the total number of all directors on corporate boards (both independent and non- 
independent) in the 2009 annual report of firm i; 
STATEi = Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by the government in firm i as 
at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i, divided by the total number 
of ordinary outstanding shares of firm i as at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual 
report of firm i; 
MANi = Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by senior managers on the 
corporate boards in firm i as at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i, 
divided by the total number of ordinary outstanding shares of firm i as at the cut-off date 
specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i; 
FOREIGNi = Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by foreign investors in firm i as 
at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i, divided by the total number 
of ordinary outstanding shares of firm i as at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual 
report of firm i; 
SIZEi = Natural logarithm total assets of firm i as reported in the 2009 annual 
report; 
PROFITi = Ratio of net earnings to total assets of firm i as reported in the 2009 annual 
report; 
LEVi = Ratio of total debt to total assets of firm i as reported in the 2009 annual 
report; 
INDi = Categorical variable to control for industry differences with industry firm i is 
given a dummy variable in the value of one (1) if the firm is in High-profile industries; 
otherwise zero (0); 
AUDITi = Categorical variable to control for auditor differences with the auditing firm 
of the 2009 annual report of firm i is given a dummy variable in the value of one (1) if the 
auditing firm is one of the 'Big Four', otherwise zero (0); 
LISTINGi = Categorical variable to control for listing duration differences with firm i is 
given a dummy variable in the value of one (1) if it is newly listed in the year 2009, 
otherwise zero (0); 
LOCi = Categorical variable to control for listing location differences with firm i 
listed on the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange in the year 2009 is given a dummy variable in the 
value of one (1), otherwise zero (0); 
λi = Regression constant. 
β1,2…n, γ1,2…n    = Coefficients to independent and control variables. 
I =  Firm specific. 
 = Error of prediction. 
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The individual items chosen for this additional analysis are based on their average 
disclosure score made by 252 Vietnamese listed firms within each sub-category. In 
particular, items that are in the top three of disclosures in each sub-category are 
taken for the extra analyses. Such additional analyses help to generate a better 
understanding about the voluntary disclosure items that are most commonly 
communicated. Specifically, within the Corporate and Strategic Information category, 
'statement of financial strategy and objectives', 'statement of strategy, 
implementation measures to improve business' and 'general discussion of industry 
trends in the past' are disclosed the most at 53.27; 49.60 and 29.37 per cent 
respectively (refer to Table 5.2). Within the sub-category of Financial and Capital 
Market Data information, 'name of stock exchange the firm is listed on', 'profitability 
ratio' and 'volume of shares traded at year end' are communicated the most at 89.68; 
76.59 and 60.16 per cent respectively. With regard to the Directors and Senior 
Management Information category, there are only three items and thus, all of these 
items are included for the analysis. For Forward Looking Information, 'forecast of 
sales and forecast of profit in quantitative terms' are published the most at 60.71 and 
60.32 per cent respectively. 'Assumptions underlying the future forecast' are reported 
at 40.87 per cent. In the sub-category of Corporate Social Reporting Information, the 
top 3 disclosure items are 'employee appreciation' (52.39 per cent), 'company 
awards' (47.41 per cent), 'discussion on the safety of products' and 'community 
programs: health and education implemented' (both at 27.78 per cent). The logistic 
regression results of these key individual items are shown in Table 6.3. 
6.4.1 Logistic Regression: VnCSI Items 
As shown in Table 6.3, in the sub-category of Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and 
Strategic Information, the item 'statement of financial strategy and objectives' 
(disclosed at 53.27 per cent) is significant in its association with foreign ownership 
(p-value = 0.014) and industry type (p-value = 0.076). This implies that firms with 
higher proportions of foreign ownership have more incentives to voluntarily 
disclose their financial strategy and objectives. Firms within high-profile industries 
are reported to engage in more voluntary disclosure in relation to their financial 
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strategy and objectives than firms within low-profile industries. Moreover, Panel A 
of Table 6.3 reveals that the proportion of foreign ownership also significantly and 
positively influences (p-value = 0.036) the level of voluntary disclosure of the 
second item 'statement of strategy, implementation measures to improve business 
(disclosed at 49.60 per cent). The stock exchange location also appears to have 
some significant impact as HOSE listed firms provide significantly more information 
on strategy and implementation measures to improve their business than HNX 
listed firms (p-value = 0.032). In contrast, the proportion of foreign ownership is 
found to be negatively associated with the third item 'general discussion of industry 
trends in the past' at a moderately significant level (p-value = 0.092). Industry type 
is also a potential determinant for the voluntary disclosure of past trends within the 
industry. Specifically, high-profile industries firms are reported to provide more 
discussion of the industry's past trends than low-profile industries firms. Firms listed 
on HOSE are also found to provide significantly more voluntary disclosure of past 
industry trend information than firms listed on HNX (p-value = 0.042). 
6.4.2 Logistic Regression: VnFCMI Items 
In terms of Vietnamese Voluntary Financial and Capital Market Data Information, 
the proportion of state ownership (p-value = 0.062) and type of industry (p-value = 
0.053) negatively influences the voluntary disclosure of the item 'stock exchange 
name'. This implies that firms with a high proportion of state ownership are 
associated with less disclosure relating to their stock exchange names. The results 
also indicate that firms within the group of high-profile industries are less likely to 
disclose their stock exchange location. Additionally, the evidence in Panel B of Table 
6.3 indicates that the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards (p-
value = 0.041) and the firm’s stock exchange location (p-value = 0.001) have 
significant positive associations with the voluntary disclosure of 'volume of shares 
traded at the end of the year'. There is no significant predictor variable detected for 
the voluntary disclosure of the item 'profitability ratio'. 
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6.4.3 Logistic Regression: VnDSMI Items 
Among the 11 possible predictor variables, none is a significant predictor for the 
voluntary disclosure of the item 'identification of senior management and their 
functions' within the Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior Management 
Information Disclosure. On the other hand, as seen in Panel C of Table 6.3, the 
proportion of state ownership (p-value = 0.005) and managerial ownership (p-value 
= 0.033) are significantly and negatively associated with the voluntary disclosure of 
'other directorships held by directors'. Firm size appears to have a significant 
positive effect on the disclosure of this information (p-value = 0.005), while firm 
leverage is moderately significant in its reduction of such disclosure (p-value = 
0.077). In relation to the 'picture of senior management team' item, the proportion 
of state ownership (p-value = 0.024) and managerial ownership (p-value = 0.028) 
appear to avoid this type of disclosure as the evidence indicates negative 
associations. By contrast, stock exchange location is found to have a significant 
positive association with the publication of the senior management team’s pictures. 
Specifically, firms listed on HOSE tend to post more pictures of their senior 
management teams than firms listed on HNX.  
6.4.4 Logistic Regression: VnFLI Items 
For Vietnamese Voluntary Forward Looking Information, the three items of 'forecast 
of sales', 'forecast of profits' in quantitative terms and 'assumptions underlying 
future forecasts' are disclosed the most (Table 5.2). Evidence from Panel D of Table 
6.3 indicates that the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards is 
positively associated with the disclosure of 'forecast of sales' (p-value = 0.016) and 
'forecast of profits' (p-value = 0.021). Meanwhile, newly listed firms are found to 
have significant negative impacts on the disclosure of 'forecast of sales' (p-value = 
0.043) and 'forecast of profits' (p-value = 0.027). Furthermore, Panel D of Table 6.3 
shows that high-profile industry firms tend to disclose more of the 'assumptions 




Table 6.3      Logistic Regression Results – 16 Voluntary Disclosure Items 
Panel A: Corporate and Strategic Information (3 items) 
Item description Statement of financial strategy and 
objectives 
Statement of strategy, implementation 
measures to improve business 
General discussion of industry trends in 
the past 
Intercept Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
Constant 1.275 0.469 0.021 0.991 -3.056 0.093 
Independent variables       
CG 0.736 0.265 1.133 0.091 -0.055 0.934 
STATE 0.054 0.940 0.422 0.553 0.285 0.692 
MAN 1.200 0.223 -0.544 0.575 0.179 0.852 
FOREIGN 3.585 0.014** 2.928 0.036** -2.359 0.092*** 
Control variables       
SIZE -0.170 0.246 -0.138 0.346 0.195 0.194 
PROFIT -0.398 0.784 2.055 0.184 -0.030 0.984 
LEV 0.912 0.231 0.490 0.523 -1.073 0.171 
INDUSTRY 0.496 0.076*** 0.013 0.964 0.641 0.022** 
AUDIT -0.436 0.291 -0.028 0.946 -0.288 0.490 
LISTING -0.450 0.151 -0.431 0.172 -0.185 0.569 
LOC -0.275 0.428 0.747 0.032** 0.740 0.042** 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.097 0.114 0.092 
Legend: The logistic regression model regresses the independent variables (CG, STATE, MAN, FOREIGN) and control variables (SIZE, PROFIT, LEV, IND, AUDIT, LISTING, LOC). Shaded 
areas denote significant findings. *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately 
significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion 
of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = 





Panel B: Financial and Capital Market Data Information ( 3 items) 
Item description Name of stock exchange firm is listed on Profitability ratio Volume of shares traded (at the end of 
year) 
Intercept Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
Constant 5.082 0.077 -3.312 0.119 -0.841 0.646 
Independent varia-
bles 
      
CG 1.106 0.298 1.100 0.157 1.434 0.041** 
STATE 2.284 0.062*** 0.116 0.889 1.224 0.101 
MAN 1.717 0.317 -0.179 0.873 -0.422 0.661 
FOREIGN -0.723 0.717 0.926 0.589 -0.455 0.743 
Control variables       
SIZE -0.335 0.161 0.267 0.131 -0.009 0.954 
PROFIT 0.354 0.888 1.690 0.360 -1.612 0.301 
LEV 0.703 0.568 -0.058 0.949 -0.583 0.467 
INDUSTRY -0.849 0.053*** 0.213 0.512 0.354 0.221 
AUDIT -0.311 0.611 -0.290 0.565 -0.528 0.214 
LISTING 0.540 0.369 -0.258 0.468 -0.277 0.392 
LOC 0.373 0.524 0.343 0.388 1.212 0.001* 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.118 0.074 0.137 
Legend: The logistic regression model regresses the independent variables (CG, STATE, MAN, FOREIGN) and control variables (SIZE, PROFIT, LEV, IND, AUDIT, LISTING, LOC). Shaded 
areas denote significant findings. *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately 
significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion 
of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = 
industry. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
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 Panel C: Directors and Senior Management Information (3 items)  
Item description 
Identification of senior management 
and their functions 
Other directorships held by directors Picture of senior management team 
Intercept Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
Constant -0.209 0.927 -3.072 0.091 -12.127 0.000 
Independent variables       
CG (H1) 0.296 0.732 0.745 0.275 0.230 0.788 
STATE (H2) -1.198 0.199 -2.109 0.005
* -2.081 0.024** 
MAN (H3) -1.478 0.205 -2.241 0.033
** -2.979 0.028** 
FOREIGN (H4) -0.598 0.734 -0.734 0.585 -0.713 0.662 
Control variables       
SIZE 0.164 0.392 0.330 0.030** 0.784 0.000* 
PROFIT 1.147 0.548 -2.300 0.204 2.210 0.216 
LEV 0.807 0.433 -1.446 0.077*** -0.945 0.337 
INDUSTRY 0.500 0.187 -0.180 0.532 0.368 0.296 
AUDIT -0.766 0.121 -0.488 0.274 -0.406 0.417 
LISTING -0.490 0.218 -0.114 0.728 -0.181 0.673 
LOC -0.435 0.365 -0.325 0.366 1.536 0.018** 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.061 0.109 0.281 
Legend: The logistic regression model regresses the independent variables (CG, STATE, MAN, FOREIGN) and control variables (SIZE, PROFIT, LEV, IND, AUDIT, LISTING, LOC). Shaded 
areas denote significant findings. *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately 
significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion 
of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = 




Panel D: Forward Looking Information (3 items) 
Item description Forecast of sales (quantitative) Forecast of profit (quantitative) Assumption underlying future forecasts 
Intercept Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
Constant -3.911 0.037 -4.299 0.023 -2.689 0.124 
Independent variables       
CG (H1) 1.666 0.016
** 1.597 0.021** 0.835 0.206 
STATE (H2) 0.619 0.391 0.343 0.636 -0.015 0.983 
MAN (H3) -0.760 0.429 -1.177 0.223 -0.451 0.633 
FOREIGN (H4) 0.305 0.826 -0.822 0.549 -0.835 0.526 
Control variables       
SIZE 0.235 0.127 0.283 0.068 0.125 0.384 
PROFIT 2.348 0.130 3.825 0.023** 0.334 0.816 
LEV 0.574 0.463 0.418 0.599 -0.035 0.963 
INDUSTRY 0.138 0.626 0.057 0.840 0.567 0.038** 
AUDIT -0.118 0.787 -0.262 0.547 0.092 0.821 
LISTING -0.641 0.043** -0.709 0.027** -0.119 0.704 
LOC -0.121 0.736 -0.102 0.776 0.189 0.584 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.096 0.106 0.046 
Legend: The logistic regression model regresses the independent variables (CG, STATE, MAN, FOREIGN) and control variables (SIZE, PROFIT, LEV, IND, AUDIT, LISTING, LOC). Shaded 
areas denote significant findings. *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately 
significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion 
of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = 




Panel E: Corporate Social Reporting Information (4 items) 
Item description Employee appreciation Company awards 
Discussion on safety of the 
products 
Community programs (health 
and education) implemented 
Intercept Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
Constant -1.274 0.466 -6.481 0.001 -2.999 0.126 -4.373 0.028 
Independent variables  
CG (H1) 0.229 0.724 0.284 0.684 0.452 0.534 0.134 0.856 
STATE (H2) 0.405 0.559 -2.172 0.004
* -1.470 0.063*** -2.142 0.009* 
MAN (H3) -0.490 0.596 -3.438 0.002
* -0.375 0.709 -2.148 0.059** 
FOREIGN (H4) -0.324 0.804 -0.544 0.701 1.016 0.459 0.464 0.741 
Control variables         
SIZE 0.109 0.450 0.488 0.002* 0.168 0.292 0.309 0.055*** 
PROFIT -0.936 0.519 5.854 0.001* 1.828 0.239 0.195 0.913 
LEV -1.056 0.162 0.491 0.548 -0.850 0.310 0.582 0.503 
INDUSTRY 0.183 0.501 -0.280 0.342 -0.260 0.401 -0.491 0.127 
AUDIT -0.097 0.800 -0.850 0.062*** -0.031 0.944 0.070 0.879 
LISTING -0.181 0.557 -0.645 0.059*** -0.087 0.808 -0.877 0.030** 
LOC 0.531 0.117 0.587 0.106 0.305 0.450 0.041 0.919 
Nagelkerke R Square  0.053 0.220 0.100 0.150 
Legend: The logistic regression model regresses the independent variables (CG, STATE, MAN, FOREIGN) and control variables (SIZE, PROFIT, LEV, IND, AUDIT, LISTING, LOC). Shaded 
areas denote significant findings. *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately 
significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion 
of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = 
industry. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
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6.4.5 Logistic Regression: VnCSRI Items 
In relation to Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure, no 
potential determinant is detected for voluntary disclosure of the 'employee 
appreciation' item (p-values > 0.100). On the other hand, there are six variables that 
can potentially predict variations on the disclosure of 'company awards'. In particular, 
the proportion of state ownership and managerial ownership result in reduced levels 
of such disclosure (p-value = 0.004 and 0.002 respectively). Firm size is reported to 
have a highly significant relationship (p-value = 0.002) with the disclosure of the item 
'company awards', while firm profit lowers such disclosure (p-value = 0.001). This 
implies that bigger firms tend to disclose more awards while more profitable firms 
are less likely to publish their company awards. The evidence also indicates that firms 
audited by the 'Big Four' auditing firms engage in less voluntary disclosure of awards 
information than firms audited by non-'Big Four' auditing firms (p-value = 0.062); 
while older firms tend to provide this information more than newly listed firms (p-
value = 0.059). The high proportion of state ownership is associated with a reduction 
in disclosure of 'safety of the firm's products' (p-value = 0.063). 'Community 
programs', such as health and education implementation information disclosure are 
also impacted negatively by the proportion of state ownership (p-value = 0.009) and 
managerial ownership (p-value = 0.059). Panel E of Table 6.3 also shows that size is a 
significant predictor of voluntary disclosure regarding community programs in a 
positive direction (p-value = 0.055). Finally, newly listed firms disclose less of this 
information as the results show that a firm’s listing duration has a negative 
association with the disclosure of this 'community program' item (p-value = 0.030). 
6.4.6 Section Brief 
Overall, this section provides some interesting insights into the voluntary disclosure 
of the 16 top items within the 84 items listed. The evidence shows that there are 
different drivers for different aspects of disclosure. For Corporate and Strategic 
Information disclosure, the proportion of foreign ownership has a positive impact 
on the disclosure of the three top items: 'statement of financial strategy and 
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objectives', 'statement of strategy and implementation to improve business' and 
'general discussion of industry trends in the past'. This implies that having foreign 
ownership in a firm increases managers’ decisions to disclose more strategic 
information. The proportion of independent directors on corporate boards, the 
proportion of state ownership, type of industry and stock exchange location are the 
predictors for various types of disclosure under the Financial and Capital Market 
Data Information sub-category. The proportions of state and managerial ownership 
are also reported to negatively influence the disclosure of 'other directorships held 
by directors' and the 'picture of senior management team', while size has a positive 
effect on disclosure of these two items of information. The proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards is positively associated with the 
disclosure of forecasted information on sales and profit, while listing duration 
influences disclosure negatively. Furthermore, the proportion of state ownership 
appears to have a negative impact on the disclosure of the three top items within 
the Corporate Social Reporting Information sub-category, namely: 'company 
awards', 'discussion on safety of the products' and 'community programs'. In 
summary, each key item of voluntary disclosure information is not consistently 
associated with a particular predictor variable. 
6.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
The multivariate results of the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index, its five sub-
categories and a variety of individual disclosure items are presented in the above 
sections. Appendix H employs a series of additional analyses in order to provide the 
robust checks of these regression models. In particular, Appendix H addresses the 
issues of possible endogeneity on the proceeding analysis provided in the above 
sections. To explore endogeneity and concerns about the validity of measurements 
used in the main regression model (Model 1), the associations between Vietnamese 
Voluntary Disclosure Index and corporate governance mechanisms and ownership 




The extra sensitivity analysis on other corporate governance aspects, such as the 
categories of: independent directors on corporate boards, dominance of 
CEO/chairperson and corporate board size, reveals a unique reporting environment 
of Vietnamese listed firms. For instance, firms meeting the minimum requirements 
for independent directors on corporate boards and their board size significantly and 
positively influence the extent of voluntary disclosure (Table H.1 and Table H.3). In 
contrast, the dominant role of the CEO and chairperson has a significant and 
positive impact on a firm's voluntary disclosure practices (Table H.2). This finding is 
opposite to the majority of the extant literature.  
Using different measurements from the main analysis, the results indicate that state 
ownership influences negatively on the VnDI (presence of state ownership as well 
as influencing state ownership of greater than 20 per cent as presented in Table H.4 
and Table H.5). This provides more confirmatory evidence of the finding reported in 
the main regression model, that state ownership reduces voluntary disclosure 
practices.  
On the other hand, different proxies of managerial ownership do not result in 
significant association with VnDI (Table H.6 and Table H.7).  
Additionally, the results from these extra sensitivity analyses add support to the 
main findings of the thesis, that foreign ownership is not a significant potential 
predictor for VnDI, although the direction of this influence is the same as the main 
regression results (Table H.8 and Table H.9).  
6.6 Summary 
In summary, this chapter provides evidence for the association of the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and its five key sub-categories with the four hypotheses tested. 
Table 6.4 gives the summary of the multivariate tests results conducted in this 
chapter (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). The results in Table 6.4 depict interesting findings 
regarding Vietnamese voluntary disclosure practices. Overall, the results provide 
evidence supporting Hypotheses H1, H2 and H3. In particular, as proposed in Chapter 
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4, a higher proportion of independent directors on corporate boards results in 
increased voluntary disclosure, while the proportion of state ownership and 
managerial ownership reduces voluntary disclosure. As displayed in Table 6.4, H4 is 
rejected as the proportion of foreign ownership is found not to have a significant 
impact on overall Vietnamese voluntary disclosure (Table 6.1). 
For the control variables, six out of seven control variables may be additional drivers 
determining the level of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure. Specifically, firm size, 
profitability, industry, auditing firms, listing duration and the stock exchange 
location have significant impacts on the level of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure. 
Bigger firms are found to be associated with a higher level of voluntary disclosure. 
The profitability of a firm positively influences its voluntary disclosure practices. 
Firms classified in high-profile industries provide more voluntary disclosure than 
other firms. 'Big Four' auditing firms are found to have a negative impact on the 
level of voluntary disclosure made by Vietnamese listed firms. Moreover, newly 
listed firms are also reported to engage in relatively fewer voluntary disclosure 
practices than older listed firms. Another interesting finding through the univariate 
and multiple regression analysis is that firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh stock 
exchange seem to disclose significantly more information than firms listed on the 
Hanoi stock exchange. 
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Table 6.4      Multiple Regression Results Summary 
  Expected 
direction 
VnDI VnCSI VnFCMI VnDSMI VnFLI VnCSRI 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.195 0.133 0.083 0.078 0.019 0.097 
Independent variables 
CG (H1) + SP NP SP NP NP MSP 
STATE (H2) - HSP MSP NP HSP NP HSP 
MAN (H3) - SP NP NP HSP NP SP 
FOREIGN (H4) + NP SP NP NP NP NP 
Control 
variables 
       
SIZE + HSP NP HSP HSP SP HSP 
PROFIT + MSP MSP NP NP MSP NP 
LEV + NP NP NP NP NP NP 
IND (-/+) MSP NP NP NP NP NP 
AUDIT (-/+) MSP NP MSP MSP NP NP 
LISTING (-/+) HSP HSP NP NP MSP MSP 
LOC (-/+) SP HSP SP NP NP NP 
Legend: Table 6.4 summarises the OLS regression results from Tables 6.1 and 6.2. Shaded 
areas denote statistically significant findings. HSP = highly significant predictor. SP = 
significant predictor. MSP = moderately significant predictor. NP = not significant predictor. 
VnDI = Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index. VnCSI = Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate 
and Strategic Information Index. VnFCMI = Vietnamese Voluntary Financial Capital Market 
Data Index. VnDSMI = Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior Management Disclosure 
Index. VnFLI = Vietnamese Voluntary Forward Looking Information Index. VnCSRI = 
Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure Index. CG = the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion of state ownership. 
MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign 
ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry. LISTING = 
listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 
252. 
The extent of voluntary disclosure of the five important sub-categories of 
information namely: Corporate and Strategic Information, Financial Capital Market 
Data, Directors and Senior Management Information, Forward Looking Information, 
and Corporate Social Reporting Information, and their association with all 
independent and control variables are also explored (Table 6.2). Whilst the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards, the proportion of state 
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ownership and the proportion of managerial ownership have a significant influence 
on the extent of the five sub-categories of information in the predicted direction, 
the proportion of foreign ownership reveals an interesting pattern but not as 
hypothesized. Specifically, foreign ownership is found to have negative associations 
with the extent of the disclosure of Financial Capital Market Data, Directors and 
Senior Management Information and Forward Looking Information, while there are 
positive associations between foreign ownership and the level of disclosure of 
Corporate and Strategic Information and Social Reporting Information. Among 
these five sub-categories, only foreign ownership has a significant and positive 
impact on the voluntary disclosure of Corporate and Strategic Information. 
Additional logistic regressions carried out for certain key individual items reveal 
some further distinctive insights into Vietnamese voluntary disclosure practices. The 
evidence shows that for the top 16 most communicated items; there are different 
drivers for different aspects of voluntary disclosure. In particular, each key item of 
voluntary disclosure information is not consistently associated with a particular 
predictor variable. 
Further additional analyses are carried out to minimize the issue of possible 
endogeneity. These extra sensitivity analyses also provide support for H2 and H4, 
indicating that state ownership has a negative influence on the VnDI (with a 
presence of state ownership as well as influencing state ownership of greater than 
20 per cent) while foreign ownership is not a significant predictor for VnDI. With 
regard to H1 and H3, there are mixed results. Specifically, employing differing 
measures for the corporate governance mechanism, this thesis finds that firms 
meeting the minimum requirements of independent directors on corporate boards 
or their board size have significant and positive influence on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure (these findings are consistent with the main findings of the thesis in Table 
6.1). The dominant role of CEO and chairperson also has a significant and positive 
impact on a firm's voluntary disclosure practices (which is not in the expected 
direction). Different measurements of state ownership yield the same result, which 
is the significant and negative association with VnDI. On the other hand, alternative 
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proxies of managerial ownership reveal no significant association with VnDI. 
Moreover, the impact of foreign ownership on Vietnamese voluntary disclosure is 
the same with different ways of measurements. Specifically, none of these 
regression results indicate a significant relationship between foreign ownership and 
VnDI. 
Overall, this chapter presents the results of the statistical analyses for the 
determinants of the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index. Three out of the four 
hypotheses of this thesis are supported. Specifically, that the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards increases the extent of voluntary 
disclosure (H1 is supported), while the proportion of state ownership and 
managerial ownership are shown to have negative associations with such practices 
(H2 and H3 are supported). Another important ownership identity variable, which is 
foreign ownership, is not a significant predictor determining the extent of 
Vietnamese voluntary disclosure (rejecting H4). The next chapter provides the key 




CHAPTER 7. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the voluntary disclosure practices of 
Vietnamese listed firms in the 2009 annual reports. Using the agency theory 
framework, a conceptual model is developed and tested empirically against an 
aspect of corporate governance, ownership identities and other firm-characteristics 
variables. This final chapter offers the concluding remarks of this thesis, presenting 
an overview of the key findings, theoretical and practical implications and the 
positioning of this research in relation to existing literature. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The thesis objectives and research questions 
are restated in Section 7.2. Significant findings and implications are summarized and 
presented in Section 7.3. Section 7.4 highlights the contributions of this thesis, 
followed by future research directions proposed in Section 7.5. Section 7.6 presents 
the concluding remarks. 
7.2 Overview of Thesis 
This thesis investigates the unique Vietnamese reporting environment, specifically 
in relation to its voluntary disclosure practices using contemporary data. The issue 
of voluntary disclosure practices is important because the development and 
sustainability of stock markets are subject to problems that arise from information 
asymmetry. The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and subsequent collapse of Enron in 
2000 clearly show that low levels of transparency (weak corporate disclosure) can 
cause enormous damage not only to individual firms but also can affect an economy 
as a whole. In recent years, with an increasing awareness of the importance of 
corporate disclosure, especially in emerging economies with weak legal systems and 
rapid industrialisation, listed firms in emerging markets come under increasing 
pressure to engage in increased information disclosure. Moreover, with the recent 
2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis where the global economy remains uncertain and 
investors are reluctant to invest, the need to improve information transparency is 
 
214 
even more imperative in an emerging market such as Vietnam. Low levels of 
information transparency can be a barrier to investment that might inhibit potential 
investors from entering the stock market. 
Despite the importance of information disclosure, there is little research 
investigating this issue in a young market such as Vietnam. With the unique 
transition from a tradition of ‘secrecy’ in a centrally planned economy towards a 
more ‘transparent’ market-driven economy, a Vietnamese study provides a unique 
extension to the extant literature of voluntary disclosure. 
The specific research questions addressed in this thesis are as follows: 
1. What is the extent of voluntary disclosure made by Vietnamese listed 
firms in their comprehensive annual reports? 
2. What are the significant predictors influencing the extent of voluntary 
disclosure made by Vietnamese listed firms in their comprehensive 
annual reports? 
Data utilized in this thesis is obtained from the annual reports of 252 non-financial 
Vietnamese firms (representing 56.30 per cent of the available population) for the 
year ending 31st December 2009. To generate important insights, a voluntary 
disclosure index is developed to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
Vietnam using prior studies as the basis. The initial index is then validated by using a 
process of critical review by Vietnamese accounting experts to validate the 
relevance of each item to the Vietnamese reporting environment. A final list of 84 
items is developed and then employed to capture specific Vietnamese corporate 
disclosure practices. Consistent with most previous studies, this thesis utilizes the 
more objective unweighted approach, whereby each disclosure item is equally 
weighted and expressed in dichotomous form and where a firm is given one (1) for 
a disclosed item and zero (0) for otherwise. This index represents the first such 
index for the Vietnamese voluntary disclosure context. 
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Agency theory is employed as the underlying theoretical framework for this thesis. 
Within the existing voluntary disclosure literature, agency theory has been used 
extensively in both mature capital market (Cooke 1989, 1992; Bradbury 1992; 
Hossain, Perera, and Rahman 1995; Frost and Pownall 1994; Meek, Roberts, and 
Gray 1995; Gray, Meek, and Roberts 1992; Camfferman and Cooke 2002) and 
emerging capital market settings (Ho and Wong 2001; Xiao and Yuan 2007; Barako 
2004; Ho 2009; Hossain and Hammami 2009; Akhtaruddin et al. 2009). According to 
agency theory, there are information asymmetries in the concentrated Asian or 
emerging markets because the dominating influencing shareholders can utilize their 
control and power to expropriate the interests of minority shareholders. Agency 
theory argues that increasing the extent of corporate disclosure can mitigate the 
problems of information asymmetry. From an agency theory perspective, the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards, three ownership 
identities (the proportion of state, managerial and foreign ownership) and firm-
characteristics (firm size, profitability, leverage, industry, auditing firm, listing 
duration and stock exchange location) are potential determinants of voluntary 
disclosure. Therefore, these variables are included in this thesis to explore the 
potential determinants of voluntary disclosure practices in Vietnam. With a focus on 
Asian and/or emerging markets, the next section summarises the key findings of 
this thesis and highlights implications in both a theoretical and practical sense. 
7.3 Summary of Key Findings and Implications 
This thesis reveals many valuable findings regarding the Vietnamese reporting 
environment, specifically voluntary disclosure practices. Table 7.1 provides a 
summarised list of the major findings for the two Research Questions. This is 
followed by a more in-depth discussion of the respective points. 
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1. What is the 
extent of voluntary 
disclosure made by 
Vietnamese listed 
firms in their 
comprehensive 
annual reports? 
The overall voluntary disclosure (as measured by the 
Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index - VnDI) is at 20.31 
per cent (Table 5.1). 
Within the VnDI, the disclosure results for the five key sub-
categories of Vietnamese voluntary information are as 
follows: 
● Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior Management 
Disclosure Index (VnDSMI): 47.49 per cent. 
● Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and Strategic 
Information Index (VnCSI): 26.48 per cent. 
● Vietnamese Voluntary Forward Looking Information 
Index: 21.88 per cent. 
● Vietnamese Voluntary Financial Capital Market Data 
Index: 17.39 per cent. 
● Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting 
Disclosure Index (VnCSRI): 16.22 per cent (Table 5.1). 




extent of voluntary 
disclosure made by 
Vietnamese listed 
firms in their 
comprehensive 
annual reports? 
For the overall Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index, the 
main predictors are : 
● Significant positive associations: CG (the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards), SIZE (natural 
log of total assets), PROFIT (retun on assets), IND (high 
versus low-profile industries) and LOC (Ho Chi Minh 
versus Hanoi listed firms) (Table 6.1). 
H1 is supported. 
H4 is rejected. 
● Significant negative associations: STATE (the proportion of 
state ownership), MAN (the proportion of managerial 
ownership), AUDIT ('Big Four' versus non-'Big Four' 
auditing firms) and LISTING (newer versus older listed 
firms) (Table 6.1). 
     H2 and H3 are supported. 







predictors for five 
sub-categories of 
information 
For the Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior 
Management Disclosure Index, the main predictors are: 
● Significant positive associations: SIZE (natural log of total 
assets) (Table 6.2). 
● Significant negative associations: STATE (the proportion of 
state ownership), MAN (the proportion of managerial 
ownership) and AUDIT ('Big Four' versus non-'Big Four' 
auditing firms) (Table 6.2). 
 
For the Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and Strategic 
Information Index, the main predictors are: 
● Significant positive associations: FOREIGN (the proportion 
of foreign ownership), PROFIT (Return on Assets) and LOC 
(Ho Chi Minh versus Hanoi listed firms) (Table 6.2). 
● Significant negative associations: STATE (the proportion of 
state ownership) and LISTING (newer versus older listed 
firms) (Table 6.2). 
      
For the Vietnamese Voluntary Forward Looking Information 
Index, the main predictors are: 
● Significant positive associations: SIZE (natural log of total 
assets) and PROFIT (Return on Assets) (Table 6.2). 
● Significant negative associations: LISTING (newer versus 
older listed firms) (Table 6.2). 
 
For the Vietnamese Voluntary Financial Capital Market Data 
Index, the main predictors are : 
● Significant positive associations: CG (the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards), SIZE (natural 
log of total assets) and LOC (Ho Chi Minh versus Hanoi 
listed firms) (Table 6.2). 
● Significant negative associations: AUDIT ('Big Four' versus 
non-'Big Four' auditing firms) (Table 6.2). 
       
For Vietnamese the Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting 
Disclosure Index, the main predictors are: 
● Significant positive associations: CG (the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards) and SIZE 
(natural log of total assets) (Table 6.2).  
● Significant negative associations: STATE (the proportion of 
state ownership), MAN (the proportion of managerial 






7.3.1 The Extent of Voluntary Disclosure 
Using an unweighted disclosure scoring method for voluntary disclosure items, the 
answer for Research Question 1: 'What is the extent of voluntary disclosure made by 
Vietnamese listed firms in their comprehensive annual reports?' is presented. The 
evidence reported in Tables 5.1 and 7.1 show that in aggregate, the general level of 
voluntary disclosure by Vietnamese listed firms is arguably low (with the mean of 
20.31 per cent and a large variation from 3.57 per cent to 50.00 per cent).  
As a point of reference, this average voluntary disclosure score is lower than in the 
recent studies in Asian and/or emerging markets by Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) in 
Malaysia (53.20 per cent), Rouf (2011) in Bangladesh (47.74 per cent), Hossain and 
Hammami (2009) in Qatar (36.84 per cent) and Mangena and Tauringana (2007) in 
Zimbabwe (39.10 per cent), but is higher than those of Wang, Sewon and Claiborne 
(2008) in China (18.00 per cent) and Al-shammari and Al-sultan (2010) in Kuwait 
(19.00 per cent). This finding is not surprising given that Vietnamese listed firms had 
no history or tradition of voluntary disclosure under the centrally planned economy. 
However, it is impossible to make a direct comparison, given that each of these 
studies measures the extent of voluntary disclosure differently. For instance, 
Akhtaruddin et al.’s (2009) voluntary disclosure index consists of 74 items; Rouf 
(2011) has a list of 68 voluntary disclosure items; Hossain and Hammami (2009) 
develop a voluntary disclosure index of 44 items; Mangena and Tauringana (2007) 
comprise 86 items in their voluntary disclosure index; in Wang, Sewon and 
Claiborne (2008), a 79 voluntary disclosure items list was comprised and Al-
shammari and Al-sultan (2010) finalize a list of 76 voluntary disclosure items. 
The result of low levels of voluntary disclosure practices amongst Vietnamese firms 
supports the view of La Porta et al. (2000) who state that the level of voluntary 
disclosure is low in developing countries. As found in this study, Vietnamese listed 
firms exhibit lower levels of voluntary disclosure than most developing or emerging 
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economies. The World Bank (2006b) further notes that compared to other Asian 
countries within the region, Vietnam is behind in regard to the level of information 
transparency. The outcomes of this thesis support this view specifically as it relates 
to voluntary disclosure.  
There are several possible reasons for this low level of voluntary disclosure. First, 
the fact that the Vietnamese stock exchange is relatively young and that most of the 
listed firms are former SOEs, which in the past did not need to provide extensive 
financial reports are plausible explanations for such low levels of voluntary 
disclosure practices. In particular, most of these Vietnamese firms are still relatively 
new to the process of preparing annual reports for a wide range of stakeholders 
and thus, they may have a tendency to report as mandated, rather than to 
voluntarily disclose extra information. Second, the lack of effective regulation and 
law enforcement by the stock exchange regulatory bodies may contribute to the 
low level of information transparency, particularly voluntary disclosure. For 
instance, as mentioned in Section 2.7, when firms did not provide annual reports or 
were late in providing such information, the State Securities Commission of Vietnam 
(SSC) simply sent out memos reminding listed firms to provide more sufficient 
information for investors (Ministry of Finance 2009). Furthermore, the penalty for 
violating disclosure regulations is relatively weak. Section 2.7 notes that fines for 
firms that provide insufficient or false information only range from five to ten 
million VND (the equivalent of $250 to $500 USD). These fines are very minimal and 
thus, are very unlikely to be a sufficiently strong enforcement motivator to improve 
a firm’s level of information disclosure. Consequently, many of the listed firms in 
Vietnam still do not seem to pay enough attention to improving their information 
disclosure. Third, as at the middle of 2012, Vietnam still has not fully adopted 
IAS/IFRS. Perhaps the ambivalence of the Vietnamese government towards 
accounting regulation is another reason why Vietnam has such a low level of 
information disclosure. 
Within the VnDI, there are five key sub-categories. Information on Directors and 
Senior Management has the highest voluntary disclosure level at 47.49 per cent. 
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There are only three items within the Directors and Senior Management 
Information category, thus, this may be why the level of this type of communication 
is higher. In effect, it is relatively easy to get a high score in this sub-category. 
Corporate Social Reporting Information has the lowest level of voluntary disclosure 
at 16.22 per cent. Whilst the society is becoming more concerned about social 
information disclosure, the evidence in this thesis shows a notably low level of 
corporate social reporting disclosure among Vietnamese firms. This result enhances 
the argument of earlier studies that there is less social reporting disclosure in 
emerging or developing countries than in wealthier or developed countries (Belal 
2001; Cahaya, Porter, and Brown 2006; Dobers and Halme 2009). One possible 
explanation for such a low level could be because social reporting disclosure 
practices are relatively new in Vietnam. According to Krechowicz and Fernando 
(2009), Vietnamese listed firms do not seem to have major concerns in regard to 
the firms’ social sustainability, as it is found in their study that Vietnamese firms 
display the lowest corporate environmental and social reporting disclosure level 
among other Asian countries such as: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. 
There seems to be a far greater focus on economic issues. Thus, it is not surprising 
that Vietnamese listed firms demonstrate a low score for voluntary disclosure of 
corporate social reporting information. 
There are arguably clear benefits towards greater transparency in corporate 
disclosure for Vietnam. With economies around the globe under threat during the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, investors are reluctant to invest, especially in 
emerging markets where the level of information transparency is lower. Engaging in 
greater voluntary disclosure is advocated as it does not only allow firms the ability 
to obtain more external finance with a lower cost of capital and debts, but also 
assists with the country’s overall economic growth since voluntary disclosure 
practices have been shown to be positively related to market liquidity and market 
liquidity is associated with economic growth (Barako 2004; Haddad, AlShattarat, 
and Nobanee 2009; Mazumdar and Sengupta 2005). In order to raise additional 
funds to facilitate the process of privatization, listed firms in Vietnam should be 
encouraged to provide higher levels of information transparency. 
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The low level of information disclosure noted in the sample of 252 Vietnamese 
listed firms suggests the need for further regulation and associated enforcement by 
Vietnamese policy makers. As mentioned above, the lack of law enforcement and 
an absence of commensurate punishment may be an important factor contributing 
to the low level of voluntary disclosure. The findings of this thesis suggest that the 
punishment for insufficient information disclosure must be increased substantially 
and enforced. This may include holding managers of firms accountable for a firm’s 
disclosure. The threat of criminal prosecution for senior managers may generate a 
far greater impetus for improvement of information disclosure. This should be 
aligned with the development of an appropriate regulatory framework which 
includes the full adoption of IFRS/IAS.  It is well documented in the extant literature 
that a full adoption of IAS/IFRS can be one of the solutions for improving 
information transparency (Horton, Serafeim, and Serafeim 2010; Tarca 2004). Thus, 
full convergence to IAS/IFRS can be a beneficial tool to improve the level of 
Vietnamese corporate information disclosure. 
7.3.2 Insights on Independent Variables 
The descriptive results in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5 reveal some interesting 
characteristics of Vietnamese listed firms. 
Across the full sample of 252 Vietnamese listed firms, the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards (representing a firm’s corporate 
governance system) has a mean of 53.89 per cent. This exceeds the minimum 
requirements of Vietnamese listed firms’ corporate governance (at least one third 
of independent directors on corporate boards). Yet, there are 30 firms that fail to 
meet this minimum requirement (three with no independent directors and 27 with 
less than one third of independent directors on their corporate boards). Compared 
to other emerging capital markets, Vietnam’s average for independent directors on 
corporate boards is higher than the 38.3 per cent in Malaysia (Akhtaruddin et al. 
2009), 24 per cent in China (Xiao and Yuan 2007), 9.72 per cent in Bangladesh (Rouf 
2011) and 36.90 per cent in a developed Asian country such as Singapore (Cheng 
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and Courtenay 2006), but lower than the 68 per cent in Kenya (Barako 2007) and 
70.3 per cent in Zimbabwe (Mangena and Tauringana 2007). The mean of 53.89 per 
cent in this thesis highlights that the vast majority of Vietnamese listed firms comply 
with the requirements and the spirit of the regulations by having at least one third 
of independent directors on corporate boards. This is a positive sign for Vietnamese 
corporate governance regulators. 
Despite massive efforts to privatize its SOEs, the average proportion of state 
ownership in Vietnam remains substantial with a mean of 26.93 per cent, and with 
the highest proportion of state ownership at 79.92 per cent. The average state 
ownership figure in this thesis is significantly higher than the mean of two per cent 
in Singapore (Eng and Mak 2003) and seven per cent in Jordan (Naser, Al-Khatib, 
and Karbhari 2002), but is comparable with 26.84 per cent in China (Wang, Sewon, 
and Claiborne 2008). As stated in Chapter 2, the Vietnamese stock exchange was 
established in 2000 in order to facilitate the privatization process of many SOEs. 
However, the evidence in this thesis indicates that a large proportion of firms still 
have a significant presence of state ownership (71.82 per cent or 181 firms) among 
the sample of 252 Vietnamese listed firms. The high level of state ownership in 
Vietnam can be explained by the fact that Vietnam is still in its early stages of 
privatization. 
The descriptive results also indicate that the proportion of managerial ownership is 
at a moderate level of 12.76 per cent. The average in this thesis is higher than the 
0.48 per cent in China (Xiao and Yuan 2007), but far lower than the 29.19 per cent in 
Malaysia (Akhtaruddin and Haron 2010) and slightly lower than the 14.00 per cent 
in Singapore (Eng and Mak 2003). Overall, the managerial ownership in Vietnam is 
still sizeable. 
Results reveal that the proportion of foreign ownership among 252 Vietnamese 
listed firms is relatively low with an average foreign investment holding of 9.80 per 
cent. This is lower than many of studies conducted in Asian or emerging market 
contexts. For instance, Barako (2007) reports an average of 28 per cent foreign 
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ownership among Kenyan listed firms in both 1992 and 2001. In Malaysia, Ho and 
Tower (2011) note an average foreign ownership of 16 per cent for both 2000 and 
2006 while in Zimbabwe, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) calculate an average 
foreign ownership figure of 11.10 and 7.9 per cent for 2003 and 2004 respectively. 
Compared to neighbouring emerging markets such as China, the proportion of 
foreign ownership in Vietnam is much lower. Wang, Sewon and Claiborne’s (2008) 
study reveals a high foreign ownership average of 33.71 per cent among Chinese 
listed firms. The fact that Vietnam has a younger market than other emerging 
markets may be the reason why there is such a low level of foreign ownership 
among Vietnamese listed firms. Perhaps these foreign investors are more likely to 
invest in emerging countries that have a longer period of establishment and to 
observe the market before investing rather than ‘gambling’ on a new and young 
market like Vietnam, which is ten years old. Furthermore, the restriction ceiling of 
49 per cent imposed on the proportion of foreign ownership in a listed firm may 
also be a reason why there is a low level of foreign ownership in Vietnam. Clearly, 
there is room for increasing foreign ownership at the firm level in the Vietnamese 
context. 
7.3.3 Reflections on Hypotheses Results 
It is hypothesised in this thesis that the extent of voluntary disclosure is a function 
of corporate governance attributes (the proportion of independent directors on 
corporate boards), ownership identities (state, managerial and foreign ownership) 
and firm characteristics. This thesis concludes that the proportion of independent 
directors on corporate boards is an important aspect associated with voluntary 
disclosure, while the proportion of state and managerial ownership are the 
ownership identities that negatively influence the level of voluntary disclosure of 
Vietnamese listed firms. Firm-characteristics significantly associated with the extent 
of voluntary disclosure are firm size, profitability, industry, auditing firm, listing 
duration and stock exchange location. The discussions below consider the findings 
of this thesis and Vietnam's position relative to other Asian and/or emerging 
countries, followed by theoretical and practical implications. 
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H1: There is a positive association between stronger corporate governance 
systems and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Vietnamese 
listed firms – Supported. 
This thesis generates evidence that an effective corporate governance mechanism 
can significantly improve a firm’s communication of information on a voluntary 
basis. The empirical data supports Hypothesis H1 that there is a positive association 
between the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure within Vietnamese listed firms (Table 6.1). This 
implies that the strength of corporate governance mechanisms (measured by the 
high proportion of independent directors on corporate boards) can act as a positive 
monitoring mechanism, encouraging firms to better engage in voluntary disclosure 
practices. The result in this thesis lends support to the findings of many studies in 
Asian or emerging markets, which report a positive association between the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Chen and Jaggi 2000; Cheng and 
Courtenay 2006; Guan, Sheu, and Chu 2007; Xiao and Yuan 2007; Xiao, Yang, and 
Chow 2004; Yuen et al. 2009; Samaha 2010; Chau and Gray 2010). Results from 
sensitivity analyses support the main thesis results that effective corporate 
governance structure improves the extent of voluntary disclosure. In particular, 
firms that comply with the requirement of at least one third of independent 
directors on corporate boards and the corporate board size are associated with 
increased voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, the dominant role of a CEO who 
is also a chairperson encourages firms to participate in more voluntary disclosure 
(Section H.1 of Appendix H). The results of a positive association between the 
dominant role of the CEO and chairperson and the extent of voluntary disclosure 
reveals the distinctive reporting practices of Vietnamese listed firms, as this 
outcome is opposite to the findings of existing literature.  
There are several possible reasons for the positive association between the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. Consistent with agency theory, independent directors on 
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corporate boards assist firms in having more effective monitoring mechanisms, 
thereby overseeing management's opportunistic behaviours. Under a more 
intensive monitoring environment, managers are less likely to withhold information 
for their own benefit, which subsequently leads to improvement in information 
disclosure. Similar to the view of Kaplan and Reishus (1990), this thesis posits that 
due to the fear of loss of reputations, lawsuits and the market for their services, 
independent directors in Vietnamese listed firms have incentives to motivate the 
corporate boards of management to make decisions appropriately and more in 
accordance with shareholders’ wealth maximization goals. Overall, it is clear that in 
the context of Vietnamese listed firms, the presence of independent directors on 
corporate boards is an effective monitoring mechanism that assists firms in 
improving their level of voluntary disclosure. 
H2: There is a negative association between the extent of state ownership and the 
level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Vietnamese listed firms – 
Supported. 
The second hypothesis in this thesis, H2 proposes a negative association between 
the proportion of state ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure made by 
Vietnamese listed firms. The results reported in Table 6.1 reveal that there is a 
highly significant and negative association between the proportion of state 
ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Thus, H2 is supported. The 
negative relationship found in this thesis is similar to an earlier study of Chinese 
listed firms (Xiao, Yang, and Chow 2004). However, in Singapore, Eng and Mak 
(2003) detect a significantly positive association, while in other emerging countries 
there is no clear evidence of a significant relationship (Bogdan et al. 2009; Xiao and 
Yuan 2007). Extra sensitivity analyses using different measurements for state 
ownership support this outcome as empirical evidence reports that the presence of 
an influential state owner can potentially reduce the voluntary disclosure practices 
of Vietnamese listed firms. The significantly negative association between state 
ownership and voluntary disclosure practices in this thesis contributes to the 
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limited studies and provides some clarification for the previously inconsistent 
findings.  
There are several possible reasons for this phenomenon in Vietnam. First, unlike 
other countries with highly concentrated ownership, the agency problem in 
Vietnam, which has highly concentrated state ownership, is somewhat different. 
Within the Vietnamese context, the state ownership represents no ‘real owner’ of 
these state shares because in its communist sense, the state is represented by the 
people of Vietnam and so the state shares supposedly belong to the Vietnamese 
people, yet they do not have direct control or interest of these assets. Thus, there is 
no ‘real owner’ of these state shares. As there is no ‘real owner’ there may be a lack 
of interest in a firm’s information transparency, which reduces the incentives for 
monitoring in these state owned firms and subsequently lessens the motivation of 
managers to engage in more information disclosure.  
Second, under a centrally planned economy, financial reports in these former SOEs 
were historically prepared mainly for the purpose of budget planning and not for 
the purpose of obtaining external capital. The only user of financial reports was the 
state and hence managers of firms had little incentive to provide more information 
than required. After privatization, the management structures of these companies 
largely stayed the same and thus, perhaps under the same management, firms still 
retained their same corporate reporting behaviour of not engaging in voluntary 
disclosure.  
Third, being the sole authority, the state is powerful enough to obtain information 
about a particular firm through different channels and thus, demand for 
information by these state owned firms is generally lower, and consequently, this 
results in a lower level of information disclosure by firms.  
Fourth, it is believed that within the Vietnamese context, firms with higher state 
ownership disclose less information because of political constraints. In particular, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, managers of SOEs must at least be members of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam and do not necessarily have any skills in managing a 
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commercial business. In such cases, firms with a higher proportion of state 
ownership may be discouraged from voluntary disclosure because the government 
and these managers may use their political influence to promote their political 
goals, which often diverge from commercial motives and investors’ interests—such 
as information disclosure.  
Finally, it is posited that in Vietnamese firms with a higher proportion of state 
ownership, the managers of these firms generally face fewer hostile takeover 
threats as the state is the main player and also the firm's long term investor. Hence, 
this may give managers of high state owned firms reduced incentives to improve 
the level of firm disclosure.  
H3: There is a negative association between the extent of managerial ownership 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Vietnamese listed 
firms – Supported. 
The empirical evidence in this thesis provides support for the H3 proposition that 
there is a negative association between the proportion of managerial ownership 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure (Table 6.1). This implies that across 252 
Vietnamese listed firms, higher managerial ownership results in lower information 
disclosure and vice versa. When managerial ownership is highly concentrated, the 
managers gain more control of the firm’s operating, reporting and disclosure 
decisions, they become more entrenched and they have the ability to expropriate 
minority shareholders’ wealth. Recent studies of Singaporean listed firms by Eng 
and Mak (2003) and Malaysian listed firms (Akhtaruddin and Haron 2010; Ghazali 
and Weetman 2006) also find that information disclosure is likely to be less when 
there are higher levels of managerial ownership. 
There are various possible reasons for this result. First, the finding in this thesis is 
supported by the agency theory viewpoint that suggests a negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and information disclosure practices. Specifically, 
agency theory posits that managers who own an equity stake within a firm may 
potentially have an ‘entrenchment effect’. These managers may exploit their 
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powers and act in their own, instead of shareholders’ interests. These actions may 
include limiting the firm's information disclosure to protect themselves, rather than 
supplying sufficient information to assist shareholders with their decision making. In 
a weak legal infrastructure environment like Vietnam, managers who are influential 
shareholders may have even more incentives and power to manipulate accounting 
information to protect their own interests.  
Second, most of Vietnam’s listed firms originated as SOEs, wherein managers are 
appointed according to their political status (as mentioned in Chapter 2). Owning 
shares in their firms may make these ‘political’ managers become more risk-averse, 
resulting in decisions to voluntarily disclose less information to protect their 
‘political’ reputation.  
Third, not only are these managers politically appointed but they are often involved 
with the firms for a very long period of time, often since Vietnam’s reunification in 
1975. The combination of employment duration, political status, high power 
position as well as ownership may lead these managers to exploit their power, 
resulting in decisions to not disclose certain information so as to better secure their 
jobs as well as ‘political’ reputations. 
H4: There is a positive association between the extent of foreign ownership and 
the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Vietnamese listed firms – 
Not Supported. 
This thesis finds no significant association between the proportion of foreign 
ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure within Vietnamese listed firms 
(Table 6.1). The finding in this thesis is similar to those of Bodgan et al. (2009) and 
Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari (2002) who fail to find a significant relationship 
between the proportion of foreign ownership and the extent of disclosure by 
Romanian and Jordanian listed firms respectively. However, there are a number of 
studies that report a significant association between these two (Wang, Sewon, and 
Claiborne 2008; Xiao and Yuan 2007; Xiao, Yang, and Chow 2004; Barako 2007; 
Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Ho and Tower 2011; Mangena and Tauringana 2007). Two 
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possible reasons for this could be that foreign investors do not have enough power, 
as supported by the relatively low levels of shareholdings to induce the managers of 
Vietnamese listed firms to disclose more information. The lack of predictive power 
of foreign ownership could stem from the fact that the inherent foreign ownership 
among Vietnamese listed firms is low (9.80 per cent). The 49 per cent maximum 
foreign ownership ceiling certainly limits the power to influence the accounting 
choices of the firms, specifically voluntary disclosure. Moreover, barriers of 
language and cultural traditions may also restrain foreign investors from influencing 
Vietnamese managers' decision making tasks, including the decision to provide 
more information. 
7.3.4 Insights on Control Variables 
Findings for the control variables indicate that firm size (as measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets) is a very important factor associated with voluntary 
disclosure in Vietnamese annual reports (Table 6.1). In particular, it is found in this 
thesis that larger Vietnamese firms tend to engage in higher levels of voluntary 
disclosure. This result is supported by agency theory and many voluntary disclosure 
studies in Asian or emerging markets (Barako 2007; Xiao and Yuan 2007; Ho 2009; 
Eng and Mak 2003; Hossain, Tan, and Adams 1994). Several reasons have been 
advanced to offer an explanation for this positive relationship between size and 
voluntary disclosure. First, Buzby (1975) states that the process of gathering, 
preparing and disclosing information is relatively cheaper for bigger firms, thus they 
can provide more information disclosure than smaller firms. Second, within 
Vietnam, bigger firms may be subject to more public and even ‘political’ attention. 
As such, they tend to provide more information to minimize scrutiny from the 
public. 
Profitability is moderately significant and positive in its association with voluntary 
disclosure practices (Table 6.1). This finding supports the results of previous 
disclosure studies in Asian or emerging markets (Wang, Sewon, and Claiborne 2008; 
Xiao and Yuan 2007; Ghazali and Weetman 2006). However, other studies in 
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Malaysia by Ho and Tower (2011) and in China by Xiao, Yang and Chow (2004) 
report no significant association. The positive relationship between a firm’s profit 
and its level of information transparency is well supported by agency theory, in that 
more profitable firms engage in more voluntary disclosure practices. Agency theory 
posits that managers of more profitable firms may use external financial reporting 
information as a tool to enhance their personal advantages such as: remuneration, 
promotions or bonuses (Singhvi and Desai 1971; Wallace and Naser 1995; Inchausti 
1997). Furthermore, the Vietnamese capital market is relatively young and as such, 
more profitable firms have a clear motivation to provide more information so as to 
distinguish themselves from other poorer performing firms in the market, in order 
to better attract capital. 
Leverage lacks statistical significance within Vietnamese voluntary disclosure 
practices (Table 6.1). This is consistent with Ho (2009), Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006), Xiao and Yuan (2007), Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Chow and Wong-Boren's 
findings (Chow and Wong-Boren 1987) that suggest a firm’s leverage has no 
significant association with the extent of voluntary disclosure. This result may be 
because in Vietnam, firms’ creditors (such as banks) can obtain firms’ information 
easily and thus, there is little or no need to provide information in the firms' annual 
reports to meet the expectations of these interested groups. 
Membership in a particular type of industry is found to be associated with voluntary 
disclosure (Table 6.1). In particular, there is evidence indicating that firms within 
high-profile industries tend to engage in more voluntary disclosure than firms 
within low-profile industries. Many previous studies find that type of industry is a 
significant predictor of a firm’s voluntary disclosure decisions (Barako, Hancock, and 
Izan 2006; Cooke 1992; Williams 1998). One possible reason is that firms in high-
profile industries receive greater public scrutiny than low-profile industries firms 
and such pressures, arguably motivates these high-profile industries firms to 
provide more information in order to minimize the pressure and attention. 
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The auditing firm ('Big Four' compared with non-'Big Four' auditing firms) is found to 
be negatively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure made by 
Vietnamese listed firms (Table 6.1). This implies that listed firms that are audited by 
'Big Four' auditing firms provide significantly lower voluntary information disclosure 
than other firms. This finding reveals the unique reporting environment of 
Vietnamese listed firms as it is contradictory to the findings of a large number of 
studies in emerging markets. Specifically, the majority of studies in emerging 
markets either find a significant positive association (Inchausti 1997; Patton and 
Zelenka 1997) or no significant association with the presence of 'Big Four' auditors 
(Alsaeed 2005; Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Owusu-Ansah 
1998; Barako 2007). This finding, which is opposite to expectations, is perhaps due 
to the distinctive auditing environment in Vietnam whereby firms with 'Big Four' 
auditors do not prioritize information disclosure. To some degree, it is as if the 'Big 
Four' auditors’ type of clients and type of business in Vietnam is fundamentally 
different than in other countries. Further research could explore this unexpected 
phenomenon. 
Additionally, a firm’s listing duration is highly significant in its association with 
voluntary disclosure in a negative direction (Table 6.1). Specifically, this thesis finds 
that newly listed firms provide significantly less information than older firms. Older 
firms are more experienced in the disclosure of annual reports and hence, it may be 
easier and less costly for these older firms to prepare one, compared to newly listed 
firms (Owusu-Ansah 1998). Hossain and Hammami (2009) state that younger listed 
firms may suffer a competitive disadvantage if they disclose certain items and as 
such, newly listed firms in Vietnam may not communicate as much information 
because of this perceived disadvantage. 
The finding in this thesis also indicates that the stock exchange location is another 
important attribute in the level of voluntary disclosure practices in Vietnam (Table 
6.1). In particular, firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange (HOSE) tend to 
engage in more voluntary disclosure of information than firms listed on the Hanoi 
stock exchange (HNX). This is another interesting finding of Vietnamese reporting 
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practices. There are a few possible reasons for this. First, as stated earlier in Chapter 
2, Ho Chi Minh City was controlled by its colonial ‘master’ the French (1858–1954) 
and later came under the management of the US (1954–1975). Arguably, Ho Chi 
Minh City displays more of a Western influence whereas Hanoi, the northern 
capital, is more closed up in its historical ‘communist’ rule. Second, there is a five-
year gap between HOSE and HNX. As such, HOSE's regulatory and enforcement 
mechanisms may be more organized than HNX’s. For instance, the management 
team for monitoring and overseeing the activities of HOSE may have a more 
efficient system than in the younger HNX. Thus, firms listed on HOSE may be subject 
to more pressure to engage in providing sufficient extensive information. Third, 
being the first and leading stock exchange in Vietnam, firms listed on HOSE may be 
influenced by more international exposure than firms listed on HNX. This pressure 
may drive HOSE listed firms to provide more comprehensive information. Fourth, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the public, investors and the listed firms themselves may 
generally perceive HOSE listed firms to be better than HNX listed firms. Thus, 
managers of HOSE listed firms may tend to communicate more information in order 
to prevent their shares being undervalued and to distinguish them from HNX listed 
firms. 
7.3.5 Section Brief 
Theoretically, this thesis provides further support for the viability of agency theory 
in explaining variations of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure practices. In particular, 
consistent with agency theory tenets, stronger corporate governance can serve as 
an effective monitoring mechanism of a firm‘s activities, including the decision to 
disclose additional information beyond that mandated.  
The negative associations between the proportion of state and managerial 
ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure add another perspective to the 
agency problem of highly concentrated corporate ownership in emerging 
economies. In particular, the determination that state ownership reduces the level 
of voluntary information disclosure supports the view of agency theory that 
 
233 
concentrated ownership provides incentives for managers to reduce the quality of 
accounting information (Fan and Wong 2002). State ownership represents no ‘real 
owner’ and as such, there is lack of ‘real incentive’ to monitor the firms, thereby 
giving firms little motivation to disclose more information. Furthermore, the state 
generally has dominating power to control firms via various ways such as power to 
regulate or enforce rule, including the power to reduce the level of a firm’s 
voluntary disclosure of information.  
In relation to managerial ownership, this thesis finds that in the context of Vietnam, 
managerial ownership leads to managerial entrenchment and thus, managers may 
exploit their power and act in their own instead of shareholders’ interests, for 
example, by limiting firm information disclosure rather than supplying sufficient 
information to assist shareholders with their decision making. Overall, the findings 
in this thesis suggest that a highly concentrated ownership structure can lead to 
potential entrenchment problems, which arguably results in a lower level of 
information disclosure. 
Apart from these theoretical aspects, valuable suggestions in a practical sense are 
also presented. Evidence in this research suggests that strong corporate governance 
can serve as an effective monitoring mechanism to enhance the level of information 
transparency in Vietnam. Thus, Vietnamese policy makers should be encouraged to 
mandate other corporate governance mechanisms, such as mandating higher levels 
of experience or expertise on audit committees. For example, audit committees 
members are required to possess knowledge of law, finance or accounting. The next 
section discusses in greater detail this thesis’ recommendations towards the 
process of financial regulatory reform in Vietnam. 
The fact that a higher proportion of state ownership reduces the extent of voluntary 
disclosure does not add another unique insight to the existing debate about such 
ownership, but is also a valuable finding for the Vietnamese privatization process. 
Specifically, since firms with a higher level of state ownership have a reduced level 
of voluntary disclosure, this thesis suggests that there should be more mandatory 
 
234 
regulations imposed on state owned firms to improve information transparency, 
especially more so in higher state ownership firms than other firms. 
7.4 Key Contributions of this Thesis 
The results of this thesis contribute to the literature in a number of important ways. 
First, in light of limited studies on the current status of Vietnam, specifically their 
financial and accounting regulatory framework, this thesis is one of the first known 
studies examining the reporting environment of Vietnamese listed firms. Within the 
Vietnamese context, it is often posited that Vietnamese listed firms exhibit a lack of 
information transparency. Nevertheless, there have been very few empirical studies 
providing evidence to support this view. By investigating the reporting practices and 
corporate governance issues, the findings of this thesis allow financial statement 
users (both domestic and foreign), regulators and other stakeholders to better 
understand Vietnamese firm’s disclosure characteristics for decision making. 
Second, the findings indicate that there is still a gap between Vietnamese listed 
firms and those of other emerging economies in terms of the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. It is found that not only does Vietnam have an overall relatively low level 
of voluntary disclosure, but the level of voluntary disclosure of social reporting 
information is at a concerning weak level. It is argued, especially in the current 
uncertain economic conditions, that low levels of information transparency can 
deter investors from entering the market. As such, to maintain the development 
and sustainability of the relatively young Vietnamese market, Vietnamese 
regulators are urged to pay more attention to the level of information disclosure.  
Third, the interesting association between voluntary disclosure and ownership 
identities suggests a need for further investigation (García-Meca and Sánchez-
Ballesta 2010). The results of this thesis add another perspective to the agency 
problem in countries with concentrated ownership. In particular, this thesis finds 
that in firms with greater state ownership, the state is so powerful that they may 
override the agent/s – principals relationship. It can be argued that managers in 
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higher state ownership firms may lack incentives to disclose information as they are 
not properly monitored. The evidence found in this thesis of the negative 
relationship between managerial ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure 
also augments the existing debate on the ambiguous relationship between 
managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure practices. Specifically, this thesis 
reports that in a firm with highly concentrated ownership and in a weak regulation 
environment such as Vietnam, managerial ownership can lead to an entrenchment 
problem that leads managers to act in their own interests, instead of those of the 
shareholders. The result highlights that Vietnamese listed firms need to carefully 
choose their management incentive programs to better protect the shareholders’ 
interests. This thesis also recommends that Vietnamese regulators should enhance 
shareholders’ protection to minimize managers’ expropriation of the minority 
shareholders’ interests. 
Last, as stated above, the thesis results offer many valuable suggestions for 
Vietnamese regulatory reforms. For instance, to improve on the level of information 
transparency, it is recommended that Vietnam regulatory bodies (such as the 
Ministry of Finance or the State of Securities Commission) should consider an 
appropriate regulatory framework that includes the full adoption of IFRS/IAS. 
Moreover, a structured process leading towards improving the level of financial 
reporting expertise in Vietnam can certainly underpin any strengthening in a 
regulatory environment, providing increased confidence for domestic and foreign 
investors. Furthermore, it is argued in this thesis that one of the reasons for a low 
level of information disclosure could be weak legal enforcement. Thus, this thesis 
recommends that Vietnamese regulators should increase fines or penalties, holding 
managers of firms accountable for a firm’s disclosure. The threat of criminal 
prosecution for senior managers may create a greater motivation for improvement 
of information disclosure. Criminal prosecution of managers does not only improve 
the level of information but also strengthens the shareholders’ protection, which 
subsequently results in more confidence for investors in this emerging market. 
Additionally, since having effective corporate governance mechanisms can help to 
enhance the level of information transparency and improve market confidence, 
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perhaps regulators should consider adopting the mandatory expertise or skills 
requirement for members of audit committees, so as to enhance the monitoring 
activities which may result in an increased level of voluntary disclosure. Existing 
literature indicates that having an audit committee with knowledge of law, finance 
or accounting can be an effective monitoring mechanism overseeing the manager’s 
activities (Taylor 2008; Ho 2009). In regard to its privatization process, it is 
suggested that Vietnamese regulatory bodies should strengthen the regulations and 
enforcement governing the level of information disclosure, especially for formerly 
state owned firms. Overall, not only should Vietnam impose more financial 
reporting regulations, it should also consider strengthening its enforcement to 
improve the level of information transparency amongst Vietnamese listed firms.  
7.5 Future Research Suggestions 
The findings of this thesis and its limitation point to several further research 
opportunities. First, future research is encouraged to address some of the 
limitations of this thesis. For instance, because of the lack of information in earlier 
years, this thesis limits its timespan to a cross-sectional study for only the year 
2009. Future research could extend this approach to a longitudinal analysis to 
better detect disclosure patterns of Vietnamese listed firms. Furthermore, in view 
of the recent 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), it may be useful to consider 
the impact of overall corporate governance and ownership concentration upon 
corporate disclosure patterns before, during and after the GFC.  
Second, as mentioned in Sections 1.6, one of the limitations of this thesis is the lack 
of availability of a large number of comprehensive annual reports (170 firms). The 
unavailability of these annual reports may impact on the generalization of the 
results. Thus, this thesis suggests that future research further adopts a qualitative 
method (such as interviews or surveys) to explore this phenomenon in more depth 
and to provide reasons as to why these 170 firms did not provide comprehensive 
annual reports for the year 2009.  
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Third, as mentioned in Section 1.6, this thesis solely focuses on annual reports to 
investigate the issue of voluntary disclosure practices; yet, there are still many other 
mediums by which firms can disclose information. Thus, it is suggested that in the 
near future, when the Vietnamese stock market is more developed, perhaps 
additional research can explore other disclosure channels such as press releases, 
media or the Internet. These other avenues are potentially as important as 
information disclosure in annual reports and future studies could provide insights 
into what factors drive the use of these other communication mediums. 
Fourth, this thesis suggests further exploration should be conducted to examine the 
relationship between managerial ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
For instance, future studies can explore the differing impacts of managerial 
ownership on the extent of corporate communication. One of the unique aspects of 
Vietnamese managers in highly state influenced firms is that these managers have 
to be members of the Communist Party of Vietnam in order to have such high 
positions (members of corporate boards or senior managers) in high state 
ownership firms. Thus, it would be interesting to find out whether there is any 
difference between the voluntary disclosure practice of firms with managers having 
political membership and firms without managers having political membership (in 
non-privatised firms). 
Fifth, as seen in Chapter 5, the majority of Vietnamese listed firms emerged from 
SOEs and although increasing, there are still only a small number of family owned 
firms. In the future, when the market is more developed and there are more family 
owned listed firms, the family ownership variable could be looked at in order to 
enhance the understanding of the relationship between highly concentrated 
ownership and voluntary disclosure practices in emerging markets. 
Sixth, the empirical evidence in this thesis indicates that the stock exchange location 
impacts significantly on voluntary disclosure practices. This is an interesting finding, 
representing a unique aspect of the Vietnamese reporting environment. This thesis 
suggests that future research could be conducted by possibly utilising qualitative 
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methods (such as interviews or surveys) in order to more fully understand the 
reasons why there are such differences between the two stock exchanges. 
Additionally, as mentioned in Section 7.3, Vietnam has a rather distinctive 
environment of 'Big Four' auditing firms. Further interviews and surveys could be 
utilized to understand their domestic development and the perspective of listed 
firms on these 'Big Four' auditing firms and the related reasons for choosing such 
firms to audit their financial statements. 
Finally, to complement the findings of this thesis, future research could also be 
undertaken by exploring how these voluntary disclosures are perceived and used by 
various key stakeholder groups. Again, the use of interview and survey techniques 
with corporate managers, auditors, investors, equity analysts and lenders may lead 
to a better understanding of the importance of disclosure transparency. 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
The Asian Financial Crisis and Global Financial Crisis have emphasized the need for a 
better understanding of corporate governance and information transparency issues. 
Yet, despite its necessity and Vietnam's growing importance in the global economy, 
there has been little research into levels of corporate information transparency in 
Vietnam. 
This thesis is one of the first that addresses the issues of voluntary disclosure 
practices by Vietnamese listed firms. From a struggling centrally planned economy, 
Vietnam has fundamentally turned its entire economy around by moving towards a 
more market oriented economy and is now becoming one of the key players in the 
world economy with GDP growth outstripping most of its fellow developing 
economies. With such a unique transition, the evidence of voluntary disclosure 
practices in Vietnam within this thesis offers a significant extension to the literature 
by enhancing knowledge in such successful transitional countries. 
Using 2009 annual reports of 252 Vietnamese listed firms, this thesis investigates 
the extent of voluntary disclosure and its potential determinants. The evidence in 
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this thesis shows that the level of voluntary disclosure among listed Vietnamese 
firms is relatively low with an average of 20.31 per cent. With the 2007–2009 Global 
Financial Crisis where economic certainty fluctuates and investors are reluctant to 
invest, the need to improve information transparency is imperative in emerging 
markets like Vietnam. It is well documented in the extant literature that full 
adoption of IAS/IFRS can be one of the solutions for improving information 
transparency (Horton, Serafeim, and Serafeim 2010; Tarca 2004). Thus, perhaps full 
convergence to IAS/IFRS can be a beneficial future tool to improve the level of 
Vietnamese corporate information disclosure. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence in this thesis provides insights into the 
influencing factors on the extent of voluntary information disclosed in the 
Vietnamese 2009 annual reports. Corporate governance mechanism (the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards) is significantly and 
positively associated with voluntary disclosure. This finding is consistent with past 
literature and offers valuable suggestions to Vietnamese policy makers to improve 
other corporate governance mechanisms. 
It is also noted in this thesis that high state ownership and managerial ownership 
reduce the level of voluntary disclosure. These findings do not only add a unique 
Vietnamese story to the existing debate of ownership identities and voluntary 
disclosure, but also provide another perspective of highly concentrated ownership 
via agency theory. 
Firm size, profitability, industry, auditing firm, listing duration and stock exchange 
location are also associated with voluntary disclosure decisions, although different 
factors are associated with the communication of different categories of 
information. 
Overall, the results of this thesis reveal many important insights about Vietnamese 
listed firms and support a call for continued research in this fascinating, yet under-
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APPENDIX A VIETNAMESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
The internal corporate structure in Vietnam is governed by Enterprises Law 2005. 
According to Enterprises Law 2005, the internal governance structure of 
Vietnamese listed firms consists of: 1) General Meeting of shareholders (GMS), 2) a 
corporate board of directors (BOD)55 consisting of three to 11 members who are 
appointed by the GMS, 3) a chairperson of BOD appointed either by BOD or GMS, 4) 
a CEO appointed by BOD and 5) a Control Board or Supervisory Board appointed by 
GMS for a term of less than five years. Additionally, all listed firms are required to 
appoint at least one secretary (as illustrated in Figure A.1). 
The main duties of the Control Board or Supervisory Board are: to monitor the 
activities of the board of directors, to approve the firm’s annual reports, to inspect 
the firm’s financial reports at the request of shareholders, or to request an 
extraordinary shareholders meeting if wrong-doing by managers is suspected. It is 
somewhat equivalent to the role of audit committees in developed countries. 
However, the World Bank (2006a) argues that the role of the Control Board or 
Supervisory Board in Vietnam is unclear, having fewer responsibilities than Audit 
Committees in developed countries. Furthermore, the BOD is also allowed to set up 
sub-committees to assist their trading activities such as internal audits and human 
resources. However, in practice, not many firms have these sub-committees in place. 
Figure A.1 Governance Structure of a Typical Vietnamese Listed Firm 
 
                                                          
55
   The Board of Directors in Vietnam is called the Board of Management. For the purpose of 
consistency with the existing accounting literature, the term ‘Board of Management’ will be 
referred as ‘Board of Directors’ in this thesis. 
Shareholders 
General Meetings of Shareholders  
Chairman of BOD Board of Directors  Control Board/ 
Supervisory Board 




APPENDIX B VIETNAMESE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE INDEX 
The initial voluntary disclosure checklist is generated from an adaptation of relevant 
prior disclosure studies. Table B.1 presents the initial voluntary disclosure index 
before being reviewed and revised by ‘experts’ for relevancy and validity of each 
voluntary disclosure item in regard to the Vietnamese reporting environment. This 
initial list contains 119 items. Table B.2 then shows the excluded items after the 
evaluation process while Table B.3 presents the final unique Vietnamese Voluntary 
Disclosure Index that has been screened and validated by Vietnamese accounting 
experts. This final voluntary disclosure index consists of 84 items. 
B.1: Creation of Initial Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index Item 
As there has been no known prior research on voluntary disclosure undertaken in 
Vietnam, as a starting point, this thesis adapts several well-known studies that have 
been utilized widely in the literature of voluntary disclosure. These are the studies 
of Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995), Ferguson, Lam and Lee (2002), Xiao and Yuan 
(2007), Ho (2009), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) and Wang, Sewon and Claiborne 
(2008). To be included in the disclosure index, an item needs to have been included 
in more than one of the above mentioned studies. 
Table B.1      Initial List of 119 Items for Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index 
 Type of information Sources 
 Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Initial Items    
 Corporate and Strategic Disclosure Information  (Strategic 
information)  
   
1 History of the company MRG  H&C FLL PH AHHY  
2 Organizational structure MRG  H&C FLL PH AHHY WSC 
3 Financial highlights – 2 years or 
more 
  H&C  PH   
4 Discussion on statement of 
strategy and objectives – general  
MRG X&Y H&C FLL PH AHHY WSC 
5 Discussion on statement of 
strategy and objectives – financial  
MRG  H&C FLL   WSC 
6 Discussion on statement of 
strategy and objectives –
marketing 
MRG  H&C FLL   WSC 
7 Discussion on statement of 
strategy and objectives – social 
MRG  H&C FLL   WSC 
8 Impact of strategy on current 
results 
MRG  H&C  PH   
9 Impact of strategy on future 
results 
MRG  H&C  PH   
10 Actions to be taken in the future MRG X&Y    AHHY  
11 Picture of major products   H&C  PH AHHY  
12 Discussion of major 
product/service/business line 
 X&Y H&C FLL PH AHHY  
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 Type of information Sources 
13 Physical output and capacity 
utilization 
   FLL  AHHY WSC 
14 Corporate policy on Research and 
Development 
MRG   FLL   WSC 
15 Discussion of Research and 
Development activities  
MRG X&Y  FLL PH  WSC 
16 Number of employees in 
Research and Development 
MRG   FLL   WSC 
17 Rate of return on expected 
projects 
   FLL   WSC 
18 Strategy to improve business 
(product quality/service/business 
performance) 
  H&C FLL PH AHHY  
19 Descriptive of marketing network 
(domestic) 
  H&C FLL PH  WSC 
20 Descriptive of marketing network  
(foreign) 
   FLL PH  WSC 
21 Reasons for acquisitions MRG  H&C FLL PH AHHY WSC 
22 Financing details of acquisitions   H&C FLL PH  WSC 
23 Reasons for disposal MRG  H&C FLL PH AHHY WSC 
24 Consideration received on 
disposal 
   FLL PH  WSC 
25 Discussion of future business 
opportunity of disposal 
   FLL   WSC 
26 Discussion of competitive position MRG X&Y   PH AHHY WSC 
  Financial and capital market information (Financial information) 
27 Geographical capital expenditure 
– quantitative 
MRG  H&C  PH   
28 Geographical production – 
quantitative 
MRG    PH   
29 Line of business - production – 
quantitative 
MRG  H&C  PH   
30 Competitor analysis MRG  H&C FLL    
31 Profitability ratio MRG  H&C   AHHY  
32 Cash flow ratio MRG   FLL   WSC 
33 Liquidity ratio MRG X&Y  FLL PH AHHY WSC 
34 Gearing ratio MRG X&Y  FLL PH AHHY WSC 
35 Return on equity ratio    FLL PH AHHY  
36 Return on capital employed ratio    FLL PH AHHY WSC 
37 Other ratios MRG X&Y  FLL PH AHHY WSC 
38 Aging of debtors    FLL   WSC 
39 Breakdown and analysis of 
operating expenses 
   FLL   WSC 
40 Breakdown and analysis of 
administrative expenses 
   FLL   WSC 
41 Breakdown and analysis of sales 
and revenues 
   FLL   WSC 
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 Type of information Sources 
42 Breakdown and analysis of 
operating expenses into 
fixed/variables 
   FLL   WSC 
43 Proportion of raw material 
purchase – local 
   FLL   WSC 
44 Discussion of industry trends  
(prior) 
   FLL PH  WSC 
45 Disclosure of intangible valuations 
(except goodwill and brands) 
MRG   FLL PH AHHY WSC 
46 Dividend payout policy MRG   FLL  AHHY WSC 
47 Financial history or summary – six 
or more years 
MRG  H&C  PH  WSC 
48 Financial history or summary – 
three or more years 
MRG   FLL   WSC 
49 Off balance sheet financing 
information 
MRG   FLL   WSC 
50 Advertising information – 
qualitative 
MRG   FLL  AHHY WSC 
51 Advertising information – 
quantitative 
MRG     AHHY WSC 
52 Effect of inflation rate on current 
results 
MRG   FLL   WSC 
53 Effects of interest rates on 
current results 
MRG   FLL   WSC 
54 Effects of foreign currency on 
current results 
MRG   FLL   WSC 
55 Foreign currency exposure 
management descriptions 
MRG   FLL   WSC 
56 Major exchange rates used in the 
accounts 
MRG   FLL  AHHY WSC 
57 Name of the stock exchange 
where the firm is listed 
  H&C FLL PH   
58 Market capitalization at year end MRG   FLL PH  WSC 
59 Market capitalization trend MRG   FLL PH  WSC 
60 Size of shareholdings MRG   FLL    
61 Type of shareholding MRG  H&C FLL PH AHHY WSC 
62 Volume of shares traded (trend)   H&C  PH   
63 Volume of shares traded (year 
end) 
  H&C  PH   
64 Shares price information (trend)   H&C  PH AHHY  
65 Share prices (year end)   H&C  PH AHHY  
66 Market share analysis MRG  H&C FLL PH AHHY WSC 
67 Order book or backlog 
information 
MRG X&Y H&C     
68 Restatement of financial 
information to non IAS/GAAP 
MRG   FLL    
 Director and senior management information ( Strategic information) 
69 Age of directors MRG     AHHY  
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 Type of information Sources 
70 Education qualifications 
(academic/profession) 
MRG  H&C  PH AHHY  
71 Commercial experiences  MRG    PH AHHY  
72 ID of senior management and 
their functions 
MRG  H&C     
73 Other directorships held by 
directors 
MRG     AHHY  
74 Position or office held by 
executive directors 
  H&C  PH   
75 Picture of senior management 
team  
  H&C  PH   
 Forward looking information (Strategic information) 
76 Effects of inflation on future 
operations – qualitative 
MRG    PH   
77 Effects of interest rates on future 
operations 
MRG   FLL PH  WSC 
78 Effects of foreign currency on 
future operations – qualitative 
MRG   FLL PH  WSC 
79 Forecast of sales – qualitative MRG  H&C FLL PH AHHY WSC 
80 Forecast of sales – quantitative MRG   FLL PH AHHY WSC 
81 Forecast of profits – qualitative MRG X&Y  FLL PH AHHY WSC 
82 Forecast of profits – quantitative MRG X&Y  FLL PH AHHY WSC 
83 Forecast of cash flows – 
qualitative 
MRG   FLL PH AHHY WSC 
84 Forecast of cash flows – 
quantitative 
MRG   FLL PH AHHY WSC 
85 Assumptions underlying forecasts MRG  H&C FLL PH  WSC 
86 General discussion of future 
industry trends 
  H&C FLL PH  WSC 
87 Discussion of external factors 
affecting the company (economy, 
politics and technology) 
  H&C FLL PH  WSC 
88 Discussion of company prospects 
(general) 
  H&C FLL PH   
89 Discussion on future expenditure    FLL  AHHY WSC 
90 Discussion of future products 
development 
  H&C FLL PH AHHY WSC 
91 Index (selling prices/quantity 
sales/raw materials prices) 
  H&C FLL   WSC 
 Social reporting information (Non-financial information) 
92 General philanthropy   H&C  PH   
93 Participation in government social 
campaigns 
  H&C  PH   
94 Environmental protection 
programs – quantitative 
MRG X&Y H&C FLL PH AHHY WSC 
95 Environmental protection 
programs – qualitative 
   FLL   WSC 
96 Charitable donations MRG   FLL   WSC 
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 Type of information Sources 
97 Community programs MRG  H&C FLL PH AHHY WSC 
98 Environmental policy   H&C  PH   
99 Geographical distribution of 
employees 
MRG   FLL   WSC 
100 Number of employees for more 
than 2 years (full and part time) 
MRG  H&C FLL PH AHHY  
101 Categories of employees by 
gender 
MRG   FLL  AHHY WSC 
102 Reasons for changes in employee 
numbers or categories 
MRG   FLL   WSC 
103 Line-of-business distribution of 
employees 
MRG    PH   
104 Employee appreciation   H&C FLL PH  WSC 
105 Picture of employees' welfare   H&C  PH   
106 Discussion of employees' welfare   H&C FLL PH  WSC 
107 Policy on employee training   X&Y H&C FLL PH AHHY WSC 
108 Nature of training MRG X&Y H&C  PH   
109 Amount spent on training MRG X&Y   PH AHHY WSC 
110 Number of employees trained MRG X&Y    AHHY WSC 
111 Redundancy information  MRG    PH   
112 Recruitment information 
(problems and related policy) 
MRG  H&C FLL   WSC 
113 Equal opportunity policy 
statement 
MRG   FLL   WSC 
114 Effects of Employment Contract 
Act 
   FLL   WSC 
115 Data on accidents MRG   FLL PH  WSC 
116 Cost of safety measures MRG   FLL PH AHHY WSC 
117 Safety of the products MRG    PH   
118 Value added statement MRG    PH   
119 Company awards  X&Y H&C     
Legend: MRG: Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995). FLL: Ferguson, Lam and Lee (2002). H&C: Hannifa and 
Cooke (2002). X&Y: Xiao and Yuan (2007). PH: Ho (2009). AHHY: Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain and 
Yao (2009). WSC: Wang, Sewon and Claiborne (2008).  
B.2: Screening of Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index 
The initial Vietnamese voluntary disclosure index (Section B.1) list of 119 items is 
sent for critical review by ‘experts’ who have at least five years of auditing 
experience in Vietnamese accounting reporting practices. In particular, 20 surveys 
are sent to the leading local and international auditing firms with the request to 
screen the initial 119 items in regard to mandatory regulations such as Vietnamese 
Accounting Standards 2003 (Decision 15/2006/QD-BTC), Vietnamese Law on 
Accounting 2003, Securities Law 2006 and Circular 38/2007/TT-BTC. 
Of all 20 surveys sent, 12 are returned (representing a 60 per cent response rate). 
However, only eight respond with thorough and comprehensive replies and thus, a 
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final useable response rate of 40 per cent is achieved. Their responses are in 
complete agreement as they all state that 25 items are mandated by Vietnamese 
regulations. Specifically, 24 items are governed under Circular 38/2007/TT-BTC and 
one item 'Off balance sheet information' is mandated through Decision 
15/2006/QD-BTC of Vietnamese Accounting Standards 2003. 
Following the responses from these experts, additional interviews are carried out 
with three other ‘experts’ who agree to participate in further discussion. As a result, 
another 10 items are excluded due to their being deemed of little or no relevancy to 
the reporting practices of listed firms in Vietnam. 
The reasons for excluding these 35 items are detailed below. 
Table B.2      Reasons for Exclusion of 35 Items from the Initial List of 119 Items 
Type of information Reasons for excluding items 
Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Excluded Items 
Corporate and strategic information (Strategic Information) 
1 History of the company Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
2 Organizational structure Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
3 Financial highlights – two years or more Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
4 Discussion on statement of strategy and 
objectives – general  
Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
5 Discussion on statement of strategy and 
objectives – marketing 
Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
6 Actions to be taken in the future Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
7 Discussion of major product/service/business 
line 
Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
 
 
8 Corporate policy on Research and 
Development 
Research and Development activities 
are not common among Vietnamese 
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Type of information Reasons for excluding items 
9 Number of employees in Research and 
Development 
listed firms. Hence, to capture the 
voluntary disclosure of Research and 
Development activities, this index 
employs one generic phase of 
"Discussion of Research and 
Development activities". 
10 Reasons for acquisitions As of the end of 2009, acquisition 
and disposal activities are very rare 
activities as firms generally are not 
involved in either acquisition or 
disposal activities. Thus, items 
related to acquisition and disposal 
activities are not included because 
they are deemed to be less relevant 
to the Vietnam corporate reporting 
environment 
11 Financing details of acquisitions 
12 Reasons for disposal 
13 Consideration received on disposal 
14 Discussion of future business opportunity of 
disposal 
Financial and capital market information (Financial information) 
15 Geographical capital expenditure – quantitative Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
16 Geographical production – quantitative Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
17 Line of business - production – quantitative Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
18 Return on equity ratio All profit related ratios are combined 
under one Profitability ratio 
19 Liquidity ratio All debt related ratios are combined 
under one Debt/Gearing ratio 
20 Dividend payout policy Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
21 Off balance sheet financing information Item deleted because it is mandatory 
in Vietnam. Specifically, all 
Vietnamese firms are obliged to 
prepare an “Off-balance sheet” 
following their Balance sheet to 
disclose any item that cannot be 
listed under the Balance Sheet 
(Decision 15/2006/QD-BTC by MOF).  
22 Size of shareholdings Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
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Type of information Reasons for excluding items 
23 Type of shareholding Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007. 
24 Restatement of financial information to non-
IAS/GAAP 
Deemed non-relevant to the 
reporting environment in Vietnam as 
Vietnam has not fully adopted IAS. 
25 Financial history or summary – six or more 
years 
Items deleted because all listed 
companies are obliged to report 
their financial highlights/ summary 
in recent years. Majority of listed 
companies in Hanoi were only 
established in mid-2005 and thus, 
these financial histories or summary 
of these years are deemed less 
relevant to Vietnamese listed 
companies. Financial highlights or 
summary of two years are deemed 
to be more relevant. However, this is 
mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007. 
26 Financial history or summary – three or more 
years 
Director and senior management information (Strategic information) 
27 Age of directors Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
28 Education qualifications (academic/ profession) Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
29 Commercial experiences  Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
30 Position or office held by executive directors Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
Forward Looking information (Strategic information) 
31 Discussion of company prospect (general) Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
Social reporting information (Non-financial information) 
32 Number of employees for more than two years 
(full and part time) 
Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
33 Discussion of employees' welfare Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
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Type of information Reasons for excluding items 
34 Policy on employee training  Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
35 Recruitment information (problems and related 
policy) 
Mandated by Circular 38/2007/TT-
BTC issued by Ministry of Finance 
dated 18th April 2007 
 
B.3: The Final Unique Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index 
Based on the careful screening process discussed in Section B.2, a final list of 84 
items is developed. These 84 items are considered comprehensive and appropriate 
and are verified by ‘experts’ as being relevant in capturing the level of voluntary 
disclosure practices of Vietnamese listed firms. 
Among these 84 items, 51 items are adapted from Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995), 
which has a 60.71 per cent adaption rate. There are 48 items (57.14 per cent 
adaption rate) from Wang, Sewon and Claiborne (2008), 58 items (69.05 per cent 
adaption rate) from Ferguson, Lam and Lee (2002), 51 items (60.71 per cent 
adaption rate) from Ho (2009), 33 items (39.29 per cent adaption rate) from 
Hannifa and Cooke (2002), 32 items (38.10 per cent adaption rate) from 
Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain and Yao (2009) and 13 items (15.48 per cent 
adaption rate) from the study of Xiao and Yuan (2007). 
In summary, the final Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index consisting of 84 items 
is a validated disclosure instrument to capture the voluntary disclosure practices of 
Vietnamese listed firms. The other 35 items are excluded because of its mandatory 
nature or are deemed to have little or no relevance in the Vietnamese reporting 
environment 
Table B.3      Final VnDI (84 Items) 
Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index – VnDI (84 items) 
Corporate and Strategic Information (14 items) 
1 Statement of strategy and objectives – financial  
2 Statement of strategy and objectives – social 
3 Discussion on the impact of strategy on current results 
4 Discussion on the impact of strategy on future results 
5 Picture of major products 
6 Physical output and capacity utilization  
7 Discussion of Research and Development activities  
8 Statements of strategy improving business  
9 Discussion of future products developments 
10 Rate of return on expected projects 
11 Descriptive information of marketing network (domestic market) 
12 Descriptive information of marketing network (foreign market) 
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Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index – VnDI (84 items) 
13 Discussion of competitive environment  
14 General discussion of industry trends (past) 
Financial and Capital Market Information (29 items) 
1 Gearing ratios 
2 Profitability ratios 
3 Return on capital employed ratio 
4 Cash flow ratio  
5 Other ratios that are not mandatory 
6 Name of the stock exchange the firm is listed on 
7 Volume of shares traded (year end) 
8 Volume of shares traded (trend) 
9 Market capitalization trend 
10 Market capitalization at year end 
11 Market share analysis 
12 Share prices information (year end) 
13 Share price information (trend) 
14 Major exchange rates use in the accounts 
15 Discussion of foreign currency exposure to firms activities by the managers 
16 Competitors analysis  
17 Aging of debtors 
18 Disclosure of intangible valuations (except goodwill and brands) 
19 Discussion of advertising, marketing activities – qualitative 
20 Discussion of advertising, marketing activities – quantitative 
21 Discussion on the effects of inflation rates on current results 
22 Discussion on the effects of foreign currency on current results 
23 Discussion on the effects of interest rates on current results 
24 Breakdown and analysis of sales and revenues 
25 Breakdown and analysis of operating expenses 
26 Breakdown and analysis of administrative expenses 
27 Breakdown and analysis of operating expenses into fixed/variables 
28 Discussion of raw material 
29 Order book or backlog information 
Director and Senior Management Information (3 items) 
1 Identification of senior management and their functions 
2 Other directorships held by directors 
3 Picture of senior management team  
Forward Looking Information (14 items) 
1 Forecast assumptions 
2 General discussion of future industry trend 
3 Discussion of external factors affecting the firm's future ( economy/politics) 
4 Forecast of sales – qualitative 
5 Forecast of sales – quantitative 
6 Forecast of profits – qualitative 
7 Forecast of profits – quantitative 
8 Forecast of cash flows – qualitative 
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Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index – VnDI (84 items) 
9 Forecast of cash flows – quantitative 
10 Discussion on future expenditure 
11 Discussion on the effects of interest rates on future operating activities 
12 Discussion on the effects of inflation on future operating activities 
13 Discussion on the effects of foreign currency on future operating activities 
14 Index (selling prices/quantity sales/raw materials prices) 
Social reporting Information (24 items) 
1 Company awards 
2 General philanthropy 
3 Charitable donations (specific amount) 
4 Participation in government social campaigns 
5 Community programs (health and education) implemented  
6 Statement of firm's environmental policies 
7 Environmental protection programs – qualitative 
8 Environmental protection programs – quantitative 
9 Employee appreciation 
10 Picture of employees' welfare 
11 Breakdown of line-of-business distribution of employees 
12 Geographical distribution of employees 
13 Categories of employees by gender 
14 Reasons for changes in employee numbers or categories 
15 Effects of Employment Contract Act 
16 Nature of training 
17 Amount spent on training 
18 Number of employees trained 
19 General retrenchment or redundancy information  
20 Equal opportunity policy statement 
21 Data on accidents 
22 Discussion of workplace safety (costs and measurement) 
23 Statements concerned with wealth created (e.g., value added statement) 
24 Discussion on the safety of the products 
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APPENDIX C RELIABILITY OF MEASUREMENT 
In order to better ensure the reliability of the disclosure index measurement, which 
is the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI), another researcher (who is an 
academic member and is currently doing a PhD in accounting) is asked to 
independently assess the disclosure score of 20 randomly selected listed firms from 
the 252 firms-population. The unweighted voluntary disclosure scores of this 
independent researcher are then compared with the researcher’s to determine if 
the scores are significantly different.  
Prior to the process, detailed instructions for scoring the data are prepared and a 
discussion of scoring methods is carried out. T-tests results indicate that overall, the 
two scores of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure are not significantly different. 
Weinbach and Grinnell (2004) refer to the reliability of a measurement instrument 
as being its ability to generate consistent results by using it several times. 
Within the five major sub-categories, the results of the scoring by two researchers 
also reveals no significant difference with all p-values far greater than 0.050. Table 
C.1 presents the t-tests scores between the two researchers. 




VnDI Author 0.846 
 Independent researcher  
VnCSI Author 0.769 
 Independent researcher  
VnFCMI Author 0.923 
 Independent researcher  
VnDSMI Author 1.000 
 Independent researcher  
VnFLI Author 0.803 
 Independent researcher  
VnCSRI Author 0.967 
 Independent researcher  
Legend: VnDI is the acronym for Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index (shaded), with its 
five sub-categories, namely: Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and Strategy Information 
Index (VnCSI), Vietnamese Voluntary Financial Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI), 
Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior Management Disclosure Index (VnDSMI), 
Vietnamese Voluntary Forward Looking Information Index (VnFLI) and Vietnamese 
Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure Index (VnCSRI). Sig. = significant difference. 
Number of firms examined in these reliability tests is 20.  
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In summary, based on the results presented in Table C.1, the subjectivity problem 
arising from the scoring of the VnDI instrument used in this thesis is deemed 
minimized. Therefore, it can be concluded that the scores for each voluntary 
disclosure item in this thesis are reliable.  
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APPENDIX D HISTOGRAMS 
Chapter 5 in the main text provides the descriptive analysis of the Vietnamese 
Voluntary Disclosure Index (VnDI) and its predictor variables. Appendix D contains 
the histograms of all the continuous independent variables (corporate governance 
aspect – CG, the proportion of state ownership – STATE, the proportion of 
managerial ownership – MAN and the proportion of foreign ownership – FOREIGN) 
and continuous control variables (firm size – SIZE, profitability – PROFIT, leverage – 
LEV). 
D.1: Independent Variables 
According to Weinbach and Grinnell (2004), a histogram is a useful graph to observe 
the frequency of a value or value category for a given variable. It is an important 
graphical device for assessing normality (normal distribution) of a variable. A normal 
distribution is one of the assumptions of the data for multiple regressions. Hair et 
al. (1995) state that within a multiple regression model the scores of data, 
especially the predictor variables, should be normally distributed. 
Section 5.3 of the main text presents the descriptive statistics results of the four 
independent variables, namely: the proportion of independent directors on 
corporate boards (CG), the proportion of state ownership (STATE), the proportion of 
managerial ownership (MAN) and the proportion of foreign ownership (FOREIGN). 




Figure D.1 Histogram of Corporate Governance Proxy 
 
 





Figure D.3 Histogram of Managerial Ownership 
 
Figure D.4 Histogram of Foreign Ownership 
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As shown in Figure D.1, it appears that the corporate governance variable is 
normally distributed. Information of the mean and median score of this variable is 
provided in Table 5.3. 
The histograms of ownership identity variables in Figures D.2, D.3 and D.4 are 
considered not normally distributed. Specifically, the histograms of these three 
ownership identities reveal that there are many firms with a zero state or 
managerial or foreign ownership structure. Therefore, Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 in the 
main text are presented respectively to generate a better understanding of firms 
with these particular ownership structures. In addition, alternative measurements 
of these three ownership variables are undertaken in this thesis. Section 6.5 reveals 
the results of additional sensitivity analyses carried out with various alternate 
measurements of these three ownership identity variables. 
D.2: Control Variables 
Figures D.5 to D.7 depict the histograms of continuous control variables, such as: 
total assets and its log (SIZE), firm profit (PROFIT) and leverage (LEV). 









Figure D.6 Histogram of Profitability 
 
 




As seen from Figure D.5, the total assets variable is highly skewed (evidenced by the 
mean and median scores presented in Table 5.7). Therefore, consistent with past 
studies, firm size is transformed into the natural log of total assets and is employed 
to improve the skewed data problem. Figure D.5 illustrates the results of total 
assets variable after log is transformed. Between the two histograms presented in 
Figure D.5, the histogram of log of total assets is clearly more normally distributed. 
The histograms in Figure D.6 of profitability and Figure D.7 of leverage are viewed 
as being normally distributed. 
Overall, when data appears to be skewed, this thesis undertakes several steps to 
minimize such problems. For instance, the independent variables of the three 
ownership identities (the proportion of state, managerial and foreign ownership) 
appear to be skewed. This thesis thus further tests the influence of these variables 
on VnDI through different measurements (Sections 5.3 and Appendix H). The total 
assets variable also appears to be highly skewed and thus the log of total assets is 
taken as the firm size measurement. In conclusion, with the extra analyses and the 
adjusted figure for skewed data variable, the assumption of normality is deemed to 
be mitigated in this study. 
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APPENDIX E NON-RESPONSE BIAS 
As mentioned in Section 4.2.1 (Table 4.2), of all 42756 listed firms in the Vietnamese 
stock exchanges (HOSE and HNX), only 257 firms provide comprehensive annual 
reports, while there are 170 firms that only publish their financial statements (and 
not the comprehensive annual reports57). In this thesis, firms providing annual 
reports are labelled as the respondent group while firms without annual reports 
and that solely provide basic financial statements are classified as the non-
respondent group. Given the considerable amount of firms without annual reports, 
an assessment of this issue, which is the non-response data, is critical for 
interpreting the results of this thesis. 
According to David, Stirling and Weldon (1998), non-response bias occurs when 
some data cannot be collected for the research study. The key issue of non-
response bias is whether the non-respondent group fundamentally differs from the 
respondent group (Tan et al. 2003). If the non-respondent group is fundamentally 
different from the respondent group, the interpretation of the results and the 
strength of confidence in the interpretation can vary considerably. Although the 
non-response issue can greatly impact on the results, David, Stirling and Weldon 
(1998) argue that such an issue does not always lead to bias or measurement 
errors. Past studies indicate that the extent of the non-response problem can vary 
according to different types of research. For instance, Smith (2003) observes and 
concludes that a response rate of less than 25 per cent is common among 
accounting research (such as the approach of this thesis), Babbie (2010) argues that 
a response rate of at least 50 per cent in analysis and reporting research (such as 
the approach of this thesis) is considered adequate, while Singleton and Bruce 
(2005) state that an acceptable rate of 85 per cent for interview surveys is needed.  
Among 427 non-financial firms listed in 2009, there is a 60 per cent response rate 
(firms with available annual reports) and nearly 40 percent non-response rate (firms 
with no availability of annual reports) (Table 4.2). Appendix E thus investigates 
whether there is a fundamental difference between the firm-characteristics58 of 
                                                          
56
 There are 448 Vietnamese listed firms in 2009. However, 21 of these 448 firms are classified as 
financial firms and thus, these firms are not included (see Section 4.2.1 for sampling criteria).   
57
  A typical annual report in Vietnam includes a set of financial statements (consisting of Balance 
Sheet, Income Statement, Statement of Cash Flows and Footnotes to financial statements). 
Specifically under this Circular, an annual report should include: background and strategic 
information of the firm, a chairman’s report, a management report, human resources and 
employee information, the ownership structure and corporate board of directors information 
and a set of financial statements. Within the Vietnamese reporting environment, a 
comprehensive annual report can vary from 20 pages to more than 200 pages. 
58
  As there are 170 firms without annual reports, the independent variables such as corporate 
governance, and the proportion of state, managerial and foreign ownership of these firms could 
not be obtained for these 170 firms. Therefore, the extra investigation into non-response bias in 
this Appendix can only be conducted on the five control variables (size, profitability, leverage, 
industry, auditing firm, listing duration and stock exchange location) available in the financial 
statements and on the websites of the two stock exchanges. 
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firms with available annual reports (respondent group) and firms without annual 
reports (non-respondent group). Figure E.1 illustrates the key question of this 
Appendix.  
The full comprehensive annual report typically contains various types of 
information including the firm's background and strategic information, a chairman’s 
report, a management report, human resources and employee information, 
ownership structure and Board of Directors' information. Thus, this thesis argues 
that firms in the respondent group (with annual reports) tend to be more 
transparent as they provide more information disclosure and maybe engage in 
more voluntary disclosure practices than firms in the non-respondent group 
(without annual reports).  
Figure E.1. Breakdown of Vietnamese Firms With and Without Annual Reports 
 
As shown in Table E.1 (Panel A), the total assets of all 427 listed firms range widely 
in size from 14,560 to 27,238,655 million Vietnam Dong (VND). The total assets of 
these firms have an average of 1,020,263 million VND. The median of total assets 
(367,194 million VND) is significantly lower than its mean, suggesting it is highly 
skewed. Thus, the log of total assets is used as a proxy to measure a firm’s size (as 
mentioned in Chapter 4). Overall, Vietnamese firms’ profitability has a high average 
of 8.45 per cent. LEV (leverage is measured by total liabilities over total assets) has a 
wide range, from 2.84 per cent to 98.23 per cent. Average leverage for these firms 
is at a medium level of 52.60 per cent.  
Moreover, Table E.1 (Panels B and C) shows that there is a high and significant 
difference between the total assets of firms in the respondent group and firms in 
the non-respondent group (p-value = 0.000). Specifically, the average for total 
assets of firms in the respondent group is far higher than those in the non-
respondent group (1,371,317 versus 489,553 million VND respectively). Moreover, 
on average, firms in the respondent group have a highly significant (p-value = 0.000) 
lower leverage ratio than firms in the non-respondent group (49.05 per cent and 
57.98 per cent respectively). Additionally, firms in the respondent group have larger 
profits (measured by return on assets) at a highly significant level (p-value = 0.003) 

























Thus, it can be interpreted from the results of Table E.1 that bigger firms, firms with 
higher profit or firms with lower leverage are far more likely to publish 
comprehensive annual reports instead of mere financial statements. Thus, the 
respondent group is arguably more transparent in their information disclosure than 
the non-respondent group. On the other hand, firms without annual reports are 
found to be smaller firms, firms with lower profit or firms with higher leverage.  
Table E.1   Vietnamese Firms Characteristics for Continuous Variables of Two 
Groups of Firms 




SIZEi (Log of 
Total Assets) 
LEVi (%) PROFITi (%) 
Panel A: Total firms listed in 2009 (n = 427 firms) 
Mean 1,020,263 12.85 52.60 8.45 
Median 367,194 12.81 55.23 6.44 
Standard Deviation 2,280,958 1.35 95.40 120.76 
Minimum 14,560 9.59 2.84 -32.92 
Maximum 27,238,665 17.12 98.23 87.84 
Panel B: Firms in respondent groups (n=257 firms) 
Mean 1,371,317 13.25 49.05 9.43 
Median 537,004 13.19 51.16 7.27 
Standard Deviation 2,728,953 1.26 21.47 10.32 
Minimum 21,422 9.97 8.02 -32.92 
Maximum 27,238,665 17.12 98.23 87.84 
Panel C: Firms in non-respondent group (n=170 firms) 
Mean 489,552 12.24 57.98 6.98 
Median 212,120 12.26 60.758 5.59 
Standard Deviation 1,167,475 1.24 22.10 6.75 
Minimum 14,560 9.59 2.84 -19.11 
Maximum 12,400,542 16.33 95.56 29.63 
T-tests  
Statistics  Size (Log of 
Total Assets) 
LEV PROFIT 
F 0.066 0.129 8.84 
Significant 0.000* 0.000* 0.003* 
Legend: SIZEi is proxied by logarithm total assets of firm i to eliminate the skewness in the 
data. LEVi is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets of firm i. PROFITi is 
calculated as net profit over the total assets of firm i. *Correlation is highly significant at the 
0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is 
moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). 
 
In regard to the categorical variables, Tables E.2 to E.5 present the cross-tabulation 
results of firms’ characteristics between the two groups of respondent and non-
respondent firms. Table E.2 shows that firms in high-profile industries tend to be 
more transparent than firms in low-profile industries (66.22 per cent of high-profile 
industry firms are in the respondent group while only 57.99 per cent of firms in low-
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profile industries are in this group). The difference in providing annual reports 
between the two groups of industry is significant as tested by the Pearson Chi-
square likelihood ratio with p-value < 0.050. 
Table E.2     Vietnamese Firms Characteristics by Industry Category 
Industry (IND) Respondent 
Non-




98.00 50.00 148.00 
 Expected Count 89.08 58.92 148.00 




159.00 120.00 279.00 
 Expected Count 167.93 111.07 279.00 
 % within Industry 57.99 43.01 100.00 
Total firms Count 257.00 170.00 427.00 
 Expected Count 257.00 170.00 427.00 
 % within Industry 60.20 39.80 100 
    Value df Sig. 
Pearson Chi-square 3.436a  0.032** 
Likelihood Ratio 3.471 1 0.031 
Legend: *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is 
significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 
level (1-tailed). 
Moreover, Table E.3 also reveals that firms audited by the 'Big Four' firms generally 
disclose more information (through the publication of their annual reports) than 
firms audited by the non-'Big Four' firms (p-value = 0.000). In particular, among 59 
firms audited by the 'Big Four', 48 firms are within the respondent group 
(representing a major 81.36 per cent figure), while within the non-'Big Four' groups, 
209 firms are in the respondent group while 159 are in the non-respondent group.  
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Table E.3      Vietnamese Firm Characteristics by Auditing Firm Category 
 Auditing firm (AUDIT) Respondent 
Non-
respondent  Total firms 
Non-'Big 
Four' Count 
209.00 159.00 368.00 
  Expected Count 221.49 146.51 368.00 
  % within Auditing firm 56.79 43.21 100.00 
'Big Four' Count 48.00 11.00 59.00 
  Expected Count 35.51 23.49 59.00 
  % within Auditing firm 81.36 18.64 100.00 
Total firms Count 257.00 170.00 427.00 
  Expected Count 257.00 170.00 427.00 
  % within Auditing firm 60.19 39.81 100.00 
    Value df Sig. 
Pearson Chi-square 12.802a  0.000* 
Likelihood Ratio 13.995 1 0.000 
Legend: *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is 
significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 
level (1-tailed). 
The results in Table E.4 show that among 134 newly listed firms in 2009, only 
slightly more than half of these firms provided their 2009 annual reports (70 firms). 
On the other hand, within the group of 293 older listed firms, 63.83 per cent of 
them are in the respondent group. This can be interpreted that older firms tend to 
provide more information (through issuing a higher percentage of annual reports) 
than newer firms.   
Table E.4      Vietnamese Firm Characteristics by Listing Duration Category 
  
Listing duration (LISTING) Respondent 
Non-
respondent  Total firms 
Newly Count 70.00 64.00 134.00 
 Expected Count 80.65 53.35 134.00 
 % within Listing duration 52.24 47.76 100.00 
Not new Count 187.00 106.00 293.00 
 Expected Count 176.35 116.65 293.00 
 % within Listing duration 63.83 36.17 100.00 
Total firms Count 257.00 170.00 427.00 
  Expected Count 257.00 170.00 427.00 
  % within Listing duration 60.19 39.81 100.00 
    Value df Sig. 
Pearson Chi-square 5.149a  0.012* 
Likelihood Ratio 5.105 1 0.012 
Legend: *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is 




Table E.5 shows that virtually all firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 
(HOSE) (97.86 per cent) are in the respondent group whereas for the Hanoi Stock 
Exchange (HNX) listed firms, only 30.83 per cent are in the respondent group and 
69.17 per cent of them are in the non-respondent group. There is clearly a 
distinctive difference between the reporting behaviours of firms listed in these 
two stock exchanges (Pearson Chi-square test has p-value = 0.000). Firms listed in 
HOSE engage in significantly higher levels of information transparency than those 
listed on the HNX exchange.  
 Table E.5 Vietnamese Firm Characteristics by Stock Exchange Location 
Category 
Stock exchange location (LOC) 
  Respondent 
Non-
respondent  Total firms 
HOSE Count 183.00 4.00 187.00 
  Expected Count 112.55 74.44 187.00 
  % within Stock exchange 97.86 2.14 100.00 
HNX Count 74.00 166.00 240.00 
  Expected Count 144.45 95.55 240.00 
  % within Stock exchange 30.83 69.17 100.00 
Total firms Count 257.00 170.00 427.00 
  Expected Count 257.00 170.00 427.00 
  % within Stock exchange 60.19 39.81 100.00 
    Value df Sig. 
Pearson Chi-square 197.064a  0.000* 
Likelihood Ratio 238.900 1 0.000 
Legend: *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is 
significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 
level (1-tailed). 
In summary, these tests above reveal some key characteristic differences 
between firms in the respondent and non-respondent groups. In particular, it 
seems that firms in the respondent group (the more transparent group) are: 
1. Bigger in size (Table E.1), and/or 
2. Higher profitability (Table E.1), and/or 
3. Lower leverage (Table E.1), and/or  
4. In high-profile industries (Table E.2), and/or 
5. Audited by 'Big Four' auditing firms (Table E.3), and/or 
6. Older firms (Table E.4), and/or 
7. Firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (Table E.5).  
Table 6.1 of the multiple regression results reports that bigger firms, firms with 
higher profits, firms in high-profile industries, older firms, firms audited by non-'Big 
Four' auditing firms and firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange are found 
to be significant predictors determining the level of voluntary disclosure. It is 
reasonable to state that caution needs to be exercised when interpreting the extent 
of voluntary disclosure reported in this thesis. Particularly if the analysis of this 
thesis included the non-respondent firms (170 firms with unavailable annual 
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reports) the extent of information disclosure, specifically voluntary disclosure 
reported, could be lower than the overall 20.31 per cent VnDI figure level reported 
in the main thesis (Table 5.1). 
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APPENDIX F SPEARMAN AND PEARSON CORRELATION MATRICES 
RESULTS 
The purpose of analysing correlation matrices is to provide further insights into the 
relationships between variables included in this thesis. Correlation matrices are 
presented for the dependent variable and its five sub-categories and between each 
sub-category with the other independent variables and control variables. 
F.1: Correlation Matrix – VnDI and Predictor Variables 
Table F.1 shows the Pearson (upper right) and Spearman (lower left) correlation 
matrix between the dependent variable of the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure 
Index (VnDI), independent variables, such as the proportion of independent 
directors on corporate boards (CG), proportion of state ownership (STATE), 
proportion of managerial ownership (MAN) and proportion of foreign ownership 
(FOREIGN) and control variables, namely: firm size (SIZE), profitability (PROFIT), 
leverage (LEV), industry (IND), auditing firms (AUDIT), listing duration (LISTING) and 
stock exchange location (LOC). 
Among the independent variables, Table F.1 reports a highly significant positive 
correlation between the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards 
and VnDI (p-value = 0.008). A highly significant positive correlation is also found for 
foreign ownership and VnDI (p-value = 0.000). State ownership is highly significant 
and negative in its correlation with VnDI (p-value = 0.005). The correlation figures in 
Table F.1 also show that managerial ownership, although being in the hypothesized 
direction, is not significantly correlated to the level of voluntary disclosure among 
Vietnamese listed firms (p-value > 0.100).  
With regard to the control variables, firm size, profitability, industry, auditing firm and 
stock exchange location are all positively related to VnDI. However, only firm size and 
stock exchange location are highly and significantly correlated (p-values = 0.000). 
Table F.1 also reveals that there are negative correlations between a firm’s leverage 
and listing duration with VnDI, but only listing duration is highly significant in its 
correlation (p-value = 0.001). 
Furthermore, the correlation matrix also provides insights into the relationship 
between the independent variables. In particular, the proportion of independent 
directors on corporate boards is moderately negative in its correlation with state 
ownership (p-value = 0.051) as well as managerial ownership (p-value = 0.097). By 
contrast, the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards is moderately 
significant and positive in its correlation with foreign ownership (p-value = 0.050). 
Within the ownership identities variables, state ownership is highly and negatively 
significant in its correlation with managerial ownership (p-value = 0.000) and 
 
F-2 
foreign ownership (p-value = 0.002). Managerial ownership is not significantly 
correlated with foreign ownership (p-value > 0.100). 
The correlation matrix in Table F.1 also indicates that the correlation coefficients 
between all the variables are generally not high (none of the correlation coefficients 
exceed the limit of 0.800). The maximum correlation figure detected in Table F.1 is r 
= -0.687 (Spearman correlation) between state and managerial ownership. This 
suggests that multicollinearity is unlikely to cause serious problems in the 
interpretation of the regression results. According to Hair et al. (1995) and Cooper 




























Table F.1      Correlation Matrix – VnDI and Predictor Variables             Pearson 
Variables 
 
DV IVs CVs 
VnDI  CG STATE MAN FOREIGN SIZE PROFIT LEV IND LISTING AUDIT LOC 
VnDI 1 0.152* -0.164* -0.017 0.253* 0.308* 0.041 -0.061 0.073 -0.198* 0.073 0.315* 
 0.008 0.005 0.397 0.000 0.000 0.256 0.169 0.126 0.001 0.124 0.000 
CG 0.138* 1 -0.103*** 0.082*** 0.104*** 0.043 -0.060 -0.162** -0.053 0.029 0.099*** 0.090*** 
0.014  0.051 0.097 0.050 0.247 0.172 0.005 0.200 0.321 0.058 0.077 
STATE -0.158* -0.107* 1 -0.559* -0.183* 0.006 0.070 0.035 0.019 0.087*** 0.041 -0.240* 
0.006 0.045  0.000 0.002 0.465 0.135 0.291 0.380 0.085 0.260 0.000 
MAN 0.041 -0.029 -0.687* 1 0.019 0.068 0.012 0.101*** -0.095 0.082*** 0.056 0.179* 
0.260 0.326 0.000  0.381 0.140 0.428 0.055 0.067 0.097 0.188 0.002 
FOREIGN 0.294* 0.056 -0.176* 0.011 1 0.340* 0.181* -0.205* 0.029 -0.265* 0.130** 0.278* 
0.000 0.186 0.003 0.432  0.000 0.002 0.001 0.325 0.000 0.019 0.000 
SIZE 0.288* 0.014 0.009 -0.043 0.394* 1 -0.103** 0.252* -0.069 -0.077 0.393* 0.424* 
0.000 0.415 0.441 0.248 0.000  0.052 0.000 0.137 0.113 0.000 0.000 
PROFIT -0.002 -0.032 0.044 -0.055 0.223* -0.133** 1 -0.418* 0.125** 0.121** 0.072 -0.018 
0.488 0.306 0.246 0.193 0.000 0.017  0.000 0.024 0.028 0.127 0.389 
LEV -0.080 -0.128** 0.035 0.105** -0.208* 0.266* -0.581* 1 -0.124** -0.040 0.045 -0.121** 
0.103 0.021 0.288 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.024 0.264 0.236 0.027 
IND 0.077 -0.066 0.011 -0.091 0.029 -0.068 0.059 -0.121* 1 0.083 0.003 0.025 
0.111 0.150 0.429 0.074 0.321 0.140 0.177 0.027  0.094 0.481 0.347 
LISTING  -0.205* 0.049 0.046 0.058 -0.321* -0.064 0.094*** -0.043 0.083*** 1 -0.054 -0.098*** 
0.001 0.218 0.236 0.179 0.000 0.157 0.069 0.250 0.094  0.199 0.060 
AUDIT  0.095*** 0.085*** 0.030 -0.063 0.191* 0.350* 0.008 0.051 0.003 -0.054 1 0.166* 
0.066 0.089 0.320 0.158 0.001 0.000 0.451 0.209 0.481 0.199  0.004 
LOC 0.331* 0.064 -0.224* 0.140* 0.339* 0.440* -0.007 -0.121** 0.025 -0.098 0.166* 1 
0.000 0.155 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.454 0.027 0.347 0.060 0.004  
Spearman 
Legend: Shaded area denotes highest correlation. DV = Dependent variable. IV = Independent variable. CV = Control variable. *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index. CG = the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = 
firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
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F.2: Correlation Matrix – VnDI and its Five Sub-Categories 
Table F.2 presents the correlation matrix between the dependent variable (VnDI) and 
its five sub-categories. The upper right of the table presents Pearson pair-wise 
coefficients and the lower left represents Spearman pair-wise coefficients. The 
correlation matrix in Table F.2 shows that for all of the five sub-categories within the 
disclosure, there are positive and highly significant levels of correlations (p-value < 
0.010). Moreover, as expected, the five sub-categories of Vietnamese Voluntary 
Disclosure Index are found to be positively and significantly correlated with each other. 
Among the five sub-categories, Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting 
Disclosure Index (VnCSRI) has the highest positive correlation with the overall VnDI (r = 
0.779).  
Table F.2 Correlation Matrix – VnDI and its Five Sub-Categories        




VnDI VnCSI VnFCMI VnDSMI VnFLI VnCSRI 
VnDI 
1 0.738* 0.656* 0.454* 0.571* 0.779* 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
VnCSI 
0.754* 1 0.363* 0.202* 0.326* 0.471* 
0.000  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
VnFCMI 
0.614* 0.394* 1 0.194* 0.170* 0.320* 
0.000 0.000  0.001 0.003 0.000 
VnDSMI 
0.448* 0.209* 0.144** 1 0.166* 0.373* 
0.000 0.000 0.011  0.004 0.000 
VnFLI 
0.566* 0.353* 0.135* 0.157* 1 0.207* 
0.000 0.000 0.016 0.006  0.000 
VnCSRI 
0.745* 0.443* 0.311* 0.381* 0.171* 1 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003  
Spearman 
Legend: Shaded area denotes highest correlation coefficient. *Correlation is highly 
significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI is the acronym for 
the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index with its five sub-categories, namely: Vietnamese 
Voluntary Corporate and Strategic Information Index (VnCSI), Vietnamese Voluntary 
Financial Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI),  Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior 
Management Disclosure Index (VnDSMI), Vietnamese Voluntary Forward looking 
Information Index (VnFLI) and Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting Disclosure 
Index (VnCSRI). Number of firms = 252. 
F.3: Correlation Matrix – VnCSI and Predictor Variables 
Correlation matrices are provided for each of the five sub-categories (Sections F.3 
to F.7). The coefficient of correlations between the Vietnamese Voluntary 
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Corporate and Strategic Information Index (VnCSI), independent, and control 
variables are reported in Table F.3. The analysis reveals that the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards, proportion of foreign ownership, firm 
size, auditing firm and stock exchange location are significantly positive in their 
correlation to the level of voluntary disclosure of Corporate and Strategic 
Information. Among these five variables, the proportion of foreign ownership (p-
value = 0.000), firm size (p-value = 0.001) and stock exchange location (p-value = 
0.000) are highly significant. The correlation between the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards and VnCSI is moderately significant (p-
value = 0.060) while the auditing firm is significantly correlated with VnCSI (p-value 
= 0.045). Moreover, the correlation statistics show that the proportion of state 
ownership, leverage and listing duration are negatively correlated with VnCSI, but 
only the proportion of state ownership (p-value = 0.004) and listing duration (p-
value = 0.000) have highly significant correlations. 
F.4: Correlation Matrix – VnFCMI and Predictor Variables 
The correlation results in Table F.4 suggest that the proportion of independent 
directors on corporate boards, proportion of foreign ownership, firm size, profit, 
industry, auditing firm and stock exchange location are positively correlated to 
Vietnamese Voluntary Financial Capital Market Data Index (VnFCMI). Four of these 
are significantly correlated. Specifically, the proportion of independent directors on 
corporate boards is highly significant in its correlation (p-value = 0.006). Foreign 
ownership is also highly significant in its correlation with VnFCMI (p-value = 0.010). 
Firm size and stock exchange location are highly significant in their correlation with 
VnFCMI (p-values = 0.000). Moreover, the proportion of state ownership, 
managerial ownership, leverage and listing duration are shown to have negative 
correlations with VnFCMI, but only leverage is significant at a moderate level (p-





Table F.3 Correlation Matrix – VnCSI and Predictor Variables                
                   Pearson 
Variables 
 
DV IVs CVs 
VnCSI  CG STATE MAN FOREIGN  SIZE PROFIT LEV IND LISTING AUDIT LOC 
VnCSI 1 0.098*** -0.165* 0.045 0.291* 0.189* 0.081 -0.080 0.067 -0.220* 0.107** 0.280* 
 0.060 0.004 0.237 0.000 0.001 0.101 0.103 0.146 0.000 0.045 0.000 
CG 0.100*** 1 -0.103*** 0.082*** 0.104*** 0.043 -0.060 -0.162* -0.053 0.029 0.099 0.090*** 
0.056  0.051 0.097 0.050 0.247 0.172 0.005 0.200 0.321 0.058 0.077 
STATE -0.133** -0.107** 1 -0.559* -0.183* 0.006 0.070 0.035 0.019 0.087*** 0.041 -0.240* 
0.017 0.045  0.000 0.002 0.465 0.135 0.291 0.380 0.085 0.260 0.000 
MAN 0.043 -0.029 -0.687* 1 0.019 0.068 0.012 0.101*** -0.095 0.082 0.056 0.179* 
0.248 0.326 0.000  0.381 0.140 0.428 0.055 0.067 0.097 0.188 0.002 
FOREIGN 0.330* 0.056 -0.176* 0.011 1 0.340* 0.181* -0.205* 0.029 -0.265* 0.130** 0.278* 
0.000 0.186 0.003 0.432  0.000 0.002 0.001 0.325 0.000 0.019 0.000 
SIZE 0.168* 0.014 0.009 -0.043 0.394* 1 -0.103*** 0.252* -0.069 -0.077 0.393* 0.424* 
0.004 0.415 0.441 0.248 0.000  0.052 0.000 0.137 0.113 0.000 0.000 
PROFIT 0.040 -0.032 0.044 -0.055 0.223* -0.133** 1 -0.418* 0.125** 0.121* 0.072 -0.018 
0.264 0.306 0.246 0.193 0.000 0.017  0.000 0.024 0.028 0.127 0.389 
LEV -0.101 -0.128** 0.035 0.105** -0.208* 0.266* -0.581* 1 -0.124** -0.040 0.045 -0.121* 
0.055 0.021 0.288 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.024 0.264 0.236 0.027 
IND 0.073 -0.066 0.011 -0.091*** 0.029 -0.068 0.059 -0.121** 1 0.083*** 0.003 0.025 
0.123 0.150 0.429 0.074 0.321 0.140 0.177 0.027  0.094 0.481 0.347 
LISTING  -0.231* 0.049 0.046 0.058 -0.321* -0.064 0.094*** -0.043 0.083 1 -0.054 -0.098*** 
0.000 0.218 0.236 0.179 0.000 0.157 0.069 0.250 0.094  0.199 0.060 
AUDIT  0.086*** 0.085*** 0.030 -0.063 0.191* 0.350* 0.008 0.051 0.003 -0.054 1 0.166* 
0.087 0.089 0.320 0.158 0.001 0.000 0.451 0.209 0.481 0.199  0.004 
LOC 0.287* 0.064 -0.224* 0.140** 0.339* 0.440* -0.007 -0.121** 0.025 -0.098*** 0.166* 1 
0.000 0.155 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.454 0.027 0.347 0.060 0.004  
Spearman 
Legend: Shaded area denotes highest correlation. DV = Dependent variable. IV = Independent variable. CV = Control variable. *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnCSI = Vietnamese Voluntary Corporate and Strategic 
Information Index. CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = 
the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. 
Number of firms = 252. 
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Table F.4 Correlation Matrix – VnFCMI and Predictor Variables               
                    Pearson 
Variables 
 
DV IVs CVs 
VnFCMI CG STATE MAN FOREIGN  SIZE PROFIT LEV IND LISTING AUDIT LOC 
VnFCMI 1 0.159* -0.048 -0.023 0.148** 0.218* 0.030 -0.093*** 0.042 -0.093*** 0.030 0.248* 
 0.006 0.225 0.358 0.010 0.000 0.320 0.072 0.254 0.071 0.319 0.000 
CG 0.164** 1 -0.103 0.082 0.104 0.043 -0.060 -0.162** -0.053 0.029 0.099 0.090 
0.005  0.051 0.097 0.050 0.247 0.172 0.005 0.200** 0.321 0.058 0.077 
STATE -0.054 -0.107* 1 -0.559** -0.183** 0.006 0.070 0.035 0.019 0.087 0.041 -0.240** 
0.195 0.045  0.000 0.002 0.465 0.135 0.291 0.380 0.085 0.260 0.000 
MAN -0.008 -0.029 -0.687** 1 0.019 0.068 0.012 0.101 -0.095 0.082 0.056 0.179** 
0.452 0.326 0.000  0.381 0.140 0.428 0.055 0.067*** 0.097 0.188 0.002 
FOREIGN 0.186** 0.056 -0.176** 0.011 1 0.340** 0.181** -0.205** 0.029 -0.265** 0.130* 0.278** 
0.002 0.186 0.003 0.432  0.000 0.002 0.001 0.325 0.000 0.019 0.000 
SIZE 0.181** 0.014 0.009 -0.043 0.394** 1 -0.103 0.252** -0.069 -0.077 0.393** 0.424** 
0.002 0.415 0.441 0.248 0.000  0.052 0.000 0.137 0.113 0.000 0.000 
PROFIT 0.014 -0.032 0.044 -0.055 0.223** -0.133* 1 -0.418** 0.125* 0.121* 0.072 -0.018 
0.412 0.306 0.246 0.193 0.000 0.017  0.000 0.024 0.028 0.127 0.389 
LEV -0.088 -0.128* 0.035 0.105* -0.208** 0.266** -0.581** 1 -0.124* -0.040 0.045 -0.121* 
0.081 0.021 0.288 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.024 0.264 0.236 0.027 
IND 0.097** -0.066 0.011 -0.091*** 0.029 -0.068 0.059 -0.121** 1 0.083*** 0.003 0.025 
0.063 0.150 0.429 0.074 0.321 0.140 0.177 0.027  0.094 0.481 0.347 
LISTING  -0.068 0.049 0.046 0.058 -0.321** -0.064 0.094 -0.043 0.083 1 -0.054 -0.098 
0.140 0.218 0.236 0.179 0.000 0.157 0.069 0.250 0.094  0.199 0.060 
AUDIT  0.083 0.085 0.030 -0.063 0.191** 0.350** 0.008 0.051 0.003 -0.054 1 0.166** 
0.094 0.089 0.320 0.158 0.001 0.000 0.451 0.209 0.481 0.199  0.004 
LOC 0.257** 0.064 -0.224** 0.140* 0.339** 0.440** -0.007 -0.121* 0.025 -0.098 0.166** 1 
0.000 0.155 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.454 0.027 0.347 0.060 0.004  
Spearman 
Legend: Shaded area denotes highest correlation. DV = Dependent variable. IV = Independent variable. CV = Control variable. *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnFCMI = Vietnamese Voluntary Financial Capital Market Data Index. 
CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of 




F.5: Correlation Matrix – VnDSMI and Predictor Variables 
Table F.5 presents the correlation of the Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior 
Management Disclosure Index (VnDSMI) sub-category and its predictor variables. 
The proportion of independent directors on corporate boards, the proportion of 
foreign ownership, firm size, auditing firms and stock exchange location are 
positively correlated with VnDSMI. However, only the proportion of foreign 
ownership (p-value = 0.027), firm size (p-value = 0.001) and its stock exchange 
location (p-value = 0.019) are significantly correlated. The other variables, namely 
the proportion of state ownership and managerial ownership, profitability, 
leverage, listing duration and auditing firms are negatively correlated with VnDSMI, 
but only the proportion of state ownership is significant (p-value = 0.013) and listing 
duration is moderately significant (p-value = 0.067). 
F.6: Correlation Matrix – VnFLI and Predictor Variables 
Table F.6 reveals three negative correlations between the Vietnamese Voluntary 
Forward Looking Information Index (VnFLI) and three predictor variables, namely 
the proportion of state ownership, managerial ownership and listing duration. 
Other predictor variables are reported to have positive correlations with VnFLI. 
However, among these 11 variables only three significant correlations between 
VnFLI and its predictor variables are detected. In particular, firm size is found to 
have a highly significant and positive correlation with VnFLI (p-value = 0.007). Listing 
duration (p-value = 0.077) and stock exchange location (p-value = 0.014) are also 
positively and significantly correlated with voluntary disclosure of such information. 
F.7: Correlation Matrix – VnCSRI and Predictor Variables 
As shown in Table F.7, amongst the independent variables the proportion of state 
ownership is highly significant and negative in its correlation with Vietnamese 
Voluntary Corporate Social Reporting Information Disclosure Index (VnCSRI) (p-
value = 0.009), while foreign ownership is highly significant and positive in its 
correlation with VnCSRI (p-value = 0.001). With regard to the control variables, firm 
size (p-value = 0.000) and stock exchange location (p-value = 0.001) are also found 
to have highly significant and positive correlations with VnCSRI. Whilst firm size and 
stock exchange location are positively correlated, listing duration is negatively 









DV IVs CVs 























 0.043 -0.060 -0.162
*
 -0.053 0.029 0.099 0.090
***
 














0.022 0.045  0.000 0.002 0.465 0.135 0.291 0.380 0.085 0.260 0.000 
MAN 0.017 -0.029 -0.687
*







0.392 0.326 0.000  0.381 0.140 0.428 0.055 0.067
**


















0.055 0.186 0.003 0.432  0.000 0.002 0.001 0.325 0.000 0.019 0.000 
SIZE 0.191
*











0.001 0.415 0.441 0.248 0.000  0.052 0.000 0.137 0.113 0.000 0.000 










 0.072 -0.018 













 -0.040 0.045 -0.121
**
 
0.215 0.021 0.288 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.024 0.264 0.236 0.027 
IND 0.036 -0.066 0.011 -0.091
***




 0.003 0.025 
0.287 0.150 0.429 0.074 0.321 0.140 0.177 0.027  0.094 0.481 0.347 
LISTING -0.089
***
 0.049 0.046 0.058 -0.321
*
 -0.064 0.094 -0.043 0.083
***
 1 -0.054 -0.098
***
 
0.080 0.218 0.236 0.179 0.000 0.157 0.069 0.250 0.094  0.199 0.060 
AUDIT -0.004 0.085
***




 0.008 0.051 0.003 -0.054 1 0.166
*
 













 0.025 -0.098 0.166
*
 1 
0.020 0.155 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.454 0.027 0.347 0.060 0.004  
Spearman 
Legend: Shaded area denotes highest correlation. DV = Dependent variable. IV = Independent variable. CV = Control variable. *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDSMI = Vietnamese Voluntary Directors and Senior Management 
Disclosure Index. CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the 
proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number 
of firms = 252. 
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DV IVs CVs 
VnFLI  CG STATE MAN FOREIGN  SIZE PROFIT LEV IND LISTING AUDIT LOC 
VnFLI 1 0.051 -0.054 -0.016 0.069 0.156
*





 0.210 0.197 0.402 0.137 0.007 0.190 0.453 0.123 0.077 0.332 0.014 




 0.043 -0.060 -0.162
*

















0.228 0.045  0.000 0.002 0.465 0.135 0.291 0.380 0.085 0.260 0.000 
MAN 0.005 -0.029 -0.687
*









0.468 0.326 0.000  0.381 0.140 0.428 0.055 0.067 0.097 0.188 0.002 
FOREIGN 0.089 0.056 -0.176
*













0.079 0.186 0.003 0.432  0.000 0.002 0.001 0.325 0.000 0.019 0.000 
SIZE 0.124
**











0.025 0.415 0.441 0.248 0.000  0.052 0.000 0.137 0.113 0.000 0.000 










 0.072 -0.018 













 -0.040 0.045 -0.121
**
 
0.472 0.021 0.288 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.024 0.264 0.236 0.027 
IND 0.078 -0.066 0.011 -0.091
***




 0.003 0.025 
0.110 0.150 0.429 0.074 0.321 0.140 0.177 0.027  0.094 0.481 0.347 






 1 -0.054 -0.098
***
 
0.100 0.218 0.236 0.179 0.000 0.157 0.069 0.250 0.094  0.199 0.060 
AUDIT 0.046 0.085
***




 0.008 0.051 0.003 -0.054 1 0.166
*
 













 0.025 -0.098 0.166
*
 1 
0.010 0.155 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.454 0.027 0.347 0.060 0.004  
Spearman 
Legend: Shaded area denotes highest correlation. DV = Dependent variable. IV = Independent variable. CV = Control variable. *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnFLI = Vietnamese Voluntary Forward Looking Information Index. CG 
= the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign 









DV IVs CVs 
VnCSRI  CG STATE MAN FOREIGN  SIZE PROFIT LEV IND LISTING AUDIT LOC 
VnCSRI 
 
1 0.102 -0.150* -0.026 0.195* 0.250* -0.010 -0.005 0.031 -0.153* 0.054 0.205* 
 0.054 0.009 0.338 0.001 0.000 0.440 0.467 0.311 0.007 0.197 0.001 
CG 0.097*** 1 -0.103*** 0.082 0.104*** 0.043 -0.060 -0.162* -0.053 0.029 0.099*** 0.090*** 
0.061  0.051 0.097 0.050 0.247 0.172 0.005 0.200 0.321 0.058 0.077 
STATE -0.109** -0.107** 1 -0.559* -0.183* 0.006 0.070 0.035 0.019 0.087*** 0.041 -0.240* 
0.042 0.045  0.000 0.002 0.465 0.135 0.291 0.380 0.085 0.260 0.000 
MAN 0.001 -0.029 -0.687* 1 0.019 0.068 0.012 0.101*** -0.095*** 0.082*** 0.056 0.179* 
0.494 0.326 0.000  0.381 0.140 0.428 0.055 0.067 0.097 0.188 0.002 
FOREIGN 0.203* 0.056 -0.176* 0.011 1 0.340* 0.181* -0.205* 0.029 -0.265* 0.130** 0.278* 
0.001 0.186 0.003 0.432  0.000 0.002 0.001 0.325 0.000 0.019 0.000 
SIZE 0.256* 0.014 0.009 -0.043 0.394* 1 -0.103 0.252* -0.069 -0.077 0.393* 0.424* 
0.000 0.415 0.441 0.248 0.000  0.052 0.000 0.137 0.113 0.000 0.000 
PROFIT -0.041 -0.032 0.044 -0.055 0.223* -0.133** 1 -0.418* 0.125** 0.121** 0.072 -0.018 
0.258 0.306 0.246 0.193 0.000 0.017  0.000 0.024 0.028 0.127 0.389 
LEV -0.032 -0.128** 0.035 0.105** -0.208* 0.266* -0.581* 1 -0.124** -0.040 0.045 -0.121** 
0.304 0.021 0.288 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.024 0.264 0.236 0.027 
IND 0.025 -0.066 0.011 -0.091*** 0.029 -0.068 0.059 -0.121** 1 0.083*** 0.003 0.025 
0.344 0.150 0.429 0.074 0.321 0.140 0.177 0.027  0.094 0.481 0.347 
LISTING -0.140** 0.049 0.046 0.058 -0.321* -0.064 0.094 -0.043 0.083 1 -0.054 -0.098*** 
0.013 0.218 0.236 0.179 0.000 0.157 0.069 0.250 0.094***  0.199 0.060 
AUDIT 0.062 0.085*** 0.030 -0.063 0.191* 0.350* 0.008 0.051 0.003 -0.054 1 0.166* 
0.163 0.089 0.320 0.158 0.001 0.000 0.451 0.209 0.481 0.199  0.004 
LOC 0.196* 0.064 -0.224* 0.140** 0.339* 0.440* -0.007 -0.121** 0.025 -0.098*** 0.166* 1 
0.001 0.155 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.454 0.027 0.347 0.060 0.004  
Spearman 
Legend: Shaded area denotes highest correlation. DV = Dependent variable. IV = Independent variable. CV = Control variable. *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnCSRI = Vietnamese Social Reporting Information Index. CG = the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign 
ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252.
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APPENDIX G EXPLORATION OF STATISTICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
In order to ensure that the results of the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index 
(VnDI) regression model are reliable, four important assumptions of the linear 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model are tested. These assumptions are: 
• Independence (no multicollinearity) 
• Outlier issues 
• Normality and linearity 
• Homoscedasticity (Hair et al. 1995). 
Various tests are carried out in order to minimize any potential problems that can 
affect the interpretation of the results. These tests are outlined below. 
G.1: Multicollinearity Issues  
One potential statistical problem to consider in the multiple linear regression 
analysis is multicollinearity. Multicollinearity occurs when two or more predictor 
variables (or a combination of variables) are highly correlated with each other. The 
existence of multicollinearity in a model makes it impossible to identify the impact 
of individual predictor variables on the dependent variable (DeFusco et al. 2007). 
Beri (2010) and Alsaeed (2005) both point out that the correlation matrices are 
considered powerful tools for a better understanding of the relationship between 
predictors. As mentioned in Appendix F, Cooper and Schindler (2008) state that a 
commonly accepted threshold for a potential multicollinearity problem is when two 
variables are highly correlated at 0.80 correlation coefficient or a greater level. The 
maximum correlation figure detected in the model (presented in Table F.1) is r = -
0.687 between state and managerial ownership. Thus, given this non-high 
correlation, the problem of multicollinearity between predictor variables is not 
deemed a major concern in this thesis. 
Although correlation matrices are the common procedure used in empirical studies, 
they are incapable of detecting linear relationships among more than two variables. 
Thus, due to this problem, tolerances and the variance inflation factor (VIF) are also 
computed for each predictor variable. The VIF provides information regarding the 
strength of a linear relationship between a predictor and other predictors within a 
regression model (Field 2009). A very large VIF indicates a high collinearity. Previous 
studies suggest that a VIF greater than 10.0 and the measure of tolerance below 
0.20 indicate a potential multicollinearity problem may exist between variables 
within a model (O'Brien 2007; Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 1996; Hair et al. 
1995). The results of VIF and measure of tolerance calculation are presented in 
Table G.1. 
As presented in Table G.1, tolerance scores are all greater than the 0.20 benchmark, 
while the VIF for each predictor variable is well below the 10.0 benchmark. From 
the results of the correlation matrices in Tables F.1 and G.1, it can be concluded 
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that multicollinearity does not seem to be a concern in explaining the regression 
results of the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index model. 
Table G.1      Variance Inflation Factors and Tolerance Scores  
  Collinearity Statistics 
  Tolerance VIF 
Independent variables   
CG (H1) 0.916 1.092 
STATE (H2) 0.599 1.669 
MAN (H3) 0.622 1.607 
FOREIGN (H4) 0.678 1.475 
Control variables   
SIZE 0.539 1.855 
PROFIT 0.734 1.363 
LEV 0.638 1.568 
IND 0.948 1.055 
LISTING 0.871 1.148 
AUDIT 0.804 1.244 
LOC 0.697 1.434 
Legend: Variance Inflation Factor for predictors where: CG = the proportion of independent 
directors on corporate boards, STATE = the proportion of state ownership, MAN = the 
proportion of managerial ownership, FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign ownership, SIZE = 
firm size, PROFIT = profitability, LEV = leverage, IND = industry, LISTING = listing duration, 
AUDIT = auditing firm, and LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
G.2: Outlier Issues  
Another factor needing to be considered to avoid inaccurate interpretations from 
the multiple regression results is the outlier issue (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). An 
outlier is a case that is substantially different from the rest of the cases in a dataset. 
Field (2009) warns that having an outlier in a dataset can cause the regression 
model to be biased because it can affect the values of an estimated regression 
coefficient, thus causing difficulty in interpreting the results appropriately. To 
identify the possibility of outliers in the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index 
model, Mahalanobis distance scores and Cook’s distance are calculated. 
 Cook’s Distance 
Cook’s distance is a measure of the overall impact a case has on the regression 
model. Specifically, Cook’s distance measures the difference between the 
regression coefficients obtained from the full data and the regression coefficients of 
the sample after removing a case from the estimation process (Chatterjee and Hadi 
2006). Field (2009) and Maindonald and Braun (2010) note that any case that has a 
 
G-3 
value of Cook’s distance of more than 1.0 is considered as a possible outlier. Table 
G.2 presents the summary results of Cook’s distance calculation. 
Table G.2      Cook’s Distance Results  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
Cook's Distance 0.005 0.000 0.190 0.013 
Legend: The above table presents the Cook’s Distance results.  
As depicted in Table G.2, the maximum score of Cook’s distance for the 252 firms is 
0.190, which is well below the benchmark of 1.0. Thus, according to the Cook’s 
distance benchmark criterion, there is no multivariate outlier in the data set of 252 
listed firms. 
 Mahalanobis Distance 
Additionally, Mahalanobis distance scores are calculated. According to Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2007), Mahalanobis distance is the distance of a particular case (in this 
thesis, a firm’s annual report) from the centroid of the remaining cases and the 
centroid is the point created by the means of all variables. Table G.3 illustrates the 
results of Mahalnobis distance calculation. With 11 degree of freedom (df) (11 
predictor variables), a multivariate outlier exists where its Mahalanobis score 
exceeds the value of 31.264 (at the 1 per cent confidence level) (Table G.3). 
Table G.3      Mahalanobis Distance Results  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
Mahalanobis 
Distance 
10.956 3.260 77.089 6.471 
Legend: The above table presents the Mahalanobis scores. 
Table G.3 shows Mahalanobis scores with a minimum of 3.260 and a maximum of 
77.089. With 11 degrees of freedom (11 predictor variables), a possible multivariate 
outlier exists where its Mahalanobis score exceeds the value of 31.264 (at the 0.1 
per cent confidence level). Upon conducting the Mahalanobis score tests, the 
results suggest that there are four potential multivariate outliers in the data set 
(with Mahalanobis scores of 31.73, 32.11, 32.93 and 77.09 respectively). However, 
as highlighted below, extra analysis conducted reveals that there is no major 
difference when comparing the results between the two datasets, with and without 
the removal of the four outliers (Table G.4). Section 6.2 therefore presents the main 
thesis results of multiple regression using the full dataset and without removing 
these outliers. 
Table G.4 below compares the results of multiple regression analysis of the VnDI, 
with and without removing the four possible outliers. As shown in both tables, the 
three independent variables (out of four independent variables) are significant 
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predictors of the extent of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure. In particular, both 
Table G.4(a) and Table G.4(b) provide evidence supporting H1 (significant and 
positive association between the strength of corporate governance mechanisms 
and the extent of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure), H2 and H3 (significant and 
negative relationships between the proportion of state ownership and managerial 
ownership and the level of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure). H4 is not supported by 
the results of both regressions (Table G.4(a) and Table G.4(b)). 
In regard to control variables, after removing the four outliers, Table G.4 (b) reveals 
that a firm’s profit is no longer a significant predictor for VnDI, although it still has a 
positive impact on voluntary disclosure. The other variables such as firm size, firm’s 
industry classification and firm’s stock exchange location are still significant 
predictors of VnDI in a positive direction before and after removing the outliers. 
Table G.4(a) and Table G.4(b) also reveal that a firm’s auditors and its listing 
duration are significant predictors, but in a negative direction. 
In theory, these four outliers violating the benchmark of Mahalanobis scores should 
be removed from the data set. However, the Cook’s distance scores indicate that all 
firms are within the benchmark. Since the multiple regression results in Table G.4(a) 
and Table G.4(b) show no major difference in the statistical testing of the four 
hypotheses (corporate governance, state ownership, managerial ownership and 
foreign ownership), this thesis presents the multiple regression with a full dataset 





Table G.4      Multiple Regression Results With and Without Removal of Outliers  
Table G.4 (a) Multiple Regression Results (full data set)  Table G.4 (b) Multiple Regression Results (removing outliers) 
Adjusted R = 0.195, F = 6.510, Significance intercept = 0.000, n=252  Adjusted R = 0.193, F = 6.419, Significance intercept = 0.000,n = 248 
  Coefficients t Sig.   Coefficients t Sig. 
Constant -0.097 -1.416 0.079  Constant -0.099 -1.428 0.077 
Independent variables     Independent variables    
CG (H1) 0.06 2.334 0.010
**  CG (H1) 0.056 2.128 0.017
** 
STATE (H2) -0.072 -2.605 0.005
*  STATE (H2) -0.020 -1.540 0.062
*** 
MAN (H3) -0.081 -2.195 0.015
**  MAN (H3) -0.061 -1.606 0.055
*** 
FOREIGN (H4) 0.011 0.204 0.419  FOREIGN (H4) 0.023 0.425 0.336 
Control variables     Control variables    
SIZE 0.021 3.682 0.000*  SIZE 0.021 3.726 0.000* 
PROFIT 0.088 1.548 0.061***  PROFIT 0.012 0.175 0.431 
LEV -0.006 -0.216 0.415  LEV -0.027 -0.886 0.188 
IND 0.014 1.32 0.094***  IND 0.015 1.362 0.087*** 
AUDIT -0.022 -1.341 0.091**  AUDIT -0.027 -1.625 0.053** 
LISTING -0.03 -2.465 0.007*  LISTING -0.032 -2.604 0.005* 
LOC 0.031 2.322 0.011**  LOC 0.030 2.190 0.015** 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-
tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion of state 
ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = 
industry. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
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G.3: Normality and Linearity  
The assumption of multivariate normality can be partially checked by examining the 
normality, linearity and homoscedasticity data of individual variables. 
Normality is the degree to which the distribution of the sample data corresponds to 
a normal distribution (Hair et al. 1995). There are two main ways in which a 
distribution can deviate from normal: lack of symmetry (called skewness) and 
pointiness (kurtosis). A classic normal distribution occurs when the values of 
skewness and kurtosis are 0. 
 Normality 
Within the sample of this thesis, the value for skewness of the data is 0.662, while 
the value for kurtosis is 0.164, which are both very close to the requirements of 
normal distribution (value of zero). Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the data 
in this sample is normally distributed. Further histogram and Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
calculations are also presented. Normality can be detected by looking at the p-value 
of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is “a distribution 
free method that tests for any difference between two population probability 
distributions. The test is based on the maximum absolute difference between the 
cumulative distribution functions of the samples from each population” (Everitt 
2002, 206). If the p-value is greater than the 0.05 level, the residuals are considered 
to be normally distributed. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test performed in this thesis 
shows that the p-value is 0.067, which is greater than 0.05. 
Additionally, the Figure G.1 histogram of the dependent variable looks like a bell-
shaped curve, which seems to be a normal distribution. Figure G.2 also shows 
deviation from normality. Taken together, the normality assumption of the 




Figure G.1 Histogram of VnDI 
 
 








Figure G.3 does not exhibit any obvious nonlinear relationship between the 
residuals and the predicted values. Thus, it is interpreted that the overall regression 
model in this thesis (Model 1) is linear.  






According to Weinbach and Grinnell (2004), the assumption of homoscedasticity is 
that the variability in scores for one continuous variable is roughly the same at all 
values of another continuous variable. Table G.5 presents the results for 
Homoscedasticity tests of all predictor variables.  
Table G.5      Homoscedasticity  
Variable 
Significance to the 
Absolute Value of 
Residual 
Independent variables  
CG (H1) 0.665 
STATE (H2) 0.542 
MAN (H3) 0.176 
FOREIGN (H4) 0.206 








Legend: CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the 
proportion of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = 
the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. 
IND = industry. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange 
location. Number of firms = 252. 
Table G.5 above indicates that among all 11 predictor variables, only the variable 
firm size violates the assumption of homoscedasticity. This variable has been 
transformed to a logged measure. Furthermore, many prior studies of voluntary 
disclosure find that there is a significant association between firm size (measured by 
log of total assets) and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Thus, this thesis is 
confident that firm size is an important predictor in determining the extent of 
voluntary disclosure for Vietnamese listed firms. 
In conclusion, Appendix G presents the tests for all key assumptions of the multiple 
regression Ordinary Least Square model.  These tests are considered important to 
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avoid biased and inaccurate prediction of the dependent variable VnDI (Hair et al. 
1995). The evidence from these tests indicates that assumptions of multiple 
regression have been met and hence, the statistical analysis in this thesis is deemed 
to be appropriate.  
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APPENDIX H SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
This section undertakes additional sensitivity analyses to provide robustness checks 
of the research questions and the hypotheses. In particular, this section precedes 
extra analyses as a way to minimize the potential endogeneity problem. More 
discussion of the endogeneity issue is provided in Appendix I. 
H.1: Corporate Governance and VnDI 
The purpose of this section is to provide further evidence on the relationship 
between effective corporate governance mechanisms and VnDI. Studies of 
voluntary disclosure indicate that strong corporate governance mechanisms 
positively influence the level of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure. This thesis 
acknowledges that there are other ways to measure various corporate governance 
mechanisms such as: the existence of an audit committee, the expertise of 
members of the committee, if the nomination committee has a policy for 
appointment of directors, the remuneration policy and many others. All Vietnamese 
listed firms are required to have an audit committee, but the expertise of its 
members is not disclosed by 83 firms. Thus, this ‘expertise of audit committee’ 
variable is not included in this thesis due to its unavailability. Other corporate 
governance aspects such as the appointment and remuneration policy aspect are 
also not disclosed by the majority of these firms and hence, these corporate 
governance aspects are not examined in this thesis. The proportion of independent 
directors on corporate boards is the most common measurement for corporate 
governance mechanisms, while the dominant roles of CEO and chairperson, or 
corporate board size are used frequently in the prior studies of voluntary disclosure 
(Taylor 2008; Akhtaruddin et al. 2009). The next sub-sections provide additional 
analyses on corporate governance mechanisms to provide further support for the 
main thesis findings of H1.  
 Categories of Independent Directors on Corporate Boards 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, Vietnamese listed firms are required to have at least 
one third of independent directors on corporate boards. Using the same regression 
model (Model 1), this extra analysis replaces the independent variable of the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards with a categorical 
variable. Specifically, the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards 
variable is alternatively proxied using a dummy variable of one (1) for firms meeting 
the requirement of at least one third of independent directors on corporate boards 
and zero (0) for otherwise. Table H.1 presents the results of this sensitivity analysis.  
The results in Table H.1 report that firms within the group that meets the 
requirement of one third independent directors on corporate boards positively 
influence the extent of voluntary disclosures made by Vietnamese listed firms (p-
value = 0.003). This evidence is consistent with the main findings in Table 6.1 that a 
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higher proportion of independent directors is associated with a higher extent of 
voluntary disclosure.  
Table H.1      Multiple Regression Results – CG(1) 
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.201 
F-Statistic  6.747 
Sig.  0.000* 
Sample Size  252 
Variables  Coefficients t-statistic Sig. 
Constant -0.099 -1.465 0.072 
Independent variables    
CG(1) (H1) 0.044 2.739 0.003
*
 
STATE (H2) -0.071 -2.612 0.005
* 
MAN (H3) -0.075 -2.050 0.021
** 
FOREIGN (H4) 0.017 0.326 0.372 
Control variables    
SIZE 0.021 3.674 0.000* 
PROFIT 0.073 1.299 0.098*** 
LEV -0.010 -0.341 0.367 
IND 0.014 1.308 0.096*** 
AUDIT -0.019 -1.168 0.122 
LISTING -0.033 -2.702 0.004* 
LOC 0.031 2.312 0.011* 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings.*Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 
level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately 
significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index. CG(1) = dummy 
variable is given the value of one (1) if firms meet the requirement of at least one third of independent 
directors on corporate boards and zero (0) for otherwise. STATE = the proportion of state ownership. 
MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = 
firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing 
firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
 Dominant Role of CEO and Chairperson 
Previous literature on voluntary disclosure indicates that the dominant function of a 
CEO who is also a chairperson indicates the absence of decision control and decision 
management (Fama and Jensen 1983). Where a CEO holds the position of a 
chairperson in a firm, he/she may have too much power and authority to manage 
the firm without constraint and hence control the corporate board (Chau and Gray 
2010). According to agency theory, the dual function of CEO and chairperson 
reduces the independence of corporate boards in monitoring, disciplining and 
compensating managers (Jensen 1993). Forker (1992) provides evidence indicating 
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that having a duality role of CEO and chairperson in a firm reduces disclosure 
quality. In a similar vein, Chau and Gray (2010) find a significant positive 
relationship between an independent chairperson and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. Thus, it can be argued that the dominant role of a CEO who is also a 
chairperson is associated with lower voluntary disclosure. 
To further enhance an understanding of the effect of corporate governance aspects 
on the level of voluntary disclosure, an extra sensitivity analysis is conducted on 
another mechanism of corporate governance, which is the dominant role of a CEO 
who is also a chairperson. This variable of a CEO who is also a chairperson 
(DOMINANT) is measured as a dummy variable given a value of one (1) if a CEO in a 
firm is also its chairperson and zero (0) for otherwise. Using the same regression 
model (Model 1), this extra analysis now replaces the proportion of independent 
directors on corporate boards by this dominant role of CEO/chairperson. Table H.2 







Table H.2      Multiple Regression Results – DOMINANT 
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.187 
F-Statistic  6.251 
Sig.  0.000* 
Sample size  252 
 Variables Coefficients t-statistic Sig. 
Constant -0.064 -0.962 0.169 
Independent variables    
DOMINANT (H1) 0.019 1.789 0.037
** 
STATE (H2) -0.069 -2.495 0.007
* 
MAN (H3) -0.076 -2.051 0.021
** 
FOREIGN (H4) 0.018 0.341 0.367 
Control variables    
SIZE 0.021 3.713 0.000** 
PROFIT 0.054 0.941 0.174 
LEV -0.026 -0.874 0.192 
IND 0.012 1.155 0.125 
AUDIT -0.015 -0.911 0.182 
LISTING -0.029 -2.332 0.010** 
LOC 0.029 2.141 0.017** 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings.*Correlation is highly 
significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese 
Voluntary Disclosure Index. DOMINANT = Dominant role of a CEO who is also a  
chairperson whereby firm is given the value of one (1) and zero (0) for otherwise. STATE = 
The proportion of state ownership. MAN = The proportion of managerial ownership. 
FOREIGN = The proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = Firm size. PROFIT = Profitability. LEV 
= Leverage. IND = Industry type. LISTING = Listing duration. AUDIT = Auditing firm. LOC = 
Stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
The evidence shown in Table H.2 indicates that the dominant role of a CEO who is 
also a chairperson is a significant determinant of Vietnamese Voluntary Discloure 
Index (p-value = 0.037). However, the positive association is the opposite of that 
expected. This is different from the corporate governance mechanism (the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards) in the main model. Thus, 
it can be implied from the results that having a CEO who is also a chairperson in 
Vietnamese listed firms helps to improve its voluntary disclosure practices.  
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 Corporate Board Size 
Prior studies of voluntary disclosure also indicate that corporate board size is 
another measurement of corporate governance mechanisms that can potentially 
influence the extent of voluntary disclosure. The argument is that the higher the 
number of total members on corporate boards, the more effective a corporate 
governance monitoring mechanism is and hence under such monitoring, firms have 
incentives to engage in more information disclosure. According to Jensen (1993), 
corporate board size of a firm relates to the ability of directors to monitor and 
control managers. Hyytinen and Pajarinen’s (2005) study reports that a firm’s 
corporate board size is positively associated with the firm's performance, as board 
size increases the monitoring power of the directors. This is because in a firm with a 
larger board of directors, these members may possess more skills and expertise that 
better equip them to monitor managerial behaviours (Akhtaruddin et al. 2009). 
Taken together, a greater number of directors on corporate boards may represent a 
more effective monitoring mechanism that associates with increased information 
disclosure.  
Consistent with Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), this thesis measures corporate board size 
as the number of members on corporate boards. Using the same regression model 
(Model 1), this sensitivity analysis replaces the proportion of independent directors 
on corporate boards by this board size (BOARDSIZE) variable. Table H.3 presents the 




Table H.3      Multiple Regression Results – BOARDSIZE 
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.191 
F-Statistic  6.404 
Sig.  0.000* 
Sample size  252 
 Variables Coefficients t-statistic Sig. 
Constant -0.087 -1.288 0.099 
Independent variables    
BOARDSIZE (H1) 0.010 2.129 0.017
**
 
STATE (H2) -0.066 -2.394 0.009
* 
MAN (H3) -0.076 -2.048 0.021
** 
FOREIGN (H4) 0.000 -0.002 0.499 
Control variables    
SIZE 0.019 3.252 0.001* 
PROFIT 0.064 1.139 0.128 
LEV -0.021 -0.712 0.239 
IND 0.011 1.051 0.147 
AUDIT -0.014 -0.879 0.190 
LISTING -0.028 -2.265 0.012** 
LOC 0.033 2.414 0.008* 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings.*Correlation is highly 
significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese 
Voluntary Disclosure Index. BOARDSIZE = the number of members on corporate boards. 
STATE = the proportion of state ownership. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. 
FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = 
leverage. IND = industry. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock 
exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
As seen in Table H.3, the corporate board size is found to have a significant and 
positive association with the extent of Vietnamese voluntary disclosures (p-value = 
0.017). This implies that within the Vietnamese context, a greater number of 
members on corporate boards increases the extent of voluntary disclosure. This 
evidence is consistent with the main thesis finding (Table 6.1) that an effective 
corporate governance mechanism, such as a higher proportion of independent 
directors on corporate boards and greater numbers of members on these boards, 
enhances the voluntary disclosure practices of Vietnamese listed firms.  
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Overall, within the three analyses of these corporate governance aspects, the 
category of independent directors group and the corporate board of directors size 
provide related support for the main thesis’ results (Table 6.1). In contrast, the 
dominant role of a CEO who is also a chairperson improves the extent of voluntary 
disclosure made by Vietnamese listed firms59.  
H.2: State Ownership and VnDI 
This section explores further insights into the relationship between state ownership 
and VnDI. These additional sensitivity analyses between voluntary disclosure and its 
association with state ownership are necessary because of the unique characteristic 
of a high level of state ownership among Vietnamese listed firm. Within the 
voluntary disclosure literature, very few researchers investigate the issue of state 
ownership. Some examples are Chinese SOEs on the Hong Kong stock exchange 
(Ferguson, Lam, and Lee 2002), Chinese SOEs in China (Xiao and Yuan 2007), 
Singaporean listed firms (Eng and Mak 2003) and New Zealand listed firms (Jiang 
and Habib 2009). However, these studies do not reach consensus and as such, 
enhanced knowledge of this relationship can make a major contribution to the 
existing literature on voluntary disclosure. 
Using the same regression model (Model 1) with a replacement of the state 
ownership variable (with two different measurements), the next two sub-sections 
present the results of these extra sensitivity analyses. 
 Presence of State Ownership and VnDI 
This section explores the relationship between the presence of state ownership and 
VnDI. Based on many existing literature, state ownership is alternatively measured 
using dummy variables, such as: one (1) for the presence of state ownership and 
zero (0) for otherwise (Jiang and Habib 2009; Xiao and Yuan 2007). Similar to 
Hypothesis H2, this thesis expects that firms with the presence of state ownership 
will voluntarily disclose less information than non-state owned firms. Table H.4 
presents the alternate multivariate regression results. 
Using the same regression model but with a different measurement of the state 
ownership variable, it can be seen from Table H.4 that the presence of state 
ownership is negatively and significantly associated with voluntary disclosure 
practices (p-value = 0.050). This result is consistent with the main analysis whereby 
                                                          
59
  To add depth to the effect of corporate governance aspects on the extent of Vietnamese 
voluntary disclosure, additional analysis is carried out whereby all three corporate governance 
aspects (the proportion of independent directors on boards, the dominant role of the 
CEO/chairperson and the corporate board size) are tested in the same model.  Appendix J 
presents these multiple regression results. Appendix J concludes that the impact of the three 
corporate governance aspects on the VnDi are the same, whether they are tested individually or 
all three are combined together in the same model (refer to Table J.2 of Appendix J for the 
multiple regression results).   
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a higher proportion of state ownership negatively influences the extent of voluntary 




Table H.4      Multiple Regression Results – PSTATE  
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Squared    0.181 
F-statistic  6.504 
Sig.  0.000* 
Sample size  252 
Variables Coefficients t Sig. 
Constant -0.069 -0.900 0.335 
Independent variables    
CG (H1) 0.058 2.224 0.014
** 
PSTATE (H2) -0.024 -1.653 0.050
***
 
MAN (H3) -0.060 -1.633 0.052
*** 
FOREIGN (H4) 0.032 0.627 0.266 
Control variables    
SIZE 0.018 3.223 0.001* 
PROFIT 0.076 1.323 0.094*** 
LEV -0.007 -0.216 0.414 
IND 0.014 1.272 0.102 
AUDIT -0.024 -1.502 0.067*** 
LISTING -0.035 -2.803 0.003* 
LOC 0.036 2.680 0.004* 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings.*Correlation is highly significant at the 
0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is 
moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index. CG = 
the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. PSTATE = the presence of state 
ownership whereby a firm is given the value of one (1) for the presence of state ownership and 
zero (0) for otherwise. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of 
foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry. LISTING = 
listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
 Influencing State Ownership and VnDI 
In this section, the state ownership variable in the main regression model is now 
replaced with the influence of state ownership. In particular, firms that have 20 per 
cent or more of state ownership are given a dummy variable of one (1) and zero (0) 
for otherwise. Again, paralleled with the results of the main analysis in Table 6.1, 
Table H.5 reports a significant negative association between the influencing state 
ownership (state ownership of greater than 20 per cent) and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure (p-value = 0.017). 
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Table H.5      Multiple Regression Results – STATE (>20) 
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.187 
F-Statistic  6.256 
Sig.  0.000* 
Sample size  252 
Variables Coefficients t-statistic Sig. 
Constant -0.078 -1.123 0.131 
Independent variables   
CG (H1) 0.058 2.256 0.012
** 
STATE (>20) (H2) -0.027 -2.139 0.017
** 
MAN (H3) -0.068 -1.878 0.031
** 
FOREIGN (H4) 0.026 0.497 0.310 
Control variables    
SIZE 0.019 3.324 0.001* 
PROFIT 0.086 1.500 0.067*** 
LEV -0.007 -0.221 0.413 
IND 0.015 1.357 0.088*** 
AUDIT -0.021 -1.260 0.104 
LISTING -0.032 -2.564 0.005* 
LOC 0.034 2.530 0.006* 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. *Correlation is highly significant at the 
0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is 
moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index. CG = 
the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE (>20) = influencing state 
ownership where the proportion of state ownership is greater than 20 per cent. MAN = the 
proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. 
PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing 
firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
The additional analyses in this section support the earlier conclusions and as 
hypothesized that within the Vietnamese context, state ownership negatively 
influences the extent of voluntary disclosure, regardless of whether a high 
proportion of firm shares are owned by state, or is just its presence or its 
influencing state shareholder.  
H.3: Managerial Ownership and VnDI 
The main regression results of this thesis report a significant and negative 
association between the proportion of managerial ownership and the extent of 
VnDI (Table 6.1). In this section, extra sensitivity analyses are carried out to further 
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the understanding of the potential impact of Vietnamese managerial ownership on 
its voluntary disclosure practices. 
 Presence of Managerial Ownership and VnDI 
Managerial ownership is alternatively proxied using a dummy variable of one (1) for 
firms with the presence of managerial ownership and a dummy variable of zero (0) 
for otherwise. As shown in Table H.6, the association between the level of the 
Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index and the presence of managerial ownership 
is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.447).  
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Table H.6      Multiple Regression Results – PMAN  
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.177 
F-Statistic  5.845 
Sig.  0.000* 
Sample size  252 
Variables Coefficients t-statistic Sig. 
Constant -0.105 -1.396 0.082 
Independent variables    
CG (H1) 0.053 1.979 0.024
** 
STATE (H2) -0.036 -1.556 0.060
*** 
PMAN (H3) 0.004 0.134 0.447 
FOREIGN (H4) 0.026 0.485 0.314 
Control variables    
SIZE 0.020 3.567 0.000* 
PROFIT 0.069 1.196 0.116 
LEV -0.015 -0.487 0.313 
IND 0.017 1.586 0.057*** 
AUDIT -0.025 -1.526 0.064*** 
LISTING -0.035 -2.770 0.003* 
LOC 0.028 2.064 0.020** 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. *Correlation is highly significant at the 
0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is 
moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index. CG = 
the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion of state 
ownership. PMAN = the presence of managerial ownership whereby a firm is given the value of one 
(1) for the presence of managerial ownership and zero (0) for otherwise. FOREIGN = the proportion 
of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry. LISTING = 
listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
 Influencing Managerial Ownership and VnDI 
In Table H.7, managerial ownership is now proxy by a dummy variable and is given a 
value of one (1) if a fraction of managerial ownership is more than 20 per cent, 
otherwise, it is given a zero (0) score. The results show that the influencing 
managerial ownership, although negatively associated with VnDI, is not significant. 
The findings reported in Table H.6 and H.7 are not consistent with the main analysis 
(Table 6.1) wherein managerial ownership is proxy by the proportion of managerial 
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ownership. In particular, the two alternative measurements of managerial 
ownership do not have any predictive power on the level of Vietnamese voluntary 
disclosure.  
Table H.7         Multiple Regression Results – MAN (>20) 
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.179 
F-Statistic  5.974 
Sig.  0.000* 
Sample size  252 
Variables Coefficients t-statistic Sig. 
Constant -0.105 -1.531 0.064 
Independent variables   0.000 
CG (H1) 0.058 2.225 0.013
** 
STATE (H2) -0.043 -1.640 0.051
*** 
MAN (>20) (H3) -0.006 -0.432 0.333 
FOREIGN (H4) 0.018 0.336 0.368 
Control variables    
SIZE 0.021 3.639 0.000* 
PROFIT 0.073 1.269 0.103 
LEV -0.016 -0.526 0.300 
IND 0.016 1.501 0.067** 
AUDIT -0.024 -1.486 0.069** 
LISTING -0.034 -2.709 0.004* 
LOC 0.029 2.157 0.016 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. *Correlation is highly significant 
at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese 
Voluntary Disclosure Index. CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. 
STATE = the proportion of state ownership. MAN (>20) = influencing managerial ownership 
where the proportion of managerial ownership is greater than 20 per cent. FOREIGN = the 
proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = 
industry. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. 
Number of firms = 252. 
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H.4: Foreign Ownership and VnDI 
In the main regression model (Model 1), it is found that the proportion of foreign 
ownership is not a significant predictor variable for VnDI (Table 6.1). Using different 
measures for foreign ownership, this section presents extra sensitivity analyses 
conducted to further understand the relationship between foreign ownership and 
voluntary disclosure practices in Vietnam. The next two sub-sections present the 
results of these additional analyses. 
 Presence of Foreign Ownership and VnDI 
In this section, foreign ownership is alternatively proxied using a dummy variable of 
one (1) for firms with the presence of managerial ownership in a firm and a score of 
zero (0) for otherwise. The results in Table H.8 are consistent with the main 
regression results in Table 6.1. In particular, the association between the presence 










Table H.8      Multiple Regression Results – PFOREIGN 
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.194 
F-Statistic  6.391 
Sig.  0.000* 
Sample size  252 
Variables  Coefficients t-statistic Sig. 
Constant -0.101 -1.499 0.068 
Independent variables    
CG (H1) 0.056 2.120 0.018
** 
STATE (H2) -0.073 -2.664 0.004
* 
MAN (H3) -0.082 -2.201 0.014
** 
PFOREIGN (H4) 0.005 0.222 0.412 
Control variables    
SIZE 0.021 3.955 0.000* 
PROFIT 0.089 1.580 0.058*** 
LEV -0.006 -0.201 0.420 
IND 0.015 1.371 0.086*** 
AUDIT -0.023 -1.400 0.081*** 
LISTING -0.031 -2.540 0.006* 
LOC 0.031 2.281 0.012** 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. *Correlation is highly 
significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese 
Voluntary Disclosure Index. CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate 
boards. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. PFOREIGN = the presence of 
foreign ownership whereby a firm is given the value of one (1) for the presence of foreign 
ownership and zero (0) for otherwise. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = 
leverage. IND = industry. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock 
exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
 Influencing Foreign Ownership and VnDI 
Extra analysis is further conducted to examine the association between foreign 
ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure among Vietnamese listed firms. 
Foreign ownership is alternatively proxied by a dummy variable where the 
proportion of foreign ownership in a firm of greater than 20 per cent is categorised 
as a score of one (1) and otherwise, it is given zero (0). The results shown in Table 
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H.9 indicate that the influencing foreign ownership (of greater than 20 per cent) is 
not significantly associated with VnDI.  This is consistent with the main thesis 
findings of Model 1 that indicate no association between the proportion of foreign 
ownership and VnDI.  
Table H.9      Multiple Regression Results – FOREIGN (>20) 
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.195 
F-Statistic  6.528 
Sig.  0.000* 
Sample size  252 
Variables  Coefficients t-statistic Sig. 
Constant -0.105 -1.577 0.058 
Independent variables    
CG (H1) 0.060 2.349 0.010
** 
STATE (H2) -0.075 -2.733 0.003
* 
MAN (H3) -0.083 -2.243 0.013
*** 
FOREIGN (>20) (H4) -0.007 -0.442 0.329 
Control variables    
SIZE 0.022 4.009 0.000* 
PROFIT 0.094 1.664 0.049** 
LEV -0.010 -0.329 0.371 
IND 0.014 1.313 0.095*** 
AUDIT -0.022 -1.347 0.090*** 
LISTING -0.032 -2.655 0.004* 
LOC 0.031 2.328 0.010** 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. *Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 
level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ***Correlation is moderately 
significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index. CG = the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN 
(>20) = Influencing foreign ownership where the proportion of foreign ownership is greater than 20 per 
cent. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry. LISTING = listing duration. 
AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
The results of these extra analyses confirm the main findings in Table 6.1 that 
foreign ownership is not a potential determinant in explaining the variation in 
voluntary disclosure practices of Vietnamese listed firms
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APPENDIX I ENDOGENEITY 
The multiple linear regression analysis provided in Section 6.2 assumes the 
exogenous determination of ownership identity variables (state, managerial and 
foreign ownership). Prior empirical studies indicate that ownership structure and 
corporate disclosure can be simultaneously determined (Makhija and Patton 2004). 
In a recent study, Jiang and Habib (2009) state that a firm’s disclosure policy can 
attract different type of shareholders (ownership), while different types of 
ownership identities can also result in different levels of disclosure. Ownership 
identities and voluntary disclosure may be interdependent and not exogenously 
determinant as the per regression assumption. Should the endogeneity adversely 
bias the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) models used in this thesis, it can affect and 
cause difficulties in interpreting the impact of ownership identities on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure (Nikolaev and Van Lent 2005; Cheng and Courtenay 2006; 
Taylor 2008). This thesis undertakes various methods to minimize the potential 
endogeneity issue.  
First, Taylor (2008) suggests that one way to alleviate any possible endogeneity 
issue in the OLS regression is to incorporate potential competing explanatory 
variables as control variables in the regression model. This has been achieved in this 
thesis through the inclusion of possible determinants of voluntary disclosure such as 
firm size (SIZE), profitability (PROFIT), leverage (LEV), industry (IND), auditing firm 
(AUDIT), listing duration (LISTING) and finally, stock exchange location (LOC) (see 
section 4.6 for justification of inclusion of these control variables). 
Second, Larcker and Rusticus (2010) suggest that running a sensitivity analysis on 
the choice of instrumental variables is one way to deal with endogeneity problem. 
As such, this thesis addresses the potential endogeneity issue by examining whether 
different ways of measuring the ownership identities can have a different impact on 
voluntary disclosure (Jiang and Habib 2009). To test this, three ownership identity 
variables, namely state, managerial and foreign ownership are measured differently 
from the main analysis. For instance, state, managerial and foreign ownership are 
alternatively measured using dummy variables, such as: one (1) for the presence of 
state, managerial and foreign ownership respectively, and zero (0) for otherwise 
(Ho and Wong 2001; Ho 2009; Gelb 2000; Xiao and Yuan 2007). Additionally, state, 
managerial and foreign ownership are examined in low and high ownership 
concentration levels (above and below 20 per cent level) (La Porta et al. 2000). 
Section 6.5 in the main text presents additional analyses with different 
measurements of independent variables to alleviate the possible endogeneity issue. 
Third, Samaha and Dahawy (2011) suggest that the ownership identities can be 
inter-related, which could lead to collinearity issues. This thesis conducts a Pearson 
and Spearman correlation matrix (Table F.1) and VIF factors (Table G.1) and the 
results suggest that these collinearity issues between variables are not deemed to 
be a concern. Furthermore, another way to minimize such collinearity problems is 
to run separate regressions with one ownership structure variable included and two 
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other ownership identities excluded (Samaha and Dahawy 2011). The results of 
these three separate tests are reported in Tables I.1, I.2 and I.3.    
Results shown in Tables I.1, I.2 and I.3 clarify that all three ownership identity 
variables, namely the proportion of state ownership (STATE), the proportion of 
managerial ownership (MAN) and the proportion of foreign ownership (FOREIGN) 
remain the same directional sign as reported in the main thesis results (Table 6.1). 
However, only state ownership is statistically significant. Given the correlation 
matrix and the VIF calculations, it can be argued that multicollinearity is not 
deemed to be a problem that poses any threat to the interpretation of the findings 
of this thesis. 
Table I.1      Alternative Multiple Regression Results – STATE (Excluding MAN and 
FOREIGN)  
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.185 
F-Statistic  7.314 
Sig.  0.000* 
Sample size  252 
Variables Coefficients t-statistic Sig. 
Constant -0.111 -1.688 0.046 
Independent variables    
CG (H1) 0.058 2.237 0.013 
STATE (H2) -0.039 -1.740 0.042
**
 
Control variables    
SIZE 0.021 4.037 0.000* 
PROFIT 0.074 1.333 0.092*** 
LEV -0.020 -0.686 0.247 
IND 0.017 1.547 0.062*** 
AUDIT -0.025 -1.516 0.065*** 
LISTING -0.035 -3.003 0.001* 
LOC 0.029 2.146 0.016** 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. *Correlation is highly 
significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese 
Voluntary Disclosure Index. CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate 
boards. STATE = the proportion of state ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. 
LEV = leverage. IND = industry type. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = 







Table I.2      Alternative Multiple Regression Results – MAN (Excluding STATE and 
FOREIGN) 
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.176 
F-Statistic  6.991 
Sig.  0.000* 
Sample size  252 
Variables Coefficients t-statistic Sig. 
Constant -0.112 -1.684 0.047 
Independent variables    
CG (H1) 0.064 2.458 0.007
* 
MAN (H3) -0.026 -0.846 0.199 
Control variables    
SIZE 0.020 3.774 0.000* 
PROFIT 0.074 1.316 0.095*** 
LEV -0.014 -0.493 0.311 
IND 0.016 1.422 0.078*** 
AUDIT -0.025 -1.550 0.061*** 
LISTING -0.036 -3.017 0.001* 
LOC 0.038 2.790 0.003* 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. *Correlation is highly 
significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese 
Voluntary Disclosure Index. CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate 
boards. MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = 
profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry type. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = 





Table I.3      Alternative Multiple Regression Results – FOREIGN (Excluding STATE 
and MAN) 
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.176 
F-Statistic  6.958 
Sig.  0.000* 
Sample size  252 
Variables Coefficients t-statistic Sig. 
Constant -0.101 -1.472 0.071 
Independent variables    
CG (H1) 0.060 2.328 0.010
** 
FOREIGN (H4) 0.036 0.692 0.245 
Control variables    
SIZE 0.019 3.386 0.000* 
PROFIT 0.063 1.109 0.134 
LEV -0.014 -0.484 0.315 
IND 0.016 1.496 0.068*** 
AUDIT -0.025 -1.539 0.063*** 
LISTING -0.034 -2.769 0.003* 
LOC 0.035 2.614 0.005* 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. *Correlation is highly 
significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese 
Voluntary Disclosure Index. CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate 
boards. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = 
profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry type. LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = 
auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number of firms = 252. 
Overall, Appendix I presents a discussion of the endogeneity issue and various 
possible tests identified in the literature to mitigate the problem of endogeneity. 
Results from these additional tests indicate that the endogeneity issue does not 




APPENDIX J ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Section H.1 in Appendix H provides analyses of individual corporate governance 
aspects (namely the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards, the 
dominant role of a chairperson who is also a CEO and the corporate board size) on 
the extent of the Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure Index. This Appendix J presents 
extra analyses to investigate the combined impact of these three corporate 
governance aspects on the extent of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure. Specifically, 
the regression model of this thesis is as follows: 
VnDIi = λi + β1CGi + β2DOMINANT + β3BOARDSIZE + β4STATE + β5MANi + β6FOREIGNi 
+ γ1SIZEi + γ2PROFITi + γ3LEVi + ∑i=1δ jINDi + ∑k=1δkAUDITi +∑m=1δmLISTINGi + ∑n=1δnLOC 
i +                              [Model 3] 
 
Where: 
VnDIi = Ratio of Vietnamese Voluntary Disclosure items reported by firm i in the 
2009 annual report; 
CGi = Number of independent directors stated in the 2009 annual report of firm i, 
divided by the total number of all directors on corporate boards (both independent and non-
independent) in the 2009 annual report of firm i; 
DOMINANTi= Dominant role of a CEO who is also chairperson of the firm in 2009 whereby 
firm i is given the value of one (1) and zero (0) for otherwise; 
BOARDSIZEi= Total number of all directors on corporate boards (both independent and 
non-independent) as stated in the 2009 annual report of firm i; 
STATEi = Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by the government in firm i as 
at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i, divided by the total number 
of ordinary outstanding shares of firm i as at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual 
report of firm i; 
MANi = Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by senior managers on the 
corporate boards in firm i as at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i, 
divided by the total number of ordinary outstanding shares of firm i as at the cut-off date 
specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i; 
FOREIGNi = Number of ordinary outstanding shares held by foreign investors in firm i as 
at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual report of firm i, divided by the total number 
of ordinary outstanding shares of firm i as at the cut-off date specified in the 2009 annual 
report of firm i; 
SIZEi = Natural logarithm total assets of firm i as reported in the 2009 annual 
report; 
PROFITi = Ratio of net earnings to total assets of firm i as reported in the 2009 annual 
report; 
LEVi = Ratio of total debt to total assets of firm i as reported in the 2009 annual 
report; 
INDi = Categorical variable to control for industry differences with industry firm i is 
given a dummy variable in the value of one (1) if the firm is in High-profile industries; 
otherwise zero (0); 
AUDITi = Categorical variable to control for auditor differences with the auditing firm 
of the 2009 annual report of firm i is given a dummy variable in the value of one (1) if the 
auditing firm is one of the 'Big Four', otherwise zero (0); 
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LISTINGi = Categorical variable to control for listing duration differences with firm i is 
given a dummy variable in the value of one (1) if it is newly listed in the year 2009, 
otherwise zero (0); 
LOCi = Categorical variable to control for listing location differences with firm i 
listed on the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange in the year 2009 is given a dummy variable in the 
value of one (1), otherwise zero (0); 
λi = Regression constant. 
β1,2…n, γ1,2…n    = Coefficients to independent and control variables. 
I =  Firm specific. 
 = Error of prediction. 
Table J.1 presents the correlation matrix results for the three corporate governance 
variables of Model 3. The correlation matrix presents that among the three 
corporate governance variables, the proportion of independent directors on 
corporate boards is negatively correlated with the dominant role of 
CEO/chairperson with p-value = 0.000. This implies that in a firm where there are 
high proportions of independent directors on boards, there may be a less dominant 
role of CEO/chairperson.  
Table J.1 indicates that there is no multicollinearity problem between the three 
corporate governance variables (the highest correlation is between the proportion 
of independent directors on corporate boards and the dominant role of a CEO who 
is a chairperson with r = -0.266). According to Hair et al. (1995) and Cooper and 





Table J.1 Correlation Matrix – VnDI and Three Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms    
               Pearson 
Corporate Governance 
Variables 
Corporate Governance Variables 
CG DOMINANT BOARDSIZE 
CG 1 -0.266** 0.058 
  0.000 0.179 
DOMINANT -0.252** 1 0.000 
 0.000  0.499 
BOARDSIZE 0.024 0.010 1 
 0.352 0.434  
Spearman 
Legend: Shaded area denotes highest correlation coefficient. *Correlation is highly 
significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-
tailed). ***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). CG = the 
proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. DOMINANT = Dominant 
role of a CEO who is also chairperson, whereby firm is given the value of one (1) if it 
is dominant and zero (0) for otherwise. BOARDSIZE = the total number of members 
on corporate boards. 
Table J.2 presents the multiple regression results of Model 3. As shown in Table J.2, 
with all three corporate governance mechanisms in one regression model, the 
adjusted R-Squared of the model is 0.222, which is slightly higher than the main 
regression model of 0.195.  The adjusted R-Squared of the model indicates that the 




Table J.2  Multiple Regression Results for Combined Impact of Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms 
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.222 
F-Statistic  6.509 
Sig.  0.000* 
Sample size  252 
Variables Coefficients t-statistic Sig. 
Constant -0.137 -1.954 0.026 
Independent variables    
CG (H1) 0.075 2.863 0.002
*
 
DOMINANT (H1) 0.010 2.191 0.015
*
 
BOARDSIZE (H1) 0.029 2.644 0.004
*
 
STATE (H2) -0.058 -2.126 0.017
* 
MAN (H3) -0.082 -2.261 0.012
* 
FOREIGN (H4) -0.013 -0.250 0.401 
Control variables    
SIZE 0.018 3.163 0.001* 
PROFIT 0.068 1.216 0.112 
LEV -0.012 -0.404 0.343 
IND 0.013 1.215 0.113 
AUDIT -0.008 -0.527 0.299 
LISTING -0.030 -2.465 0.007* 
LOC 0.030 2.209 0.014* 
Legend: Shaded areas denote statistically significant findings. *Correlation is highly 
significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
***Correlation is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed). VnDI = Vietnamese 
Voluntary Disclosure Index. CG = the proportion of independent directors on corporate 
boards. DOMINANT = Dominant role of a CEO who is also chairperson, whereby firm is 
given the value of one (1) if it is dominant and zero (0) for otherwise. BOARDSIZE = the 
total number of members on corporate boards. STATE = the proportion of state ownership. 
MAN = the proportion of managerial ownership. FOREIGN = the proportion of foreign 
ownership. SIZE = firm size. PROFIT = profitability. LEV = leverage. IND = industry type. 
LISTING = listing duration. AUDIT = auditing firm. LOC = stock exchange location. Number of 




The results in Table J.2 indicate that the proportion of independent directors on 
corporate boards and corporate board size both have positive and significant 
associations with Vietnamese voluntary disclosure. In particular, the proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards highly and positively influences the level 
of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure with p-value = 0.002, while corporate board size 
also exhibits a positive and significant association with the VnDI (p-value = 0.004). 
These results are consistent with Tables 6.1 and H.3, which test the individual 
impact of these corporate governance mechanisms on Vietnamese voluntary 
disclosure. Furthermore, the results in relation to the dominant role of a CEO who is 
also a chairperson is also consistent with the individual test of this variable on the 
VnDI (Table H.2). Results in Table H.2 report a highly positive association between 
the dominant role of a chairperson who is also a CEO and the extent of Vietnamese 
voluntary disclosure at p-value = 0.015. The positive association between the 
dominant role of CEO or chairperson and the extent of voluntary disclosure, in both 
the main text and this Appendix, illustrates the unique reporting environment of 
Vietnamese listed firms as the majority of the existing literature finds otherwise.  
In summary, Appendix J reports the results concerning the impact of various 
corporate governance mechanisms on the level of Vietnamese voluntary disclosure. 
It is found in Table J.2 that the effect of the three corporate governance 
mechanisms (the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards, the 
dominant role of the CEO or chairperson and the corporate board size) on 
Vietnamese voluntary disclosure practices are virtually the same when testing them 
individually or combined together in one multiple regression model. Overall, 
Appendix J provides consistent results supporting the findings of the influence of 
corporate governance aspects in Table 6.1 and sensitivity analyses in Tables H.2 and 
H.3.  
 
